

CSGI

Absolute Form

Modality, Individuality and
the Principle of Philosophy
in Kant and Hegel

Thomas Sören Hoffmann
Translated by David Healan

Absolute Form

Critical Studies in German Idealism

Series Editor

Paul G. Cobben

Advisory Board

Simon Critchley – Paul Cruysberghs – Rózsa Erzsébet – Garth Green
Vittorio Hösle – Francesca Menegoni – Martin Moors – Michael Quante
Ludwig Siep – Timo Slootweg – Klaus Vieweg

VOLUME 27

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/csgi*

Absolute Form

*Modality, Individuality and the Principle
of Philosophy in Kant and Hegel*

By

Thomas Sören Hoffmann

Translated by

David Healan



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Hoffmann, Thomas Sören, author.

Title: Absolute form : modality, individuality and the principle of philosophy in Kant and Hegel / by Thomas Sören Hoffmann ; translated by David Healan.

Other titles: Absolute Form. English

Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2021. | Series: Critical studies in German idealism, 1878-9986 ; volume 27 | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: "Knowing precisely what philosophy actually is, is itself a matter of philosophical science. It is knowledge of the idea of philosophy that is explicit to itself; knowledge's cognition of itself in the separation of its beginning and its end, from which difference its precise determination follows, is not itself a knowledge "about something"— Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020045218 | ISBN 9789004441057 (hardback : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9789004441071 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. | Modality (Logic)—History. | Individuality—History. | Methodology—History. | Absolute, The—History.

Classification: LCC B2798 .H63413 2021 | DDC 193—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020045218>

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 1878-9986

ISBN 978-90-04-44105-7 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-44107-1 (e-book)

Copyright 2021 by Thomas Sören Hoffmann. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents

Preface VII

Preface to the English Edition VIII

1 Introduction 1

- 1 Philosophy and Its Topic 1
- 2 Form as Relation–Preliminaries 7
- 3 On the Form of the Syllogism 12
- 4 External Reflection 20
- 5 Consciousness and Appearance 26

2 Kant and Hegel 40

- 1 Critique and System 40
- 2 From Kant to Hegel? 51
- 3 Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Language 74

3 Absolute Individuality 100

- 1 Individualisation of Cognition 100
 - a) *Absolute Inversion* 100
 - b) *Infinite Proposition* 108
 - c) *Cognition as Process and Definition* 123
- 2 On the Way to the Predicate 136
 - a) *Reality of Perception* 136
 - b) *Categories and the Context of Experience* 145
 - c) *Transcendental Ideal* 154
- 3 Hegel's Category of the Absolute 161
 - a) *The Absolute in the Logic* 161
 - b) *Interpreting the Absolute* 172
 - c) *Absolute Attribute* 186
 - d) *Modus of the Absolute* 189

4 Kant's Modal Concepts 198

- 1 Logical versus Ontological Modality 198
 - a) *Kant's Concept of Logic* 198
 - b) *Kant and the History of Modal Logic* 201
- 2 Differentiating Logical Modality 213
 - a) *Logical Possibility* 213
 - b) *Logical Actuality (Truth)* 217

| | | | |
|---|----|--|-----|
| | c) | <i>Logical Necessity</i> | 220 |
| | d) | <i>Logical Modality and Unity of Thought</i> | 222 |
| 3 | | Postulates of Empirical Thinking | 227 |
| | a) | <i>Status of Modal Principles</i> | 227 |
| | b) | <i>Possibility Postulate</i> | 233 |
| | c) | <i>Actuality Postulate</i> | 242 |
| | d) | <i>Necessity Postulate</i> | 247 |
| 4 | | Absolute Modality | 256 |
| 5 | | Hegel's Logos of Actuality | 261 |
| 1 | | Actuality and Language that Speaks | 261 |
| 2 | | Contingency and Its Formal Interpretation | 268 |
| 3 | | Relative Necessity or Actuality of Content | 277 |
| 4 | | Absolute Necessity | 287 |
| 5 | | Absolute Relation | 300 |
| | a) | <i>Substantiality</i> | 300 |
| | b) | <i>Causality</i> | 305 |
| | c) | <i>Reciprocity</i> | 311 |
| 6 | | Science of Absolute Form | 314 |
| | | Bibliography | 317 |
| | | Name Index | 328 |
| | | Subject Index | 331 |

Preface

This study treats of the form of philosophy. Proceeding primarily from the topics modality and individuality in Kant and Hegel, criteria will be established for the precise determination of the idea of philosophy and of philosophical method. This excludes from the outset any attempt at a merely historical comparison. Neither is the intention that the two thinkers be considered in terms of questions external to their concerns. Instead the attempt is made to let each of them say what they have to say as concisely and distinctively as possible on specific topics, such that from these topics then it becomes possible to recognise their distinctive proposals for determination of the form of the practice of doing philosophy. The question as to a *relation* between the two thinkers in the specific *matter*, but then also the question as to the *matter itself*, can only really be answered in reference to that determination.

The connection between the problem complexes modality and individuality may not seem immediately plausible, especially not in terms of methodology. Of course the concept of method informing this study can only redeem itself in the execution but its most important feature can be given a preliminary statement as follows. Instead of a proposal for regulating the language with a view to the widest possible general validity, the method must on the contrary be understood as a movement from *external* generalities into *individuality*, i.e. into the real location of cognition; it must demonstrate itself to be the pathway to an individualising kind of speech capable in all its functions of the self-consciousness of truth. The 'modal' aspect then relates to the determination of the active *modes of formation* of objectivity mediating what appears to be determined as general and objective to take it back into self-individualising speech; a return which is equally the individualising utterance of what is objective.

The study was accepted in the summer of 1990 by the Philosophical Faculty of the Rheinisch Friedrich Wilhelm University in Bonn as a Ph.D. dissertation supervised by Prof. Josef Simon, to whom my gratitude is owed not only for his support including many and varied suggestions but also for the freedom he granted me in the completion of the study. Thanks are also due to Prof. Gerhart Schmidt, who as second referee encouraged me in the research from the beginning. I also benefited greatly from doctoral scholarships of the federal state North Rhein Westfalia and then from the German Academic Scholarship Foundation.

Preface to the English Edition

The focus of this study, now appearing in English thirty years after the original, is the always provocative claim of philosophy to autopoiesis of philosophical thought, to a knowledge that encompasses its own mediation completely within itself, to the self-contained and self-fulfilling concept. From this standpoint philosophy is never merely a manner of “thinking of something”, never merely an external form of something thought like common or garden thoughts, which includes the kinds of thinking usual in the natural and social sciences. Philosophical thinking is always thinking of itself—and that precisely then when it is a matter of thinking with well-defined, *determinate* content. Philosophical thinking is radically autonomous. It is the implementation, the performance, the embodiment of *absolute form*.

Awareness of the claim of absolute form was achieved early on in the history of philosophy. It finds expression—as one could say, in archaic simplicity—in Parmenides’ principle of the unity of thinking and being. It is also found—including initial steps to systematic development—in Plato’s dialectic of ideas, and it is there in the vanishing point of Aristotle’s metaphysics. Absolute form constitutes one of the fundamental motifs of Descartes’ re-establishment of philosophy in the medium of self-sustaining certainty, just as it was essential to Leibniz’s initiative proceeding from infinity.

This study defends the thesis that the claim to self-determination based on pure thinking attained its maximal development in Hegel’s philosophy. A comparative study of the fundamental forms of philosophy in Kant and Hegel establishes a foundation for the study fully acknowledging the contribution of transcendental logic to the emancipation of thinking from heteronomous thought forms. These opening moves include a demonstration of the immanent limitations of Kant’s own form of thinking, which Hegel’s speculative logic undertook to overcome. As is well known Hegel always saw in Kant a new beginning in philosophy, and he regarded him as a genuine pioneer in speculative thinking too. For Hegel it was Kant’s speculation that made it possible precisely to identify and name the logical form moments from which a repulsion to genuine absolute form had to happen.

For this new preface it may suffice initially to explain the intention behind the leading terms in the title of modality and individuality in relation to the principle of philosophy in Kant and Hegel. This will be followed by a statement of the systematic premisses and implications of the theses developed here, especially in their relation to the problem of universals, as a way of briefly outlining the new “conceptual realism” tied to the claim to a self-determined

thinking, to an autonomous language of philosophy. These preliminary remarks are intended as an introductory plea for a form of doing philosophy which today is no longer necessarily the usual procedure, but which nevertheless remains consistently committed to the heritage of the tradition of the science of reason. There is no future for philosophy without the science of reason.

I

In common understanding, thinking and knowing refer to “something”, thinking is “intending” thinking and knowing finds its truth in dependence on a “reference”, an external object. Thinking, knowing is “true” when it is “adequate” to the external object—it matters little here whether “adequacy” is meant as formal (in the sense of contradiction-free modelling), pragmatic (in the sense of attainability of subjective goals), or in its genuine meaning of material (in the sense of a real determination of thinking by the matter through its “duplication” in thought). Philosophical thinking and knowing is in its kernel a thinking and knowing that fulfils and confirms itself by itself—as such in terms of form it is reflexive knowing, in terms of content “self-verifying”, such¹ that it has its own function for its content, it has itself for its own content. What appears at first quite alien, if it does not already sound suspiciously like a solipsistic *circulus vitiosus*, is in fact nothing other than the reference to Plato’s ἀνάμνησις, to Aristotle’s νόησις νοήσεως and even (a very famous example indeed) to the ontological proof of God’s existence, whose main (or at least speculative) point lies precisely in demonstrating the knowledge of God as self-realising and in this sense absolute knowing.

All three of these examples belong to the metaphysical tradition, which ultimately does not mean that they refer to mediating instances assumed to be objective—the soul, the ideas, God—themselves requiring liberation from the form of external objectivity in order to open them up to the pure self-determination of thinking and knowing, to the true λόγος. Plato conceived of this “liberation” of the λόγος to self-determination in the supraobjectivity (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας) of the good as ultimate ground of the λόγος. The Neoplatonist dialectical tradition similarly found this supraobjective ground in the concept of the unattainable transcendence of the vanishing point of all mediation—the *one* in Plotinus and *infinity* for Nicholas of Cusa. The ground

1 Cf. the author’s “‘Die Philosophie ist wie das Universum rund in sich’. Enzyklopädisches Wissen und Selbstbegründung der Philosophie bei Hegel” in T.S. Hoffmann and Hardy Neumann eds. *Hegel und das Programm einer philosophischen Enzyklopädie*, Berlin 2019, esp. 18–23.

of the λόγος remains external to this in its immediate self-expressing, i.e. the language of philosophy relates to its “matter” contingently. Philosophising still “refers” to something which it is not itself; philosophy is not yet the self-consciousness of its own matter.

For Hegel this is where Kant’s critique of metaphysics reached the decisive breakthrough. Although for Kant there remains an other than self-mediating thinking in general, this other external to thinking can clearly no longer constitute an instance against the self-determination of thinking as such. The “reality” of the object no longer hangs on an external instance as such—and certainly not on a “thing-in-itself”. Cognition no longer consists in the “mental” reproduction of something, of matter independent of the cognition, but instead in the constitution of a self-referential form of “experience”, of a knowing that may indeed satiate itself on a material of perception outside of it, but which is never simply occasioned by that. To this extent Kant already took the step towards an at least partial self-grounding of cognition. The objects of objective cognition are in terms of form already functions of the self-relation, the kernel of which is the at least formally absolute knowing lying in the performance of transcendental apperception. Hegel’s step beyond Kant then consists in the insight that what is for Kant the self-referential form of experience contained in transcendental apperception relates to the content of experience and in general of all knowing not by any means only as (external) form. As long as this (as in Kant) essentially remains the case, then cognition remains immediately forced into the form of the judgment, the proposition. Cognition is only the self-execution of the concept refracted through the form of the judgment, not the concept reconstituting itself in the form of the syllogism: it is not the concept that in its self-relation already immediately repels itself from itself in order to set itself as the other and be able to know itself in the other. Kant does indeed offer several points of contact for speculative moves beyond his characteristic form of thinking, and indeed the impulse lies there in Kant’s work itself. Examples include constitution theory and the concept of the category adequate to that;² the syllogism, the function favoured for the form of experience; and the transcendental ideal. Hegel’s overall assessment here is that Kant was on his way to a structure of the self-presenting of reason that ultimately

2 It is not the least aim of the deduction of the completeness of the Kantian table of categories presented here (cf. 136 ff. below) to demonstrate that the category is the form of mediation of the external–internal opposition in the logic of essence, and that as such it constitutes the procedure for implementing the concept. It has to be stressed however that the category in Kant only immanently bridges the opposition of appearance and does not itself supersede the logic of appearing.

supersedes the distinction made by the transcendental philosophy itself between self- and other-mediation. This study pursues the same goal, initially restricted to the Kantian theory of modality.

II

In the field of the modalities, Kant introduced some decisive innovations affecting formal logic and their use in the logic of experience. Confining ourselves here to the logic of experience or transcendental logic, Kant understands the modal terms as reflexive, indeed as reflections of every determinate (objective) experience via the unity of (formal) experience. In this way the modal terms “contextualise” single experience within the “idea” of experience or indeed within its concept. As Kant puts it they add no “objective” term to the object of experience, but “format” it as it were for integration into the whole of experience and to that extent to the objectivity of experience in general. Now the unity of experience is itself always a function of the unity of (transcendental) subjectivity. This is precisely what the transcendental deduction in the second edition of the first critique showed. This means that the *self-implementation* of subjectivity generates “objectivity”, comprehending (conceptual understanding) gives itself reality, which indeed initially is still bound to the form of consciousness and as such is the appearance of reality. Nevertheless it includes the reference from the logic of autopoietic, continuously self-extending experience to a *focus imaginarius* of all experiencing that transcends experience itself. In Kant this *focus imaginarius* lies in the limit concept of an *idea in individuo*, in which the motion of the self-realisation of transcendental subjectivity would come to a conclusion and Kant’s hypothetical form of the mediation of cognition would imagine the absolute form. From Hegel’s point of view this corresponds to the question of the individual locus of cognition, which is one of the central critical questions that have to be directed to Kant.

The problem here can be easily seen in the difference that for Kant arises between (transcendental) subjectivity and (ideal) individuality, while for Hegel it has already been superseded in the actuality of comprehending. Hegel introduces the absolute form theme in the transition from the logic of essence to that of the concept, so for him the simultaneity of actual cognition and the cognition of actuality can only be logically located in the actual existence of cognition *in individuo*. Now *actuality* for Hegel is precisely not as in Kant only the verified reference of experience as such to an external *present being* (*Das-ein*), i.e. to a given perception. It is much more the reference of the totality of mediation to itself and as such self-perception, “self-showing” of the (logical)

totality. In the context of Hegel's logic actuality is initially the pure performance of essence itself; it is the performance of the difference of essence, something transcendental logic does too, although clearly restricting itself to a logic of appearing or of letting appear. With recourse to Plato's metaphor of the sun, we can say that actuality is initially no more than the "light" of appearance, that which is manifest as well as manifesting everything else, and here lies the difference of essence, the essential difference. The actuality of this "light" is sufficient unto itself; it is an immediacy, but an immediacy that has mediated itself from within the relations of essence and is itself again mediation. As the immediately non-relative, the actual is the absolute, which in Hegel—despite the reference back in the history of philosophy to Spinoza—is the category, and as such is not simply an instance or somehow external to representation. The absolute is, totally true to the meaning of the word, what transcends all relation, to which as such it is not possible to "refer". Similarly one cannot really "show" the absolute, and hence actuality neither, because here there is no difference between showing, object and subject. The absolute, and hence also actuality, is *one self-showing*, self-manifesting, and then also showing others along with it in the "light" of this manifestation. That the absolute, actuality is *manifestation* means nothing other than this: cognition is already there, already active and effective, and does not need to be brought to the world by us with an external intention. Grasping something in its actuality means seeing it in the "light" of its own self-relation instead of merely illuminating it from outside. This is why for Hegel actuality is already in its immediacy also in fact the *concept*. In the concept—absolute form transparent to itself and comprehending itself as mediation—the self-relation of the matter is set as manifest. On the pathway to the idea it reveals itself as simultaneously being for cognition, or as manifestation given for itself, which is studied in this investigation above all in anticipation of one topic in particular in the philosophy of spirit: language. This anticipation involves no subreption because Hegel himself is able to conceive of the *Logic* as the "automotion of the absolute idea", in which the idea is presented "as the original word", as:

an *expression* or *externalisation*, but one which vanishes as something external simply by virtue of being; the idea is thus only in this self-determination of *hearing itself*, it is in this *pure thinking* in which the difference is not yet an *alterity* but is completely transparent to itself and remains so.³

3 Hegel, *Science of Logic* (SoL) 825; *Wissenschaft der Logik* (WdL) III, GW XII, 237.

Logical absolute form includes within it the logical “anchor” of language as language in general, even if this is in its *empirical* unfolding always a reference back from out of natural “alterity”, while, especially as a particular language, it cannot be adequately determined by logic alone. It is obviously of vital importance, especially in times when language is only understood semiotically, if not mechanically, to hold on to Hegel’s insight that language is absolute form, autopoietic manifestation, the clarity of the pure self-mediation of cognition.

III

This work, completed in 1990, was produced in a time when the fronts had already begun to harden between historical, hermeneutical and increasingly also analytical interpretations of Kant and Hegel from the philosophy of the understanding. It took issue with protagonists of the various tendencies, most often critically, because it was throughout concerned to do justice to the wider horizons of genuinely speculative thinking. It constantly sought the conversation with the philosophical tradition as a whole, as it often addressed authors who did not stand at the centre of interest in philosophy. In that spirit the fortunate circumstance can be recorded that the author was enabled to conduct his investigation with the advantage of access to the unpublished habilitation thesis of Franz Ungler (1945–2003) in the typescript in the Austrian National Library.⁴ As difficult as Ungler’s magnum opus is to understand, it possesses the far from common virtue of referencing and being developed by consistently posing one of the fundamental questions of philosophy, namely the problem of universals, to Hegel’s, and indeed also to Kant’s, entire philosophy. Ungler’s position is not without relevance for understanding “absolute form” and can be briefly stated as follows:

4 This principal work of the Vienna philosopher Ungler was only published several years after his untimely death: Franz Ungler, *Individuelles und Individuationsprinzip in Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik”*, eds. Max Gottschlich and Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Freiburg and Munich 2017. Ungler’s systematic study represents one of the most important contributions to the appreciation of the epochal significance of Hegel’s philosophy; it is also an excellent demonstration of the enormous fertility of the work of Bruno Liebrucks (1911–1986) as one attempt to penetrate Hegel’s philosophy. Another alumnus of the Liebrucks school was Josef Simon (1930–2016), who supervised this dissertation and to whom I express my gratitude here. It is to Simon that the work owes among other things the insight that as philosopher, one should never discuss philosophical texts of which one has not already attained complete mastery, a principle that protects against both dull literalness and the embarrassing gesticulations of those who assume they know better simply for having been born later.

In a certain sense—to that extent setting a counterpoint to modernity—Hegel's philosophy re-established conceptual realism. The foundation of both metaphysical ontology and its form of conceptual realism, as well as that of nominalistic thinking all the way to post-Frege formal logic, is a subsumption logic that is in many respects aporetic. Hegel's conceptual realism works by replacing that foundation with a logic of the dialectical coincidence of universal and singular in the performance of cognition as well as of being. For Hegel the individual is no longer what cannot be reached by the concept, the *ineffabile*. It is much more the genuine location of self-realising reason that knows itself as actually knowing and asserting itself as such.

Obviously this thesis is highly controversial in its systematic aspect and indeed at first sight not necessarily easy to make plausible. It means that Hegel stands obliquely to most other modern philosophers; already in such a fundamental sense as well as with the *concept of the concept* his thinking is not compatible with those other philosophies. This relates by no means only to philosophers before Kant; it refers to most of those following Hegel: for it makes no difference whether one is a Nietzschean or a Fregean, a follower of Heidegger or of Wittgenstein, of Luhmann or a post-structuralist—Hegel does not share the firm commitment common to all these positions (and in a certain sense also even to Kant's transcendental logic) of the mere formality of our concepts. Interpretationists and hermeneuticists, formal logicians, language pragmatists, system theoreticians and even representatives of critical theory: all of them proceed on the assumption of a position—which for Hegel has to be called fundamentally naive—of the character of concepts as abstractions and tools. On this view our concepts are “media” we insert between us and “the world”, with which however we do not really grasp that “world”. Instead all we do is isolate certain general aspects gained precisely through logical or pragmatic abstraction—aspects which on closer observation conceal within them theoretical or practical intentions. It should be noted in passing that it is only a derivative or secondary realism problem that can arise here, in which the real question is: how exactly do our concepts or representations relate to the contents whose “media” they are supposed to be? It soon becomes clear in this context that only those who are convinced that our concepts ultimately are due to these contents, or that they in ideal manner are “isomorph” to them, are to be called “realist”. On the other hand those who deny that there is any sense to the search for a reality independent of our concepts are to be dubbed “idealist” or “phenomenalist”—already Kant determined that we have nothing other to compare our representations with than other representations, and that for this reason it is indeed difficult for us to make the naive demand that we should tailor our representations to “reality”. Of course realism has

experienced varying levels of acceptance and rejection over the last several centuries. The claim is essentially that the concept is not a form looking for content and reality is not something external to the concept but that this latter is nothing other than active reason in the context of actual reason in general. For Hegel too the concept is not a “medium”, not a means serving intentions and goals external to it, least of all a mere sign that (as in the late Wittgenstein) only in its “use” gains “meaning”. Instead actual cognition organises itself in the concept; as such its being lies in its function as a focus of I and world, which in a certain sense both are *each other's functions*, not each other's *other*. In Ungler's work it quickly becomes clear that Hegel's approach is not a falling back to pre-critical positions, such as into an abstract Platonism, an Aristotelian essence philosophy or an ontology of things. Hegel's realism (his conception of a thinking fulfilling itself in its own performance) enables him to think Kant through to the end: the transformation of transcendental logic into a speculative one includes the overcoming of formal logic and of the nominalism it entails because it (speculative logic) precisely does not, like metaphysics, stop at the “thing-in-itself”, being rather as already stated based on the *performance of thinking*. Kant's “I think” becomes the fundamental schema of the concept in Hegel as comprehending thought–“concept” is for Hegel “*comprehending*”–as actuality coming to itself here and now. It is precisely in Hegel's words only “absolute form” lets determinate thing and determinate subject respectively free by itself.

IV

Several issues the book deals with have been subsequently addressed again or further developed by the author; other topics–such as the question as to a sustainable speculative interpretation of nature or the foundations of a practical philosophy on the basis of the logic of absolute form–remain still to be addressed. This selection of publications may suffice to indicate his approach to such issues:

- 1) The following collections edited by the author deal with the relation between Kant and Hegel:
 - 1.1. Thomas Sören Hoffmann and Franz Ungler eds., *Aufhebung der Transzendentalphilosophie? Systematische Beiträge zur Würdigung, Fortentwicklung und Kritik des transzendentalen Ansatzes zwischen Kant und Hegel*, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1994.
–: Thomas Sören Hoffmann, “Der Begriff des Erkennens beim Jenenser Hegel und die Überwindung der Gnoseologie”, 95–123.

- 1.2. Héctor Ferreiro and Thomas Sören Hoffmann eds., *Metaphysik–Metaphysikkritik—Neubegründung der Erkenntnis: Der Ertrag der Denkbewegung von Kant bis Hegel*, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin 2017 (Begriff und Konkretion. Beiträge zur Gegenwart der klassischen deutschen Philosophie vol. 5).
 –: Thomas Sören Hoffmann, “Die logische Reduktion der Metaphysik. Zu Hegels Begriff der absoluten Idee”, 11–26.
- 2) The following book offers a comprehensive introduction to Hegel’s philosophy:
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Eine Propädeutik, Marix, Wiesbaden 2004; second edition revised and updated 2012; fourth reprint 2020 (E-book 2013). Spanish translation: *Hegel. Una propedéutica*. Traducción del alemán Max Maureira y Klaus Wrehde, Editorial Biblos, Buenos Aires 2014. English translation: *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. A Propaedeutic*. Translated by David Healan, Brill, Leiden and Boston 2015 (Critical Studies in German Idealism, vol. 14).
- 3) This study addresses the problem of a speculative concept of nature: Thomas Sören Hoffmann, *Philosophische Physiologie. Eine Systematik des Begriffs der Natur im Spiegel der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Frommann-Holzboog: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2003 (Quaestiones vol. 14).
- 4) These works deal with the interpretation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*:
 - 4.1. Thomas Sören Hoffmann ed., *200 Jahre Phänomenologie des Geistes. Neue Beiträge zur Würdigung eines Klassikers der neueren Dialektik—Zur Einführung*, Themenheft der Zeitschrift Synthesis Philosophica 43, Zagreb 2007.
 –: Thomas Sören Hoffmann, “‘Unsere Zutat’. Zum näheren Verständnis eines methodologischen Motivs aus der ‘Einleitung’ zu Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes*”, 87–105.
 - 4.2. Thomas Sören Hoffmann ed., *Hegel als Schlüsseldenker der modernen Welt*. Beiträge zur Deutung der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* aus Anlaß ihres 200-Jahr-Jubiläums, Meiner, Hamburg 2009 (Hegel-Studien suppl. 50) (E-book 2009).
 –: Thomas Sören Hoffmann, “Hegels phänomenologische Dialektik. Darstellung, Zeitbezug und Wahrheit des erscheinenden Wissens—Thesen zur ‘Vorrede’”, 31–52.
 –: “Präsenzformen der Religion in Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes*”, 308–324.
- 5) This collection of essays is devoted to Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*, especially to its first edition:

Thomas Sören Hoffmann and Hardy Neumann eds., *Hegel und das Programm einer philosophischen Enzyklopädie*, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin 2019 (Begriff und Konkretion. Beiträge zur Gegenwart der klassischen deutschen Philosophie vol. 8).

–: Thomas Sören Hoffmann, “‘Die Philosophie ist wie das Universum rund in sich’. Enzyklopädisches Wissen und Selbstbegründung der Philosophie bei Hegel”, 13–28.

6) Some articles on Kant that relate to the content of this study:

6.1. Thomas Sören Hoffmann, “Der Begriff der Bewegung bei Kant. Über den Grundbegriff der Empirie und die empirischen Begriffe” in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 45 (1991), 38–59.

6.2. –: “Kants transzendente Deduktion der Verstandesbegriffe—ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln?” in Kirsten Schmidt, Klaus Steigleder and Burkhard Mojsisch eds., *Die Aktualität der Philosophie Kants*. Bochumer Ringvorlesung Sommersemester 2004, Amsterdam and Philadelphia 2005, 58–79.

6.3. –: “‘Darstellung des Begriffs’. Zu einem Grundmotiv neueren Philosophierens im Ausgang von Kant” in Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt eds., *Kant als Bezugspunkt philosophischen Denkens*. Festschrift für Peter Baumanns zum 75. Geburtstag, Würzburg 2010, 101–118.

6.4. –: “Kants ‘Kontextualismus’. Zur Logik des Machens der Erfahrung nach Kant” in Lois Marie Redl and Robert König eds., *Schlusslogische Letztbegründung*. FS Kurt Walter Zeidler zum 65. Geburtstag, Vienna 2020, 345–362.

7) Further articles on Hegel that relate to the content of this study:

7.1. Thomas Sören Hoffmann, “G.W.F. Hegel” in *Klassiker der Sprachphilosophie*, ed. Tilman Borsche, Munich 1996, 257–273.

7.2. –: “Hegels Urteilstafel” in Max Gottschlich and Michael Wladika eds., *Dialektische Logik. Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ und ihre realphilosophischen Wirklichkeitsweisen*, Würzburg 2005, 72–89.

7.3. –: “Reflexion, Begriff und spekulative Erkenntnis. Über Weisen des Wissens im Blick auf Hegels Logik” in Rüdiger Bubner ed., *Von der Logik zur Sprache*, Stuttgart 2006, 88–108.

7.4. –: “Bildung, Entzweiung, Sprache. Zur Dialektik des Bildungsgeschehens nach Hegel” in Axel Hutter and Markus Kartheiningers eds., *Bildung als Mittel und Selbstzweck. Korrektive Erinnerung wider die Erinnerung des Bildungsbegriffs*, Freiburg and Munich 2009, 82–104.

7.5. –: “Totalität und Prädikation. Zur ersten ‘Stellung des Gedankens zur Objektivität’ im enzyklopädischen ‘Vorbegriff’ der spekulativen

Logik" in Alfred Denker, Annette Sell and Holger Zaborowski eds., *Der "Vorbegriff" der Hegelschen Enzyklopädie*, Freiburg and Munich 2010, 114–143.

- 7.6. –: "‘Absoluter Geist’. Zur Aktualität eines Hegelschen Theorems" in *Philotheos* 11 (2011), 152–161.
- 7.7. –: "Hegel oder die Provokation der spekulativen Logik" in Hans Feger and Gloria Dell' Eva (eds.), *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, Würzburg 2016, 243–262.
- 7.8. –: "Variationen über Sittlichkeit. Zum Gehalt und zur Rezeption eines hegelschen Theorems" in Michael Spieker, Sebastian Schwenzfeuer and Benno Zabel eds., *Sittlichkeit. Eine Kategorie moderner Staatlichkeit?* Baden-Baden 2019, 145–161.

All that remains is for me to express my deep appreciation to David Healan in Berlin. Not only did he propose the translation of my dissertation, he also undertook the great exertions required to complete the project. The task was not to be accomplished except by one who managed to share in the thinking of every part of the text. Thanks are also due to the publisher, Brill, for accepting a second book into their programme.

Thomas Sören Hoffmann

Vienna,
in the year of Hegel's 250th birthday

Introduction

1 Philosophy and Its Topic

διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν
 συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν.

PLATO, *Sophist* 259 e

ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο.

GOSPEL OF JOHN 1, 14

Knowing precisely what philosophy actually is, is itself a matter of philosophical science. It is knowledge of the idea of philosophy that is explicit to itself; knowledge's cognition of itself in the separation of its beginning and its end, from which difference its precise determination follows, is not itself a knowledge "about something". Philosophy's knowledge of itself does not simply confer determination upon a merely passive item of knowledge; it is nothing but the autopoiesis of the idea, generating itself as content and permeating that thoroughly, separating the moments of beginning and end and bringing them back together again; only as such is it this its determinate content, revealing itself from out of itself in dynamic, immanent opposition to its form. Knowing and stating what philosophy is, is thus not a matter of being able to name specific contents; it rather demands an ability to relate to content in a form very different from what is usual and required in non-philosophical cognition.

Philosophy is not a particular but a process of rendering itself particular. As such it demands a thorough individualisation of its form and language with which the notion of some entity remaining purely passive and positive beyond active language, only to be received and accepted as is, is not sustainable. Such external, abstract entities exclude language from the relation to them to the same extent that they appear capable of withstanding absolute particularisation by the form of cognition but it is precisely the task of philosophy against what appears to be only immediate and universal to assert the mediating power of language and the absolute self-relating of its idea or form—a form whose strength lies in its ability to present differences as self-mediations and thereby to return from all language forms back to speech activity.

The sciences are normally defined by giving their specific *topic*. But the content of the philosophical form of language cannot be any kind of topic distinct from philosophy. Keeping their subject matter external to them makes of the sciences formal mediations; they “designate” an “external reality”, which, precisely because it is *external*, offers any number of topics for any number of sciences with their objects outside of them. Keeping their subject matter external to them keeps them external to themselves. Their progress is arbitrary and they never amount to more than current research levels, which are no sooner demoted to stages of development of only historical interest as they sink into the externality of time. Philosophy makes no claim *whatsoever* to possess a topic in this sense. What one could offer as objects of philosophy if pushed to do so would be the topics of the old metaphysics perhaps, the theory of the concept, of the judgment and in general of the forms of truth and of course this, truth itself—clearly as all of these show in their own right, not only can they not be regarded as “external reality”, in fact (as at least non-dogmatic philosophy knows) there is no sense in which they can be positively stated at all. Philosophy *has* these “topics” only because it has *itself* wholly in them, because it regards the difference lying in thematising something as itself the *self-relating* of negativity, because it views what can be determined as a topic in terms of the determination of what is absolutely individual. It is by means of its form that philosophy *unites* the act of thematising and its own difference from that.

The inner structuring of the philosophical form of language, in which the whole or the idea of philosophy becomes explicit, ensures that there can be none of the haste and restlessness of the special sciences but also none of the tumult of the *weltanschauungen* either. Both result from an external urge to force the matter, to force it into being *something* that it *ought* to be in order to satisfy *something else*. In contrast philosophy is pure patience in the face of what it truly knows to be the *matter*; indeed if subjective affects may be allowed to designate form characteristics of the concept, the “patience of the concept” can with confidence be cited as the distinguishing characteristic of the philosophical form of language.¹ Right from the start then philosophy avoids distraction by an external (e.g. technical or ideological) intention aiming at “something” or “something other” from the concreteness endemic to the matter in its purview; determining speech, while not fixing anything in its positivity, is also not excluded. Instead philosophy seeks to recognise the immanent

¹ Cf. G. Lebrun, *La patience du concept*, Paris 1972. Lebrun appropriately takes Hegel as his starting point in developing this aspect of philosophy. In this context Lebrun rejects terms of the understanding such as ‘reference’ and ‘meaning’ as well as the notion of an ‘information dite philosophique’, 14.

connection between that determining speech and the form of the constitution of meaning and determination and its negative moments in complete generality, the better to exercise critique from this form and not externally.

Traditionally awareness of the characteristic form of setting philosophical topics coloured its presentation in various contexts, such that taking up something specific as an object had to be capable of being assigned something absolutely conclusive in philosophical form. For Plato only the μέγιστον μάθημα, the idea of the good, makes it possible to know things in their true determination; for Augustine it is the form of divine subjectivity, which, itself not a “thing”, illuminates all cognition and endows it with immanent closure. Even Malebranche could say, ‘nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu,’ referring to the meaning of the third Cartesian substance as that subjectivity distinct from the determinate variety that ensures the closure of subjective representations, lending them conclusiveness. If Schelling too could claim ‘all things are presented only in the absolute,’² then clearly the question remains: what can this resort to the conclusive absolute amount to after the Kantian critique, which was completed by the time Schelling was writing. The critique’s response to an absolute that is to be relied upon immediately is quite clearly completely negative, the implication being that one cannot refer to the absolute in any judgment or proposition with a claim to transcendental reality and by extension, since the proposition in execution is the form of objective positive assertion, neither can the absolute be anything that can be objectively asserted. In fact the critique³ indicates only that the *judgment* cannot be the form of linguistic mediation of the absolute, while other forms, initially at least, could remain open to such a possibility. According to Kant we have ‘the *unconditioned*, which reason necessarily and with every right demands in the things in themselves ... as completed’ in the *idea*.⁴ Kant’s concept of the idea is, put briefly that of a *relation* of propositions of experience to the totality of the *one* experience. A unifying relation between distinct propositions is represented logically as a syllogism. On the difference between the forms proposition and syllogism, I will say here provisionally only the following. The truth and fulfilment of the proposition, the form in which a statement is made *about* something *on the grounds* of something else, lies precisely in its activity of

2 Cf. *Schellings Werke* [sw] nach der Original-Ausgabe in neuer Anordnung ed. Manfred Schröter, Munich 1978 reprint, sw IV, 315.

3 On the originally aesthetic concept of critique and its relation to the issue of the judgment with respect to what is *individual* cf. A. Baeumler, *Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Darmstadt 1981 reprint, esp. 96 ff.

4 Kant, CpR Bxx.

spontaneously *repelling* itself from itself on the one hand into what is other in general—into the theme or topic about which by means of the proposition objective statements can be made in other ways (in other propositions)—and on the other hand into the ground, the proposition's inner other. The syllogism in distinct contrast remains in its truth by itself—it suspends further discussion, excluding it and is as such the *actual* understanding of the *matter*, rendering it simultaneously thought *and* being and no longer something that is simply external. The reflection on alterity is nothing new to the syllogism, which has it already expressed in its various premisses and indeed as the simple negation of relationality, has already superseded it. In fact it turns out that in the execution of the form of the syllogism, alterity is not some sort of instance of a content tenaciously distinct from it, nor that of a form otherwise determined but is a necessary form moment of its relating activity itself.⁵

It cannot be said however that the Kantian syllogism of the idea in any way claims that the absolute is conclusively expressed within it. Indeed as is well known, for Kant there always remains a break between ought and being in the idea, between the syllogism as an exclusively ideal construction of the absolute and the proof of the realised idea, which is lacking. For Kant the idea is essentially *originally divided* (*ge-ur-teilt*—lit. judged). This means firstly that those propositions of experience the idea relates to each other within it are no mere (external) others to it; they have their general form solely within it because they are not isolated, unconnected expressions but from the outset moments of the *context* of experience. One could say in each case they are *quasi* derivations of the idea of experience for their specific location within it. At the same time this context itself, depending upon the determinacy of the connection within it, must first be realised so that the experience remains as yet to be made. The *original* contextuality of the propositions of experience, together with the immediate *present being* (*Dasein*) of the idea in them, will reveal itself in Kant's *modalities*, in which also their conformity to the form of the syllogism can be demonstrated. They close off the object of experience against its direct objective further determination by turning it in "subjective-synthetic" function back into the horizon or context of the determining understanding. Whenever we know something with determination or precision, for Kant we know it in the form of "empirical thinking in general", in a form then that is not itself a possible object but which can only be a condition of all objective

5 Fixing the isolated terms of the premisses in opposition to the syllogism would only be possible in an external reflection (strictly non-concluding thinking, devoid of closure) that would consequently not grasp the syllogism as a *definition* of its content and could only accept *determinate* content as simply *given* to it.

cognition and is *marked* as conditioning in what is known individually as its binding to the ideal totality. What is expressed in these cross-connections of the judged idea is on the one hand that we understand nothing without ideas, so the single proposition in itself is already beyond itself (namely not only in the object but also in the form of objectivity and of objective judging as such, i.e. potentially then already in other propositions). On the other hand the idea “exists” in the factually mediated objects of experience *externally to itself*, so that it could only restore itself from out of this externality in a mediation that is no more than an ought, that is imagined as infinite and that would be the absolute unity of inner and outer. Fundamentally speaking Kant knows that the concept of the absolute into which both of these—what could be called Cartesian poles—inner and outer, are overcome and completely mediated is ‘a concept with which we cannot dispense except at great disadvantage to all transcendental judging.’⁶ Still the transcendental dialectic treats this concept as antinomic and as a semblance in which as it were the essence of the appearing finite is only mirrored as an infinite unity but without *actually* being. Between ideality and reality of the judged idea there is no syllogism offering closure or conclusion and philosophy comes down to uttering and affirming this immediate difference as such.⁷

At any rate a closer look at the contrast between the assumption of the idea—presenting only the *possibility* of experience which as such would become explicit in the reflection of the transcendental philosophy—and the idea’s task of overcoming within it the difference between potentiality and

6 CpR B 380 f./A 324.

7 We will later have to consider to what extent the CpR as a whole is to be comprehended as the mediation strung out between the extremes of the transcendental apperception (real immediacy of the idea) and the transcendental ideal (ideal mediatedness of the idea). Schleiermacher’s dialectic, which by the way far more than Kant’s transcendental philosophy deserves the designation “philosophy of reflection” in the sense in which Schelling and Hegel used it, can in a certain sense be regarded as the actually executed original division (*Ur-teilung*) of the idea that dispenses with the specific Kantian form of mediation. Schleiermacher distinguishes the presupposed immediate totality (of ‘feeling’) as *terminus a quo* of cognition from the task of an infinite, complete mediation of the world in knowledge as *terminus ad quem*. Both ideas are supposed to be *transcendent* and oddly, both to thinking as well as to ‘actual being’. The immediate idea, the idea of God, is supposed to be for itself ‘absolute unity’ as well as ‘transcendent ground’ of thinking and being accompanying them, although it is never actually to be thought of *as* ground. Absolute unity is imagined as simultaneously lying outside of thinking and being and immediate to thinking; moreover a unity undifferentiated within itself, it is still supposed to be able to accompany contingent thinking, i.e. the thinking of diverse content. The formal contradictions in this conception are glaring. Cf. *Friedrich Schleiermachers Dialektik*, ed. R. Odebrecht, Darmstadt 1976 reprint, esp. 306 f.

actuality of experience, dialectically expressing the concluding *necessity* of pure self-mediation here, could isolate the *actual making* of experience, which is neither the assumed *that* nor the task of setting the *what* but the *act of setting* itself and as such the actual *medium term* of the empirical. One could then, even under Kantian premisses, present the idea as a whole, at least *as a moment of itself*, a totality moment that might recall the unity of the philosophical topic.⁸ In this sense it could be shown from some remarks of Kant's in the *Opus postumum* concerning affection that it is certainly not a simple immediate, a 'hard reality' but that it must refer to a whole mediated within itself, which *in nuce* already contains the syllogism of the whole. Suffice it to say that the Kantian philosophy at various points *indicates* the genuinely mediating aspect, absolute mediation, without ever being able fully to elevate it into its topic.

In fact this is precisely what Schelling and Hegel would have regarded as the essential task of philosophy. While retaining the critical edge of the critique and without falling back, speaking with Kant, into 'dogmatic claptrap',⁹ their aim, articulated clearly in the years of collaboration in Jena, amounted to nothing less than the attempt to effect a breakthrough through a simple indication to the actual wholeness of the idea. With this they hoped to restore to philosophy an original constitution of determinacy in the return from out of the self-concluding idea instead of fundamentally relinquishing the constitution of real determination to the individual sciences, devoid as they are of totality. Hegel formulated it programmatically as follows: 'As the science of truth, philosophy has for its object infinite knowing or the cognition of the absolute'.¹⁰ Although of course after Kant one would not expect to find insight into the inner right to a restoration of the philosophical topic, or of the philosophical form of establishing a topic, in the programme as such but only in its execution. Thus the claim is found compressed into a single expression that Schelling and Hegel introduce with a very specific meaning and which, as its success shows, was well formulated to become emblematic for the effort at

8 On the implementation of such a program: G. Wohlfarts, *Zum Problem der transzendentalen Affinität in der Philosophie Kants* in *Akten des 5. Int. Kant-Kongresses*, Bonn 1981, 313–322. Wohlfarts draws upon the required purposiveness of the field of appearing objects for the notion of the actual ideality of experience (esp. 315 f., 317). Kant's term for the purposive field of appearances, the 'context of experience', the ideal mediation totality of everything individually objective, in which this purposiveness is *materialiter* not specifiable and which only comes into our purview as the form of the subjective horizon of determination, will take on a significant role in our inquiry. Cf. below Ch. 2.2.b.

9 Cf. *Prolegomena* AA IV, 366.

10 K. Rosenkranz, *G.W.F. Hegels Leben*, Darmstadt 1977 reprint, 190.

superseding the Kantian—and then also the Fichtean—determinate aposiopesis of the absolute. This expression is: ‘absolute form’.¹¹

2 Form as Relation—Preliminaries

Form in Hegel’s synoptic logical formulation is ‘the consummate whole of reflection’.¹² The negativity of thinking is concentrated in form as the totality reflected into itself into an inside knowing itself to be a simple inside, i.e. mere thinking as what is preserved of the outside, of what is not thinking.

11 The *Critical Journal* was initiated by Schelling and Hegel with the declaration of intent of a ‘breakthrough to pure formlessness or, what is the same thing, to the highest form’ (SW III 515/2, 175). In the same year 1802 Schelling calls ‘absolute formlessness ... the highest, the absolute form’, repeating this in his *Philosophy of Art* (SW III, 485), which is extremely important for his use of the term ‘absolute form’ (cf. SW III, 410, 418, 427, 495 f., 498). For Fichte we find the expression ‘absolute form’ in the *Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre* of 1801, §§ 8 f. (WW II 18, 19 f., first published in this edition) but then in this case only relating to ‘absolute knowing’ (in the Fichtean understanding of the term), especially as the ‘real inner essence of knowing’ and in distinction to its ‘absolute matter’ (ibid.). In substance what is important and can fundamentally be related to (e.g.) the syllogistic interpretation of absolute form is clearly Fichte’s assertion that ‘reciprocal penetration, completely independent of what performs the penetration,’ is ‘the absolute form of knowing’ (19), for the conclusiveness of the syllogism can be taken *immediately* in fact as such a permeation or περιχώρησις. The difference between Fichte and Schelling’s usage and that of Hegel is that fundamentally speaking Hegel uses the term ‘absolute form’ absolutely. It is found in the *Journal* essays more or less regularly; particularly useful in this regard is its use in Hegel’s *Natural law* essay (cf. e.g. Nr. 2, 436, 437, 464 on the relation to the categorical imperative, 481 for the ‘totality of ethical life’ of peoples, 502 for its relation to intelligence). The Stuttgart private lectures of 1810, published posthumously, could be cited for Schelling’s later use of the term. At a not unimportant point of the development there absolute form appears as the essential but set identity $A = A$, resolving within itself the material-quantitative differences of the identity expressed as the subject-object opposition ($A = B$) and returning it back into the absolute essence that is being-in-itself (SW IV, 318). From the doubling of the difference of the absolute-formal identity Schelling then derives ideality ($A = B$ regarded according to A) and reality (the same according to B) and constructs from the two his theory of potencies. It turns out that on this path absolute form is only a *passive* middle term and in no sense what Hegel makes of it: the “container” of absolute negativity. We add here for our systematic context, as it will emerge, that Hölderlin in the *Anmerkungen zur Antigone* finds in the tragedy a ‘patriotic reversal,’ which he understands as a ‘reversal of all modes and forms of imagination or representation,’ in which ‘the important point is that each of them, as gripped by an infinite reversal and trembling in shock, feels itself to be in infinite form’ (Insel edition, Frankfurt a. M. 1969, vol. II 789. Cf. also for the relation between ‘infinite reversal’ and individuality the Homburg essay *Das Werden im Vergehen*, loc. cit. II esp. 642).

12 Hegel, SoL 449, GW XI 296.

Reflection's knowledge of itself as what is preserved from the outside is precisely what constitutes its totality; which means that reflection is in fact only this relating-to-another as such becoming a moment in the relation. The other of the relation of form can appear under various names and, depending on the level of differentiation of the relation, can have distinct concepts. As difference (χωρισμός) from form that other is essence. In the case of form as totalised reflection or the negative unity of intensionality, the other is extension, self-externality in the sense of a *positive* unity: matter.¹³ Kant himself made the not unimportant observation that 'in every proposition one can call the given terms', i.e. the dispersed many beings pertaining to it as such, 'logical matter (for judgment), their *relation* (by means of the copula) the form of the proposition.'¹⁴ Alterity *as such* emerges in the other of the form relation, matter. Taken in isolation matter is the indeterminacy of present being and in intuitive terms: the spatial in the sense of real or realisable space, to the extent that it is opposed to determination and remains in a state of merely becoming determinate. The matter is the perpetual other in determinate speech that does not itself speak determinately, remaining instead "inactive". In fact for Hegel its inactivity is inherently 'absolute negativity',¹⁵ i.e. relation to the opposed activity as *itself* an activity. This is the sense in which the matter *speaks*. It speaks in the relation of form and is then, e.g. in the Kantian expression 'unlimited reality', the 'matter of every possibility', in relation to which form is 'its bounding ... (negation)'.¹⁶ This does not mean that matter would be "something", which, standing outside all relation to it, might persist "identically" and thus quite simply infinitely formable. What it means is that it is the totality of the possibility or the *being-possible* of the complete relation, whose other moment or actual *being* would be form. The problem with the distinction between form and matter is precisely that neither of the determinate and relative concepts

13 The negativity-positivity relation in the explication of the relation pair "form" and "its other" refers on the one hand to the immediate provenance of form as a term of ground from the *contradiction* and with that, as in particular the Jena Hegel would have said, from infinity, where it is known about negative and positive that they have 'their truth only in their relation to each other' (SoL 438, GW XI 285). On the other hand in the logic of essence this truth is only arrived at in reflection, which means that the difference between thinking and being still *is*, so the difference is also found in the corresponding categories of being, the one and the many. The negativity of the one and the positivity of the many (this latter explicitly also as *extension*) is worked out—perhaps with greater clarity than in the corresponding sections of the SoL (SoL 164 ff., GW XXI 151 ff.)—in the *Jena Logic* of 1804/5, GW VII 7 ff.

14 Kant, CpR B 322/A 266 (author's emphasis).

15 Cf. Hegel, SoL 454, GW XI 300.

16 Kant, CpR B 322/A 266; cf. B 601 ff./A 573 ff. See also below Ch. 2.2.c.

into which the whole relation breaks down is capable of expressing the self-consciousness of the whole relation, so that the relation itself, from which they have their determination, remains an excluded third.¹⁷ The whole—in this context according to Hegel the *ground*—remains unspoken: immediate thinking in terms of the difference of form and matter thus does not attain the form of philosophical thematising in which the concepts, which it can only *utilise*, are elevated to speaking for themselves, which is precisely what would make them moments of absolute form.

In absolute form it would not be possible for the relative moments merely to be, or be thought of as, *beside each other* without the concept. In complete generality this means that absolute form would relate only to a self-determined other that is *its* other and clearly not its immediate overcoming. At the very least this means that the other of the form relation is no longer simple matter but the *determinate* other of form i.e. *content*. Content in general is the other of form that has emerged from the matter and has become determination, the other which form already has in its own right and to the extent that, as one could say, there is something *and* another (abstractly: plurality and the relation internal to it). It is in this sense that for instance what the common forms of materialism specify as matter, precisely not the alterity that is other to itself but the determinate other of thinking, the immediate identity of many terms or of determination in general, tends to be understood as content, which, by the way, as determined in such a manner cannot deny the relation to form: ‘quite generally everything *determinate* belongs to form.’¹⁸ The relative form of content still appears to be the reflection that is for itself, as *only* the mediation, while the *and* holding (as one could say) the plurality of the content together stands opposed to that reflection as the immediacy of the essential relation.¹⁹ The “and” is the indifferent identity of the relatively formal

17 The limitation on essence is that the essential difference *is* thought of as *being* and *ought* to be so; in the being of the difference the logical finitude of the essential difference is as it were deposited as representation, as a form of the imagination. As is well-known the immediate being of the difference as such is semblance. Like doketism in Christology, in its immediacy essence only attains a semblance of body of the infinite relation or of absolute form.

18 Hegel, SoL 448, GW XI 295.

19 That *and* of the difference is discussed by Hegel at two systematically important points in the *Jena Logic* of 1804/05. First in the logic of quality as *limit* of being and nothing, both of which persist precisely through the limit (cf. GW VII 5 ff.) and then in the logic of relation, in which the being of the simple connection totalises itself to the infinity of the relation (cf. GW VII 36 f.) via ‘the absolute *and*’ (GW VII 32). It is not obtuse to ask to what extent the topic of *limit* in the logic of being as the constitution of determination in the *sense of being* already *anticipates* the logically subsequent ‘action of reflection,’ i.e. the

mediation as substrate. A thinking that remains caught in this finite form and understands itself in its terms has consequently the content not as *its* content but abstractly and, in the expectation of a ground for the connection to it, only *outside* itself; it pays all due respect to the “facts” before its immediacy and becomes descriptive, itemising or also ideating. But this servitude of thinking in fact happens not really with what one could call a pure heart; for just as the language that *uses* it does not speak, remaining external to it, so does it also have aims that are imagined as lying *beyond* language—once again “hard” facts, implicit truths, selfless formality e.g. of theoretical consistency or also (“material”) interests strictly external to itself. The violence done to language in these finite and, once fixed by their finitude, also so-called “scientific” forms of *language*—fundamentally incapable of any concept of language in the philosophy of spirit—becomes logically determinable by working out the absolute form. Already in the Jena philosophy of spirit Hegel had liberated language from the representation of it as a means to something alien to it and recognised it to be instead a conversation ‘between two free selves.’²⁰ It is not self-alienation that lets language arrive at the matter; for as Hegel says, ‘λόγος’ is ‘matter and utterance—*Sache* und *Sage*’²¹—‘Man speaks to the things as *to his own* [*dem Seinigen*] and this is the *being* [*das Sein*] of the object.’²² Philosophical language that strives to comprehend itself must thus first attain for itself what language already is.²³

In absolute form the content emerges from the immediacy of its mediatedness and is explicitly *what is related* in form’s own *self-relating*. In the *and* of the content essence no longer has any being and all that is left to it is the

setting of determination and as such essence in general. For even if limit or also being-for-itself produces persistence at all, they certainly cannot be persistence in the same sense. Cf. on this L. Lugarini, *Logica e movimento riflessivo*, in his *Prospettive hegeliane*, Rome 1986, 121–144, especially 127 ff. Thus also content persisting in the manner of a substrate has its persistence in another that it itself does not express; such content is, as Hegel’s *Phenomenology* occasionally puts it, the ‘division’ of form (cf. e.g. Hegel, PhoS § 364 f., GW IX 167).

20 Hegel, GW VIII 189; cf. PhoS §§ 651 ff., GW IX 351.

21 GW VIII 190.

22 Ibid. To refer to yet another in this preview of the diversity of aspects of the problem of absolute form, the linguistic relation between I, being and self, insofar as it presents (practical) consciousness, is the ‘judgment of possession’ and thus belongs to the foundations of the realm of law (cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia* § 489; GW VIII 215 ff.; and esp. in the *Philosophy of Right*, § 57).

23 With Lebrun (op. cit. 292 f.) this could be summarised as follows: ‘le discours *du sens même*, la manifestation *du concept même* se substituent au code qui *utilise* des concepts suppose des doués d’un sens fixe. Être hégélien, c’est poser que la récusation de ce code n’est nullement le sacrifice du sens, mais, bien au contraire, la condition de sa libre circulation.’

middle term of the relation. Absolute form *generates* its own content—not, as will be discussed immediately below, as a making, thinking up or some sort of genius in the sense of bad subjectivity but such that form is the connecting of content's connection, the absolute *comprehending* of the content that is the 'content set by absolute form itself and hence tailored to it',²⁴ while form is 'already *for itself the truth*',²⁵ 'the concept knowing itself and everything as concept.'²⁶ Absolute form attains absolutely a being that emerges from speaking instead of merely "discussing being". In the course of Hegel's *Logic*, which regards itself as 'the science of *absolute form*',²⁷ in general what happens is that being is progressively determined from its extreme externality or alienation (abstraction) in the passivity of the beginning up to the "inside", to the activity of philosophical form. Thus at the end of the *Logic* being *is* "activity" and this in no way means that it has become from that point on a made or willed being, as the abstract idealism of all the various philosophies of consciousness would have it; it in no way becomes conscious "praxis", which in any case would better be called *ποίησις*; for on the contrary the essential structure of awareness is also *overcome* into absolute form, i.e. reduced to a moment to which it is then essential that it be related to its other moment not immediately (in direct intention) but only via the negative whole of the form relation itself. The comprehensive logical significance of this thesis of the reduction of awareness to a moment—and that includes the production of its totality, which in Kantian terms is regarded as unattainable (except in his theory of the beautiful)—can only find its precise development later. It is important to keep this in mind against the misunderstanding of being as action, as conscious making *through* activity, because this only leads to a mediated passivity and bad "objectivity", in which neither the activity nor its result are genuinely free.²⁸ At

24 Hegel, SoL 592, GW XII 25.

25 SoL 593, GW XII 26.

26 SoL 839, GW XII 250.

27 SoL 592, GW XII 25; cf. also SoL 50, GW XXI 34 and *passim*.

28 The reflection concept 'history' can be useful in our efforts to understand being in Hegel as it would result here, that is as merely practically mediated. Hegel's philosophy could all too often be understood as if it advocates the elimination of the self from the conceptual via the historical mapping of the concept onto the natural form of time (which, as the most abstract term of natural externality, along with space, is utterly 'selfless'; cf. Hegel, GW VIII 186) and with that implicitly the selflessness of the connection to it. O.D. Brauer's claim that 'For Hegel philosophy is a theory of individual being *sub specie temporis*', *Dialektik der Zeit*, Stuttgart 1982, 148, is at any rate to be firmly rejected. The statement itself contains other problematic assumptions, such as the finite concept of theory and the suggestion that the object of philosophy is 'individual being—*das Seiende*'. Directly to the contrary, Hegel's philosophy establishes the *concept* as 'the power of time' (Hegel,

the end of the *Logic* Hegel says, ‘the absolute idea alone is *being*, everlasting *life*, *self-knowing truth* and is *all truth*’.²⁹ Thus with the automotion of absolute form the *Logic* attains a self-relating that can let itself *be* active *as language* because it knows itself to have overcome awareness and its logical principle into that. This knowledge, which again here we can only anticipate, is ‘absolute knowing’ and the speech as which absolute knowing knows itself is the ‘original word’.³⁰ This word character of absolute form that starts with itself is the one word and in the double sense most relating (and most related) word among the many words. This word relates to everything purely and, because equally in it everything is related, it touches nothing merely externally—which is why it makes no sound.

3 On the Form of the Syllogism

In the introductory explanation of the problem and claims of absolute form, the syllogism, already referred to even prior to that, assumed a very special role by virtue of the fact that in it the being of a content is logically expressed as a *resulting*. Kant conceived of the idea, the concept that grasps propositions of experience in a single relation, in formal terms as a syllogism and this means that the *being* of the one experience should result as a mediated totality from a formal relation of what is already given to us in experience, which formal relation should at the same time impart to the knowing subject the certainty of arriving in its knowing at the *actuality* of the result. The syllogism or inference that is conclusive in this way leads the mutually external terms—“subject” and “object”—into the unity of a strictly certain actuality, a certainty that *knows* the being and a being that *is* certain. The subjectivity of concluding forgets itself in the matter; it presents itself as an objective activity.³¹

Encyc. § 258 Obs.). The same holds for what is in contrast to Brauer the far more ambitious attempt by H. Marcuse in *Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*, Frankfurt a. M. 1975³ (1932¹) to use for Hegel’s ‘new grounding’ of ‘ontology’ and its putative transformation into the practical the (unhegelian) reflection concept of ‘movedness—*Bewegtheit*’, which can only be a finite representation of the contradiction.

29 Hegel, SoL 824, GW XII 236.

30 SoL 825, GW XII 237.

31 Roughly speaking with this is also characterised the difference that has to be clearly drawn between the terms of the *Objective Logic* and those of *Objectivity* in the *Subjective Logic* in Hegel’s *Science of Logic* or SoL. The two books of the *Objective Logic* are those of *Being* and of *Essence*. In the former we have a deficient speech that has *alienated* or *externalised* itself to something truly passive (being) or to a true negating which in its own terms *is* (*Essence*), while in *Objectivity* in the third, the one book of the *Subjective Logic*, namely

Certainty of course became a special problem in modern philosophy beside, or even prior to that of truth. One could define it as the subjective anticipation of the totality of cognition, that does not need to be objectively mediated at this stage (indeed what “subjective” here means logically, i.e. without recourse to what are often far too definite notions, can also for now be left aside). The modern insight here refers indirectly to the fact that there cannot be any “truth” in isolation from totality, without a conclusion of the terms claimed to be true in a context folded back into itself, i.e. without a *horizon*. Being-for in general is what truth needs; which means that for truth as such there is no material criterion free of context. The formal criteria, especially those of consistency or compossibility, relate precisely to the *form of the context* or of that *for* whose immediacy knowledge with certainty is at all; they frame what is *objectively* known under the aspect of its *contextuality*. We have already referred to the fact that Kant’s modal concepts will be the functions of contextualisation of the known in fulfilling the horizon form. The syllogistic component lies in demonstrating the unconditional necessity for all making of experience of the *identity* of thinking and being and correspondingly of the interpenetration of certainty and truth, i.e. of the subjective horizon connection, which as such cannot become objective, and the relation of objectivity, which within the horizon and by means of it sets the respective content as sufficiently determinate and (in Kant’s terms) as “transcendentally true”. Clearly there is no question of any psychological narrowing of the problem of truth in all this. What happens is that the critique of truth dogmatically understood, i.e. as persisting in itself, emerges here in the framework of a non-empirical problem of form—a problem that leads to the philosophical concept of individuality as the concluding unity of all determining, in which empirical and as such completely non-individualised concepts of the subject (including that of psychology) fall under the critique.

Christian Crusius formulated the problem of the subjectivity and certainty of truth in terms of a subjectivist syllogistic prior to the transcendental philosophy, but then not without a certain substantial proximity to its motives.³² For Crusius:

Concept, the self-consciousness of being true on the side of speaking itself is presupposed. It is only from this self-consciousness that the unity or totality of objectivity in general can result; it comes from the subjective activity of the syllogism which is no longer driven beyond itself in isolated objective terms. R. Bubner’s view that no being can emerge from subjectivity (cf. *Zur Sache der Dialektik*, Stuttgart 1980, 70–123, esp. 108 ff.) does not even do justice to the syllogistic content of the problem of objectivity and amounts to nothing less than depriving subjectivity of actuality.

32 Cf. Kant’s reference to Crusius in the pre-critical *Prize Essay* of 1763 (esp. AA II 293 ff.).

The very highest ground of our inferences or syllogisms ... is that that which we cannot otherwise think of than as true is true and what we simply cannot think of at all, or not otherwise than as false is false.³³

We 'feel'³⁴ a compulsion of form to come to content and in the syllogism we generate the content by connecting ourselves to ourselves within it. That true and false are *only* ascribed to subjectivity and its thinking and cannot simultaneously be known *absolutely* as truth and falsity of the matter, that the expression of the original appropriateness of the matter to thinking remains absent constitutes a kind of Protagorean limitation on Crusius' initiative. Kant's highest principle of synthetic propositions brings the free adequacy of knowledge in propositions of experience and known experience as formulated by transcendental philosophy against Hume to systematically mediated expression. In that one can still hear something of Crusius' 'very highest ground of our inferences'. When we say:

The conditions of the *possibility of experience* in general are simultaneously conditions of the *possibility of the objects of experience* and hence possess objective validity in a synthetic proposition *a priori*,³⁵

we claim for ourselves a form of language in which the premisses of certainty are identical to those of truth and which in the conclusion ('hence') present objectivity. It is important to note that inferential simultaneity of thinking and being in this form, the mutual *interpenetration* or μεταβολή of each into the other is confined in Kant to the parentheses of the condition concept, so that the whole syllogism of form concludes not absolutely but only refracted through the hypothetical form. The *immediate* opposition *persisting* throughout this between experiencing ("inner") on the one hand and the sphere of objects in general ("outer") on the other is the precondition for the *mediation*

33 Chr. A. Crusius, *Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis*, Leipzig 1747 (reprint Hildesheim 1965), VII § 256 (here without the original emphases). Kant sees in this rule at most 'a confession but not a ground of proof' of the truth of a particular cognition (AA II 295). It is only in the concept of 'transcendental truth' that he himself will present the forms of certainty and truth adequately mediated.

34 Cf. Crusius op. cit. §§ 251 ff.

35 Kant, CpR B 197/A 158. This reference is in fact not to the 'highest principle of all synthetic judgments' but rather to its consequence formulated as a syllogistic inference closing the chapter on the principle. One can take our quotation as an *axiom* and the principle as the cognitive ground for it in terms of the logic of experience; cf. the comparable formulation in *De mundi sensibilis* § 26 (AA II 413) where it is called the *axioma subrepticium*.

of the two, which mediation correspondingly is then explicitly not a syllogism but a proposition *of experience*.

In a proposition of experience subject and predicate are not only factually connected as in one of perception but also—and this is the *reflection* of the absolute syllogism form within it—the subject is reflected into the predicate thereby *expressing itself* in it.³⁶ Subject and predicate, which in a genuine synthetic proposition are *others* to each other, are only capable of this reflection if they fall into *one* horizon and context such that this reflection is itself the establishment or constitution of their contextuality. The *ground* of the unity of subject and predicate which in terms of the transcendental philosophy can find determinate expression appropriate to it as a categorial form or unity function, simultaneously stands for the prior relatedness of each possible determinate experience, constantly guaranteed by the ultimate universality of experiential determining as *forma formans*.³⁷ The *determinate* (objective) move from and beyond the subject into the predicate is to be taken in its own right already as a reference back to the previous, *a priori conclusion* of experience in the *totality* of what we have already called the immediate idea, which again stands for the absolute unity of determining.³⁸ But propositions of experience nevertheless do quietly conclude the objective determination of experience by virtue of their subjective, concluding form, so they can in general be called enthymemes, whose subjective premisses, the context itself, can never explicitly, i.e. objectively be determined. But without the context according to Kant we would make *no* experience. It is the context that tells

36 The grammatical index of the reflexive relation in the proposition of experience is the active form of the verb in the predicate (cf. *Prolegomena* § 20 note 1).

37 On the two senses of the concept of experience as determinate, singular experience (*in intentione recta*) and active determining *one* experience (*in intentione obliqua*) cf. E. Heintel, *Das Problem der Konkretisierung der Transzendentalität* in his *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* vol. II Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1988, 7–30, esp. 8 ff. Kant's *Opus postumum* in particular contains many statements emphasising the *unity* of experience (unity as the idea to be realised), which are also of great significance for Kant's 'dynamism of experience' even in the initial critical period (cf. AA XXI 99; XXII 97 f., 471 and *passim*); further we can refer to the late work for the expression 'making of experience' (cf. e.g. AA XXII 103, 320, 444 *passim*). On the unity of experience as 'idea' in the *Opus postumum* as it also includes existence, and which is even 'derivable', cf. V. Mathieu, *Kants Opus postumum*, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, 209–211.

38 A. Kulenkampff, *Antinomie und Dialektik*, Stuttgart 1970, calls it the 'task of the CpR' to legitimate the 'latent connections of all single cognitions to the totality' (64 note). The 'leading question' of 'philosophical reflection' is according to Kulenkampff that 'of the unity of the context of experience' as it declares itself in the '*certainty* accompanying all knowledge of experience' (9).

us when we have *enough* for the objective determination of something. Determining something *in indefinitum* would be the nothingness of experience that would lose itself in the absence of context. This is why Kant can argue, especially against Hume, that if we have really understood A and B in the making of experience as standing in a relation of causality so that the objectification of A and B as cause and effect then leaves no real problems of understanding remaining that affect their relation, then in the same moment the reflection of the so-called induction problem—that namely A and B at another time or at another place or even in another positive language, *could* be understood in *another* sense than this—which is always merely hypothetical, against the *actuality* of objective understanding is a completely empty consideration. We could not seriously know *as what* we then would understand A and B to be in such a case, as functions of what connections that would *then* be constitutive they would be asserted to be and what exactly would *then* lead us to regard their explanation as concluded. A sun for instance about which we one day seriously accept that it sometimes does not warm stones, would then be what we now *actually* understand by the term “sun” in name only—not only space and time (or language or culture) but our entire conceptual content would be thoroughly changed from within. When Hume believes he can make polemics against what are *per definitionem* contextualised propositions (which as such are essentially not positively expressing their own context) of experience from the standpoint of what is in fact other experience not actually made, i.e. devoid of context, merely imagined experience, then he is *not* an empiricist but merely rails against the concrete—as all scepticism does—insisting on the vague possibility of alterity. Hume cannot see at all that it is thoroughly *dogmatic* to believe that the concepts A and B could be *the same* even if for instance the terms of the relation between them change. He dogmatically overlooks the fact that the making of experience is the only valid definition of empirical concepts. And in all *necessity*, understanding the making of experience in the way that one actually *understands*, there is really no induction problem.

Kant regards experience in general as ‘cognition through connected perceptions’.³⁹ The presupposed totality in all making of experience, the given side of the originally divided, or judged, idea is the immediacy of the *connection*, the original unity of apperception, which constitutes the original relation of the binding determinate connections of perception to experience. In contrast the perceptions themselves, of which there must be at least two or in general

39 Kant, CpR B 161.

several, constitute the outer condition of objectivity or the condition of the externality of the object related internally to unity; for without constitutive reference to plurality (sensibility) in general the object could not enter into the opposition to connecting cognition. This means that within the perceptions to which experience refers, plurality is expressly accepted into the premisses of objectivity, just as the premisses in the syllogism must necessarily be several and, moreover, taken for themselves and without context represent statements that are understood in various ways. On the level of perception then there is no guarantee that different subjects are speaking about “the same thing”. Plurality of the premisses in the syllogism, it should be noted at this point, essentially also has the logical function of imparting determination to the result of the syllogism into which it reflects itself. The syllogism does not simply transit into a being but into a content full of being.⁴⁰ We can certainly now ask the question, which of the potentially infinitely many determinations offered by the external perceptions—to the plurality and externality of which Hume in his own way referred—enter into the proposition of experience in such a manner that the objective determination of the object results. The condition for this however is: that the perceptions contradict each other.⁴¹ “The sun warms the stone” is a proposition of experience containing among its perception premisses the following *antinomy*: the stone is cold—the stone is warm. In this the stone remains the same but a third element in the relation (the activity of the sun) is similarly identical or can be set continuous; indeed both are identical with respect to the antinomical constitution of the predicate (as active and as passive identity of cause and effect). The predicate contains a complete disjunction (warm/cold) *and*, in the proposition of experience although not in that of perception, *unity*, the common sphere, which as “genus in motion”, as horizon of the reflection-in-itself represents the *subjective totality*.⁴² Kant’s basic insight,

40 It thus transits into ‘a *being* that is at once identical and is the concept that has produced itself from and within its alterity’ (SoL 704, GW XII 126). Cf. GW VII 94 f.; Encyc. § 180 but also of course Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics*.

41 With some reservations at this point we might refer to the investigation of M. Wolff, *Der Begriff des Widerspruchs*, Königsten Ts. 1981. On the opposition in the ‘logic of reflection’ (to be distinguished from, e.g., real opposition) Wolff observes that an object finds its *determination* in the *relation* between its predicates, which determination Wolff then rather unfortunately calls the ‘substrate in the logic of reflection’ (46). In fact the point is ultimately to demonstrate that determination in general is not so much substrate as the matter rendered completely relationalised, which is precisely what Wolff then proceeds to do for the concept of real opposition in Kant (67).

42 In the *Jena Logic* of 1804/5 Hegel has the syllogism emerge from the subject completing itself in the hypothetical judgment and the predicate correspondingly completing

that the identity of the (grammatical) subject in opposed predicates and the identity of the (judging) subject to be assumed for the concept of the *motion* of the subject through its predicates are *absolutely the same subjectivity*, is simultaneously the insight into an objectively connecting motion that is capable of a concrete determination of its own. Thus the diverse perceptions that enter into opposition become generative of totality, since they let the general passive identity (the “substrate”) of the object emerge, in which *all* perceptions relating to the object have to have their being. The proposition of experience is thus on the one hand *subjective*—and, as one has to say from Hegel’s standpoint, if it is subjective, it is not that only for a subject or a subjective activity, it is *in its own right* or *absolutely* subjective, that which is itself turned back into itself and teleological. On the other hand it *is* the mediation of determination as *objective* connection to another which it is not itself—in its subjectivity it is in its own right just as much objective. It was always a rather flat understanding which in the contention with Kant was surprised how something “merely” subjective like a proposition could simultaneously be objective, and even be constitutive of the object.⁴³ The objection this kind of imagination raised

itself in the disjunctive judgment. We cannot go into the details of the difficult text at this point but it should be noted that in Hegel’s view then subjectivity and objectivity complement each other in opposition in the following constellation: subjectivity as the hypothetically necessary binding of objectivity as the formally necessary disjunction of determination, until that is the two unite with absolute necessity in the syllogism solving the problem left open by the ‘determinate concept’: the unification of reflection-in-itself (subjectivity) and determination (objectivity) (cf. GW VII 79, 91 ff.). The parallel with Kant would then lie in the fact that according to Hegel’s early theory of the judgment here, the subject proves to be objective by setting itself differentiated as something immediate that is simultaneously the mediation of another, while the predicate proves to be subjective by referring its own determination to itself in the disjunction, i.e. it is therein reflected into itself. Hegel abandoned this approach in the later logics, probably because he no longer regarded the hypothetical judgment as falling under the (categorical) subject-predicate-schema (cf. SoL 652, GW XII 79). But also because in the later ‘stronger’ theory of the concept the problem looked fundamentally different (it is indeed doubtful whether the *Jena Logic* contained the characteristic Hegelian “concept of the concept” at all; cf. F. Ungler, *Das Wesen in der Jenaer Zeit Hegels in Hegel-Studien* suppl. 20, Bonn 1980, 157–180, e.g. 175).

- 43 M. Hossenfelder in his *Kants Konstitutionstheorie und die transzendente Deduktion*, Berlin and New York 1978 attempts to give expression to such difficulties with the understanding. Thus he claims e.g., ‘only an intuitive understanding would be capable of constitutive principles’ (87). Similarly he also believes it necessary to understand conceptual-discursive determination only as ‘an analysis’ of *given* synthetic unity (!) (106), while the concept is fundamentally a ‘vehicle’ for ‘seeking’ the unity of the manifold (109, 114 ff.). If one presupposes unity in this manner, indeed unities in the empirical as given, then one will always have difficulties in seeing exactly where Kant’s problem lies;

against Kant amounts logically speaking to the claim that the *form* of the mediation, which for the imagination can only be *pertaining to* the matter, should contain the root of the objective determination of the matter or its content, indeed that the form itself should lead to a validly *determinate* conclusion, in which the understanding necessarily is not only by itself and remains form only relatively but also gains another as intuitive content determined by itself. Actual understanding thus *particularises* itself and inferring in this way gains the *matter* by letting it free, while for the imagination this is precisely what is not understandable because it only wants to hold fast to the simple form here and the simple content over there. It is however only an external reflection which, seeking in this way to distinguish between a reflection-in-itself of form and one of content, ends up having to make the difference between the two an unresolvable contradiction (indeed the only one that actually mediates and maintains itself). The subject should not succeed in getting beyond the plurality of perceptions, characteristics, standpoints, or briefly premisses; which claim is then formulated as follows: all terms uttered by the subject intended to relate to the matter remain too general to actually express it.⁴⁴ Language is degraded in all this by the understanding to a means; but in the self-sustaining of the immediate difference language demonstrates that it is not a means. The intending subject and its relative form of mediation now appear to be too general for the world. Meanwhile it is the subject which has from the language and from the concept the image or representation that these are only bad universals, i.e. approaches external to the matters of what are once again external purposes, all merely the subjectivity of the bad universal. Precisely because it is only general in its own peculiar manner, such empty subjectivity presents *nothing* as comprised under it. It is non-individualised awareness that does not acquire new knowledge but mere intelligence which, as subject, is in fact in the true understanding already completely (or still) *dead*. Absolute form, in stark contrast to that, has to be recognised as the form of absolute particularisation, the form of actual speech that discovers *itself* from out of its premisses, which are essentially distinct from it, and with that does justice to the matter which it lets be as it is. Neither this logical context of matter and thought nor its own self-consciousness can be reached without taking the path through absolute

provisionally as propylon to that, one can only recommend the antinomy. Besides, this rather blatant realism ultimately stands waiting with a scepticism (the eternal bastard of reflection and dogmatism) as its heir, which, at least for philosophy, is hardly surprising.

44 In the *Phenomenology* it is the level of consciousness that fails because of its abstract universality; cf. below 83-84.

particularisation and pure individualisation of the true universal. This is precisely why Hegel can say of the individual that it is 'absolute form'.⁴⁵

4 External Reflection

Philosophical form has to show it is *absolute* by generating the complete contextualisation of everything within it uniquely determined in connection to the *individual* sufficiency of determination that cannot be rendered positive. Totality and completeness here cannot mean the demand for the putative complete overview of everything positive and its conclusive, complete deduction. Kant's critique of the concept of totality does not claim simply that the empirical subject cannot know everything positive, indeed nor know it all positively; instead it proposes the far less trivial proof that the subject does not need to do this in order to know. Philosophically speaking the totality of all that is determinate required in cognition in fact only emerges in the relation of their *syllogism*, which is at the same time the genuine definition of their determinacy and determines them as being functions of individuality, which is hence indicated in them in each case as singles. As already mentioned, in the Kantian context this will underlie the notion of modality. Whoever overlooks the critical "modal index" in anything objectively determinate, or prefers not to notice it in order to hold fast to those determinate singles in their isolation, will be driven into an enumeration of finite determinations that falls into the bad infinity, which then deprives them precisely of the chance of objectivity. They will perhaps end up taking "actuality" as indifference to all determinacy instead of as *concretissimum* or else in grasping its determination not as a syllogism of individual understanding but as an arbitrary attempt at determination indifferent to other such attempts.

Such speech belongs to the logical status of what Hegel called external reflection, of which of course the absolute form is fundamentally master. But then subject to its *tendency* to pure absence of totality, it attempts from its own standpoint to oppose absolute form. That "absence of totality" is a *tendency* of external reflection because it in fact can never be completely attained, at least not without reflection itself as a motion of speech sinking back into the indifference of mere being—and that is also what happens to its simple opposition of subject and external object, which in its own way remains its orientation. External reflection initially has the apparent advantage that it focusses on

45 Hegel, PhoS § 26, GW IX 23.

immediately given contents as substrates, on empirical differences and characteristics and even on general “conditions”, instead of on the matter itself and so can claim that it has solved its determination problem “immediately”. Against that, absolute form is not a showing off of determinations that are precisely not to be “seen” in immediacy, for it is just the setting of determination in the return that follows the prior advance, which setting happens in its individual unity of the necessary relation of conclusion; it is only negation of the positive given and this not as *ought* but as the actuality of that given. Insight into the difference between the two language forms is only accessible to philosophy because no external reflection can break through to a concept of itself and for that same reason not to the concept of this difference either. This reflection is in fact selfless speech as such. For these reasons the difference can best be considered with the help of the concept of determination. In terms of the logic of present being [*Dasein*] determination is the *medium term* of the syllogism of the category “something”, the extremes of which are what something is according to its ‘constitution’ *in itself* and what it is according to its ‘composition’, i.e. what it is *for another* or what it has *belonging to it*.⁴⁶ This medium term however is broken to the extent that it represents no simple and unambiguous, univalent identity of what is initially differentiated but instead an alternating *transition*, a becoming in both directions, and to that extent it remains *ambiguous, bivalent*.⁴⁷ Philosophically speaking what lies in the ambiguity of determinacy, which in a far more radical manner than the external reflection that likes to focus precisely on this, is that it secures the *right* to alterity, the possibility of an adequacy and agreement of the two sides, the possibility of *truth*, which, however—especially if it is set on this logical level—is certainly not to be thought of as a representation of a *res* in the repertoire of an *intellectus* but must mean the *free* unity that cannot be intended in the word spoken from individual necessity.⁴⁸ External reflection shows what it really is exerting itself mightily to

46 Cf. Hegel, SoL 122 ff., GW XXI 110 ff.; at SoL 124, GW XXI 112 the relation is explicitly called a syllogism.

47 J. van der Meulen has very plausibly developed his thesis of the thoroughgoing and essential brokenness of the *medium term* in Hegel and of the ‘tetradic’ basic form of dialectical relations implied by it (which can clearly only be a matter of their representation) also in the case of this relation between constitution and composition: cf. his *Hegel. Die gebrochene Mitte*, Hamburg 1958, 15 ff. For the expression ‘broken medium term’ in Hegel cf. *Encyc.* § 208 Obs.; further Rosenkranz op. cit. 158. We are grateful to the study by Th. Penolidis, *Bestimmtheit und Reflexion*, mss. 1989 for important suggestions in this regard for our own work.

48 Ambiguity specified in this way finds its expression in the *infinite proposition*, which will be discussed in greater detail below (Ch. 2.1.b.). On its positive side it brings out ‘*determinate determinacy*’ or the singular as such (Hegel, SoL 642, GW XII 70); thus the *Jena Logic*

resolve the ambiguity (bivalence) of determinacy into two (or more) clarities (univalencies) and at least in this way trying to fix the externality of constitution and composition or of reflection-in-itself and reflection-into-another. For Hegel this means that it is *itself* doubled, namely in a presupposing of the one side, determinacy, and in a determinant self-relating to what has been so presupposed—certainly not the presupposing that external reflection in a “second” move has in fact already dispensed with; what has been forgotten here is the band of the connection.⁴⁹ External reflection is thus the creation of a presupposition conceived of as uncreated that is imagined as reflected into itself, as *something other* than the relation to it that says “something”.⁵⁰ This

emphasises the correspondence with the singular proposition (cf. Hegel, GW VII 89). But then it also *simultaneously* sets the universal as such (the sphere of the predicate that gets negated), so it overcomes the simple judgment difference as well as its mediation in a *being* into a double opposition. Now both of these sides—because of their identity, mutually repelling and because of their repulsion, identical—turn out to be the nothingness of the being of the copula as well as that of reflection and its counterthrust; but equally simultaneously the destruction of reflection in the sides is the production of being in them. It should be noted in passing that just as one can call the antinomy of determinacy through which the syllogism reaches its conclusion (cf. 15) ambiguity, similarly the ambiguity of the form of the infinite proposition as a complete disjunction of subject and predicate is the antinomial (or more precisely still the contradictory) immediacy of their mediation in their universal or into the concept. At certain logically important places in the *Science of Logic* Hegel uses the figure of what is in this way ‘unmediated identity’ (e.g. Hegel, SoL 526, GW XI 367) which especially leads into the pure in-itself of mediation, such as in the transition from the disjunction of appearance into the absolute. The significance of the infinite proposition is in no way, as H. Schmitz tried to present it in his *Hegel als Denker der Individualität*, Meisenheim 1957, 90 ff., limited to the Jena period when in fact Hegel did not have the completely determined concept of the infinite proposition (cf. below 108 esp. 117 n55), while the later Hegel as ‘logician of the syllogism’ decided instead to rely on the principle of mediation. The infinite proposition is certainly also a mediation; in every syllogism the mediating reflection contained overcome (not explicit) within it can be represented as an infinite proposition through a reduction of the syllogism. Thus the well-known proof of the mortality of Gaius contains in its premisses the antinomy of singular and universal (Gaius *is not* all men) as an infinite proposition of present being; an antinomy that is only resolved by the *reflection* of the singular as contained in the universal—by a reflection, that is, which is not expressed in the *conclusio* if certainly presupposed by it. Every syllogism leaps from being into essence in order to arrive at the concept or at itself. The truth and unity of this leap is what is individual.

49 Cf. for the context Hegel, SoL 402 f., GW XI 252–254. ‘External’ reflection too falls only ‘in us’ (cf. e.g. SoL 403, GW XI 252; SoL 586 f., GW XII 20), it is not the language (the utterance) of the other but rather the attempt not to have need of such a language.

50 One can resort to external reflection—as external to itself always self-externalising—or externalised reflection to attempt to present the ‘subjective’ (negative) moment with reflexive and adverbial expressions (self-external, external, self-externalising reflection), while the ‘objective’ (positive) moment can be expressed with the adjectival and passive

link to what is only elsewhere presupposed is the *intending* of the matter in the usual sense of the word. It refers to what is distinct from itself but *ought* to become identical only with that; truth is abandoned and consists only in the consciousness of a beyond that constantly regenerates itself anew as a goal to be achieved. The difference here not only with the matter but also with the truth of the connection to it from reflection itself is simultaneously only the difference of reflection *with itself*, to the extent that is that, forgetting its own setting of the presupposition, it grasps only the one side of determinacy—God's left hand, as Lessing's modesty expressed itself, containing only the drive for truth, all actual truth being held by God in his right hand—and with that the intention is that it not affect the other side, which is not knowable, or at least not “without remainder”.

The perennial nature of the intended relating and hence the persistence of the difference, imagined as being in everything, that indeterminable difference between the reflection of the understanding and the matter for itself which external reflection itself generates, confers on it the (certainly ambiguous) advantage of moving only among unambiguous determinations—only among *names* that it itself attaches, well aware of its action, to the matter. These externally set names are in the same measure as they are not capable of truth also not concepts but labels for what is other than itself. Thus it is clear that the root of the nominalistic concept of the concept lies in the position external reflection takes to the ambiguity of true determinacy. In any case the continuum of these names is the possibility of bringing them together syntactically and on the whole to let them “say” something; making the connection is then, as Kant says, no longer to be understood purely nominalistically. The discourse

participial expressions. But Hegel is not strictly consistent in his use of language. Cf. the more precise distinctions of B. Liebrucks, *Sprache und Bewußtsein*, vol. 6/2, Frankfurt am Main/Bern 1974, 325, 122 and 150. Hegel's *Difference* essay, e.g. the section on the ‘relation between speculation and healthy common sense’ (Hegel, TW2, 30–35), could be referred to for a systematic account of external reflection and its development in Hegel's work. See also in that essay Hegel's remarks on ‘isolated reflection’ (TW2, 26). Also pertinent here is the *Wastebook* note on the ‘*bad reflection*’, where this is described as ‘the fear of immersing oneself in the matter’ (TW2, 554). The fully developed systematic of external reflection is then given only in the *Science of Logic*, even though the expression is found earlier (cf. Hegel, TW4, 195). On this topic cf. W. Jaeschke, *Äußerliche Reflexion und immanente Reflexion* in *Hegel-Studien* 13 (1978), 85–117. It may be questioned however whether it is sufficient to dub the ‘*bad reflection*’ with Jaeschke ‘prescientific’ (102), for even in the science that the SoL gives of the absolute, external reflection is not simply excluded but has a logically determinate meaning (it would be precisely the positive science of the absolute). Note that in his paper Jaeschke concentrates on the role of absolute reflection for the presentation of the absolute essence.

of external reflection wants in its own way to be “correct”, even if it already has its doubts about the possibility of representing the matters in the names. Still it lives on the one hand from the *syntactic* functions, which themselves in that sense represent *nothing*, although in a certain way the language of nominalism still relates to itself.⁵¹ On the other hand it is sustained by the fact that the names certainly do mean *something* in general before they enter into the discourse. But finally it stakes its claim on the fact that the understanding of *something* via names and in syntactically regulated contexts is always *already understood*—for what it means that among themselves names and matters have a *relation*, from which then all “sense” of naming first emerges, cannot be explained by the names. External reflection does not thematise this prior understanding of speaking in words in and as relation to its own “constructive” efforts to achieve clarity or univalence, unless it does this merely by isolating the process of understanding or the conceptual relation and addressing it directly (e.g. under the term ‘metalinguistic’ difference).⁵²

But perennial intending ‘fundamentally’ knows what is rational, which expresses itself precisely in its drive to attaining the totality of the absence of totality, to driving ‘matter and utterance’ apart ‘without remainder’.⁵³ For a

51 Cf. once again below esp. 84–86. The “holism” of the philosophy of science can provide a stark example: for Duhem and the innovators if theories only stand ‘in total’ before ‘sense perception’ or the immediacy of facts, then there cannot be a further ‘model’ for this contextuality of the theory, regarded as essentially known (indeed taken positively), that would relate in the same sense as the other theory elements or formulas to the presupposed ‘structure’, as little as this functional totality needs to be isomorphic to anything at all in the ‘structure’.

52 For the critique of the hierarchising of ‘language levels’, that would be each in the same sense capable of being intended, with reference to what is the *whole* of knowledge only as self-mediation (which can only then understand what a metalevel *as such* is) including the simultaneous critique of the ‘semantic’ theory of truth connected with it, cf. once again A. Kulenkampff op. cit. 45 ff. The dialectical alternative is developed by Kulenkampff from the *πρῶτος-ἄνθρωπος* schema (72 ff.). For a complementary parallel to this, which is indeed for the speculative language form no less important, see U. Richli, *Form und Inhalt in G.W.F. Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik”*, Vienna and Munich 1982, 139 ff.

53 Already in the *Logic and Metaphysics* lecture course of 1801/2 in Troxler’s transcript, Hegel speaks of a ‘striving of reason’ that expresses itself in ‘reflection’, i.e. in the sense that it ‘with each determinate term’ sets ‘two opposed terms’ and then strives ‘to synthesise them again’; fundamentally then it relies on the concretising movement of disjunction. Reflection, by the way, like reason in Kant, becomes antinomical, because ‘it does not acknowledge the nullity of its oppositions and syntheses’ and is not capable of setting up the rational totality (of metaphysics) (cf. K. Düsing ed., *Schellings and Hegels erste absolute Metaphysik (1801–1802)*, Cologne 1988, 70). The nullity of the opposition of reflection is its finitude or precisely what makes the opposed terms incapable of actually interpenetrating. The *Difference* essay speaks of a ‘secret efficacy of reason’ and of ‘leading to the

nominalistically conceived science there can be neither in its concepts nor in its matter a *ground* for “research”, i.e. for a movement of the relations between concepts and their “referents”. One could certainly consider, like the ancients, the acquisition of *onomastika* as sufficient and learn these perfectly, if that is in science it were a matter of educating oneself with such nominal information and of “constructing” such knowledge. The self-consciousness of some recent sciences consists in demonstrating themselves to be *active connections* of names (to matters and among each other), thus in demonstrating their capability for the *continuation* of attained connections beyond themselves. Conceptions of the end points of mediation provide the orientation for this continuation, which according to its own understanding of itself is not an arbitrary uttering of something other but as a rule should certainly constitute “progress”: in the synthetic direction, there is the idea of the attained overview, as Laplace’s demon would have it or would offer a “world formula”, and in the analytical direction, the notion of definitely achievable facts and perceptions or at least unimpeachable accounts thereof. That the two end-points are no longer regulative extrapolations from the performance of the nominalistic discourse is perhaps more plausible or at least more understandable for the first direction than for the second. At any rate it seems that a discourse would arrive at an end in analytical terms when it can no longer be pursued in language and instead results in a *deixis*, in which linguistically reflection-in-another and reflection-in-itself of the matter certainly seem then to make contact with each other. Now it is always arbitrary at which point a linguistic mediation is interrupted by a *deixis*, moreover it is never clear before it happens whether the *deictic* mediation succeeds—i.e. whether it is taken *as language* that says something or not. It is also true that the *deixis* does not fall outside of all language, in the sense that in a context in which one accepts showing as the closure of the context, without a further analysis appearing to be necessary, for one must have already understood what “showing” actually means. At any rate it is not possible externally to show the complex relation *showing*; conversely showing in action relies on having an understanding of what showing is. The I that already understands what is showing is thus present in every *deixis* and is mediated in it. A *deixis* appeals to the I that already knows what it means to view them separately—the pointing finger, the something pointed out and the context of the question

totality of necessity’; it is even stated that reason ‘seduces’ the understanding to ‘produce an objective totality’, rendering the understanding then antinomical (Hegel, TW2, 26). Analogous assertions could be pointed out in various contexts, e.g. for the drive to totality as a moment of mechanism in the *Science of Logic*.

in response to which something is shown in this way—while still taking them as a whole of differences. The I that can do that shows itself simultaneously to be the logically prior relation to all the determinate relations of showing. A *deixis* is thus no simple end to an analysis. It is instead rooted in a clarity—in a δῆλωσις of which Hegel, as we shall see, will say that it is the original in-itself, the absolute.

5 Consciousness and Appearance

External reflection is, and this must be kept firmly in mind from now on, not an arbitrary competitor to absolute form. It is instead what one could call its falling away from this latter and is not simply about subordinate form moments. It is about the medium term of absolute form and with that, as we shall see, the principle of individuality. Falling away from the medium term, external reflection presents itself as *external immediacy*, as the unmediated *being* of cognition and—in real philosophical terms—as *natural knowledge*, as common understanding or immediate *consciousness*. In terms of its logic and determinacy it is one of the most difficult sciences philosophy has to develop, if, that is, the aim is to give a substantial concept of external reflection as such.

As natural spirit consciousness is the presentation in spirit of the intending relating, directed at “something” and knowing itself to be this direction and to be distinct from the something. In short consciousness is the presentation in spirit of the logical relation of external reflection. It is this to the extent that it is *isolated* as consciousness, which is exactly what has to be done in its treatment in the philosophy of spirit. In spirit as nature overcome there are always aspects that can be brought out that do not directly relate to logic. Real philosophy in Hegel means also the project of absolute form itself of giving itself an *extension* “beyond” its logical self-reflection, in which it confronts and knows itself as emerging from its opposed (objective) concepts—from concepts it should be noted in the complete sense, which have already realised themselves as their own sphere and “body”. Real philosophy in this sense is not some sort of occupation with assumed nomenclatures of the particular sciences in philosophical terms. To speak with Hegel it is the ‘*expansion*’ of the logical, which has itself become ‘*a system of totality*’ and to that extent simple and immediate absolute form. It is thus the expansion via determinate connecting to what is *different* from this resulting simplicity of totality, external and sustaining itself as externality—via connecting then to a ‘moment of content’ that ‘in the whole’ of the new, real philosophical

relation can 'be seen as the first premise'.⁵⁴ The external of absolute form in the sense of a similarly philosophically presentable content is not the objects determined by the particular sciences and certainly not what is immediately given in general as such; it is the different persistence of the other of the absolute idea, initially in infinitely many finitely distinct differences, i.e. as immediacy of the persistence of absolutely external difference (nature), then as pure resumption of the self from out of the completed non-relation, which sustains itself as self-mediation out of the absolute externality of the idea (spirit).⁵⁵ Absolute form ensures in its articulated formation a systematic real philosophy to the highest limit of its proposed principle of method, namely that in the self-determination of its content it proceeds 'according to the *necessity* of the concept' but that it remains in the form of individuality such that:

'each new level of the motion of *going outside itself*' is 'also one of going into itself and to the greater *extension* there is a corresponding *greater intensity*'.⁵⁶

54 The investigation by L. B. Puntel, *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur, Hegel-Studien* suppl. 10, Bonn 1973, is valuable in treating in a fundamental and rigorous manner the problem of the relation between logic and real philosophy, which is rarely properly thought through. The quotation here from Hegel's *Science of Logic*, SoL 840, GW XII 251, is of central importance to Puntel; he draws upon it for the construction of a logical-phenomenological 'noological' elementary structure that presents itself as a backward and forward 'countervailing motion' of (theoretical) grounding and (practical) progressive determination (cf. also SoL 840, GW XII 251) especially in terms of the correspondence to doubling into the theoretical and practical idea (cf. SoL 830 ff., GW XII 242 ff. and SoL 800 ff., GW XII 215 ff.). Apart from the questionable claim of an elementary 'structure' in philosophy, one must beware of *abstractly* separating the last two named motions that Puntel himself calls 'complementary' (Puntel, 217), which is what happens as soon as 'the theoretical dimension' is too casually dubbed 'consciousness' without more ado and then 'the practical dimension' corresponds to 'self-consciousness' such that logical terms are too easily assigned to locations in real philosophy (cf. e.g. 244). For instance the knowledge of absolute form is certainly self-conscious but not for that practical in simple opposition to the theoretical, as it is never practical in the sense of conscious willing (intention to finite goals).

55 For Hegel's concept of nature and its systematic relation especially to the concept of spirit, the introduction to the Jena *Philosophy of Nature* of 1804/5 (Hegel, GW VII 179–192) possesses an importance that cannot be overestimated; this holds despite the differences with the later, e.g. *Encyclopaedia* versions—because here nature asserts itself as contradiction, as it were in *its own* infinite judgment, it goes beyond itself. Cf. e.g. V. Mathieu, *Filosofia della natura e dialettica* in V. Verra ed., *Hegel interprete di Kant*, Naples 1981, 91–12, esp. 97.

56 Hegel, SoL 840 f., GW XII 251.

Absolute form creates for itself in confrontation with the external the possibility of its own *speech*—which does not mean that it only speaks “about” the external as if absolute form were just one of the sciences but that it expresses and produces it as that which it is.

The advantage a real-philosophical presentation of external reflection in consciousness can have over a logical one consists in the fact that it includes in its purview something that external reflection itself does not see, namely its own essential immediacy, its semblance character. Clearly logic as the science of absolute form knows this but real philosophy takes it seriously too—which is why by the way a phenomenology of consciousness was not only capable of attaining great favour among the interpreters, in terms of the matter itself it also functions well as an introduction to conceptual science.⁵⁷ As we have said, external reflection relies on a presupposition and its own self-relating to that. Now both of these are only related finitely and antinomically to each other and as such it once again distinguishes then from itself as subjective understanding. Now in distinguishing its presupposing from its relating activities (*each* of which precisely speaking is both reflection-in-itself as much as it is reflection-in-another, if only finitely so), taking them as mutually external, it has forgotten the totality of the mediation. But the theory of consciousness does perceive what is thus forgotten—e.g. in the being of language—so that one can indeed say that the logical pathway is cut short by an immediacy. This is not without significance for the Kantian I, where, looked at from Hegel’s standpoint, logical aspects and those of the philosophy of spirit get mixed up with each other. This I only gets to see itself expressly as appearance, while its present being and hence its totality, as for all reflection, lies as it were in its “blind spot”. Kant himself became aware of the apories associated with his “I think”—in fact introduced to meet a *speculative* need—when it is taken as an empirical understanding. Thus in the paralogism chapter for instance he attempts to treat it in *real-philosophical* terms. The same can be said of Kant’s occasional return to faculty psychology and interpreters are always well advised to exercise caution with those places in his texts where what is conceptually problematic is only

57 Moreover the issue of an ‘introductory science’ is surely marginal to the system of philosophy; it may even have been overestimated for a while by Hegel himself. The notion of a situation in which philosophy has to make itself understood by what lies outside it is purely fictitious—here too like is known by like and in this case it can even be said that in an introduction to philosophy it is precisely a matter of separating what has *inequality vital to it* from what has equality vital to it. Clearly not a matter of the skilled application of dialectic but simply of systematic mediation itself. Alternatively put, philosophy as individualised form always addresses itself indirectly to what is individual and therein lies the introduction.

explained with empirical illustrations. Still at least such observational material always reveals something of a limit to the concept in question.

Consciousness is for Hegel 'appearing spirit'.⁵⁸ Spirit is here referred to appearance in two ways. It appears, i.e. for others, which naturally also means: it appears other again for itself, i.e. it appears to be *natural*. It also appears in such a manner that the other is *logically* appearance. As appearance the other is for another and indeed loses itself in being-for-another; but it is also for itself in that being-for-another or it retains its purity in being-other-than-appearance. Kant was being somewhat simplistic in distinguishing between the phenomenal and the noumenal in appearance. But then it is precisely when this difference is fixed that it generates the second difference, which can be quantitatively expressed as the plurality of the phenomena against the unity of essence or which must be thought of as the difference to a third, which in turn is what first relates the sides of the first difference to each other, fixing them.

In this sense it is still quite common to speak of the concept of appearance as a three-term relation of an in-itself (1), which as phenomenon (2) appears to another (3).⁵⁹ A dogmatics of appearance and its differences would start from the position that all terms of the relation are understood as possessing being in the same sense—e.g. in the sense of what in abstract metaphysical terms is called Platonism. The fact is that it was Immanuel Kant himself who eliminated all possibility of such dogmatism root and branch, at least to the extent that he was able to establish the *whole* relation in the second difference as *principle*. Kant held that for the actual performance of the cognition of appearance, the 'essence' or the 'thing in itself' can only be extrapolated from the relation of the understanding to the appearing manifold⁶⁰—all this

58 Cf. on this apart from Hegel, Encyc. §§ 413 ff. also the *Science of Logic*, preface to the first edition of 1812, SoL 28, GW XXI 8; further § 2 of a fragment on the theory of spirit from the Nuremberg period: 'Conscious spirit, more precisely conceived, is appearing' (Hegel, TW 4, 291). In his Solger review Hegel speaks of the 'dualism of our consciousness, of our appearance' (Hegel, TW 12, 241).

59 We will attempt below to derive Kant's table of categories from the terms of the series to be grasped logically as 'inner (1) as (2) outer (3)' (cf. below Ch. 2.2.b.).

60 Maimon can be referenced in this connection. He had already determined the relation that interests us. He calls the *noumena* 'differentials of the objects' and the 'objects arising from that themselves ... the phenomena'; cf. S. Maimon, *Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie*, Darmstadt 1963 (reprint), 32. In this he wants to regard the 'pure concepts' as 'relation concepts' (37). In experience we are dealing with as one could say objects that are already integrated from these differentials; objects for which the noumenal as principle for explaining their emergence (cf. 32) are only ideal and themselves not intuitive but in the abstract sense of 'concept' also not comprehensible (cf. 43 note). It is instead *incommensurable* to the concept and intuition and still not somehow

independent of the question as to what exactly Kant elsewhere and relating to other issues may have thought ‘metaphysically’ about the ‘existence’ of a *mundus intelligibilis*.⁶¹ This grounding of the appearance relation here is only possible if the connection of the understanding to appearances is the *total* relation to the world, besides which there is no other (theoretical) knowledge. The totality demanded here is represented in Kant by on the one hand the theory of the ideality of the forms of intuition, via which everything external is mediated, and on the other by the highest principle of all synthetic propositions, according to which the understanding is what conditions all its objects—their thoroughgoing internalisation. The *thing* necessarily standing under the form of understanding, by virtue of which subsumption it is other to itself, is *only* appearance, i.e. as something positive and unambiguously constituted and as also a *total* thing reflected into itself, a negative unity, persisting beyond the understanding which at best is supposed to be only knowable through reason. The understanding regards what is positively or passively mere appearance as determinate in that it moves on from one determination to another within the plurality of appearances. Moreover this progress happens in the form of the synthetic judgment, thus in a kind of relation whose determinacy lies wholly in the understanding, in its own categories so that it has their *ground* and *possibility* within itself. In general this ground is the horizon of subjective understanding, its totality which it is not directly capable of intending. The understanding can *thus* progress from one appearance to another because in its progress it remains by itself and is nothing more than such an extending of itself out as the general contextuality of the distinct appearances. This ground of the progress is thus immediate to consciousness and the Kantian idea is assigned the task of mediating it by means of the regulative demand of the progress itself; this should be taken as possibly the conscious ground from

‘irrational’. In the differential of the object we have external reflection as a finite progress through the determinations in perennial intending and the ‘flowing object’ of the understanding (cf. 33) overcome into totality. Maimon expresses with this in his own way the demand not to let things remain in the simple antinomy of appearance.

- 61 In *Kants affirmative Metaphysik von Dingen an sich* in G Micheli and G. Santinello eds. *Kant a due secoli dalla „Critica“*, Brescia 1984, 181–191. H. Wagner wanted to propose such an independent, i.e. practical interest of Kant in what is intelligible in order then to polemicise against a theoretical view of the noumenal, which only determines it as an arbitrary reference to the object of experience. Even if this polemic is correct in terms of the matter, it clearly goes too far in the other direction, namely all the way to taking the things in themselves as a ‘species of objects’ (182). The noumenal is instead—e.g. with Maimon—to be grasped as a relation of objectivity in which everything given is to be related to each other.

out of the immediate opposition of appearance so long as the opposition is grasped as an antinomy.

Hegel addressed the issues involved in this progress from one appearance to another. For him it is precisely the essence of appearance to be constantly mediating itself or mutating into other appearances and so becoming a *world*.⁶² As this tendency to such mediation, appearance is not only immediacy (being), nor indeed merely the immediacy of the essential difference (semblance). Hegel elevates it to an immediacy of negativity itself, which shows itself in appearance to be its totality moment. The simple expression of its totality is the 'law of appearance', as expressed by Kant e.g. in the principles, which are the persistent settings of unambiguous, positive determinacy in the variations of what is immediately appearing.⁶³ Now precisely *because* it can only mediate unambiguous determinacy and indeed seeks to do no more, the Kantian principle does not attain the concreteness of what is to be determined. It attains neither the 'particular laws' of nature⁶⁴ nor even the determinate immediacy of appearance, which precisely for that reason remains finite and devoid of totality. What immediately appears remains "always other" and a merely empirical concept; it remains the object of external reflection, while simply conceiving of the law is more than that and already has to count as *determining*. The law determines appearance from a ground that is at once alien to it (as immediate ground) but also (as appearance) not alien to it, namely from the form of the understanding reflecting itself into itself, i.e. as general contextuality. Mediation with the form of totality in fact has to be accomplished from the self of the consciousness of the determinate—in Kantian language: from the transcendental apperception—just as for Kant all my impressions have to be capable of being accompanied by the "I think". Likewise it is from the self that consciousness becomes *certain* that it is saying something and not nothing when it determines appearance. On its own external reflection can never give this certainty—just as it prefers to have its own self in others: in specific collections of representations of the sciences, in majorities and public opinions or simply confined to the externalising empirical. Transcendental reflection in contrast achieved a tranquility and certainty of its own, as only it can communicate the connection to the negative form principle of

62 Cf. just Hegel, *Encyc.* § 132.

63 Hegel places the double concept of appearance exactly in the middle of the *Logic of Essence* in the SoL (indeed as the middle section of *Essence* and as the middle chapter of this section), so it actually forms the midpoint of the SoL as a whole. For the 'law of appearance' cf. above all Hegel, SoL 500 ff., GW XI 342 ff. and Hegel, *Encyc.* § 133.

64 Cf. Kant, *CpR*: B 165; B 197 f./A 158 f.; Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (CPJ): *Introduction* IV; *First Introduction* IV (esp. AA XX, 210).

individuality. It attained that by repelling itself from appearance or positive determinacy *to itself*, such that it knows itself to be principle simultaneously of the understanding and of what is understood.⁶⁵ Despite Hume Kant's understanding does arrive at setting contents, which it knows to be grounded in it as principle *and for that reason* knows to be sufficiently determinate. But as long as these contents are just univocal determinates, only positivities, the understanding remains only the injunction to absolute form, an ought, a reflexive

65 For the repulsion of the self in transcendental philosophy one can call upon Hegel's concept of the 'absolute counterthrust' (cf. Hegel, SoL 401, 444, GW XI 251, 291 and *passim*), which, as one could say, determines the original 'forest clearing of light' in consciousness, even if it is immediately concealed from consciousness. Conscious understanding, i.e. its own motion of elimination coming out of the conscious negating of the merely ontic into the nothingness of consciousness itself as the '*motion of nothing to nothing and thereby back to itself*' (SoL 400, GW XI 250), has in this repulsion its "broken" medium term; from out of it extends all relations and hence what is understandable. External reflection no longer knows or does not yet know that the doubling of determination as a whole is to be set in *one* relation, in which it shows itself to be the same as the reflection's original "counterthrust". The problem in broader terms is: the coming to itself of reflection is to be determined such that in this *ipso facto* determination comes to itself and as being of the self becomes understandable. D. Henrich did a great service by considering in detail this problem of the 'self-relation and determination relation', drawing upon the concept of negation (including that in the logic of being, namely alterity) as logical instrumentarium for the main issue and with that explaining the relation between essence and semblance (cf. his *Hegels Logik der Reflexion*, revised edition in *Hegel-Studien* suppl. 18, Bonn 1978, 203–324; loc. cit. 232). For the solution to this problem it is indeed the case, as Henrich explains, that a relation needs to be logically presented in which essence is at once *identical* to being *and opposed* to it (cf. 234), i.e. the opposition that the essence is itself has to develop itself such that it still comprehends the opposition of this opposition and its other (undifferentiated being), (we will pursue the same issue below in relation to the infinite judgment). In addition Henrich's development in terms of the logic of negation reveals how it is that from the simple negating motion (of consciousness) 'absolute alterity' (265) must emerge: this happens precisely there where negation becomes self-referential (in real-philosophical terms: when consciousness becomes self-consciousness), i.e. then also when in this motion reflection as being is no longer immediately negated (intended). The alterity that emerges is one that 'sustains' itself (cf. 271). But if the self-maintenance of the other is seriously known, then in that the other in its own way is already the substance that has become subjective and no longer merely a semblance (reflex) of essence; it is as in its own way negating, and *eodem actu* with this, infinitely related to itself, which absolute mediation has to be presented by the concept. Also important is Henrich's observation that self-relation is only in the *ground* (as far as it knows itself to be its own ground for its negating action, that is also ground of external action) no longer subordinated to determination (cf. 273). In grounding it is seen that the immediate setting up of determinations cannot be 'capable of truth' but that this only happens when subjective mediation determines immediate determining. This logical constellation is claimed by us here for Kant as well.

image—no matter that it nevertheless remains automotion⁶⁶—grasping of the contents as of one relation, and even if all this remains confined to the medium of consciousness, the understanding is still knowledge of the totality within the content.

Working with the Kantian terms of things and understanding, externals and internals and the *as*, nature and freedom, logic, morality and religion means regarding the absolute form in a mirror that reflects the image at a specific angle of refraction. It is a speech form that seeks to bind language to the opposition of consciousness in a definite way and this binding does not proceed without principles. This is why Hegel's objection will be that consciousness itself can only be one side of the complete disjunction of the self and only a moment of that; it is no more than the positive and intended unity of self-determination and never the *actuality* of self and self-determination. Even if Kant's reflected absolute form does indeed repel itself from appearance back to itself, only Hegel's concept can negate the whole sphere of appearance together with its merely reflexive self-relation and move away from the form of what is no more than an essential and finite relationality of determination and the self. It is in this regard characteristic that Hegel's critique of Kant prefers to start with what Hegel calls Kant's 'storytelling' of the many categories, whose merely immediate difference is accepted as given, persistent.⁶⁷ The fact is however that this difference has its persistence precisely in that it lies in the "blind spot" of consciousness, which *itself* as the opposition of reflection is not capable of elevating itself to 'the category' (devoid of opposition), whose claim to reason is vindicated in the *Phenomenology*.⁶⁸ The science of absolute form, logic, is essentially the science of the differences of the categories but of these differences as constitutive relations and their own self-mediations, which is why 'the

66 'As progress, the motion (of reflection in 'going beyond the immediate') turns immediately back into itself and is only in this way automotion' (SoL 402, GW XI 252). The concept of 'turning back', 'reversal', of 'inversion' or μεταβολή, which in the absolute sense is always reflection and thus includes a μετάνοια, will become important for our determination of the individual.

67 For Hegel's critique of Kant on this point cf. Hegel, TW 20, 392 f., 345 f.; Hegel, SoL 63, GW XXI 48; GW XI 42, SoL 786 f., GW XII 203 f.; Hegel, Encyc. § 42 and *passim*. In the observation to this paragraph in the *Encyclopaedia* Hegel recognises in *Fichte's* philosophy ... the profound contribution' of 'pointing out that the *terms of thought* are to be demonstrated *in their necessity*, that they must be essentially *derived*'; cf. Hegel, TW 20, 401. Fichte undertook 'the first rational attempt the world has ever known to derive the categories'. The context is presented systematically and along the lines of Hegel's development by L. Lugarini in his *La „confutazione della filosofia critica*, see his *Prospettive hegeliane* op. cit. 77–10, esp. 104 ff.

68 Cf. Hegel, GW IX 134 ff.

liberation from the opposition of consciousness', which confines it to plurality, is its prerequisite.⁶⁹ In the concept in Hegel's sense the plurality of consciousness is a moment mediated by the whole form in equality with the absence of opposition; here plurality is itself also *determined* as consciousness, i.e. it has already entered into a higher opposition that sets it and appearance as well as the determination given in itself as overcome. The other of consciousness is then no longer what it took this to be, its "intentional correlate", its "object" but an other free of external intention that instead eliminates the positive representation of it by itself. It is a free other only not now in the sense of something consciously freely *determined*, nor merely abstract as an *indeterminate*, a freely set other that would be merely without relation and dead; now it is *related* in the concept that has become free *in* the relation and preserves the freedom of the entire relation. Liberation from all images and representations happens through and to the speculative concept; it is liberation in a "proportion" of consciousness to what is for it the thoroughly "dark" or even "blind" activity of *its* other, something which as proportion is a form of connection that is *capable of truth*, which is moreover as whole completely *incommensurable* to all fixed content and to merely identical significance. It is in consequence not known in finite knowledge but only in the *absolute knowing* that understands itself in terms of itself.⁷⁰

To get a better grasp of the systematic relevance of the issue of consciousness for the problem of philosophical form we shall now take a look at the question of consciousness as it was considered after Kant, above all in the work of Reinhold and Fichte. *Image* or *representation* was treated occasionally by Kant in terms of faculty psychology. Against this Reinhold tried to approach it in more strictly philosophical terms by regarding it as *definable* by means of the *relation* of consciousness.⁷¹ As a 'simple concept fundamental to consciousness itself',⁷² for Reinhold representation is not capable of immediate definition. But it is also true that consciousness constitutes the highest philosophically presentable relation, which is how it is referred to in the 'principle

69 Hegel, SoL 49, 51, GW XXI 33, 35.

70 For the expression 'proportion' cf. first the relevant chapter of Hegel's *Jena Logic* of 1804/5 (GW VII, 105–125), which is the preparation for the later theory of ideas. In a certain sense the Kantian modalities too will turn out to be proportions, the utterance of which has its ground in absolute knowing.

71 Of course Kant did not produce a dogmatic science of representation, instead he initiated a science of *representing*; cf. the letter from K. A. Wilmans reproduced in Kant's *Streit der Fakultäten* (AA VII, 69).

72 Reinhold, K.L. *Über das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens*, ed. W.H. Schrader, Hamburg 1987, 79.

of consciousness', the definition of representation *qua* moment of consciousness or as mediated within consciousness and this makes it 'the highest of all possible definitions'.⁷³

The original, composed, explainable concept (that of representation) ... *results* from consciousness and is determined by the facts that constitute it, namely the *differentiation* of the representation, in itself inexplicable, and the *relating* of same to object and subject and by the *principle* expressing these facts.⁷⁴

Transforming the theory of representation into one of consciousness is logically presented as rendering the immediate of representation in relations within a relation, whose moments are (1) a differentiating, (2) a relating and (3) the expression of the whole. When Reinhold designates consciousness differentiated within itself in this way as its 'fundament', indeed:

as genus and in its species as *sole and complete fundament of the elementary philosophy*, both for the *general* and for the *particular forms*,⁷⁵

he opens up the possibility for a moment of clearly formulating the philosophical problem centred in the issue of consciousness. But then the limit of Reinhold's initiative was already demonstrated by Fichte's approach to the problem. For Fichte it is no longer possible to bring together the terms of consciousness in only one sentence, especially if the relata of the active (representing) relation, namely the immediate representation together with subject and object, are supposed to remain passive extremes. Fichte himself proceeds immediately on the assumption of the relation of consciousness as a whole, as a self-differentiating totality and as such as a matter of pure mediation as present being. If we now inquire after the 'fundament of all consciousness', this has to remain in the *immanence* of mediation or itself lead to a consciousness known to be simultaneously the foundation of the empirical consciousness that is to be grounded.⁷⁶ Fichte was driven from the doubling that consciousness has in

73 Op. cit. 78.

74 Op. cit. 79. The 'principle of consciousness' is well known in the following form: 'that the representation in consciousness is by the subject differentiated from object and subject and related to both' (78, the entire quotation is in italics in the original).

75 Op. cit. 80, 107.

76 According to § 1 of the *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* it is about the 'action (*Tathandlung*)...', that does not appear among the empirical terms of our consciousness,

its own right as generally intending “something”, to a second doubling but this time of this first consciousness itself. Consciousness differentiates itself here as empirical (immediacy of opposition) from itself as pure consciousness immediate to itself (immediacy of the absence of opposition in the sense of the *intellectual intuition*).⁷⁷ The second difference of consciousness is that between being and its reflection-in-itself. So then Fichte also goes on to determine the task of philosophy from this doubling of consciousness, which can be made explicit as ‘two very different series of behaviours of the spirit’ or as ‘a double series of being and observing, of the real and the ideal’.⁷⁸ Fichte emphasises that the task of philosophy is only to be *freely* undertaken⁷⁹ and as such it is: watching, the “observation” of the immediate actions of the I in order to bring the *forms*, i.e. the modes of relation to the other reflected in themselves, into view in which empirical consciousness seeks to balance itself with itself and to unify itself to itself (theoretically or practically). Empirical consciousness in general displays a tendency to balancing with itself—for it: of itself with the object requiring (theoretical) categories—and this is the mark of the higher consciousness reflecting itself into itself within empirical consciousness. Clearly it remains only an indication and is not yet free, philosophical cognition.⁸⁰

From Hegel’s standpoint the formulation of the problem of consciousness by the (young) Fichte shows above all insight into the logical nature of the opposition characterised by self-doubling. As we have seen, it is not possible to conceive of an antinomical relation without simultaneously having to think of a relation *to this relation*, which would be itself antinomically opposed to the first relation (namely identifying instead of separating). If one wanted to

neither can it appear there but which instead lies at the foundation of all consciousness, alone making it possible’ (Fichte, ww 1, 91). The ‘action’ here is the self-relating of the first relation, to be determined as something like self-grounding or self-determination (cf. ww 1, 98); this seeks to give itself shape and externality in the ‘syntheses’ to be attained.

77 ‘All possible consciousness, as what is objective to a subject, presupposes an immediate consciousness in which the subjective and the objective would be simply one’ (*Neue Darstellung*) ww 1, 528.

78 Cf. *Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre*, ww 1, 454 as well as *Neue Darstellung (Erste Einleitung)*, ww 1, 436.

79 Cf. *ibid.*, ww 1, 429.

80 The context leads to the problem of self-consciousness, which for Hegel Fichte had not properly grasped. Self-consciousness is called ‘immediate’ at the point already quoted ww 1, 528. The *Wissenschaftslehre* knows it *qua* pure I as *conditioning* the objective world of empirical consciousness in the sense of *determining* it (cf. *Zweite Einleitung* ww 1, 476 f.). The determination of both sides of consciousness by each other cannot happen only in one direction, for empirical consciousness something would in that case be only some sort of ‘material’ for formation by self-consciousness; nevertheless it remains the case, as Hegel says, that empirical consciousness is a *condition* for self-consciousness (cf. Hegel, TW 2, 65).

sum up Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in one sentence then one could say that what is shown in it is that the nature of consciousness is one of the self-doubling opposition that overcomes itself absolutely out of the doubling. What the *Phenomenology* did was basically put an end to all philosophy of consciousness including that of Fichte. Hegel always recognised in Fichte that he:

‘first brought the knowing of knowledge to consciousness’ and in that elevated himself above common consciousness.⁸¹

But one could sharpen this to say that what happened was that the knowing of knowledge was *only* brought to consciousness; the elevation whose form is ‘artificial consciousness’ merely iterates the form of alterity of the consciousness relation such that ‘alterity is taken as in itself, unconditioned’ instead of returning back ‘into absolute self-consciousness’.⁸² Fichte’s deductions or syntheses remain ‘only an alternation of self-consciousness and other-consciousness and the infinite progress of this alternation’.⁸³ The connection to the empirical, which is precisely what one is supposed to elevate oneself above, is in this way constantly restored. The empirical itself is not overcome into the doubled opposition—into the form in which respectively higher and higher complexes are supposed to mediate it and bring relation to it—or, to use an expression of Hegel’s *Difference essay*, it does not enter into the ‘system’ of mediation but remains the external ‘condition’ of that system.⁸⁴

Fichte’s knowing of knowledge in the form of consciousness is necessarily an intending of intending. In that it is in its own way free and has no option but to move exclusively throughout the domain of reflection, differentiated from the other domain of *being*, while knowing itself to be external to that—external such that it is of the opinion that it can present the latter domain in the form of the ought. On the other hand it is precisely by virtue of this externality that it is merely finite and not absolute knowing. Absolute knowing, or in Hegel’s terms conceptual cognition, is in no way completely “unconditioned”—even the premisses of the syllogism are in certain respects conditions on its inference. Instead it is a cognition that knows the conditions to be *its own* simply in that *it knows*, so precisely *for that reason* it does not elevate them immediately into the topic.

81 Hegel, TW 20, 393.

82 Ibid. 398.

83 Ibid. 399.

84 Cf. *ibid.* 61 where what Fichte lacks is further specified as lying in the fact that the actions corresponding to the first two principles are not ‘absolutely opposed actions in the system’.

In contrast dispensing with thematising would have been seen by Fichte as dispensing with subjectivity and freedom. For him, as indeed for almost all philosophy after him, it was held as established and accepted that the spheres of free subjectivity and of consciousness are identical. This situation is clearly not to be helped by a subsequent direct “making conscious” nor by a critique of the “conscious” intention of achieving that effect, as it was actually thought possible to manage certain apories that must follow from it, i.e. with critiques in the name of the “unconscious”, of the “body”, of the “writing system” and so on. That would do no more than reproduce the criticised form in other positive contents. When philosophy speaks of moments of knowledge that are not intendable in terms of the understanding, then that means *neither* that this opacity is to be artificially illuminated for consciousness, *nor* that it is to be spread around somehow just as artificially. For the “need of philosophy” in general is to *understand itself* conceptually in terms of the other of consciousness, which understanding can be the only answer to a situation of awareness pushed to the point of perversion.⁸⁵

In the *Difference essay* we read:

‘speculation ... in its highest synthesis of the conscious and the unconscious’ demands ‘also the destruction of consciousness itself’.⁸⁶

What we have here is the philosophical problem of the presentation of absolute form and not at all with some kind of “mysticism” bereft of the concept. A final look at the first of the Jena fragments on the philosophy of spirit may make this clear. When it talks of the task of presenting ‘the absolute reality of consciousness’,⁸⁷ this does not mean a positive determination, it means comprehending the self-determination of consciousness, i.e. its own realisation. Then again consciousness here does not generate its own determination only as a form of reflection as in Fichte, for such a determination would remain merely conscious without being that of ‘absolute consciousness’,⁸⁸ it would not be its absolute reality. For this the whole double opposition of consciousness has to

85 J. Simon in his book *Wahrheit als Freiheit*, Berlin and New York 1978, investigates philosophically the meaning of the persistent opacity and objective indeterminacy of the individual especially in the framework of the problem of truth; for Simon ‘the kernel of Hegel’s concept of truth’ consists in the fact that ‘such a negative knowing’ of the ‘opacity ... simultaneously has positive meaning’ (222).

86 Hegel, TW 2, 35. Cf. on this Hölderlin, *Anmerkungen zur Antigone*, ed. cit. II, 785: ‘It is a great help to the soul working in secret, that in the highest consciousness it moves away from consciousness.’

87 GW VI, 274 (fragment 18 of the *System der spekulativen Philosophie* 1803/4).

88 Ibid.

overcome itself into a being in which the mediation effecting that overcoming, the medium term *is*. This being of the medium term is the *work*, the *product*. In its work consciousness is strictly medium term but it is that as simultaneously the process of connecting with the opposed term of its reality (reflection) as well as being ‘itself an opposition’,⁸⁹ i.e. a mediation (being) itself determined by the middle term that is other to it. Absolute determination of consciousness gives rise to the syllogism of the self, consciousness reflected into itself on the one side and being that is other to itself on the other, or, which here is the same thing, of consciousness other to itself and being reflected into itself. The well-known triad of such middle terms in the Jena system drafts is: language, tool and the good.⁹⁰ In all of them consciousness is no longer merely appearance but instead in a true relation is simultaneously present “unconsciously”. But then in this way the knowledge that is the object of philosophy is also present, self-understanding in its own present being as other to itself, the knowledge of the fact that ‘I’ in its other ‘is present’⁹¹ and how its own pathway to that is to be understood. This knowledge,⁹² as already indicated, is completely incommensurable with every objective and in general conscious knowing; consequently it is not a possible object for any finite relation to it. Only in the cases of art and religion can one say that they have this knowledge in the form “general objective relation”. Philosophy does not have it; philosophy is it.

In this investigation the aim will be to present the terms of absolute form in Kant and in Hegel, individuality as this form itself and the concepts of actuality, possibility and necessity as the form’s own modifications of itself, i.e. as concepts in which absolute form is incommensurably present in its self-relating. The modalities should show themselves to be concepts that only produce an actual knowing from objective determinations by translating them into *individual meaning* and generating philosophical form with them. Between Kant and Hegel there is on this point a fundamental agreement that is put into question neither by the difference in logical status found in the two, which has already been discussed, nor by the differences in the exposition of these concepts that have still to be worked out in detail. And if it is possible to let both *speak philosophically* from their respective principles, this would indeed be an agreement in the form that is the individually absolute power of speech.

89 Ibid. 275.

90 Ibid. 277.

91 Cf. Hegel, GW IX, 276.

92 Already from the ‘reason of language’ it is clear that anyone who ‘knows’ e.g. how to handle something, possesses more than merely conscious knowing; instead they understand in this sense while also still knowing consciously a great deal which does not understand itself. One thinks further of Plato’s τέχνη-cognition as well as of the statement of Democritus: πολυνοῖν, οὐ πολυμαθὴν ἀσκέειν χρή (fragment 65).

Kant and Hegel

1 Critique and System

‘Beyond unity towards totality’—this is how what occurred philosophically between Kant and Hegel has often been understood, with varying assessments of the intentions behind it but primarily with an appreciation of the success of the undertaking. Rotenstreich uses this formula especially in the sense of departing from a universality that is not strongly comprehensive—the principle of unity of Kant’s merely “accompanying” I-think—and the advance to a form of universality in Hegel’s concept of spirit. Dieter Henrich has ably developed this latter in recent times. Henrich has demonstrated that as a self-differentiating form of *self*-relation Hegel’s spirit also *contains* the absolute concept of the *other*, something which remains *strictly external* in all merely reflexive kinds of self-relation.¹ Now if Kant’s unity and the plurality remaining outside it can be regarded *sub specie spiritus* as moments of a *totality* uniting them, then it is also clear from the *logical* progress the *concept* of spirit brings with it that the lack of totality is a defect of *form* and not something that would be supplied by further content.

Since Kant it is fundamentally impossible to avoid the question of totality, so even blanket statements like the claim that “if the *all* is to be arrived at, it will always be refracted by *some* content or other” are no help in avoiding it. Kant’s transcendental apperception is not simply an arbitrary subsumption universal, which naturally remains contingent and external to everything that falls under it. Given the logic of the matter it is always possible that other and more matter falls under it without ever reaching the *totality* of these cases. The universality even of Kant’s I-think is indeed *synthetic*, if in this case with a formal limitation that will be considered in detail below. Briefly put, a true universal such as Hegel’s concept generates itself as totality by *particularising itself* into two species or moments, which as a complete disjunction

1 Cf. N. Rotenstreich, *Legislation and Exposition. Critical Analysis of Differences between the Philosophy of Kant and Hegel*. Hegel-Studien suppl. 24, Bonn 1984, 37 ff. Readers will be unsatisfied with Rotenstreich’s discussion of the concept of spirit (as ‘animating principle’, 44, along with its historical ‘derivation’ for instance). For the kernel of the concept refer rather to D. Henrich’s *Absoluter Geist und Logik des Endlichen in Hegel in Jena*, Hegel-Studien suppl. 20, Bonn 1980, 103–118.

present the *whole* determination of the universal, itself again nothing but their *connection* between those moments in their opposition. Carried out on the somewhat simplified example of the subject that particularises itself into subject and object, it becomes clear that the subject as *universal* relation is not a third to the terms of this difference but only the difference itself as the *connection between those differentiated terms*, just as the *particular* moments are what they are only by virtue of being related in the universal. Now the object is differentiated from the subject precisely in that it means “many objects” (particularisation as plurality), the plurality that is for the concept of the object correspondingly not merely quantitative and external but logically constitutive. None of this leads to the elimination of the form of totality of the entire relation, for this grasps, as one could say, each of the thoroughly *indeterminately* many objects still in this plurality as its own connection to the subject and *reflects* it as something objective, i.e. as a particular moment into the universality of the subject. In this sense totality is not externally claimed as an ought but is instead *genetically defined* via the truly universal concept and presented as such.

Kant and Hegel agree completely that science presupposes:

always an idea ... of the form of a whole of cognition prior to the determinate cognition of the parts and contains the conditions required *a priori* to determine for each part its position and relation to the others.²

Thus the transcendental analytic presupposes the ‘*idea of the whole* of understanding’s *a priori* cognition’ and that the ‘completeness’ of its concepts is not ‘merely an aggregate accumulated by trial and error’ (listen carefully now:) but is ‘only possible through their *connections in a system*’—a system that again is just the understanding itself as a universal to be particularised, for it is ‘a unity constant and sufficient unto itself, not to be augmented through any additions externally attaching to it.’³ The understanding itself is its own immediate idea and what is lacking in the understanding must be in terms of form a systematic development of this idea, i.e. genetically definable.

² Kant, CpR B 673/A 645.

³ CpR B 89 f./A 64 f. Cf. also B 860 f./A 832 f. System is ‘the unity of manifold cognitions under an idea’ as a purposively ‘articulated’ whole that ‘can certainly grow internally (*per intus susceptionem*) but not externally (*per appositionem*)’—‘like an animal body’, as Kant adds. For Kant ‘in the idea’ an object is not *intended* in order to determine it as objectively isolated but instead it is held within the whole of determination as if it were a completely mediated immanent moment of knowledge.

The concept “system” as a form of totality does not mean in Kant, and certainly not in Hegel, some kind of positive *stock*. It is rather a determinate, indeed absolutely formal moment of motion that is presented in detail in the theory of method in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. ‘In the speculative use of pure reason’ in the terms of the critique the method cannot be a ‘*dogmatic one*’ but ‘is always *systematic*’.⁴ Now ‘systematic progress in doing philosophy’ consists according to Hegel ‘really speaking in nothing other than knowing what one has already said’.⁵ Doing philosophy systematically here means: being clear with oneself about *absence*, knowing how to deal properly with that which is *necessarily* not in consciousness, to remain conscious of what has been and the other things in immediate relation—in relation that is to all that “one *has* said” without having to say it again now, without being required to *intend* and to have “present to one’s mind” everything all at once or even as much as possible of it. Doing philosophy systematically entails being certain about the idea and within that of the inclusion of what has been excluded. Kant developed this systematic cognition as *critique*. This is not some sort of highly refined scepticism but a systematic answer to scepticism. The sceptical argument is usually presented by referring in general to the *difference* between what is absent and what is present, to the unconscious and the known, to (immediate) condition and the matter itself, to outer and inner, etc. To the extent that this difference *is*, scepticism is right to call it a *semblance*. But then often enough even with that nothing has really been said. Philosophy has just as often responded to such claims by pointing out that given differences of this kind, where they are correctly claimed and *seem* to apply to a whole of mediation, should not be taken as simply “linear” oppositions but instead in the sense of a philosophical “complementarity” that has to be precisely delineated. The concealed dogmatic tendency of scepticism reveals itself clearly whenever it raises one of its implicit demands for instance that what is absent in fact must really be present. Now while consciously positioning itself with respect to that, it avoids taking it seriously *as* what is absent. Thus Hume wanted to see the problem of induction as lying in an immediate opposition of universality and singularity in the form of *law*. Kant determines this opposition anew as a *transcendental* difference such that it is no longer only an existing difference *qua* lack of mediation but a difference as the mediation of determination: a difference certainly in the form of law and of the countless—as always uncounted—“cases” of this form in its application only for Kant in *relation to the unity* of all application.

4 CpR B 765/A 737.

5 Hegel, TW 4, 434 f.

The difference has its *own* determination only in relation to this unity, a unity which the difference mediates into plurality. The difference is understood in general as middle term—but then regarding differences as middle terms is again precisely what doing philosophy systematically means.

The critical philosophy turns a specific semblance [*Schein*] of scepticism into what is eminently amenable to mediation, especially: into *appearance* [*Erscheinung*]. The “many” appears [*er-scheint*] only out of unity. The critical philosophy presents that systematic unity it demands in general here in this special case. Kant distinguishes clearly between critique and system. For him ‘philosophy’ as ‘the system of rational cognition through concepts’ has to be strictly separated ‘from a critique of pure reason’.⁶ The critique is ‘certainly a philosophical investigation of the possibility of that kind of [i.e. systematical-ly constituted rational] knowledge’; it belongs ‘however not as a part to such a system’ but ‘drafts and examines’ for the first time ‘the very idea of such a thing’.⁷ With this Kant ultimately drew Hegel’s ridicule, that one is somehow supposed to know what knowing is even before knowing. There is indeed in Kant a strange separation of the philosophical form of language into two halves or spheres, which are clearly not to be taken as disjuncts of a higher unity that is systematic because it divides itself into this opposition. The division even expresses itself in chronological terms between a ‘now’ or ‘first’ and a ‘then’ or ‘some day’.⁸ This difference within the philosophical form of language is intimately related to a difference that the critique elsewhere lets stand. It is that between the general reflection-in-itself of the understanding, its self-mediation via the category forms possessing, as the transcendental deduction shows, still the *form* of perception and the content, given to perception and remaining external to that mediation, the manifold in not only perceptual-quantitative but precisely in qualitative terms, whose mediation can only be experience itself. The ground of all synthetic propositions *a posteriori* for Kant has to be the affection of the senses. Corresponding to

6 Kant, CPJ *First Introduction I*, AA XX, 195. Cf. CpR B 25/A 11.

7 CPJ *First Introduction I*, AA XX, 195.

8 Cf. just Kant, CpR B 25 f./A 11 ff.: ‘*Critique*’ is ‘*propaedeutic* to the system of pure reason’, ‘a preparation, ... at most’ in order to present ‘at some time the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason’. Even Fichte is of the opinion, ‘that Kant in no way *set up* such a system’, although he certainly ‘*thought of*’ it and further ‘that all he actually presents are fragments and results of this system and that his claims only have meaning and context on this assumption’ (Fichte, *Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre*, WW I, 478). It is very rewarding to read Kant’s *Opus postumum* with reference to this absent system, even if one must come to the conclusion that it is in fact about a reflection form of the system. Cf. also Kant, AA XII, 370 f. Kant’s reaction to Fichte’s ‘presumption’ (371).

that only under an “as-if” of reflection do we have a “system of experience”, i.e. a concordance of the particular laws of nature with a teleological whole, whose general form simultaneously determines the principles of the understanding. The thesis on the relation between the refraction of the philosophical form of language, i.e. into the “present” of a critique and the mere “future” of a system, and the difference between the self-mediating form and an immediate given always lying outside this mediation is thus to be made explicit in the following terms. As the *intending* of cognition the critique in a certain sense presents itself as external or *external to itself*—as “something” that refers to something else—but precisely for that reason in fact it must distance from itself the *systematic* structure of cognition, the structure of which Kant himself says that it develops only *per intus susceptionem*, through internalisation of the external, and declare it to be a beyond. The critique’s *position* on cognition is that we only know appearances, that we do not really know and instead only generate determinate semblance; this position means that the system does *not* appear.

Now we do not have to stand still here lamenting Kant’s missing presentation of philosophy in the form of reason, which, as already mentioned, does not refer immediately to objects but to their connection (their “syllogism”, their contextuality); instead we can concentrate on the systematics we do find in the critique even under the restriction mentioned. Not surprisingly it is the didactic texts, of principal interest in the study of Kant, in which his version of a true universal appears again and again together with its systematic presentation. Prominent in all this is the exposition of the *principle of unity* as the universal of *every* relation of the understanding, all the way down to the connection to perception (the transcendental deduction of the categories). Then there is also the principal *difference* between the form of understanding and sense content as particularisation of the *identical* relation of the inner sense (schematism), which one could call the analytic of the universal of experience (its possibility) and that of its specification (its actuality).⁹ In the first case Kant calls the moment of systematicity that we are considering here:

9 It is not unimportant to separate properly the two parts of the system that Kant distinguishes as the *Analytic of the concepts* and the *Analytic of the principles* and e.g. not to get the purpose of the schematism chapter mixed up with that of the transcendental deduction, to which unfortunately the theory of the *synthesis speciosa* in the deduction B has often given occasion. In its middle section the deduction has to demonstrate a self-differentiation of identity, while the schematism chapter as a whole has to demonstrate a self-identifying of (assumed) difference.

a spontaneity of determining the inner sense through the manifold of given representations according to the synthetic unity of apperception.¹⁰

It is that from the claim of an active continuation of the understanding itself into the specific intuition according to 'our' forms of sensibility. The totality of the understanding in its different forms is thus essentially to be conceived of as the self-active motion of an expansion not only in extension (§§ 20 f. of the deduction) but also into the specifics.¹¹ In the case of schematism the connection between the determinate 'picture' of an object and its concept becomes perceptible in time as a form of totality, to the extent that is that time contains 'the formal condition of the inner sense manifold and therefore of the connection between *all* representations',¹² thus even as they flow into each other the difference remains continuous while held in their unity. In both cases the systematicity or totality is characterised by its *active* (deduction) or *passive* (schema) becoming or arising out of what is respectively presupposed. Its systematic character *is* in this becoming, which Kant describes as inner action or as the 'general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its picture'.¹³ Hegel considered this more of a real-philosophical approach instead of comprehending it logically. At any rate it is in this becoming, to bring it down to a simple concept, immanent infinity. But then this is a "characteristic" of the philosophical concept not completely excluded from the critique, if only kept divided within reflection. The critique thus presents infinity as immediate being, e.g. that of the spontaneity of the understanding, which establishes a relation between the form of the understanding and our intuition in a manner that is not commensurable. It establishes it *also* as the opposite of a being, namely as an ought of mediation in the idea and this second infinity is commensurable with the positive, indeed with everything positive.¹⁴ The

10 Kant, CpR B 150.

11 On the division of the deduction with particular respect to individualisation, i.e. simultaneous acquisition of intuition via the form of activity of the *synthesis speciosa* cf. J. Simon, „Anschauung überhaupt“ und „unsere Anschauung“. *Zum Beweisgang in Kants Deduktion der Naturkategorien in Perspektiven transzendentaler Reflexion* (FS G. Funke), Bonn 1989, 135–156.

12 CpR B 177/A 138; author's emphasis.

13 Ibid. B 178 f./A 140.

14 For the critical insight on the level of what is presented (the positive) the infinite can only emerge as an ought and in that sense in terms of potentiality. Already in *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis* § 1 note 2 (AA 11, 388), Kant introduced the (mathematical) infinite as a *relation concept*, namely of unity (as the basic measure) to plurality. Human measuring, which is always no more than a question of applying a unit measure and 'absolvendo hunc progressum tempore finito', reaches only a *determinate* concept (in

first infinity is regarded by the critique as only standing in relation to objective consciousness; it definitely does not claim itself to be conscious or intentional. In contrast the infinite series of positives in the mediation of the idea is consciously executed and indeed science is tasked with making it conscious.

If we can now say that systematicity does not have the formal character of a *product* but the character of the actual infinite, namely that of a self-producing, autopoietic relation (concept), then this means that we have understood also Kant's *a priori* of synthetic forms as the immediate systematicity of these forms. On the *a priori* both are true: it is neither a "something" that could in linear fashion be related to other somethings—with respect to the determination of the something it is instead infinite—nor *must* there necessarily be a determinate realisation of its synthetic form (for Kant, experience). The critique does not claim that the activity of pure intending (e.g. in one of the sciences) could encounter an *a priori* and would be able to deal with this just as it does with its other objects. For *logic* the *a priori* aspect is systematicity when for 'the division from the principle of synthesis *a priori*' it is a particular form, i.e. it has to be *trichotomy*.¹⁵ The logical theory of method addresses itself to this because while a purely (formal) logical division always turns out to be *dichotomy*,¹⁶ an objective division referring either to pure intuition or to the empirical turns out in general to be *polytomic* and not necessarily consisting of three members.¹⁷ Looked at more closely in terms of the trichotomy of synthetic unity we do indeed have here a polytomy, since the first of its two members is itself a dichotomy. For Kant's explanation of trichotomy involves:

- 1) the concept, as the condition, 2) the conditioned and 3) the derivation of the latter from the former.¹⁸

mathematics: a specific number) and so does not produce a presentation of the *infinitum actu*. But for Kant this does not mean that its concept is completely meaningless; it is much more the (qualitative-quantitative) concept of a '*multitudo omni numero maior*' and not completely opaque, if it is only so in relation to the successive-serial procedure of the discursive 'intellectus humanus', which cannot carry it out. Another (intuitive) understanding certainly could do that.

15 Kant, *Jäsche Logik* § 113; cf. the corresponding statement in CPJ B LVII Obs.

16 'For all true disjunction can only be *bimembris* and logical disjunction is also *bimembris*' (*Jäsche Logik* § 77).

17 'Polytomy cannot be accepted in logic; for it requires *knowledge of the object*' (*Jäsche Logik* § 113 Obs. 2).

18 Ibid. In the corresponding statement (cf. note 15) the members are called: '1) Condition, 2) a conditioned, 3) the concept emerging from the unification of the conditioned with its condition', in which 'concept' in the third position is to be taken as 'sum' or 'summary'. For the form of trichotomy one can naturally still refer to the well-known statements

But then 'condition' and 'conditioned' form a complete disjunction, i.e. a dichotomic division (if the difference between A and B is to be described by a relation of conditioning then A and B in the same respect can each only be either condition or conditioned). The third member, the 'derivation' of the relation itself is what then makes out of the remaining members of the dichotomy, fixed as they are in opposition, a *system* which then again *only* really consists in the fact that the conditioned is presented *as* conditioned by that condition, as the latter's conditioned member and not any old conditioned member, i.e. when the conditioning is performed in opposition to *the condition*. In the form of the synthetic unity *a priori* as Kant sees it infinity or the system lies in the transition to the *conclusio*, which then only expresses the whole synthesis as the unity of the difference between its 'premisses'.¹⁹ The

in § 11 of the CpR (B), in which it is also said 'that the third category' of any of the four three-member titles 'as a whole emerges from the connection between the second and the first of their class' while also not being any 'merely derived' concept of the understanding, since 'the connection of the first and second in order to produce the third concept' requires 'a special *actus* of the understanding' (B 110 f.). In one of his posthumously published reflections discussing trichotomy with respect to the categories it is justified by saying that 'two of the same (sc. categories) that showed the unity of consciousness in two *opposites* with the third reconnecting the two sides of consciousness. More kinds of unity of consciousness cannot be conceived. For it is a) a matter of a consciousness that combines plurality, b) another that combines in an opposite way: then we have c) the combination of a) and b)' (R 5854). By the way, J. Simon gives a systematic of the categories of nature in his study *Kategorien der Freiheit und der Natur* in Koch, D. and Borst, K. eds. *Kategorie und Kategorialität* (fs K. Hartmann), Würzburg 1990, 107–130 precisely in reference to consciousness and the Kantian modi of holding something to be true with respect to differentiating states of 'affections' of its 'conviction'. It turns out that 'every single category can be understood as a *combination* of modalities of its title and its *position* under this title' (117). Thus the contradiction-free and to that extent possible acceptance of a determinate term in the context of an (immediate and unfounded) *holding of an opinion* leads to the category of unity, since the holding of an opinion of this determinate term already knows itself to be analytically contained in itself. This contrasts with the exclusion founded in this context itself (thus subjectively) of what is determinate from the form of unity under the impression of an affection leading to the determination of plurality. Totality ultimately results if the 'opposed concept' constructed with respect to what has been excluded as the determinate term must be valid as *derived* from the form of unity and hence must be valid as content mediated over the *whole* context (118 f.). Such a pattern of the systematic of the categories can be valid as superior to a formal-constructive attempt as a 'completeness proof' and as more appropriate to Kant, since Kant never considers categories by themselves in the Hegelian sense determining their multiplicity only in relation to what is intuitive (here: the states of holding something to be true).

19 It should be noted in passing that the problem of infinity or of continuity as we encounter it here in the logic of the forms of synthetic unity has its equivalent in the problem of infinitesimals or of the constancy of the mathematical concept of function. One could

acquisition of the conditioned via the condition can here also be regarded as its realisation (further determining) and individualisation. Thus again in the course of the transcendental deduction it is the individualisation of the understanding, itself only the ideal condition of all making of experience, when it relates to a *conditioned* factor (determinate sense intuition) as *its* conditioned factor, which it can only do in a spontaneous—in respect to both the general understanding and to the manifold—*infinite* reversal of the opposing terms into a (real, because immanently *determined*) unity. As understanding we are for Kant the “derivation” of objectivity as *our* objectivity from the merely objective difference. The aspect of being “ours” itself is what is infinite and incommensurable developing as the systematic connecting of what is univocal and commensurable whose *a priori* character lies in the fact that it does not start with this but instead with itself.²⁰

easily bring out the references for the concept of derivation, as an example, or, as far as the Kantian concept of the idea is concerned, for its serial forms of presentation in the infinitesimal calculus. In *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*, Darmstadt 1980⁵, E. Cassirer impressively demonstrated the systematic internal structuring of mathematical concepts, e.g. that of number according to Dedekind (49 ff.) or already in Leibniz (56), and in that has identified what is not nominalistic in these concepts (56 f.) Starting from synthetic geometry he is able to grasp the universal genus of mathematical concepts as ‘concrete totality’, more precisely as ‘a *network of conditions* in which everything individual is ordered in an integrated manner, not as a dispersed whole of characteristics that uniformly return in it’ (p. 107). Maimon was the first to notice the formal identity between Kant’s term universal and the mathematical concept of function; moreover he understood the functional universal not without explicit reference to Leibniz as formal substance and turned this against Kant’s (hypothetical) form. Cf. also R. Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, Tübingen 1977³, I, pp. 356 ff.; for the mathematical aspect of the concept of infinity in Kant cf. Gr. Büchel, *Philosophie und Geometrie*, Kant-Studien suppl. 121, Berlin and New York 1987, 200 ff.

- 20 We do not intend in this framework to enter into the details of the very extensive discussion of the transcendental deduction and will limit ourselves to some references that stand more or less in relation to the form of synthetic unity in Kant that interests us. That the discussion of the heart of the transcendental analytic often does not attain very much clarity in the matter has, as we would like to suggest, inevitably to do with the fundamental amphiboly of the deduction itself. This lies in the need to produce the proof of a thesis of transcendental logic by means of objects that are to be approached only in terms of real philosophy (‘our intuition’, the power of imagination, perception etc.), as if one had to extract it out of that, whereas ultimately only intuitive evidence can be claimed. With K.W. Zeidler, *Die transzendente Geschichte des Ich. Deduktion und Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe* (*Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie* XVIII, 1986, 95–125) this difficulty can be compared to the task of proving the ‘reason of experience’ with clichés or hackneyed ideas from an ‘experience of reason’. Of course this ambiguity of the deduction (even of the B version, to which we principally refer) has not gone completely unnoticed; it has been registered above all in attempts to capture it through

If Kant explicates the form of synthetic unity according to the logic of the *condition relation*, then subsequently this will turn out to constitute a certain narrowing of this form. It is formally speaking the restriction of the form of synthetic unity to the hypothetical syllogism. That this became for Kant the decisive means by which he philosophically expressed himself is so obvious that explicit reference to the hypothetical form is hardly required. It is under this form that reason precisely in the antinomy questions after totality. Nor should reference be required to the formulation of the highest principle, to the special meaning of the causality category or to the second analogy of experience for the content-laden realisation of experience in its context or to

interpretative investigations, which for themselves were as a rule less successful. These include attempts to separate a 'validity' from a 'range' proof with reference to the application of the categories; such a distinction underlies D. Henrich's aporetic study *Die Beweisstruktur von Kants transzendentaler Deduktion* (in G. Prauss ed. *Kant*, Cologne 1973, 90–104). Henrich proceeds on the assumption of an 'only partial capability of the understanding to produce unity in the impressions of sense' (95). Others have tried to use the syllogistic form against a so-called 'juridical' proof of legitimacy, as if in such a proof it would among other things not be necessary to *infer* (cf. critically R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, *Neue Monographien zur Argumentationsstruktur von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft in Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 15, 1, 1990, 39–49, esp. 42 f.). The important point here would be to refer as much as possible to the logic of the figures of synthetic unity, to which Kant's 'brief outline' of his deduction (B 168 f.) offers a guide. (B. Thöle's division of the deduction procedure into three parts e.g. in connection with this position in the text, is in principle to be agreed with, cf. also Thöle, *Die Beweisstruktur der transzendentalen Deduktion in der zweiten Auflage der 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft'* in *Akten des 5. Int. Kant-Kongresses*, Bonn 1981, 302–312, esp. 302). This form should then be presented as no merely external connection of the *form of truth* ('validity' and 'meaning' of the categories) and the *form of certainty* ('use' of the same in *all* objective relations). Henrich takes up this challenge when he distinguishes between the (conscious) 'I-think' cases' and self-conscious certainty *a priori* such that the latter must simultaneously be capable of being thought of as 'actual performance' of consciousness, in the sense of a 'sum' in general of possible 'I-think' cases' (as systematic form), which sum 'makes it possible starting from each of these cases to make reference to all the other cases', 'and clearly both to the system as a whole, the content of which cannot have been defined as the content of one single "I-think" instance, as well as to each single other case' (cf. his *Die Identität des Subjekts in der transzendentalen Deduktion* in H. Oberer und G. Seel, *Kant*, Würzburg 1988, 39–70, loc. cit. 59, 63; cf. also by the same author *Identität und Objektivität*, Heidelberg 1978, esp. 65 ff.). Put in our language what has to be shown is this: that the category is absolute form, a whole that all conscious content has to satisfy which in terms of its totality can only be defined genetically from the form itself, while identical with that as a whole which itself can only be known *absolutely*. To this end we have a not unimportant contribution from H. Röttges, *Dialektik als Grund der Kritik*, Königstein Ts. 1981 where he emphasises the incommensurable unity of meaning and use of the categories (indeed not only in connection with the deduction).

the very well known leading question as to the “conditions of the possibility” of synthetic knowledge *a priori*. The hypothetical form assumes in Kant’s philosophy a systematic rank comparable to the developed negation concept in Hegel and what would need to be philosophically formulated is the difference between Kant’s and Hegel’s thinking ultimately only in reference to these two systematic fundamental forms. One thing that interests Kant in the relations of condition is the aspect of the irreversibility immanent to them; for this makes it possible to represent linear oppositions, as for instance scepticism raises them, as in truth complementary in which the two sides are precisely not arbitrarily referred to each other. “Irreversibility” or the directedness of the transition implies here an asymmetry in favour of the assumption in the position of the *condition* and with that also of what is taken as universal and stands against the given particular, the conditioned. Distinguished here in this way are a presupposed negative unity of mediation and a positive manifold of the immediate; thirdly also the relation of derivation, of the negative setting of the positive as conditioned. In the relation of condition the converse setting is not valid, so that the motion of derivation in its immediacy can be understood as teleological form, thus as a form that expresses (logical) subjectivity.²¹ That the subjectivity of the condition relation is an immediate one corresponds precisely to the reflection status of Kant’s philosophy in which reflection has its existence as such only in the “blind spot” of its purview. Once again Kant draws his critical power from the fact that he found a form in which he could refer differences to subjective unity and in this way turn the “and” of the immediate (e.g. sceptical) difference into an “as” of transcendental difference. But in Kant this “as” is only an existence in absolute position: ‘*that I am*’ is all of which I ‘am conscious of in the synthetic original unity of apperception’.²² In contrast all determinate consciousness of my existence comes already refracted through the form of the immediate “as” and I have ‘as a result no knowledge of myself *as I am* but only as I *appear* to myself’.²³ The I is the given mediation of *everything*

21 That the form of judgment corresponding to the causality category is the hypothetical judgment does not contradict the teleological moment emphasised here. As one can easily show from Hegel’s standpoint every notion of objective causality implies a concept of (external) teleology. If one wishes to distinguish objectively between cause and effect in a causal relation then it is not possible that in the same respect cause is also effect, nor indeed conversely that the effect is also cause. But this means that their relation is irreversible, a relation that is teleologically directed. The distinctive character of causality lies exclusively in the fact that the ambiguity is assigned not to the objects but to the relation of their determination (in Kant to the context of experience).

22 Kant, CpR B 157.

23 Ibid. B 158. One can call ‘appearance’ the objectively developed subjective “as”.

(in this lies the systematicity of synthetic form) with the exception, that is, of this its givenness *as* the mediating “as”. The I thus expresses everything in Kantian terms with the exception of itself. I as “as” *is* not I but only appears to be so.

From Hegel’s standpoint the I is not “as” but language and as such always comes already expressed. This means that the formal systematicity the critique presents in its own form of synthetic unity, the hypothetical form, can then no longer be merely formal, not merely principle of the non-appearing system but must also become material and itself the whole system. One can say again from Hegel’s point of view that the I as the speaking of language is the absolute system. Now this is valid initially only for the *speech* but not for what is spoken. This latter is certainly—in distinction to Kant—capable of truth but it is not yet necessarily true, i.e. a positive system. Moreover even after Hegel the *Critique* retains the sense of differentiating between absolute form and its infinity from finite, non-synthetic forms. Looked at from the well-understood system the critique is never directed against this as the totality defining itself genetically but certainly against positive totalities, so also against instances of speechlessness, indeed in general against every attempt to reduce absolute knowing that is present as language to an object of consciousness. Understood in this way critique and system mutually require each other and are one and the same motion of the matter and thinking.

2 From Kant to Hegel?

At least philosophical treatment of a subject matter distinguishes itself from one that is restricted to the history of philosophy in that it *thinks* thoughts instead of merely *observing* them. Of course this is not to deny that observational presentation of a thought can constitute one side of its own realisation. Philosophical treatment insists that this realisation be capable of being grasped as the self-realisation of the thought itself, i.e. it must be possible to make clear the extent to which a term of thought does not relate to a particular observation merely accidentally, defining itself with respect to the observation instead of being merely accepted in the sense of external observability and reduced to say its chronological aspect. Comparing Kant and Hegel with each other sharpens this perspective to the point that the thinking of the former distinguishes itself from observation while that of the latter refuses to regard this difference as fundamental, instead systematically relativising it so that it can understand itself as the concept defining itself with respect to observability. The consequence of this in Hegel’s case is that the history of philosophy does not get to consider very much or in some cases nothing at all of the *matter* of his thinking. When it comes to Kant even if again not much then certainly at least

something—at least for Kant the matter is the determinate something. Thus the view remains stubbornly persistent that Kant—even if only somehow—gets to *the* or *a* matter while Hegel is somewhere else.

Nevertheless the “transition” from Kant to Hegel historically, “exoterically”, can with some justice be made clear by referring to two circumstances, *that* Hegel made statements on Kant and even more by *how* he did it. In this respect the essay *Faith and Knowledge* published in the *Critical Journal* in 1802 possesses a special importance and has been much discussed. It has indeed become almost the key witness for the claim that Hegel “does” something with his predecessors which they would not have “wanted”. Hegel’s fundamental conviction in *hermeneuticis* is precisely that in *thinking*, as long as one is serious about *thinking* and is not stuck in external reflection, nobody can “do” or “want” anything apart from thinking itself. This philosophical conviction does not release anyone from obligations like that of philological correctness; what it does is release philology from the semblance of an obligation of having first to produce the *truth* of a text with its own means. Since Hegel’s time people have gotten used to regarding the truth of intellectual, cultural and spiritual forms as “doable” in the sense of e.g. philological text production. The projection technique of historical reflection claimed to “understand” a text by taking it so to speak “from within its own time”. But the procedure would be better described as just putting the text back *into* that, into the natural form. This amounted to *doubling* the given text as a “time” and then taking this doubling into *its* time (not ours) as the “truth” of the text. What has in fact happened here is that the text has only been set in the abstract medium of *alterity*. Now this picturing procedure of turning something into nothing belongs so recognisably to external reflection and the making of consciousness that it is hardly surprising that “historicism” had such a relatively easy time of it with its philosophical critique. That happened because the ‘language’, the ‘word’ was restored more or less explicitly as ‘*middle term*’ of our ‘affiliation’ to all forms of meaning including the absolute form.²⁴ In Hegel the very concept of the

24 A passage in H.G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, Tübingen 1975⁴, naturally suggests itself here. It sums up concisely the characteristic features of the absolute form. We are referring to the section ‘The medium term language and its speculative structure’ (432 ff.) and in that to the statements on the *word*: ‘Every single word bursts forth as if out of a medium term bearing reference to a whole, through which alone it is a word. ... Every single word also for that reason, as the occurrence of its moment in time, bears what is unsaid present with it to which it relates as answering and acknowledging. The occasionality of human speech’ is regarded in this way ‘the logical expression of the living virtuality of speech ... All human speech is finite in that an infinity of sense that has to be unfolded and interpreted is laid in it’ (434). In contrast to the philosophical treatment of

history of philosophy already includes knowledge of these relations to a great degree free of pathos. This is not just any old subject matter waiting for its total positivisation or positive totalisation by the retrospective understanding that has just been born after it but 'the history of how thought finds itself'; moreover 'in the case of thought', 'it only finds itself by autopoiesis, by producing itself, indeed it only exists and is actual by finding itself'.²⁵ This interweaving of the actuality of thinking and its generation, also in the sense of the return to itself from out of an initially merely abstract other, the concept then of this actuality as one that is not *positive* but active in the sense of Aristotle's ἐνέργεια is precisely what the "hermeneutics of absolute form" expresses. It is the form of the present being of a determinate content *as* that of the moment of an absolute mediation or middle term which thought is but which equally *we* are when we think. The vantage point of this form also offers a concept of the hermeneutics of positivity and reflection which conversely the latter, reflection, does not and cannot provide for the former, the concept. For the "observer" with a historical attitude will have to *see* the structures of absolute form in its philosophical self-presentation as it does all living things necessarily as *dead*. While like all external reflection it too concedes reflection-in-itself to its object, this reflection-in-itself is not supposed to be simultaneously the reflection-in-itself of the observation because the object has to be regarded with respect to this latter as *observationally closed*.²⁶

the differences between contingency and necessity, finitude and infinity etc. in Gadamer, the historical treatment by somebody like Dilthey cuts itself off from that all the more crudely. This is clear for instance when in Dilthey we encounter the difference between the linear opposition of intending 'observer' (of 'types of weltanschauung' etc.) and the positive totality of life that is not grasped as middle term as in Gadamer. According to Dilthey we become aware of the (objective) 'meaning' of an (especially individual) 'life', i.e. for him 'the relation of the parts of a life to the whole which is grounded in the essence of the life' (*Gesammelte Schriften* VII, 233) in that we regard this life precisely from its end, i.e. as a *dead* life: 'Only in the final moment of a life is it possible to gain an overview of its meaning, so this can only happen within a moment at the end of the life as it relives that life' (ibid., 237). Thus Dilthey makes the most dogmatic assumption that 'meaning' is fundamentally something intendable for itself, while in Gadamer's *critical* conception of a difference between virtuality and actuality of meaning *actu*, of *to mean*, no assumption of a 'meaning' isolatable in that way is made. Cf. also below note 26.

25 Hegel, TW 18, 23 fn. 10 (in Michelet's edition of the Berlin lectures on the history of philosophy).

26 The attempt to penetrate patterns of spirit reduced to the intuitive by way of external reflection is given in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics as a 'task of psychological interpretation'. This is 'in general that of grasping every given (!) thought complex (!) as a life moment of a particular person' (Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutic und Kritik*, ed. M. Frank, Frankfurt 1977, 178), a formulation which could to some extent be considered programmatic for the divining and empathetic emoting of the nineteenth century. Following the

In *Faith and Knowledge* we find the logical ground as to why Kant determines his concept of thinking in opposition to intuition. This is why Kant has a relatively intuitive concept of thinking for an immediate understanding and why he himself thinks intuitively. It is summarised in a statement that sounds highly categorical. Kant, says Hegel, 'decided strictly for appearance' and in doing so he 'dismissed the rational, an intuitive spontaneity to think, with contempt'.²⁷ Hegel feels that there would have been no need for Kant to do this, if only he had realised that his idea of an *intuitive understanding*,²⁸

is certainly nothing other than *the same idea as the transcendental power of imagination ...* for it is intuitive activity and at the same time its inner unity is precisely the unity of the understanding itself, the category immersed in extension, the unity which only becomes understanding and category by separating itself from extension.²⁹

reflection schema of whole and part individual 'utterances' are expressed while the whole standing 'behind' is directly intended in order to be able to derive the utterance through mediation from it. So the attempt is made to grasp the other who might want to *express* something or also *itself* in this figure of reflection and with that the "what", the intellectual or spiritual content of the matter, disappears in what the "observer" was always capable of understanding by themselves and above all to assert as understandable. 'In every desire to understand another,' says Schleiermacher, there lies 'already the assumption that the difference (namely in the relation of observation) is resolvable' (ibid.). When Dilthey later criticises the absence of motion in Schleiermacher's apparatus of reflection in referring to the 'historicity' of all lives, including that of the observer, (cf. e.g. the letters between W. Dilthey and the duke P. Yorck von Wartenburg 1877–1897, Halle an der Salle 1923, 427) this does in a certain sense relate to the 'affiliation' that Gadamer speaks of, while also being placed in indeterminacy with finality, just as an additional mirror that reflection sets up always ensures not greater clarity but at best more intense bedazzlement (also of others).

27 Hegel, TW 2, 326.

28 Cf. in Kant especially CpR B 135, 138 f., 145 (at this last point Kant supports a 'divine' understanding as what we have called the definition of intuition by the concept itself: he means 'an understanding ..., that does not imagine or represent to itself given objects, instead by means of its representation the objects would be simultaneously given or produced' – which is formally the idea of absolute form); further CPJ §§ 76 f., *Critique of practical Reason*, AA V, 137.

29 Hegel, TW 2, 325. On Hegel regarding the transcendental power of imagination and the intuitive understanding as identical to each other cf. V. Verra, *Immaginazione trascendentale e intelletto intuitivo* in Verra ed. *Hegel interprete di Kant*, Naples 1981, 67–89. Among the ways Verra clarifies Hegel's synthesis concept are referring to its 'organic' form (cf. 75) and differentiating it from faculty psychology (cf. 73, 83). Beyond that the study is more a matter of making assertions without putting the question as to the philosophical meaning of Hegel's treatment of Kant really at the centre of interest, on the other hand the (completely obsolete) rubrication question as to whether Hegel's image of Kant is

Kant developed his concept of the intuitive understanding especially in the framework of the reworking of the transcendental deduction of the categories in the second (so-called B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, where he acknowledges that it is necessary. On Hegel's view Kant's 'decision' to stop and remain stationary at appearance would amount to the same thing as the decision to distinguish between intuitive understanding as mediation completed in itself from the merely immediate principle of mediation in *every* activity of the understanding (of spontaneity). This in turn implies presenting *mediation actu* as not necessarily completed or at most only capable of completion. The notion of a completed mediation was for Kant antinomical so he avoided it by separating the extremes. In fact this separation is what we above called the "original division [*Urteilung*] of the idea". Developing this thought we would now like to call the relata of the division the completed subject (transcendental apperception—being of the idea) and the completed predicate (transcendental ideal as "idea *in individuo*"—ought of the idea). Kant effects the separation by inserting between the extremes the chronologically distinct settings of the copula *is* in propositions of experience. The form of the judgment [*Urteil*] or proposition is one of the reference points with which Hegel begins his discussion of Kant. He believes that in Kant's question as to the possibility of synthetic propositions *a priori* is 'expressed the true idea of reason'.³⁰ For it could be said that the question aims directly at the *contradiction* that Kant's original division of the idea seeks to avoid through chronological differentiation and in that sense it points to the *whole* idea. This contradictory aspect can according to Hegel be expressed as follows:

that in the synthetic proposition subject and predicate, the former the particular, the latter the universal, the former in the form of being, the latter in the form of thinking—that these inhomogeneous elements are simultaneously *a priori*, i.e. absolutely identical.³¹

In the form "synthetic proposition *a priori*", what interests Hegel is the form of absolute synthesis; absolute because it bears the contradiction within it and hence presents itself infinitely, namely repelling every attempt at *finite*

perhaps 'romantic' is quite rightly left open (87). For more on the topic cf. the similarly oriented study by K. Düsing, *Ästhetische Einbildungskraft und intuitive Verstand in Hegel-Studien* 21 (1986), 87–128.

30 TW 2, 304. Cf. SoL 589, GW XII, 22.

31 Ibid.

determination. The term for this in the Jena writings is primarily 'absolute concept'.³² The principle of synthetic form encompasses, Hegel further claims,

- 32 We confine ourselves to some significant text positions. In the *Jena Logic and Metaphysics* of 1804–5 the 'absolute concept' actually belongs to the section on metaphysics; there it is described as 'the opposition of determination and of determination overcome' (Hegel, GW VII, 134). Cf. GW VII, 158 for 'I as species' in the sense of the 'infinity' of self-referential negation, also *ibid.* 173. In the *Natural Law* essay it is called among other things 'the principle of opposition and the opposition itself' (Hegel, TW 2, 469), further 'the unmediated opposite of itself' (TW 2, 502). In the *PhoS* it is called 'the category; it is this: that the knowledge and the object of knowledge are the same' (§ 548; GW IX, 296). Its 'negativity' is 'what abolishes all objective essence that is supposed to stand *opposed* to consciousness and turns it into a being of consciousness' (§ 529; GW IX, 288). Synthesis is thus for Hegel the overcoming of the awareness from out of its own form and that not only into its condition (Kant). Moreover that does not happen into its condition relation to the unconditioned (Fichte) or into its immediate-unconditioned differentiation from the unconditioned (Schelling). The expression 'absolute concept' is of course also found in the *SoL* and in the later lectures, in which contexts it is certainly no longer confined as in the *Jena Logic* to standing against (only) the 'determinate concept'. This relation that Hegel sees between the form of the synthetic proposition and the synthesis of apperception has been rejected as illegitimate and Hegel has been criticised for it. We will go into some detail on the criticism K. Düsing makes in his study *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik, Hegel-Studien* suppl. 15, Bonn 1984², 110 f. because it can throw light not only on our topic but also on the limits of the philological, archival treatment of philosophy. In what follows we will avoid asserting 'differences' that are intended merely historically for their own sake issuing primarily from the historical understanding's lack of system. It must be said in advance that in our context, certainly not a trivial issue, Düsing does not himself make any attempt to present Hegel's reception of Kant in terms of its inner homogeneity or in terms of its *thought content*. This latter is not denied even if, as Düsing claims, in relation to Kant himself, it is no more than a 'mixture' of completely disparate elements (although we cannot take the oft repeated statement that Hegel moves in the direction of 'Aristotle's ontology' (111) for proof that the productive and internally consistent aspects of Hegel's thinking have been grasped). For Düsing it is not only Hegel who makes the fatal error; it was the error with which Reinhold began (110 fn. 118) and to which many Neo-Kantians succumbed (111), indeed it turns out to have been seriously collective although even that inspires here no more than expostulations. Düsing firmly maintains the position unwaveringly throughout his study that Hegel claims something distinct from Kant without sufficiently differentiating what is here quite distinct. For the explanation of the claim that the synthetic unity in judging *a priori* is 'something completely different' (110) from the synthetic unity of apperception one might expect Henrich's *Identität und Objektivität* to offer some insight, for Düsing does have it in his bibliography (362). What one actually finds is the following argument: synthetic propositions *a priori* connect concepts in relation 'to intuitions *a priori*' and this marks their diacritical moment against analytical propositions; contrasting with that the original-synthetic unity of apperception *qua* synthesis is the 'connecting of representations to the unity of apperception' (110). Düsing says at this point that 'all propositions in general ..., whether they are analytical or synthetic' (*ibid.*) stand under the principle of the unity of apperception. That is without doubt correct but it is hardly an argument in relation to

not only the 'principle of figurative synthesis' but also the 'sensibility' which has 'previously only been' characterised as 'receptivity', so that 'space and time themselves as synthetic unities' are comprehended in 'absolute synthetic activity'.³³ In the transcendental aesthetic the "manifold" of intuition is determined only quantitatively; now it becomes equally conceivable as qualitative infinity and that *externality* and alterity which is merely presumed and which is the condition for any concept of the proposition, according to which it is realised as a relation to what is and *remains* external to it (spatially as well as

the proof that the synthesis of apperception is 'something completely different' from that in synthetic propositions. For the statement that the 'extension' of the original-synthetic unity of judgment with respect to the synthetic proposition unity is as it were increased by the 'domain' of analytical propositions means only that the former is referred also to this domain but not that it is not referred to the synthetic propositions *a priori* in question—completely disregarding the fact that Kant himself emphasises that in relation to connecting in general the difference between synthesis and analysis is only an apparent one: 'for where the understanding did not previously connect anything, neither can it there dissolve anything' (CpR B 130). The issue is precisely the relation or non-relation of the two modes of synthesis that Düsing claims is not given but which Hegel claims is an identity. Düsing's argument cannot be that synthetic propositions are connections in relation to intuition (which would be a tautology; for when the connected terms are mutually *external*, manifold, which is the case in synthetic propositions then in that they are mutually intuitive—or else one should name another criterion of externality); the relation of the concepts is not grounded in that; the primary task is to ground them. Now for something that even Düsing would presumably not dispute: intuitions are included among the representations that are connected originally-synthetically into the unity of apperception. Düsing's argument reduces to the simple situation that the synthesis of judgment is the conscious synthesis of objectivity, while the synthesis of apperception in contrast is the self-conscious synthesis of identity. In this situation it would indeed be difficult to claim that the elements differentiated in this way are 'something completely different' with respect to each other. After all § 16 is no arbitrary statement, separate from all the others, in the CpR for with Kant's consciousness of the problem that objective (judgment) synthesis demands a 'ground of unity' (B 131) since the representation contained within it of '*connecting ... cannot be given through objects*' (B 130) as these are already *connected*. This general ground (in Kant's terms the ground conceived of in hypothetical form), this general condition of objectivity itself is the apperceptive synthesis. A ground is in relation to what is grounded certainly something other but one that originally *sets* what is grounded and in that is *identical* to it. It can even be said that the ground is only this setting relation itself and it is only the intention directed to it that makes it 'something' if certainly not yet 'something completely different' from what is grounded; this, the merely distinct, it becomes only when it is comprehended as *not* a ground or is not comprehended as a ground. The synthesis in propositions is one of the manifold (intuitive); according to Kant it is respectively the index *of the* synthesis it has for its condition and it is as this indicated relation already its own universal, its identifying activity which Hegel has every reason to understand as (infinite) identity.

33 Hegel, TW 2, 305.

in terms of time), is now realised as a relation to intuitive objects and equally intuitive other judging and is thus undermined even from the premisses of all *judging* and definitely from the mere possibility of judging. In this context Kant's original division of the idea comes down to clinging to the fixed form of the proposition *against* what had already been recognised as the condition of all judging. Hegel responds to this situation with the following statement:

the *a priori* aspect of this (sc. synthetic) proposition, the absolute identity as middle term, is not expressed in the proposition but in the syllogism.³⁴

The differentiated form of the proposition is held fast to *against* the infinity of spontaneity, that is precisely against the binding of subject and predicate. In the face of the determinate conceptual content of subject and predicate terms this binding is purely incommensurable. The resulting proposition of experience taken for itself does not let the incommensurability of the possibility of all binding reveal itself as such in terms of determining *actu* against the determinates; in fact it has moved away from the transcendental difference into the simple difference between immediate binding and mediated determinations and has sunk into the "that" of the empty copula or of being, i.e. it shows itself only as the possibility that this binding of the "is" with these determinates of subject and predicate could also *not* be bound. 'The proposition itself is only the preponderant appearance of the difference'.³⁵ So it must be about imparting determination to the being of the copula itself in which its relation to what is different from it would be expressed. But that can only be accomplished by the syllogism or the idea. If this were to make it possible that being would be thought of with determination as in relation to subject and predicate then it would have to be thought of as the overcoming of the (intuitive) determinations external to it, i.e. as their *negation* in itself for only in this way would it be full being. This means nothing other than that being can remain neither simple nor indeed transcendental difference and instead *has to become contradiction*. As such it is initially the double difference of the proposition: simultaneously the relation of subject and predicate it immediately presents and what it is in respect to their determination, as it were not only

34 Ibid. 307. In *Sprache und Raum*, Berlin 1969, 110 f., J. Simon develops Hegel's progression from the form of the proposition or from the moment of the *a priori* copula to the idea in the perspective of the 'solely logical form' of space as the 'alterity of reason' (111). The purely 'copulative synthesis' in the judgment 'fixes' for Simon 'what are only in this way related as separate' and is as such a 'form of separation' (ibid.).

35 Hegel, TW 2, 307.

as “existence” but also as “essence” of the relation, that is their lack of mediation. Hence (following Hegel) the whole Kantian problem of the idea is firmly located in the copula of the proposition. Moreover being as contradiction is not only this double difference which can still be understood as a subcontrary antinomy; now it is the thinking which accepts that the non-mediation of the determination of subject and predicate in their binding immediately excludes this binding while conversely in terms of its own concept the binding excludes this absence of mediation. Nevertheless the two mutually exclusive relations must simultaneously be thought of in the form of the proposition and as mutually including each other precisely in the relation to this form. In other words when the thought is a conceptually completely determined proposition and not merely a sentence³⁶ or a juxtaposition of names, then this thinking includes the following assertions. a) The subject *is* the predicate as is immediately asserted and thus a ground will be met with ensuring that that is the case. b) At the same time the proposition *form* presupposes that the subject *is not* the predicate, the predicate is in fact only negated (particularised) by the subject and in that set ideally. That red in the famous example proposition “the

36 For the difference between judgment and sentence we follow Hegel's not Kant's usage. For Kant 'an assertoric judgment' is 'a *sentence*' and as such is governed by the principle of sufficient reason (Kant, *Über eine Entdeckung* AA VIII, 193 f. Obs. 3; R 311). In this Kant turns against 'the logicians' who 'define a sentence as a judgment expressed *in words*' (ibid.). For Hegel a proposition is distinguished from a 'mere sentence' because in it 'the predicate' relates 'to the subject according to the relations of the terms of the concept, thus as a universal to a particular or individual' (Hegel, SoL 626, GW XII, 55; cf. Encyc. § 167 Obs.). A sentence in contrast merely relates an individual to an individual and is *this relation* itself, while 'the proposition ... lays the content in the predicate as a universal determination which is for itself and is distinguished from its relation, the simple *copula*' (SoL 410, GW XI, 258 f.). It should also be noted that Hegel sometimes remarks that 'in fact in so-called sentences subject and predicate are in truth unequal because one of them is individual, the other universal' and 'hence their relation is the essential thing, the ground in which they are one' (Hegel, TW 20, 189). Here sentences in the sense e.g. of the propositions of Spinoza (who is being discussed in the context) are meant. Hegel complains about them that 'the motion of knowing, as proof' falls '... outside of the sentence which is supposed to be the truth' (ibid.). The *speculative sentence* provides this proof of truth in itself. It is not a judgment which remains the immediate contradiction to speculation and the latter's *finite* premise (cf. Hegel, SoL 834, GW XII, 245); it is a sentence, namely the *developed relation* as a whole and as true unity of the differentiated subject and predicate. The point of comparison with Kant is that he too in the case of the sentence emphasises the relation itself as the real content, thus in his example of a 'conditioned sentence' which is concerned solely with the consequence in the sense of logical implication and not with the content of the antecedent or consequence (cf. ibid. Hegel, AA VIII, 193 f. Obs.). Clearly Kant knows nothing of Hegel's condition, that in the judgment the opposed terms of the concept have to be expressed in the subject and predicate positions.

rose is red" is now not itself a being; now it has its *essence* in something else. This makes it clear that the formation of the substantive abstraction the "red" is down to *reflection*. Finally c) that the ground of the proposition set together with the being of the copula must contain both of the above assertions a) and b). Indeed this must happen in such a way that *because* it is the setting of the predicate (as positive) the subject is precisely its negating or overcoming, while simultaneously *because* the predicate is set as determinate, i.e. as the presupposing of a determining subject, it is similarly not this determination through the subject but the negation precisely of this presupposition, its idealisation and reduction to a case of its own generality. An example then: through the proposition ground the rose is referred to the predicate "red" such that, *in that* the rose is determined by "red" it is itself the determining of what within it can be called "red" (namely only: "as red as *this* rose") thus also not determined by "red". At the same time the ground also sets the predicate "red" in the rose as *being* such that the red itself *reflects* this being by binding the predicate with its opposite (in the most general case: "not red") without which binding in general there would be no determining and therefore no proposition would have happened. The rose *is* only what it is in that it is not only being but also *determined*, in that it is reflected through the determination and is *overcome* in this reflection. The "being" and the "nothing" of the rose are in the double sense identical: a *mere being* of the rose *is* the nothing of *the rose*, while on the other hand the *determinate* being of the rose *is* an alterity of the being itself and for that reason *is* the nothing of its immediacy. In a true proposition the being of the copula expresses the immediate unity of these two nothings and now we can call them the nothing of the unmediated state and the nothing of mediation.³⁷ It is their immediate contradiction.

37 The 'nothing of the unmediated state' is the immediate negation of immediacy, while the 'nothing of mediation' is the nothing mediated by reflection. The proposition 'the rose is red' can be divided according to this difference of nothings in the statement from the logic of being: 'the rose becomes something red' (the 'Heracleitean' moment in the proposition) and the statement from the logic of essence: 'the rose is overcome into the red' (the 'Platonic' moment). Against both of these abstract statements the identification of the two nothings in the conceptually completely determined proposition as being reproduces the *subject* indeed as substance which one could understand as the uncovering of the ἀτομον εἶδος and in that sense as the 'Aristotelian' moment in the proposition. The important thing is just to see that the motion from the predicate back into the subject, expressing the second moment and capable of being made tangibly understandable as e.g. μέλεις, is in the third moment comprehended as identical with the motion in the first beyond the subject into the predicate. The substantiality thereby arrived at is nothing other than this identity of the two negations as the negative reversing into itself

that Hegel can expressly call the 'turning point in the motion of the concept' (Hegel, SoL 835, GW XII, 246; cf. Hegel, PhoS § 787; GW IX, 109 for self-consciousness as the 'turning point' of consciousness, which is not unimportant for the real philosophical aspect of our interpretation of absolute form). Resting upon a persistent difference between subject and predicate the proposition form thus disappears in the process of turning on itself, of judging itself; no simple assumption of e.g. a persistent subject can be made any longer since that has already vanished on the 'Heracleitean' level. On the other hand it is also the case now that all being and persistence to be gained anew, all 'autonomy' of the subject, has to be obtained from the double negation. As Henrich rightly says Hegel showed how to regard negation utterly devoid of correlation. It is legitimate with Henrich in his study *Hegels Grundoperation in Der Idealismus und seine Gegenwart* (FS W. Marx), Hamburg 1976, 208–230, to call negation itself 'autonomous' (214). Moreover it would be more precise in Hegel's sense to comprehend negation as the only category at all that can be called autonomous and that every form of autonomy is a development of negativity. In his study Henrich also showed that the autonomy of negation requires grasping *both* sides of the negative relation as *double* negation, otherwise it could only be an opposing *reflection* and not pure *self*-relation, i.e. it would remain always dependent on an initial immediacy (220 ff.). The other of the relation thus supersedes in itself simple alterity or a first immediacy and is free or released to itself (cf. Hegel, SoL 117 ff., GW XXI, 105 ff.; SoL 835, GW XII, 246). Simple negating (reflection) presupposes this overhaul as having already happened (as essence); but then the negating of reflection too arrives at what the other merely presupposes. It overcomes the presupposed alterity to itself into absolute *unity* as which it produces itself. Both motions have their true 'equilibrium' in the *concept* (cf. Henrich *ibid.* 224). Henrich elsewhere seeks to differentiate the self-referential negation of alterity from a double negation that is not self-referential by demonstrating this latter relation in the (finite) being-for-itself (of being) on the one hand, while on the other hand in the result of the system, where being-for-itself is no longer (simply) exclusive but has become infinite, the one of being-for-itself should be thought of as only capable of 'being truly for itself in the identification of itself with its other'. Unfortunately these moves produce no genuine extension of the argument. For the result given is in any case again only absolute negativity itself whose concept was already available. It is just that now it is expressed precisely in the language of being (rendered infinite), i.e. after shedding the semblance that absolute negativity would be *only* reflection (contradiction). But finite being-for-itself is only the presentation of the absolute negative relation in the externality of being, i.e. as three separate negative moments: one, (simple) other, exclusion which moreover amount to *one* relation (fourth moment, which is so to speak the 'inside' of the exclusion relation). Being-for-itself (of being) is in a certain manner *excluding* in terms of being *other-to-itself*, while that of the result had expressed it *as the self* (cf. Henrich, *Formen der Negation in Hegels Logik* in R.P. Horstmann, *Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Frankfurt a. M. 1978, 213–229, loc. cit. 224). Henrich's inability speculatively to identify the presentations of the formally exactly described absolute negativity separately in terms of *reflection* and of *being* unfortunately sometimes obstructs his access to Hegel and results in his not really being able to find the unity of the presentation and the material as Hegel presents it. Then all he does is displace it into the bad *ought* of a 'construction of the mono-logical process' etc. (cf. Henrich, *Die Formationsbedingungen der Dialektik in Revue internationale de philosophie*, no. 139/140 (1982) 139–162, esp. 159 ff.). Put in very different terms Henrich should do for the concept what he has already done for reflection.

What this all means for the transcendental power of imagination and intuitive understanding is that withstanding the contradiction contained in every true proposition can be called the incommensurable power of imagination of the identity of the understanding in what is for itself an antinomical relation of commensurable determinations. Now this identity does not drive the antinomy asunder and as one might say make it spatial; instead a relational *system* results which *logically* considered cannot be a unity of *discursive* understanding (as a temporal recapitulation of what is spatially dispersed) but only an *intuitive* one (namely of the overcoming of the mode of externality of time into the 'moment').³⁸ The *power* in the power of imagination is not to be understood as an occult quality "beyond" all visual or intellectual access but only as the undeveloped being-in-itself of the systematic relation of all access by the understanding. Even in the Kantian context it is understood as the (real) possibility of *all* experience. It is *total* form but in the sense of the genetically self-defining totality and not e.g. as a positive form totality that could only be a reflexive extrapolation from active form.³⁹ Against that one could consider the power of imagination not logically but intuitively as indeed Kant himself did all the way up to his anthropological studies.⁴⁰ Then it remains opposed and external to its similarly intuitive products just as it does also to the *imagination* or *representation* of an intuitive understanding not opposed to its products. Its products come under the form of externality which as total intuition is essentially time; they *are* temporal and take the course external to the idea of everything temporal, i.e. becoming something indeterminately other. Only in the case of the product of the aesthetic power of imagination was Kant able to think of an "object" to which one could in no way relate externally because in

38 Cf. Kant, CPJ B 99: 'The collection of plurality into unity, not that of thought but in intuition, therefore that of what is successively grasped within one moment is a ... *regressus*, which again overcomes the time condition into the *progressus* of the power of imagination and makes *simultaneity* intuitive'. Cf. Kant, CpR A 99.

39 J. Simon in his study *Einbildungskraft und wirkliche Zeit* in H. Busche, G. Heffernan and D. Lohmar eds. *Bewußtsein und Zeitlichkeit. Ein Problemschnitt durch die Philosophie der Neuzeit*, Würzburg 1990, 147–158, says that forming the 'limit image of a thing comprising everything' lies 'in the image of time itself' comprising 'even time' itself (147). But such a 'thing' would be appropriate to the capability of the (abstract) intuitive understanding; but it would be 'our' intuitive understanding through which 'the things ... obtain ... their integration into a world picture', while 'the shining through of this integration' constitutes 'their aesthetic' (157).

40 Cf. Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* §§ 28 ff. Whether one precisely here can expect 'insight into the ground laid for metaphysics (sc. by Kant)' as Heidegger thinks seems doubtful to us (cf. his *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Frankfurt a. M. 1973⁴, 123).

such a relation one would no longer have the object. Kant's manner of imagining the "interiority" of the relation to the object as such dubbed "beautiful" or "sublime" is that of a complex structure of the judging understanding itself, a self-referentiality of consciousness that is formally teleological in releasing the object without concept into what is the understanding's very own element and definitely not into time. In the aesthetic sphere then it becomes thinkable that even an intuited power of imagination is not only a capability to produce finite intuitions; it is also the power of idealising what is finite by entering into an infinite "game" as Kant puts it the beginning and end of which are certainly not the simple intended behaviour but the idea as the activity of the self. Thus Hegel finds in the aesthetic power of judgment as well as in the teleological form of it which transits into reflecting the nature form as a whole as teleological for cognition, 'the idea of reason everywhere expressed in a more or less formal manner'.⁴¹ The thinking now is that the immediate contradiction of the proposition copula is no longer held together by means of a special "force", which can always be a matter of arbitrary violence; instead it becomes capable of maintaining itself by being bound together in conclusion with the other in the idea. The action of the power of imagination does not remain unanswered. What corresponds to it is the other that is congruent with the incommensurable and set free. So it is not deprived of language by being summed up in a silent intuition in which it would have closed itself off to its reflection-in-itself (strictly external to determination even if only generated by it). Instead it is the other to which is accorded language and above all *speech* as the power to build for itself a body,⁴² to provide itself with space and hence to take on shape

41 Hegel, TW2, 322.

42 After all Kant himself speaks of the fact that the 'plastic arts can be counted among the gestures in a language (in terms of analogy)' because 'the spirit of the artist' in his 'forms of what and how he has thought of gives a bodily expression and as it were makes the matter itself mimetically speak' (Kant, CPJ B 210 f.). In Hegel of especial interest here is that the logic already spoken of above of the 'other in its own right' is thought of as having the independence of the natural and thus also of the natural moment of the body which as such is not merely a (set) 'expression' (cf. Hegel, SoL 117, GW XXI, 105). Hegel's statement that 'nature' is 'in its own right only ... what it is against the spirit' is not to be misunderstood as if it were *not* 'other in its own right' which it would rather be only 'taken for itself'—an error that M. Theunissen makes in *Sein und Schein*, Frankfurt a. M. 1980, 264 (for the context see 261–267). In *Michael Theunissens Destruktion der Einheit von Darstellung und Kritik in Hegels 'Wissenschaft der Logik'*, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 63 (1981), 61–79, esp. 74 ff. U. Richli has demonstrated that he was bound to make that error given certain fundamental premisses of his approach to Hegel. Richli argues with what is for speculative discourse the fundamental figure of relation and relatum as a *unity* which also in our context makes understandable the 'opposition' between nature and spirit as a differentiated relation and certainly not a matter of terms in linear opposition standing

and not only a construct, its own sphere and not only something abstract *as* an external setting. For Kant the aesthetic 'state of feeling' as the CPJ imagines it is a 'subjective relation in general perfectly capable of knowledge' and a 'proportioned mood'.⁴³ The 'proportion' must still be 'capable of being generally communicated' even if this can only happen in a determinate manner not by mediation of an objective representation but 'by no other means than through feeling'.⁴⁴ Destined to become knowledge for Kant this destiny contains a moment not isolated from the intendable whole and totality of which we nevertheless already know in all knowledge and which as idea once again brings the objective determinates into relation. The knowledge of the ideal sufficiency of the *is* in the aesthetic or teleological proposition here clearly means not the knowledge of a measure to be presumed and fulfilled "ontologically" for that would render the entire relation once again thoroughly commensurable. It means focussing the understanding upon what is expressive in one's own speech but not uttered and which is simultaneously known as the truth of one's speech, the essentially contradictory that nevertheless is the possibility of one's own free utterance.⁴⁵

What Kant in this way gains from what is still an intuitive and representational consideration of the power of imagination is taken up in Hegel's philosophy *logically* according to its whole concept, i.e. in the form of speaking in propositions as such. The power of imagination is studied in the philosophy of subjective spirit (not surprisingly as the middle term in the psychological theory of theoretical spirit) but this does not have to concern us here. The concept of *spirit* assumed there as the potency or reality or completion of the infinite relation of intuitively separate determinations in itself incommensurable to abstract externals has yet to be attained in Kant. Indeed it can only be attained when the elemental forms of the relation, e.g. of the relation of subject and predicate in the proposition are shown to be themselves infinite and as such prior to spirit. For only then is it possible to avoid the case that the proposition

'for themselves'. In Hegel's sense thus nature is precisely *only* against spirit truly the other of itself. For the speculative argument of the unity of relation and relatum cf. U. Riehli, *Form und Inhalt in G.W.F. Hegels 'Wissenschaft der Logik'*, Vienna and Munich 1982, 75 ff.

43 Kant, CPJ B 29, 31.

44 Ibid. 65, 66.

45 Wilhelm von Humboldt says of 'poetry' as an '*art through language*' that it is not about '*resolving*' the contradiction it commits with this definition (in reference to language's ability to be understood) in order to '*unify*' what is contradictory therein for 'everywhere ... , where in man contradictory properties are combined into something new he is certain of appearing in his highest nature' (*Über Goethes Hermann und Dorothea* XIX, *Werke* ed. A. Flitner und Kl. Giel, Darmstadt 1986⁴, II, 173).

form remains an irrefutable objection to the content and to judging itself. In that case one would indeed like Kant have to retreat to the (theoretical) original division of the idea or to an (aesthetic-teleological) “as-if”. Despite that we shall continue with the form of the proposition. In the transcendental discussion of the proposition even in Kant the power of imagination is thematised not ultimately for itself but in terms of its synthetic *function*. We still need to approach closer to the infinite, ideal moment of judging whose expression in the individual proposition should present itself in its *modal* determination.

In an important addition to the second edition of the CpR Kant describes the *categories* as ‘concepts of an object in general’ (only in relation to the objective difference itself and not to ‘our’ intuitions), ‘such that its intuition is regarded as *determinate* with regard to one of the *logical functions* of judging’.⁴⁶ This means that the categories address the objective difference and because a form of externality in general is intuited the difference is no longer mere variety but a determinate, generally related difference. A determinate difference is necessarily an opposition for only in this does one member show in its own right that it is not the other even though it is determined by it and in turn itself determines the other. The following distinction between the logical and the categorially determined (transcendental) form of proposition immediately shows that this interpretation is in agreement with Kant’s intention. In a logical proposition it remains ‘indeterminate which of the two terms one would want to assign the function of subject and which that of predicate’.⁴⁷ Kant demonstrates this with the categorical proposition ‘all bodies are divisible’. In logical terms only the form ‘all S are P’ is uttered and the ‘substitutions’ for S and P remain completely open so that with a *conversio per accidens* from the first proposition one can also infer ‘some divisible things are bodies’. The conceptual intensions are thus in logical terms not integrating components of the functional unity of the proposition for even with respect to this too they are among themselves *various*. This only changes in the transcendental use of the proposition, i.e. as soon as it stands under a categorial function which taken for itself is a purely syntactic moment though still a moment of the one relatively absolute syntagma of experience representing the definition of all conceptual contents.⁴⁸ Thus in Kant’s example:

46 Kant, CpR B 128.

47 Ibid. B 128 f.

48 Only Hegel’s developed theory of the proposition in the SoL secures the intensionality of its termini precisely by treating them as moments of the concept and not only via the statement context external to them.

through the category of substance ..., if I bring the concept of a body under it, ... it is determined: its empirical intuition in experience would always have to be regarded only as subject and never as mere predicate.⁴⁹

This shows that the setting of subject and predicate terms,⁵⁰ according to their function in the proposition, mutually exclusive *in terms of content*, lends the judgment of experience transcendental reality. At the same time that judgment reveals itself to be a total proposition in the sense of systematic form. One can also say this means that the transcendental reality of the proposition is nothing other than the utterance of the whole context of experience (certainly only *potentia* or in *intentione obliqua*) as the moment generating propositional determination. In the real determination of “body” via substantiality implicitly something is judged relating to all propositions of experience, namely that in the context of the same experience—and experience is for Kant essentially *one*—the (empirical) concept of the body can never be handled other than as substance even if the moment of substantiality does not have to be made explicit in every proposition of experience. An example is the causal proposition “The sun warms this body”, in as far as one understands the *accidental* state of warming already as thematising the form of substantiality as such. The empirical concepts of the body and of divisibility are thus connected in a relation that one does not immediately ‘see’ them in but which the power of imagination—speaking with Fichte—must ‘see in it’.⁵¹ Moreover the relation does not come to them merely externally *per appositionem* for only they can determine it according to their ‘inside’, their conceptual content, so they acquire it for themselves *per intus susceptionem*⁵² in the activity of determining.

In real judging the determined *respect* of the difference between subject and predicate terms simultaneously constitutes the *intuitivity* of the object of the proposition. This difference is not itself a conceptual content, instead it is the *immediate relation* of the proposition termini and simultaneous with

49 Kant, CpR B 129.

50 To be precise it should be mentioned that Kant expressly rejects the (categorical) subject-predicate schema as the form of the proposition in general; he refers to the fact that in hypothetical and disjunctive propositions not terms but already propositions are bound together in a relation (cf. CpR B 140 f.). For our purposes we can still distinguish between the respective components of the proposition as subject and predicate functions, just as Hegel does in his *Jena Logic* 1804/5 (but cf. also SolL 636, GW XII, 64).

51 Cf. Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, WW I, 230: The ‘setting of what is intuited happens by the power of imagination and is itself an intuiting [*Anschauung*] (a seeing in it [*Hinschauen*] (in the active sense) of an indeterminate something’).

52 Cf. Kant, CpR B 860 f./A 832 f., cited above in note 3 of this chapter.

their content. To the extent that conceptual contents can be regarded as (logically) isolatable and separated from the intuitive relation (e.g. in analytical propositions), it can turn out that they involve meanings persisting in or for themselves and constituting a “reservoir” of concepts. Now beside the intuitions that we have immediately those concepts exist for the purpose of occasionally observing in conscious acts which concepts correspond best to which intuitions. Clearly this is not what Kant has in mind and is not to be associated with the thought of an objectively constitutive categorial synthesis function. It is much more the case that as we have them our empirical concepts are not without intuitions. This holds in the double respect that they are always referred to (determinate) intuitions distinct from them, just as they are themselves intuitable (e.g. divisible). We do not have empirical concepts without their definition through the making of experience in the actuality of which intuition and concept are certainly not separate.⁵³ Thus in empirical concepts we have not only logical formulae but always objects too.

The *coincidentia* in the difference we have “seen in” subject and predicate terms and hence in the formal opposition in the object as such lies in its amenability to being understood from the observable fact of its givenness. This is the transcendental-philosophical formulation of the thesis of the identity of thinking and being. Initially though this is only a finite synthesis because the subject and predicate terms constituting the definition of the empirical concept are in their own right *only* logical: only through having been “seen in” by the power of imagination, that is through their “alienation” to observability, do they acquire reality. What interests Kant here is not the “static” empirical concepts in their finitude but their *motion* in the context of experience, i.e. in the realisation of the intended idea through them. Empirical terms must be strictly *determinable* from this standpoint and mediate the continuous extension of determining beyond anything and everything already reached. As such they are not to be further determined in the sense of real experience by the simple addition of more predicates, as would be possible in analytical or even in perception propositions. Progress in *experience* demands more from the new predicate than that it be identical to the subject term like an analytical predicate, or just indeterminately different from it like a perception predicate; it requires instead a renewed opposition between subject and predicate which

53 The category, which here can be called the *definiens* of empirical concepts, must in this be so understood that ‘for itself’ it has no meaning independent of its use in definitions of empirical concepts through experience; cf. H. Röttges, *Dialektik als Grund der Kritik*, Königstein Ts. 1981, e.g. 23. The ‘objectivity of the concept’ consists for Röttges in ‘being always already applied’ (18). Cf. also Kant, CpR B 298/A 239.

again can only be held in the power of imagination. The prerequisite for rendering the term infinite through ever renewed opposition is expressed by the regulative principle of the fourth antinomy. It stipulates that ‘everything in the world of sense’ is in terms of its existence exclusively ‘empirically conditioned’ and ‘nowhere in it in regard to any of its properties’ can there be ‘an unconditioned necessity’.⁵⁴ In that case no empirical concept as such can be held firmly by means of its finite determination. Nor indeed is the demand of external reflection that it be unambiguous sustainable. It is instead always as such referred to its opposition. According to the principle of the fourth antinomy for instance nothing is simply a *condition* for it is simultaneously to be regarded as *conditioned*; a regress of being conditioned in terms of the second analogy of experience turns a previously defined given empirical cause into an effect simultaneously asserting that the *same* object of experience is in one respect cause and in the other effect. If the perception brings forth further features of the given cause, e.g. primary or secondary qualities, that is in fact not progress in experience so long as from it no opposition emerges to what is already known. The subject of the proposition of experience is a real object insofar as it “withstands” the *aspect* of opposed aspects and is similarly only as determinable as it is capable of being the unity of these opposed aspects realising it.

Viewed in these terms the specific difference between subject and predicate functions found in transcendental propositions leads to a whole series of further disjunctions which reveal their logical meaning in Kant’s philosophy from that difference. If the subject is on the one hand observable (empirical term) and on the other still *must* be capable of the complete reversal of the *aspect* of the power of imagination, if it is the ambiguous (manifold) that still is the given unity then the concept of such a subject in terms of the logic of experience demands in the Kantian context a “faculty” of *intuition*. If conversely the predicate only *ought to* determine this subject term unambiguously and in an understandable manner (namely as a “positive” in reference to an opposition set up against the “negative” subject) then the concept of such a predicate in terms of the logic of experience requires that for itself it must be formally free of contradiction, it requires a “faculty” of the *concept*. As a “piece of theory” in faculty psychology intuition and concept could be said to present as solid and tangible what is logically required for the concept of judging under the assumption of an originally divided [*geurteilen*–judged] idea. Kant himself develops a further opposition from these “exoteric” contents of his thinking. Requiring the ‘two fully heterogeneous elements, understanding for concepts

54 CpR B 589/A 561.

and sensuous intuition for the objects that correspond to the concepts' for the 'exercise' of our 'faculty of cognition', this constitutes the 'ground' for 'distinguishing between possibility and actuality of the things'.⁵⁵ This distinction is for 'human understanding' and hence for understanding in or by means of propositions of experience. Understanding in terms of the proposition form is thus for Kant 'unavoidably necessary'; 'were our understanding ... intuiting, then it would have no other objects than what is actual'.⁵⁶ It would not be *reflection* that can:

'always have something still in thoughts ... even if it does not exist' or can 'imagine ... that something is given ... even if we still do not have any concept of it'.⁵⁷

The reflection of "our" understanding has *logical* concepts in reserve even without for that reason *knowing* something already with them in propositions of experience. *By this means* however "our" understanding is *subjective*, referred back to itself without going beyond itself to an object of experience.

Thus the statements: that "things can be possible without being actual" and that "thus it is not possible to deduce the actuality from the possibility" are completely correct for human reason without for that having to prove that this distinction lies in the things themselves.⁵⁸

The understanding remains instead precisely with this difference by itself. It is for Kant the understanding's specific difference to the intuitive intellect that does not think of anything without knowing it to be existent and whose "reflection" for that reason is also immediately the inference to the "position". This is how it utters the 'ur-ground' demanded by reason 'in which possibility and actuality can in no way any longer be distinguished'.⁵⁹ In this understanding the difference between the form of the proposition or judgment and judging *actu* no longer happens. The copula is no longer chronologically stigmatised so that externality can no longer penetrate into the relation of the proposition

55 Kant, CPJ § 76, B 340.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid. B 340 f.

59 Ibid. B 341. The transcendental ideal is similarly called in a parallel statement in the CPJ 'ur-ground' (B 615/A 587) or also 'ur-essence' (B 606/A 578 *passim.*), 'ur-image' (B 606/A 578) and 'ur-concept' (B 601/A 573). Cf. also *Fortschritte der Metaphysik* AA xx, 301.

and break it up. Instead the possibility of time itself is eliminated so that in the proposition no longer does any moment external to it appear within it. This means above all that no abstract reflection, no merely logically possible representation and similarly no unmediated intuition devoid of relation appears in it. The important point for us here is this: the functional difference between subject and predicate terms indispensable for the concept of the substantial proposition of experience leads in Kant's theory of experience to material differences like that between possibility and actuality or concept and intuition. Again however these only express that "our" understanding is precisely a *differentiated* one so that we know in diverse ways and we have remaining to us a concept of that in the idea of reason. Briefly put then Kant comprehends the proposition difference as the absolute location of "our" subjectivity.⁶⁰

Already in the Jena writings Hegel attempts to understand this absolute location of subjectivity as a *logical* location. This means initially that what are claimed to be the "absolute locations" of human understanding become amenable to criticism with logical means and are thereby deprived of the immediacy they claim for themselves. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is perhaps the

60 Some observations of Maimon are important here on the difference between 'finite' and 'infinite' understanding made in the context of the formulation of his 'principle of determinability'. Like Kant Maimon refers for the finite or infinite 'quality' of the understanding to the *modal determinations* of both terms in the proposition when he says 'In an infinite understanding the subject is merely what is thought of as possible, while the predicate is what follows necessarily from that ... In a finite understanding in contrast the subject is not what is *thought* in itself but what is merely *given* in itself and the predicate is only what is thought of in relation to that, as object. In the first case the concepts are propositions of the possibility of things while the propositions and conclusions are of the necessity of the things derived from what is prior; in the latter case the concepts are also judgments of the possibility of things but these are in a one-sided synthesis' (S. Maimon, *Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie*, Darmstadt 1963 (reprint), 87 note). The infinite understanding judges analytically, the finite one by means of synthesis of something thought to something given; in the case of the first from the mere possibility of determining follows the necessity of determination, in the latter case from the fact of its determining (cf. 61) it follows that it necessarily distinguishes an actual something as determinable from one possible as determination. The asymmetry in the synthesis is expressed by Kant in the irreversibility of the relation between condition and conditioned in the form of synthetic unity and it is referred by Maimon's principle of determinability to subject and predicate in the synthetic proposition: the subject is only subject or something determinable in the proposition by virtue of the fact that it can also be thought of as independent of the proposition relation (thus is it 'substance'). The predicate on the other hand is only determined in this relation (cf. 84 f. and *passim*). On the striking points of contact between Maimon and Hegel cf. W. Bonsiepen, *Salomon Maimons Kantrezeption – Ausgangspunkt für Hegels Kant-Kritik?* in *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 7, 3 (1982), 37–44 which assembles the relevant material for comparison.

greatest fruit of this endeavour. The thinking there is that an “in and for itself” differentiated understanding is impossible unless the difference in which it is supposed to maintain itself for itself is precisely the difference which for that understanding is its constitutive *connection*. The upshot of this being that in absolute knowing all that is left known is pure connecting or relating that has absorbed the extremes of the previous merely passive relata, e.g. the “in-itself” of the thing known by Kant’s intuitive understanding. This means further that Hegel’s philosophy for its part dispenses with the claim that a *determinate* location can be assigned to human thinking—in this sense it can afford to dispense with a determinate concept of ‘human’ thinking and even of ‘man’.⁶¹ The absolute location of subjectivity given by Kant stands in immediate relation to the “restriction thesis” of the critique of cognition because all his determinate concepts are *finitisations* of man. Now Kant locates the power of imagination under the condition of the proposition form as itself the absolute location of thinking. What is in relation to all determinate concepts the infinite relation or that of original determining, this power of imagination now becomes a conditioned, broken infinity in opposition to which the conditioning location is always even more infinite than it could be itself. This is why the power of imagination determines ever new syntheses without being able in all this to present as overcome into them the assumed, immediate difference that first makes synthesising a requirement. The means to find the determinate location of Kant’s understanding logically is for Hegel already in *Faith and Knowledge* ‘Spinoza’s unity’, a true understanding of which according to Hegel, Kant never attained.⁶² At the latest at the end of his time in Frankfurt Hegel realised that Spinoza’s substance can be a logical means to grasp all finitude and hence also the claimed barriers and conditions of knowing on their finite side, to negate them and indeed to overcome them into a true negativity.⁶³

61 Cf. on this aspect E. Heintel, *Der Begriff des Menschen und der ‘speculative Satz’* in the author’s *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1988, vol. 1, 284–310, esp. 303 ff.

62 Cf. Hegel, *TW* 2, 327; on Spinoza also 345 ff.

63 We know that Hegel’s knowledge of Spinoza, deepened by Jacobi and Lessing, in fact dates from his time in Tübingen (cf. K. Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben*, Darmstadt 1977 (reprint), 40). In Frankfurt Hegel attained an understanding of the totality to be grasped as synthetic as the power of reconciliation in contrast to the divisiveness of reflection and to demand this as much as possible philosophically even if it is initially located in religion (as still in the so-called *System Fragment* of 1800). On the significance of Spinoza in this and generally for Hegel’s development cf. E. Chiereghin, *Dialettica dell’assoluto e ontologia della soggettività*, Trient 1980, 30 ff. as well as the same author’s *L’influenza dello spinozismo nella formazione della filosofia hegeliana*, Padua 1961. Further the substantive study by L. Lugarini, *Spinoza nella formazione della dialettica hegeliana*

If it is the Kantian conception of subjectivity that this maintains itself *in* the assumed difference of its own finitude and then only *as* difference—namely as the difference of consciousness,⁶⁴ of the modalities or in general as the difference *from itself* in the externality of objectivity—then Hegel's concept of subjectivity insofar as it is coincident with the form of absolute substantiality eliminating all its presuppositions and determinations is that of *absolute differing* itself and the knowledge of it is not that of “something” like that of a *determinate* understanding but eliminating all determination makes it purely indeterminate. ‘Absolute nothingness’ for Hegel ‘to be known ... as the first in philosophy’⁶⁵ it is for that reason—if initially only negatively—free. The

in his *Prospettive hegeliane*, Rome 1986, 55–76 is notable for presenting Hegel's Spinoza reception as already possessing an orientation to absolute negativity making it possible to relate it to the production of the peculiar positivity of determination as a central problem of the Jena period (cf. 64). A brief historical outline of the Spinoza reception of Hegel, Schelling and their contemporaries is given by W. Bonsiepen, *Der Begriff der Negativität in den Jenaer Schriften Hegels*, *Hegel-Studien* suppl. 16, Bonn 1977, 44–52.

64 That Kant proceeds ‘merely ... from a conscious ... understanding’ is expressly criticised by Hegel at TW 2, 340.

65 Hegel, TW 2, 410. Subjectivity is the concluding topic in Hegel, *Jena Metaphysics of 1804/5* which initially means that it is the most incommensurable. A decisive intermediate level on the pathway from the ‘first’ substantiality in the *Logic* to the ‘highest essence’ of the *Metaphysics* and then to subjectivity itself is the treatment of substance as subject in terms of the *logic of the proposition* which refers back to Kant's criterion for real propositions and Maimon's principle of determinability (cf. GW VII, 80). The logical path from substance to subject developed later in the SoL presented below remains in general a matter of relating differentially the *difference* (of substance) already understood *absolutely* to what seems to be absolutely different *from that* (e.g. substances) and in recognising in this relation subjectivity as the self *of* substance, as ‘concept of the negative unity of the self’ (SoL 250, GW XXI, 247). The thought which alone knows this complete (systematic) differentiation by the power of the self is the *concept* whose knowing is not simply a purely conscious one. Hence it is not even necessary to pose Düsing's question as to why the subjectivity gained from substance ‘should then be a thinking relation and not merely an essentially existing self-relation’ (cf. his *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik*, *Hegel-Studien* suppl. 15, Bonn 1976, 231). Hegel's concept of the concept is precisely the proposal for a unity of the difference (only presupposed by Düsing) between ‘merely existing’ and ‘merely thinking’ (only conscious). The fundamental problem in Düsing's approach is his concept of subjectivity itself. Ultimately he understands it as if one could present a ‘structure’ of ‘subjectivity’—by the way free of antinomy and dialectic—‘constructed out of simpler constitutive elements’, i.e. supposedly *aggregated* while nevertheless ‘in the synthesis’ (in the aggregate) ‘of these elements ultimately becoming self-referential’ because it recognises (n.b. in reflection) the ‘equality of the mutually related relation structures which are distinct in the methodical construction’ (loc. cit. 345 f.). In fact for Hegel even before it can have recognised ‘anything’ a reflection must already be ‘in itself’ self-referential.

notion of *dialectic* that remains dominant up to the *Logic of 1804/05* in Hegel is this: starting in the simple connection and in proportion via the relation up to the relation of relations to drive differences in each case into a differing with themselves in order to develop the elenctic of their finitude, their merely passive intuitiveness. Now even if for itself it is a topic of “metaphysics”, clearly on this understanding of the dialectic Spinoza’s infinite substance has become a logical “operator”, a means for the reduction of all determination persisting for itself.⁶⁶ This is demonstrated by the extraordinary result of the first part of the *Jena Logic* that the ‘reality of simple connection’, thus each ‘impartial’, direct qualitative or quantitative determination of ‘something’ is nothing less than ‘infinity’.⁶⁷ The semblance that one could in simple connection relate to ‘something’ thereby determining it is destroyed by the proof that each simple connection, if it actually says something, is many connections—thematic *and* non-thematic simultaneously as one might put it. One further consequence of this is that the connection in this way coming into view between simplicity and connection plurality as *infinite* connection is no longer susceptible to attempts to thematise it as simple but is only expressed in the concept of the relation; now this taken as the immediate negative unity of the infinite *and* is the relation of substantiality.⁶⁸ This is how Hegel found in Spinoza the general form of how to relate *negatively* to each simple relatum, to each of what is in this way immediately determinate in terms of being and especially to each consciously focussed finitude and to make it dialectically disappear. Our account of Hegel’s modal concepts especially that of the absolute relation will have to show that it is not a question of a sophistical trick but of the realisation that is solid in the details of the absolute form itself. As the highest claim of philosophy this may under no circumstances be relinquished and it has the infinite right with respect to itself in every exposition of a philosophical thought to let the thought find itself and to differentiate out the positive dross in that exposition to the point where it too becomes fluid joining the life of the thought.

66 It is for this reason that the concept of infinity especially in the *Jena Logic* has also been called a ‘metacategory of all categories of “simple relation”’ and this in the sense of the ‘genuinely dialectical concept’; cf. M. Baum, *Zu Methode der Logik und Metaphysik beim Jenaer Hegel* in the author’s *Hegel in Jena, Hegel-Studien* suppl. 20, 1980, 119–138, loc. cit. 135, 136; cf. A. Moretto, *Hegel e la ‘matematica dell’infinito’*, Trient 1984, 163 f. This point is also discussed by K. Düsing (loc. cit. note 65) 150 f.

67 Cf. Hegel, GW VII, 36.

68 Ibid. 38 f.

3 Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Language

The aim of the previous section was “hermeneutically” to “allow” the philosophical language form of infinite self-referentiality to relate also to possible obstacles to its activity in finite forms not only without the concept but indeed also with it. This is only ever not a licence to violence when its execution is forced by the need to realise the potential for making connections contained even in all finite form; only this kind of procedure can be philosophically acceptable. Hegel referred to such potentiality when confronting the transcendental theory of the proposition form, central to Kant’s whole undertaking, relating explicitly to it especially in the moment of the power of imagination. Indeed he was not alone in this regard. He found a forerunner in the early Fichte.⁶⁹ The weight of this potential in which “in itself” the finite form of the proposition is transcended can only be fully measured when it has become clear in what relation the proposition form stands to the general root and ground of knowing. For Kant this means to the transcendental apperception within which everything objectively related has returned back into itself.

The result of our previous discussion was that the ‘supreme principle of all synthetic propositions’ in the CpR or the identity axiom following from it in relation to the conditions of the possibility of experience and conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience is presented in every proposition that is “substantive” and not just logical. By claiming a material difference between subject and predicate functions the proposition points to an intuitive something external to the judging which is the whole point of judging in objective orientation. The proposition moves beyond itself to the object, i.e. to “something” to which also other judging can refer. According to the principles chapter it moves simultaneously only into its own form when this is the form and the *ground* of all objectivity as simultaneously every possible material, i.e. explicitly made ground in formal terms is once again a proposition. In the individual synthetic proposition the unity of the experience as being-in-itself to which the supreme principle refers is *set* as identity of proposition form *qua* experience form and the objectively determinate externality of the object. The factually synthetic proposition is hence *in-itself* grounded in its form and is simultaneously connection to a *set* content; this difference between merely immediate

69 Cf. especially Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, WW I, 2115, 216 f. 218. The power of imagination ‘hovers’ according to Fichte ‘between determination and non-determination, between the finite and the infinite in the middle’ (I, 16) and ‘unites’ thus ‘what is contradictory’ (I, 218); this makes it the ‘*productive power of imagination*’ (I, 284) only grasped by itself (cf. *ibid.*).

reflection-in-itself as being-in-itself and mediated reflection-in-another makes it a form of object consciousness. The supreme principle grounds objects of experience as essentially *conscious* objects. It grounds their formal necessity in the fact that they emerge from the self-referential form of awareness—from immediate consciousness that becomes the form of mediation—in their objective reality of experience. Objects of experience are nothing other than realisations of consciousness or of the subject of experience as the formal condition of the totality of experience in a concrete determination ('grown together' with intuition).⁷⁰ This situation can be summarised in the simple rule that in every single proposition of experience the *copula* does not express a simple "is" as in one of perception but instead an "is as". The simultaneity of "is" and "as" once again is Kant's peculiar modalisation of being, eventually fully demonstrated especially in the postulates of empirical thinking.

In fact neither the identity axiom nor even the supreme principle itself claim to assume a prior "overview" of thinking and its object from which they would be able to find an "equality" or an "agreement" of the two sides. Such a "view from nowhere" could clearly only amount to a dogmatic claim just as these formulations are not supposed to represent experimentally proposed hypotheses for which one still does not quite know, if, how or whether at all they will prove themselves or not. Kant's intention in contrast is to start with the difference of the two sides, not only as with something found but in the sense that we ourselves *make* them immediately and *are* them ('as' and "is"). The difference that "is there" and in which everything different "is there" is for Kant a form that is itself *conditioned* and into whose condition different from it the transcendental question can yet pose itself. The critical path is not about giving content information—apodictic or hypothetical—about the difference of as one might say "subject" and "object" but to define this difference before everything else according to the expression introduced above genetically by giving principles for it.⁷¹ Elements providing the principles are for Kant 'the formal conditions of intuition *a priori*, the synthesis of the power of imagination and the necessary unity of the two'⁷² (apperception). These three are the moments

70 A simultaneous realisation of the object of experience in this relation in the Kantian form is unthinkable. This is what constitutes the general ground for Kant's critique of the theoretical concept of God. Only Hegel's PhoS overcomes the one-sidedness of the highest principle; its position is that the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience are *also* simultaneously the conditions of the possibility of the experiences of this object.

71 Every rational syllogism does this according to Kant, cf. CpR B 356 f./A 300. 'Strict principles' are 'synthetic knowledge from concepts' (B 357 f./A 301).

72 CpR B 197/A 158.

of experience as being-in-itself which however means that they are the possibility of making experience with content or of *setting* it; into these elements according to Kant the immediate idea logically divides itself in order to produce a *possible* content of themselves (as such standing under the condition of these elements and their unity), one that is *actual* (for Kant an immediate perception understood as conditioned by the elements and their unity) or a *necessary* one (following from the unity of condition and conditioned).

It cannot be overlooked in all this that as much as the contents of experience are *conscious* objects and are because of their setting *appearances* exposed to external reflection,⁷³ the *condition* of this setting, the in-itself of the one experience or the unity relation of consciousness itself cannot be the same kind of conscious content or even just another object of experience beside the others. Once again it must be remembered that Kant calls upon the logic of the relation of the condition in its asymmetric and complementary difference to put a stop to the sceptical tendency to indeterminate equalisation of different things. Hume succumbs to this when he lists 'psychic' *entities* like 'impressions' or 'ideas' (e.g. of causality) beside empirical contents supposedly standing equally with those other contents like the soul itself as 'a bundle of perceptions in a perpetual flux and movement'.⁷⁴ Kant's hypothetical form is much more about saying that all real consciousness is something derivative (conditioned) of pure *consciousness* as its condition and that this last cannot appear on the level of the conditioned. But then the logic of the condition relation produces not only an asymmetric difference but also a reflexive *identity* of the differentiated terms: the conditioned is not only something other than the condition, it is just as much *its* mediated present being and that condition in *its* other. Somewhat pointedly one can say that if he wanted to use the logic of the condition relation in philosophical intention Kant *had* to follow its lead to the reflexive form and that, if it were supposed to be treated under this form, for him consciousness would emerge as a form of *self-consciousness* at least proportionate to the extent of this form. It is hardly surprising then that in the—on the whole not very numerous—formulations where in Kant the term "self-consciousness" occurs, its origin in the logic of the hypothetical form cannot be denied. Thus he states that 'self-consciousness in general (is) the representation of what is the condition of all unity and which itself is nevertheless unconditioned'.⁷⁵ Reference to the unconditioned nature of the self in fact

73 *Logically* determined Kant's objects of experience are propositions (the merely positive synthesis of two antinomical spheres).

74 D. Hume, *Treatise on human nature*, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grosse, London 1898, I, 534.

75 Kant, CpRA 401.

brings the condition relation as a whole into view. It is for its part overcome into the “supreme” condition.

Considered in isolation the unconditioned moment of all consciousness is for conscious knowing an *absolutely* certain and *simple* ‘representation’, namely that of ‘the I’.⁷⁶ It was in such isolated consideration that Descartes declared the I *categorically* and as a consequence of this form to be *substance*. What remained then as a problem of mediation was the relation of this certain substance to the plurality of substances, of simplicity to extension or of negativity to positivity. Descartes did indeed try to give forms of this relation that were from their point of view certain, simple and as it were “I-like”. These forms are the *coniunctiones necessariae* representing an absolute ‘ability’ and in that freedom of the understanding in relation to positive contents.⁷⁷ That certainty is communicated from the free form of I to the contents presentable in necessary connections in a manner completely analogous to the way motion spreads out freely by the communication of the impulse in Cartesian physics. Thus can Descartes think in general that the I is in extension. But then the extension the I gives itself in this way is only that of its own accidentality while extension as such remains *other* substance and with that the still unintegrated *assumption* of the process of the I becoming accidental to itself. This is why for Descartes the I’s knowing does not necessarily reach the outer, at least not as long as the unity of the two substances is not proved in God: in the self of *the* substance.⁷⁸

With his question Kant no longer needed to look for the self outside the I. He succeeded in distinguishing himself expressly from Descartes in the paralogism chapter of the CpR and initially at least the difference consists in the fact that in Kant the I is understood not immediately as *thinking* but as ‘the condition under which I think in general’.⁷⁹ With that for Kant, according to

⁷⁶ Cf. CpR B 68.

⁷⁷ Cf. the extensive discussion in J. Simon, *Wahrheit als Freiheit*, Berlin and New York 1978, 121 ff. Truth in Descartes becomes according to Simon ‘an absolute ability’ (125; cf. also 128), and that in such a way that *thinking* maintains itself as *negating* (133); thinking here is the negation of all positive ‘signs’ in ‘a single meaning context in which they take up their well determined location’ (139). Negation can for that reason in general be called ‘the methodical principle of generation itself’ (127).

⁷⁸ Extending the above analogy to Descartes’ theory of motion one could say that just as it tries to explain motion with the Cartesian concept of an exclusively positive magnitude of motion leaving the ‘independence’ of the other in the communication of the impulse out of consideration and consequently is incapable of demonstrating the maintenance of the impulse, just so would the ‘maintenance’ of the I be endangered if it were not possible to refer to the concept of God. Descartes’ physics lacks the concept of God in contrast to Aristotle’s physics.

⁷⁹ Kant, CpR B 404/A 346.

the unconditionality of the “supreme” condition, the *present being* of I is also immediately stated if, as shown by the critique of rational psychology, without all further (‘essential’) determination. But then in transcendental terms it is clearly stated in the hypothetical form that on the one hand the I so determined does not stand abstractly against plurality; instead from the simple difference between condition and conditioned it already in itself contains a plurality, which can then on the side of the different something (of the condition) infinitely multiply itself without in all that presenting anything more than “cases” of the condition. But then this means that self-consciousness is “essentially” identity that maintains itself in plurality and similarly only arrives at itself within that and that, moreover, the I contains within it the forms of the unification of plurality or as Kant says must be⁸⁰ their ‘vehicle’.⁸¹ Thought through to its end however this last aspect means that the I does not stand beside its concepts, intuitions and objects, nor does it simply use them or refer to them but rather that it is nothing other than *the relation of their use and their objective relation itself*. I is the transition from the condition of experience (its in-itself) as which it itself is imagined into the many conditioned somethings or the formal as well as material determination. It is this just as the subject function in the hypothetical form ‘if A then B’ is simultaneously condition *and* the setting of the predicate function.⁸²

Thought of in this determination I is a truly universal concept that always contains its relation to the particular. In terms of the hypothetical form then the particulars—in Kant the conscious objects—are also not themselves truly universals but *strictly* particular, i.e. at best presentable as abstract universals. Conscious objects necessarily have no relation to themselves or no “insides”.

80 Ibid. B 399/A 341; B 406/A 348. As such pure mediation of the concept I is not itself a (Kantian) concept which is expressly stated in CpR B 404/A 436 and Prol. § 46 (AA IV, 334). This means the understanding does not know the I; it knows *through* the I (cf. CpR A 402).

81 D. Henrich refers repeatedly to this last aspect when he determines Kantian self-consciousness as knowledge of the rules of the ‘transitions’ between the (conscious) ‘I think’-cases; cf. his *Identität und Objektivität*, Heidelberg 1976, e.g. 93 ff. and *Kant und Hegel* in his *Selbstverhältnisse*, Stuttgart 1982, 171–208, esp. 176 ff. The category is the determinate form of the transition of consciousness to *itself* so that the self remains one of the categorial determinations.

82 In rough outline one could say: Descartes comprehended the I categorially as a merely immediate relation and thus as being; with the hypothetical form Kant gave it reflection and established the self as its own mediation. Fichte tried to comprehend the I in disjunctive form, thus the predicate *without residuum* as relation to the subject. Hegel demonstrated the presence of finite moments in all forms of relation. For him the I is absolute negativity.

The price they pay for the fact that objects are in fact the inside of the I, that they absolutely fall in the self-defined horizon of subjective knowing is that they have no horizons of their own, or better that they are not their own horizons and instead are arbitrarily divisible, indeterminable moments set in the time of an inside external to them. They are reflexes not themselves reflection; settings without being laws unto themselves; knowns but not knowable. Just as Descartes did with his own doubt, Kant too most certainly reduced empiricist scepticism and put it in its place. Like Descartes Kant did this from a philosophical principle, one indeed that even led him to a reflexive structure of self-consciousness. But with this principle all that happened was that from the conscious world (of appearance) it went back to its self-conscious condition and showed with that, to the extent that we ourselves are this condition, that we *actually* know our conscious objects—at least insofar as experiential knowing of appearances can be called knowing—and have not fallen merely for the semblance or the probability of cognition. Conversely the step into a *self-conscious world*—the world of language as it will turn out—cannot be done with the help of the Kantian form. I, which is only the setting form of the objects, *does not speak* in what it sets, much less does it express *itself*. In the hypothetical form there is the subject function and in general subjectivity but in no way an individual, whose characteristic it would be to have its other (the “predicate”) not only as something set but standing over against it as a liberated something and essentially free. The problem can be shown in two ways in the hypothetical form. *First* this form has to be irreversible, because only as such does it attain its specific reflexivity. Kant consistently excludes the inversion “if B (the object), then A (knowing)” as *dogmatism*. Only from this exclusion in the interest of the presentation of the hypothetical form does the ur-division [*Urteilung*] of the idea happen at all; for the *idea* also thinks the predicate as completed, i.e. as mediated-in-itself. Indeed it announces this claim with respect to the self-realisation of the subject in the aesthetic, in the teleological power of judgment, in the *Opus postumum*’s conception of the completion of experience and above all in the concept of the transcendental ideal. As contents all these claims *must* hold dogmatically *if* the transcendental form and its certainty are to be upheld. *Second* the form begins from an immediate assumption. “If A then B” does not mean “that A” without more ado. We have already seen that Kant understands the supreme condition *simultaneously* as unconditioned. To that extent A also steps outside the form and is strictly in “absolute position”. The Cartesian categorical concept of I is as it were the second, immediate premiss without which the hypothetical form would not give a *modus ponens*, even if a (no longer immediate) deduction might yet be made from it. This presents no great difficulty to Kant’s task of founding the conscious world,

since Kant only goes back from B to A with the hypothetical form or seeks only to set up its relation and may not deduce B first from a problematical A. Kant's problem is not that of first *deducing* cognition; what concerns him is the performance of the consciousness we *already have* of our cognition in the forms and objects of knowledge, i.e. to strip that knowing of its immediacy and present it as mediated.⁸³ The immediacy of self-consciousness or of the reflexive moment only becomes a difficulty with respect to the form of mediation when it is a question of thinking a mediation of subjectivity with its form of mediation itself. The most prominent example in which Kant himself addresses this problem is the third antinomy of reason. Kant's solution can be summarised as follows: the theoretical form of mediation is not capable of saying anything about the composition of the unconditioned or immediate it presupposes itself, so in practical terms freedom most certainly may *exist* even if, unavoidably, only in *categorical* (!) form. This says only that while the practical mediation whose result is not an object but a determinate action may remain by itself but cannot be seen as a conscious object, neither indeed can the objectified action be seen as a formation of freedom or as an I-like realisation of subjectivity.⁸⁴ In theoretical mediation then subjectivity *does not* mediate *itself*. It remains rather for itself the immediate that it was already before all mediation. In its speech it becomes *merely external* to itself without fulfilling itself. If it had a content for itself, then one could also say that in speaking it empties itself. Practically speaking it may at best have a content that it makes conscious to itself, according to Kant in "maxims"; equivalently one can say that

83 To that extent Kant's much criticised reference to the 'fact' of scientific knowledge against its empirical explanation CPr B 127 f. is not objectionable at all. Knowledge is not derivable (knowable) from non-knowing as ultimately Locke and Hume must believe. Neither does the critique not 'discover' any new knowledge; what it does rather is set cognition in relation to itself.

84 It is clear that for Kant religious representations have a special status, such that generated according to a 'schematism of analogy' (Kant, *Religion* AA VI, 65) they do not make any claim to knowledge but do make practical ideas of reason accessible to sense. In the contents of 'church faith' we have *examples* and a 'leading thread' which only 'the audacity of the power genius' deludes itself it 'has now grown out of' (Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII, 65; cf. also Kant, *Vornehmer Ton* AA VIII, 401 note). The example is 'an *aesthetic* mode of representation' (*Vornehmer Ton* AA VIII, 405), indeed—in the case of religion—that of the idea of reason as the 'ur-picture' lying within us (cf. Kant, *Religion* AA VI, 64 ff. *passim*). In the example we comprehend sensuously the ur-picture and the totality of reason; it thus gives the subject a new and more pure relation *to itself*. Ultimately the religious examples present the practical sphere sensuously as already realised and finished, which means they anticipate the mediation with itself 'as if' it were already accomplished in order to make the ideal form of practice plausible at all: 'the practical (is) only understandable for us at best in a symbolic representation' (*Religion* AA VI, 171).

it practically *individualises* itself and does not remain merely empty universality. But the excluded predicate is also not in this way to be regained for theoretical knowing. It remains the “in-itself” of things of the conscious world, which corresponds to the immediacy of the in-itself (of possibility) of experience in self-consciousness. At this point the two deficiencies of the hypothetical form come into contact with each other. This form does not realise the predicate in order to think subjectivity as the form of mediation; indeed neither does it mediate subjectivity with itself when it excludes the predicate that was its only option for fulfilling itself.⁸⁵ More generally the rational realisation of the subject and its cognition Kant upholds and makes thinkable against scepticism is not already the realisation of reason itself, which is nothing other than the self-setting unity of subject *and* predicate, while the speech of the subject happens with exclusion of the rational-linguistic relation according to which hearing language is always a constitutive moment of speech itself and precisely of self-conscious speech. Only as this rational-linguistic relation would the subject, as already Hamann’s objection to Kant claimed, be *individualised*.⁸⁶

One must of course be careful about what in philosophy can be called an “objection”. It cannot mean that one seeks to deny a particular kind of thinking the right to think as it thinks. It would on the contrary hope that the thought in question thinks as consistently as possible from its own presuppositions. In this respect Kant, whose consistency can hardly be objected to in any way, would be more satisfying than many other philosophers. But then the objection would hardly be placated by assuring us that one can also think “otherwise”, for against a *determinate* and within itself concrete thinking, *indeterminate* alterity as simple negation means initially nothing other than that one could also *not think*. Its more urgent concern will rather be with articulating

85 Internal to Kant the problem can only be solved by trying to bring the ‘system components’, above all theoretical reason and practical reason, i.e. into a relation determining *both sides*. What Kant himself calls the ‘absolute’ predicate, namely the ‘idea in individuo’ or God, is practically a definitely realisable thought and (as postulate) ‘to be accomplished by us ourselves’ (Kant, *Vornehmer Ton* AA VIII, 401 note; cf. Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII, 36). The connection of the system components and with that simultaneously a production of the relation of the *actual* individual and its theoretical contents is attempted primarily by J. Simon who proceeds on the basis of the methodology of the CpR. A concept capable of carrying this mediation is in Simon especially that of *pragmatic faith*, whose theoretically determining function in relation to the (Kantian) concept of the *subjective horizon* is explained; cf. e.g. J. Simon, *Kants pragmatische Ethikbegründung in Archivio di filosofia* 55 (1987), 183–204. We too will encounter aspects of the individual in our presentation of Kant’s modal concepts.

86 Cf. on this J. Simon, *Introduction* to his edition of J.G. Hamann, *Schriften zur Sprache*, Frankfurt a. M. 1967, 7–80, esp. 66 ff.

within the objection a *determining* relation to what is addressed, indeed it is only this relation that produces the object together with the objection in its determination. The thought *finds itself*, as Hegel said, in relation to thought. But such finding itself is reason as such. An objection is the inversion of something heard and found, as long as this does not fall out of reason but is instead inverted *by reason into itself*. Everything rational is capable of absolute inversion. The fixing understanding will make of this the claim that what is found should be distorted or perverted, in which it presupposes that persistent criteria can be given against which the distortion can be read. But the rational has no criterion or parameters external to it but is (n.b. *sit venia verbo*) *absolute* turning and motion. Reason also knows that in every understanding *actu* the inversion, which is in fact the whole problem of individuality, already happens, that understanding as a relation to “something” (in the language of the Jena Hegel) is already infinity (freedom from finite criteria) and contradiction (freedom to speak) and this because, as speculative logic has to show, absolutely everything is rooted in rational freedom and is itself inversion.

The text passages in which Hegel most extensively criticises the Kantian view of the relations between consciousness, self-consciousness and language are found in the first parts of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. There is practically no direct reference to Kant to be found here; nevertheless they provide the tools necessary to bring the *specific* Kantian situation into view, because they arise from a fundamental objection, i.e. from a relation to Kant that first generates the determinateness of Kantian thinking enabling its ‘inversion’ into the determinateness of its own thinking in the process of its performance.⁸⁷ A phenomenological response to Kant’s critique might seem inappropriate as an explicitly real-philosophical form of speech, which as such can and must make assumptions and in turn however cannot be taken as valid in a transcendental philosophy. We have already made it clear that in general an intuitive and real-philosophical position, relating as it does to totalities, also brings into view what in the purely logical or experience-logical treatment of the total structure necessarily must be assumed but which must not unconditionally be mediated.⁸⁸ The *Phenomenology* certainly does assume *individuality*, thus what the objection—under this assumption naturally—did not find produced in

87 The criterion of a merely *arbitrary* interpretation is according to philosophical hermeneutics precisely this: that it claims to be able to understand the text without oppositions, which assumption makes it in fact incapable of transmitting determination to it at all; this is why it imposes what it wants the text’s determinate quality to be taken for externally upon it without including this imposition in the interpretation.

88 N.b. above 26.

Kant.⁸⁹ Making assumptions in this way in relation to the whole still clearly has to be systematically mediated. Nevertheless it does not as such constitute an objection to the attempt to determine from its own position the assumptions underlying the Kantian presentation of the context that interests us. It would be completely sufficient if it could be shown that the Kantian problem of a subjectivity that is merely immediate mediation but not real self-mediation does represent a serious problem for the Kantian assumption, of which one can have a determinate concept but only starting from a different assumption.

The first three stages “consciousness” as consciousness runs through in the PhoS constitute its experience of intending and ultimately the crisis of intending. We have already stated that the form of intending in logical terms is the proposition, the *difference* between subject and predicate, which, when it attains unity and “truth”, again indicates something distinct from this unity, namely the object. As willed the orientation in direct intention to the object is the *ought* of the unity of subject and predicate and a proposition that *is* not this unity cannot claim to know “something”. We recall moreover that consciousness, which according to its concept is the presentation of *determinate* subjective spirit, is also immediately the presentation of the opposition of determination, thus performing simultaneously a reflection-in-itself and a reflection-in-another but this in such a way that these two reflections remain mutually external to and repelling each other. The word repulsion here expresses the term of reflection “opposition” with the qualification that from this point on it exists in consciousness. If one conceives of judging thus as subjective cognition, then it falls on the subjective side of the opposition and is a form of reflection-in-itself while initially repelling the object (reflection-in-another). The phenomenological question then becomes: how can the reflection of the object emerge from the reflection of the proposition? How could consciousness itself be capable of giving itself a form that sets its contents?—the absolute form in which alone the question of truth can find an answer.

Putting the question this way makes it possible initially to recognise the transcendental aspect. The difference however is clearly that the *relation* of the proposition difference to the opposition of consciousness is expressly *thematic*. What happens in the phenomenological approach is not, as in Kant,

89 With the individual in Hegel's PhoS absolute form is already presupposed, which is what consciousness should first become for itself; cf. the already cited statement at PhoS § 26, GW IX 23, where the '*individual*' is called 'absolute form' in that it is 'the *immediate certainty* of itself and ... with that unconditioned *being*'. In terms of the encyclopaedic system the individual possesses natural philosophical and anthropological determinations in itself that distinguish it from (logical) subjectivity or (spirited) personality.

that a determinate structure of the self-relation of consciousness is presupposed for judging as its condition; instead it should be observed how the two terms of the difference lie within one another and what “truth” each respectively generates from lying within the other. It is certainly possible to say that in these terms too consciousness remains a condition of the generation of the respective truth. Nevertheless it is as such neither the sole nor certainly the supreme condition of the genesis of truth, while on the other hand there is no requirement that it possess a knowledge of this its conditioning function. Indeed *as* consciousness it essentially does *not* have this knowledge. Instead of that it makes its experiences with the truth by intending; soon however it becomes clear that the predicates set in the reflection that are supposed to express the true remain only intended predicates. “We” know that the predicate remains an ought or a *mere* predicate as long as it does not express the totality of the mediation, i.e. both oppositions together.⁹⁰ Up to that point it remains merely something *other* than the subject, with which the beginning was made, and is replaced by *other* predicates. But then the predicate function *as such* is already mediated from the assumed totality, whose opposed moments—that of the thought of the object and the moment of cognition of this object being driven into itself—this function unifies. This genesis of the predicate remains unknown to consciousness as long as it has not become the concept of itself or has arrived at ‘absolute consciousness’.⁹¹ This is why it holds the predicate to be an external *means* in order to intend the object, a means it inserts between the object and itself to arrive at the greatest possible “agreement”. Consciousness regards predication understood in this way as a possible form of truth.⁹²

Experience with such a form of truth begins already in sense certainty. Here all that happens is that the (proposition-)subject’s *being* is *repeated* in the predicate: ‘It says of what it knows only this: it *is*; and its truth contains

90 It must be noted that the knowledge of the ‘we’—in fact that of the spirit itself appearing in consciousness—may not, as is often claimed, be referred to external observers approaching from outside. It is quite simply impossible to have any knowledge of consciousness in external reflection, because consciousness itself is essentially external reflection. The ‘we’ or the oft referenced ‘phenomenologist’ are nothing other than the totality moment of consciousness as such and with consciousness itself immediately *given*.

91 Putting it in the terms of J. Simon’s *Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel*, Stuttgart 1966, 110: ‘The breakthrough to “absolute form” is only possible ... when consciousness attains understanding of semblance and as such first becomes complete understanding of the present being peculiar to it. Such a totality of representations of the matter (as unity of matter and thing) is only possible as completed unity of producing and hearing, of form and resistance.’

92 Wholly in the original sense of the term here the (grammatical) subject means the object as immediate and supposedly reflected in the predicate.

solely the being of the matter'.⁹³ In philosophical terms of course the *fact* of a *repetition* of being is of the greatest significance, for the *making* of this fact can already stand as the in-itself of subjective freedom, which is *set however* only as truth, i.e. as concept of being *and* ought. 'From itself' of course no being repeats itself but is being pure and simple and devoid of memory. It is the difference in the proposition that first repeats being, indeed as ought, as intended *identity*.⁹⁴ But Hegel shows that the identity remains completely differentiated, so that the repeating does not come to an end, i.e. that the subject term remains always *more general* than the predicating accompaniment. The form of the proposition turns out to be general, while something singular is supposed to be uttered. This failure of opinion to be able to utter something sensual and singular through simple predicating is the first and original failure of intending itself. For intending with its made predicates has only produced the opposite from what was opined or intended. It understands this in such a way that the object as it were has become another in the course of its activity. This is why it no longer comprehends the object as a positive singularity but as 'a *negative* as such'⁹⁵ and with that as a universal that repels external determinations from it. It is 'the divine nature' of speech 'immediately to invert the opinion'⁹⁶ and, as one could add in anticipation, to bring out individuality through this inversion.

Grown cleverer from this experience with sensibility, *perceiving* consciousness draws the consequence of understanding predication itself as 'the inconstant' and 'inessential'⁹⁷ against the 'summarising *thinghood*'⁹⁸ of the (negative) object. The subjectivity of judging now takes into account that it does not reach the 'substance' of the object because it possibly 'assesses it incorrectly

93 Hegel, PhoS § 91, GW IX, 63.

94 For the relation being–identity–judgment it is common to refer to Hölderlin's short essay *Urteil und Sein* (Insel edition, Frankfurt a. M. 1969, vol. 11, 591 f.). Identity belongs according to Hölderlin in fact to the judgment, because identity does not mean 'unification' in every 'consideration'. There is a difference with Hegel's position it has to be said in that 'self-consciousness' is comprehended from identity and in exclusive opposition to 'being', so that it ultimately still has solely reflexive status (Kant-Fichte).

95 Hegel, PhoS § 96, GW IX, 65.

96 Ibid. § 110, GW IX, 69.

97 Ibid. § 111, GW IX, 71. *Thinghood* slips into the position of 'pure essence' (loc. cit. 91) to the many predicates, it is 'distinct and free from these its determinations; it is pure self-referentiality or the *medium* in which these determinations all are' (ibid.). It will turn out that this mediality is also a determination (loc. cit. 99) and thus cannot be abstractly kept out of the domain of predicates.

98 Ibid. § 116, GW IX, 74.

and deceives itself⁹⁹ or also that it may not have considered all ‘aspects’ it could have. Perceiving, shrewd intending tries to compensate for its original failure by setting up a ‘criterion of truth’ which amounts to the claim that the object in every case is a negative unity ‘equal to itself’,¹⁰⁰ which *for that reason* should not contradict the statements about it. From this point on consciousness undertakes to speak “consistently”, which means that—as a consequence of the previously established “metaphysics” of identical thinghood—attention is already directed at its own production of sentences in whose “correct” *syntax* now the object—instead of as formerly in the simple predicate—is supposed to be repeated.

The object however is now imagined as not only determinable in a relation but as itself a relation. It is the relation of its unity and its differentness; for itself according to the former and for another according to the latter. This means that the opposition of consciousness is itself represented in the object: for, in order to be claimed as the totality of the *one* object, the relation between unity and plurality must now be capable of being thought of as not merely an arbitrary diversity but as a strong opposition, as ‘absolute difference’.¹⁰¹ The unity may not be differentiated from other materials like some arbitrary “matter” of the thing but must be set opposed to the form of materiality as such and must overcome this. Now the object presents *in its own right* the necessary relation to others and ‘in this way the unconditioned absolute universality is available, and consciousness only now enters truly into the domain of the understanding’.¹⁰² It enters into that because now on the level of the object there *is* understanding. For the object is now itself nothing other than the collection of its indeterminately many properties (predicates) in its unity; it *is* the transition from P to Q to R ... or, more generally, the transition from P to – P and “in reality” nothing apart from that. For Hegel then ‘the sophistry of perception’ attempts to avoid the contradiction in the predication (S is simultaneously P and – P) ‘by distinguishing between *regards*, by resort to *and* and *to the extent that*’,¹⁰³ thus by presenting the in fact already achieved infinity or contradictory predicating itself in the manner of the ‘bad infinite’ and in this way once

99 Cf. Ibid. § 113, GW IX, 72.

100 Ibid. § 116, GW IX, 74.

101 Ibid. § 124, GW IX, 78.

102 Ibid. § 129, GW IX, 79.

103 Ibid. In fact ‘the last *insofar*’ that has to fall away is the one that ‘separates being-for-itself and being-for-another’ (loc. cit. 99); now is ‘the object ... *in one and the same regard the opposite of itself: for itself insofar as it is for another and for another insofar as it is for itself*’ (ibid.). The same thing happened to consciousness through its entry into the ‘domain of the understanding’.

again to save the consistency criterion. But the thought of an object that identifies itself with its predicates and is 'a unity capable of plurality',¹⁰⁴ imposes the necessity not simply of conceiving predication as moved but of thinking the object itself as motion through its predicates.

Intending has failed for the second time. In this it has emerged that the object as a true universal is nothing determinate any more but is only the transition of the determinations into each other, thus in terms of form it is the same as what the understanding is. With this the 'concept' is '*in itself*' thought.¹⁰⁵ The immediate representation of an object as no more than the motion through its determinations is *force*. But then the conception of force means that consciousness has made enormous progress, for it refers now to something '*non-object-like*'¹⁰⁶ and has hence by the logic of its own judging finally thrown off the sensuous, which is where it began. It finds its object in the negation of the immediate, 'inside of things'.¹⁰⁷ Force even shows itself to be the abolition of immediate being, provided that it is at least solicited; then the inside *externalises* itself but in such a way that it also returns back into itself in that which is soliciting, for, with respect to this latter, it is only then force when it does not lose itself therein, instead revealing itself to be the power and unity of what does the soliciting. Force has however 'through the fact that another is for itself and it is for another, not yet stepped out of its concept at all', for the soliciting one is 'itself force'—there are 'two forces present'.¹⁰⁸ But since the actuality of force can only manifest through *both* forces, the two forces are one single *relation* in which their being with respect to each other vanishes;¹⁰⁹

104 Cf. Hegel, GW VII, 66.

105 Hegel, PhoS § 132, GW IX, 82. Intending now behaves in *essential* attitude ('platonising').

106 Ibid. § 136, GW IX, 85.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid. § 138, GW IX, 85.

109 Cf. Ibid. § 141, GW IX, 87; GW VII, 45: 'In force the opposition remains a completely ideal one'. The *doubling* in the force concept, which in the awareness of the understanding anticipates the corresponding doubling in self-consciousness, belongs to Hegel's preferred examples for identical relations that are internally differentiated, which at best are broken down into their abstract sides by the reflection of 'explaining' whose persisting-for-itself would be precisely the overcoming of the relation; cf. just Hegel, SoL 178 ff., GW XXI, 184; Hegel, Encyc. § 262; GW VII, 4 f.; Hegel, *Logic* 1801/2, 64 (edition K. Düsing) in *Schellings und Hegels erste absolute Metaphysik* (1801–1802); Cologne 1988. Kant, to whom Hegel in this mostly refers (cf. Kant, MAdN AA IV, 508 ff.), talks expressly about the differentiation into 'felt' repulsion and merely 'inferred' attraction (loc. cit. 513), so that one can regard the doubling as one of *being* and *ought*, ought for the purpose of construction that is. On the relation between doubling of force and the indeterminacy lying therein of the ('material') whole cf. J. Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, Berlin 1969, 143 f.

they are 'a pure *setting by another*', with which also the image is abolished as if they had their 'own substances sustaining and maintaining them'.¹¹⁰ This step in breaking down the substantiality of the subject in predication must also be paid attention to. It expresses itself initially in the concept of an appearance that has its conditioning substance outside itself; this means that the substance is in motion within the appearance while simultaneously being for consciousness, which is how the effect of the forces discloses the view '*into the true background of the things*'.¹¹¹

This 'insight' is sustained by an object and a truth concept appropriate to it, which concept fulfils the three-member relation of appearance.¹¹² What we have here is a 'syllogism that has for its extremes the inside of things and the understanding'—which in the manner presented are *the same*—'and for its middle term it has appearance'.¹¹³ In this however the inside of things or the understanding is completely 'empty' until in the formulation of *law* an expression is found that inserts into this emptiness the 'silent ... image' of the moving world of appearance.¹¹⁴ One sees in this that intending has not yet left the form of the universal proposition, indeed it has only just begun to give it complete expression.¹¹⁵ The law expresses a transition from subject to predicate grounded in the subject function and as such presents a universal form that is itself reflected into its own contents and sets them. It is indeed the case however that as yet only the '*concept of law as such* has been found',¹¹⁶ and the universal proposition consciousness has found says only: '*all actuality is in its own right lawful*'.¹¹⁷ Similar to the problem of the 'particular laws' in Kant, the transition into the differentiation in the content of the laws, which would be simultaneously the transition from *concept* to *being* in appearance, is still lacking. What is lacking is a *principle of individuation* of the laws, which would be simultaneously a principle of the motion of what has up to now been the

110 Hegel, PhoS § 141, GW IX, 87.

111 Ibid. § 143, GW IX, 88.

112 Cf. above 29. Since the middle term (appearance in the narrow sense) is itself doubled or 'broken', obviously one can also—in the sense of the well-known assertion in SoL 836, GW XII, 247—speak of a quadruple. Cf. above 21 note 47.

113 PhoS § 145, GW IX, 89.

114 Cf. Ibid. § 149, GW IX, 91; SoL 503 f., GW XI, 345.

115 In the view that the judgment form throughout the *entire* section on consciousness remains the universal proposition we follow F. Chiareghin, *Dialettica dell' assoluto e ontologia della soggettività*, Trient 1980, 328 ff.

116 PhoS § 149, GW IX, 92.

117 Ibid. The progress happens because it turns out that the appearance, whose 'in-itself' claims to express what is lawful, is in fact *another*.

merely abstract-universal domain of lawfulness, by means of which also law would depart from its beyond with respect to the sphere of appearance and would hence accomplish what the Kantian transcendental ideal does not, namely the step into the dynamic horizon of experience—whose logical moment it as idea naturally always is.¹¹⁸ According to Hegel the transition happens in such a way that in the law is repeated what formerly happened to the predicates: according to its simple determination and meaning it suffers its demise in the ‘variation’ of appearance¹¹⁹—for the lawful presentation of the individual appearance requires opposed laws, so that it is rather the case that concepts of force, which may share the same name, are finally ‘divided’¹²⁰ into two forces, which now no longer constitute an *identical* supersensible relation. It is certainly the case that what is now to be thought is still something ‘supersensible’ while there is no way that the immediate intention of sense certainty has been restored; but it is still simultaneously a matter of the negation of the ‘first’ supersensible world, which was a world of abstract (law-) identities and meanings. The experience will be made that the *use* of these meanings contradicts their universality by revealing that used on the individual they are *not* truly universal. Instead what is now required is ‘*to think pure variation, or the opposition in itself, the contradiction*’.¹²¹

By this principle of the ‘inverted world’ conscious intending is forced in fact to transition from the universality of law (thus from understanding itself) to appearance; appearance is no longer external to lawfulness, now it has been ‘taken into the inside’ in ‘all moments’.¹²² In relation to the previous fixed

118 Cf. CPr B 607/A 579: the transcendental ideal thought of as ‘ground’ instead of as ‘summation’ of all reality would have to have the manifold of things as ‘its complete consequence’, ‘to which then also our entire sensibility, together with all reality would belong in appearance’. This is almost literally the programme of the *Opus postumum*.

119 PhoS § 155, GW IX, 95; cf. also Encyc. § 133 Obs.

120 Ibid. § 156, GW IX, 96. The unity of the whole concept (of the relation) was initially only the name, e.g. that of force, with respect to which the solicited and the soliciting remained distinct and as such actual. It turns out however that it was the concept or the relation itself that externalised itself so far as to be only a synonymous something and as such self-repelling. Gadamer has indicated that the ‘synonymous’ refers not only to physical examples, which even Hegel calls upon but also to the ὁμώνυμον, the *univocum* of Scholasticism, thus to the species concept (cf. Gadamer, *Die verkehrte Welt* in his *Gesammelte Werke* vol. 3, Tübingen 1987, 29–46, esp. 38 f.). For the genesis of the nominalistic concept of the concept a not uninteresting aspect is to be able to think that the concept in the moment of realisation of its types (in the situation of the judgment) has in these moments become a mere name and that for the sake of its reality it *had to* become that.

121 PhoS § 160, GW IX, 98.

122 Ibid.

determinations what is intended now is the purely incommensurable, the contradiction (e.g. also in the sense of an antinomy of Zeno) or ‘infinity’.¹²³ In the *Jena Logic of 1804/5* Hegel gave one characterisation of ‘the true infinity’ as ‘the fulfilment of the demand that determination overcome itself’.¹²⁴ This happens with the emergence of the second supersensible world, in which a determination immediately lets its own opposite go forth from it thereby overcoming its own unambiguousness and in general its conscious structuring. The understanding wants to avoid this irritation, of which physical or semantic “fuzzy relations” can provide examples, in that it understands the opposition once more in the sense of two ‘predicates, whose essence is a substrate in the mode of being’.¹²⁵ The understanding remains in this predicating that misses infinity in different and indeed opposed aspects, because ‘explaining’ in the free variation of aspects, which is now indeed completely arbitrary, leaves it ‘so self-satisfied’.¹²⁶ The understanding explains with this however that the ground of its linguistic motion is not anything like the object and its truth, as it previously may have appeared and as the purely intending consciousness will still continue to claim but that it is *itself* this ground and similarly it itself is the certainty of this motion. As such it is already *self-consciousness*. It is the infinite ground for why the truth is not to be found in the object but in its presentation. The truth of the presentation of the understanding, however is its self-presentation. The object is for that still only a means and is still only as such intended; the purpose is the self’s infinity, which is *not* to intend but lies initially in *desire*.

In the third failure of intending the object has discarded its externality with respect to consciousness. But then with that consciousness also discards the form of objective intention as a form of truth. It knows now that it is not about an external “agreement” but that it itself is the ground of the setting of all predicates and that the predicate is a real one when in that the self (not an object) is attained and expressed. Alterity is no longer indeterminate externality; now

123 Ibid.

124 GW VII, 33; infinity is further ‘as this absolute contradiction ... the sole reality of what is determinate and not a beyond’ (loc. cit. 34).

125 PhoS § 164, GW IX, 101. The passivity in the representation of the substrate still conceals the fact that the object is already ‘pure concept’ (ibid.).

126 Ibid. § 164, GW IX, 101. For the interpretation of ‘explaining’, which is in itself already self-consciousness (cf. ibid. § 163, GW IX, 100), as “ground” of the departure from the purely objective attitude in general’ cf. J. Simon, *Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel*, Stuttgart 1966, 46 f. The linguistic character of explaining is referred to when Hegel says that in explaining consciousness ‘is only concerned with itself ... in immediate conversation with itself’, although it ‘appears to be doing something quite different’ (PhoS § 164, GW IX, 101.).

alterity is that of the self, i.e. it is its own otherness. For the object too, the initially abstract other, has *made* its experience and has become other to itself; it too has found its self in alterity. Infinity appeared *within the self*. It is of the utmost importance to comprehend that it is “the same self” that is realised in self-consciousness as one and other, “subject” and “object”, thinking and extension, ought and being or however one wants to put it. At this point Kant’s hypothetical form is actually superseded, because its two assumptions—the immediacy of the self outside of mediation and the selflessness of the predicate function—have been superseded.¹²⁷ On this latter point in the *Phenomenology* the concept as such, i.e. the self-like relation, is ‘the indigenous self of the object, which presents itself as its becoming’.¹²⁸ Firstly Hegel showed that the self cannot be in one respect the ‘equality with itself’ (immediacy, position of reflection) and in another ‘what is unequal to itself’ (mediation, negation of the ‘externally’ immediate), while as absolute contradiction or absolute negation in the very same aspect or respect in which it is equal to itself, it is also unequal to itself and in the very same respect in which it is unequal to itself, it is also equal to itself, indeed that even the directions of these opposed respects are the same. Hegel can for this reason say that:

‘torturing oneself over such questions ..., *how* from this pure essence (sc. the infinity of the second supersensible world), how from *out* of it does the difference or the alterity arise’ can hardly be regarded as philosophy.¹²⁹

In the philosophical treatment of absolute form it is never the case that an “other” comes out of a “something”; all that belongs rather to the individual sciences, which with confidence apply the finitising of determination set with that process even to infinite “objects” such as life. What the absolute form does is conversely to identify finite determinations as such and by means of this production of the determination of the determination it infinitely reduces them. The philosophical question relates to the form that presents itself as relation

127 B. Liebrucks is right to develop Hegel’s ‘second revolution in the manner of thinking’ after Kant’s especially in the interpretation of the second supersensible world, cf. esp. Liebrucks’ *Sprache und Bewußtsein*, vol. 5, 68, cf. 61 and *passim*.

128 PhoS § 60, GW IX, 42. According to Hegel’s philosophy something like nature cannot be saved by consciousness (nature’s alterity is far too serious for that); on the other hand however it *is* already saved in true self-consciousness and in language.

129 Ibid. § 163, GW IX, 100. Directions for the most difficult dialectic, that of the self concept, could be provided by Plato’s *Parmenides* but that would require grasping it as a *whole* (cf. 136 d f.), thus above all grasping the unity of the two main hypotheses as one self-differentiating relation.

to and in that also as relation of alterity, that fills *itself* with the other and hence becomes simultaneously internally and externally subject and substance, i.e. *concept*.

From this self-like character or infinity of the object thus attained results immediately its ambiguity; that is in the sense that because it has produced itself as its entire determination, it then has in its own right the two sides of determination, its logical disjunction into constitution and composition—the negative and positive unity—and displays them. Thus as Hegel sees it for immediate self-consciousness the object is *two objects*, realised alterity for the imagination. This means also that intending has become a doubled, differentiating intending.¹³⁰ On the one hand it is about an other devoid of truth, what has been up to this point the object of consciousness, which '*for it* is designated with the *character* of the negative'; on the other hand it is about the self of the other or the other as self and, with that also with respect to itself, to 'the true *essence*'.¹³¹ With this assumption consciousness can now utter only the truth, that what is simply other *is* not the truth *and* instead consciousness *ought* to become the truth. In this relation contrasting with that of reason, the first other is still named and the truth emerges only in relation to that. Self-consciousness is in this way only in itself the truth; its proposition still utters the difference between being and ought, immediacy and reflection. Self-consciousness is as it were only "generally" or infinitely beyond all individual determinations of the simply other but in terms of their positivity it has not yet mediated them. This only *ought* to happen and it is with this ought of the negation of the positive that self-consciousness becomes "practical". 'It is desire in general'.¹³²

130 According to Chiereghin (loc. cit. note 114) with self-consciousness the form of the particular proposition is arrived at (358 ff.).

131 PhoS § 167, GW IX, 104. On the dialectic of alterity cf. above 60 note 37 and 63 note 42; in addition to the studies by Henrich given in note 37, cf. also his *Andersheit und Absolutheit des Geistes* in his *Selbstverhältnisse*, Stuttgart 1982, 142–172, esp. 164 ff., where he acknowledges the relation between the speculative concept of alterity and that of *cognition*.

132 PhoS § 167, GW IX, 104. Kojève's well-known aperçu on the topic of desire, namely that it is the desire for somebody else's desire, is not an original variant on the reading Hegel but quite simply logically false. One can hardly reduce the (as we say:) proportion-concept of desire to a *conscious* "in-order-to" of desire itself just to be able to claim that the *ground* of desire is the behaviour of others understood as desire. Such a 'ground' assumes what it is supposed to ground, apart from the fact that it obviously assumes already recognised others who unfortunately in the relation that Hegel defines as desire are precisely what cannot be present. The consciousness that Kojève has in mind and of which in empirical reality there are no doubt any number of sad examples is as such so composed that it senses that another consciousness outside it is self-conscious while it also senses by itself a lack that it tries to compensate for through *objects* that the self-conscious others

But then the object is ambiguous also with respect to desire. The object is that as what the latter sets it *and* it is not that. This “and” constitutes its self-like alterity. This is why self-consciousness makes the ‘experience of the independence of the object’,¹³³ which experience is immediately expressed as reproduction of the desiring relation to the object. Now the conception of the object that first makes desire possible, namely that it can be negated, was thus only “half” the truth. Only objects of consciousness or infinite objects that can be made into conscious objects can be abolished; the object of self-consciousness however is not that at all. To the extent that desire comprehends that in negating, it simultaneously produces what is supposed to be negated, it shows itself to be a *proportion* of the differentiated sides in which both have an infinite persistence: the one as *cognition* and the other as *life*. These two are the sides of one complete disjunction, of that namely which self-consciousness immediately is. The one side is cognition because it knows that in being directed to the other it is simultaneously directed into itself and in this way it produces the truth; the other is life because in transiting over to the other or itself becoming other it returns back to itself.¹³⁴ What enters into confrontation are two true universals, two relations, which define everything as their content. But since both relations are equally presentations of the *one* relation of self-consciousness one can also say that they are *the same*. This is expressed initially in the assertion that cognition knows life. It knows that in the same sense in which it distinguishes itself from that, i.e. cognition knows itself as its other and has individualised itself. What is unknowable in mere awareness is now available in the form of the disjunction of self-consciousness, i.e. has become knowable through individualisation of cognition as the one “type” of the whole or the genus. This context too is for Hegelian thinking fundamental; it will lead us to Hegel’s concept of the absolute as well as to the more precise determination of the concept of the individual.

On the “other” side of the disjunction, life, the unity of plurality and multiplication has come into confrontation with the unifying unity of cognition (e.g. in desire). One can call phenomenological life the medium of everything that

‘desire’ or to which they fulfil a rational relation. Their truths are with that in contrast to self-consciousness the *objects* or in general something finite. Cf. A. Kojève, *Hegel. Eine Vergegenwärtigung seines Denkens*, Stuttgart 1958, 12 ff. Completely in this sense by the way there is in Hegel no struggle ‘for’ recognition, even though one often hears talk of such; the struggle is rather the first structure of the relation of recognition itself.

133 PhoS § 168, GW IX, 105.

134 Phenomenological (as opposed to logical) life certainly has necessarily perceptible, intuitive sides or extension but it is still a relation of the extended that is to be presented logically and—as e.g. also a self-conscious person—is itself an intuitive logic.

is solely particular or with Hegel, the ‘universal fluid’ or ‘substance’.¹³⁵ In this determination it is like its pendant self-conscious cognition not accessible to any external determination but itself containing all determination as the universal power of determining. Life *is* in this initially what desire *ought* to be: ‘the *overcoming* of all differences’.¹³⁶ As a ‘purely axle motion’¹³⁷ it enters into the differences, differentiating itself into dispersion and remains despite that in its “position” or at “rest”. The dispersed sides into which life divides itself are simultaneously in their own right always already mediated “shapes”. But then these shapes are as such conversely from their standpoint *middle terms* of life through which it passes and returns back to itself; they are necessary to life’s motion and the shapes are independent like these medium terms. The independence of the medium term is however not an abstract fixity but this: that the medium term is capable of inversion or it is itself μεταβολή. With this the structure is (*qua* medium term of life) the difference that inverts the non-inverting, abstract fixity or simply determinate—‘inorganic nature’¹³⁸—breaking it down and making it into something other; the shape is the life of life or ‘life as individual life’.¹³⁹ In Hegel the shape that turns the pure universality of life as such into particularity through the process or inversion thereby doubling that universality is called the “individual”; only the individual state of independence in that inversion makes the substance of life into a truly universal substance because it is self-relation.¹⁴⁰ This is how life reaches the *genus* which could not be the merely assumed mediality of infinite differentiation, i.e. only in the singular and simple position of the individual whose being is inversion.¹⁴¹ When the

¹³⁵ Ibid. § 169, GW IX, 106.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid. § 169, GW IX, 105. The formulation reminds us of Plato’s *Timaeus* according to which the stars as ζῶα θεῖα ... καὶ ἰδίδια ... ἐν ταύτῳ στρεφόμενα ἀεὶ μένει (40 b).

¹³⁸ PhoS § 171, GW IX, 106. The inorganic is *included* in Hegel’s concept of life as infinite mediation of the determinate as is e.g. abstract being in the logical relation of the concept. This is why one cannot deploy immediacies, ‘conditions’ or ‘circumstances’ *against* this concept without missing it; that would be tantamount to thinking the dependence (and in that indeed the commensurability) of what is strictly independent (and with that absolutely incommensurable).

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ The separation of the individual from life determines this to be a simple universal or (the first) other; the inversion of the individual is no simple turning but ‘*inversion in itself*’ (PhoS § 171; GW IX, 106) which also inverts this inversion in that according to its unity it is nothing other than itself the universal of life: absolute differentiation. In the intersection of life with itself in the individual it is in itself knowing or (the second) other to itself.

¹⁴¹ A not unimportant and certainly illuminating parallel to this context can be found in fragment 10 of the *Jena Philosophy of Nature* 1803/4 (cf. GW VI, 110–209, esp. 181–186). The ‘organic’ in this context, which can even be called the ‘simple unity of the elements or

text states that life 'in this *result*'—in context: the species that has emerged, i.e. inherent cognition—'refers'¹⁴² 'to another than it is, namely to consciousness,

the absolute substance' (182) breaks down into the 'elements ... as a universal *being*, independent, eternal against the singularity of the organic individual'—like life as a simple universal—and in the 'idea of the organic', the 'absolute universality' and 'genus' that (in the gender difference) 'is infinitely another to itself and in this alterity is itself' (183, 182, 184, 185). Both sides, the plurality brought together in totality and the unity of the species taken for itself have, as Hegel in what is for us the desired clarity says, their 'medium term' and their 'oneness' as '*absolute form*, infinity, which is at once *this* absolute opposition as immediate and the ideality, the absolute overcoming of this opposition' (183). With respect to their mediation the elements are abstract universals, just as the representations, with respect to the concept in which as in what is individual they always have their species, are also abstract universals and only through their use in the peculiar clarity of the concept, i.e. through their reduction to the status of moments, do they become more than that. The 'infinity' is the 'side of the *medium term*' or 'the individuality itself', 'which inverts (!) that relation of the being of the elements and particularises (!) the universality of the elements absolutely, their reflection, making them into single points thereby elevating itself to the absolute universal' (ibid.). The correspondence with the text of the *Phenomenology* is clear; moreover relations to our topic of the absolute and with that individualised philosophical language form will emerge and will be discussed below. The figure of a broken or doubled medium term will come to stand between the abstractions of immediate being and the idea (of the organic in this case); this *medium term* is what is in its own terms broken individuality that is simultaneously single, that is τὸδε τι (namely oriented to the elemental) *and* infinity, idealisation, soul (cf. 184), the medium of universality (oriented to the ideal). The decisive aspect for the absolute form is this *and*, the infinite simultaneity of the opposed sides, which is no arbitrary conjunction but the *and* of the complete disjunction of the opposition, more precisely still the position of self-disjuncting and for that reason itself the inversion ('absolute particularisation') of abstract universality to 'being' in the *active* sense. But that which *is* in this way is 'reflection' (!), 'thoughts' (184; 180 f.) and that 'which formerly was our reflection'; precisely 'this exists in *the organic*' (184). The *being* of thinking in the thought of the absolute form (of the individual) can still be taken on the level of the philosophy of nature such that an appearance of nature (the objects of nature are as external to themselves essentially appearance) and give 'occasion' to set, for instance in the manner of the Kantian 'as-if', something conceptual or even merely a relation in the logic of reflection as being—as one might say, nature is open to its over-interpretation. But with respect to the relation of self-consciousness what is strictly individual is the inverting medium term between the subjectivity of knowing and the substance of life, the *punctum saliens* of their disjunction, so that knowing and life both transit into each other in that they are both individualised. In this there also lies the fact that the selfless, because not individualised, reflection of the understanding does not actually know, because it does not have the *point* of actuality, the individual, for its genetic principle but obstinately persists in the abstract universality of formal possibilities, which even if they wanted it to be so, *cannot* be covered by life.

142 W. Marx in his *Das Selbstbewußtsein in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Frankfurt a. M. 1986 interprets the "reference to" consciousness ... also ... as a reference to the *telos* of life', as he sees it: self-consciousness, in that it is simultaneously '*being-for-another*' (species) and '*being-for-itself*' (43). Translation of terms of the concept (species!) and relations

for which it is as this unity or is as species', this can give rise to the impression that this 'reference' is just an external reflection through which now it should be returned to the other side of the self-consciousness disjunction—a subreption then, which is the more far-reaching since in that return it would endanger the cognition of self-consciousness itself. Everything thus depends upon grasping precisely the relation between set knowing and knowing as being-in-itself in the life that has become species. Both sides have emerged as contradistinguished moments over the entire relation, such that right from the start—as indeed always in Hegel—a “linear” derivation of the one concept or moment from the other is excluded.¹⁴³ The two are rather to be mediated through their respective negation and their absolute negation (self-consciousness as a whole). For life Hegel maintains a three-fold negation, which after what has been said is no longer especially surprising. First is the negation of what is other to it through desire, which is the only way it reaches the sphere of alterity or self-externality. Secondly he has the negation through the “shapes” or medium terms (individuals) in which it has become a determinate external to itself (negation of the negation, self-sustaining other). Thirdly however there is the ‘absolute’ negation, the ‘*inorganic universal nature*’ of life, ‘the species as such’ in which the persistence for itself of the shapes resumes within itself the general sphere of externality and simultaneously is resumed by this, the true universality or ‘the species as such’: ‘*self-consciousness*’.¹⁴⁴ Self-consciousness does not come “out” of life because it might have been projected into it but because in self-consciousness life already has its in-itself. It also does not come out of it in

of negation can be tracked through the determinations of the sphere of being. The status of the reference would then correspondingly have to be determined as the status of *being-in-itself* and hence also life determined as in-itself ‘telos’. Liebrucks (loc. cit. note 127) understands life as the ‘passive’ ‘type’ of self-consciousness, hence as ‘language as being-in-itself’ (78) but then also the realisation of the I as already spirit in the sense of being-in-itself (cf. PhoS § 177, GW IX, 108) as the present being of language: ‘when something is both I and object, then it is a linguistic object’ (82).

143 A ‘linearity’ in the succession especially of the logical categories is either sought or missed in Hegel on different levels. G. Maluschke in his *Kritik und absolute Methode in Hegels Dialektik*, *Hegel-Studien* suppl. 13, Bonn 1974, speaks of a problem of ‘linearity’ or ‘progression’ of the categories in relation to their claim to the self-determination of the idea within them (cf. 53, 205). Now ‘linearity’ of the category sequence is a requirement or a finding of external reflection, which as such has nothing to do with logic; it only becomes a problem when it could be shown in detail that particular transitions in fact only happen in external reflection and are not the self-mediation of their complementarity—in other words: a problem would only arise if a transition *were* linear. The extent to which such a (method) problem is fundamentally not one for Hegel is shown by H. Röttges, *Der Begriff der Methode in der Philosophie Hegels*, Meisenheim am Glam, 1976, esp. 233 ff.

144 PhoS § 175, GW IX, 108.

that way but rather only *sets* itself out of it. With that we have at last the entire disjunction of self-consciousness itself set, or ‘there is a *self-consciousness for a self-consciousness*’.¹⁴⁵ This statement does not mean that now an indeterminate plurality or even just a duality of “self-consciousnesses” has entered the field, which, by the way, is only thought of if self-consciousness is uttered while consciousness is thought; for this latter is in its own right external to it and *for that reason* suffered its demise in self-consciousness. What we have now is much more a *total relation*, which moreover is totalised by itself; a total relation of the self-consciousness as being-in-itself to the set self-consciousness as that relation to itself:

Self-consciousness is *in* and *for itself* in that and by reason of the fact that it is for another in and for itself.¹⁴⁶

The set self-consciousness is in the same respect in which it is set, in itself; equally self-consciousness as being-in-itself is in the same respect in which it is in itself, set. In the self-consciousness disjunction of lordship and bondage self-consciousness as being-for-itself and that as being-in-itself initially *separate out*, and indeed such that the incommensurability of this logical difference appears as *struggle*. It is only of this struggle that one can say that it is *self-consciousness* in its unity or individuality; but it is in its “moments”, of which one is initially the being-for-itself of self-consciousness (lord) and the other its being-in-itself (bondsman), that the *whole* relation first has to emerge in that each is “inverted” to its opposite. The incommensurability of the logical difference of for-itself and in-itself shows up *against* these moments as singles inverted as their downfall or as their immediate *death*. Because in death that solely internal self-consciousness becomes external—it realises itself as not only ought (desiring) but as completed negation of all that is externally objective and is thus set negation. At the same time as something only set, it acquires its in-itself (life)—as conversely that solely external self-consciousness becomes internal—gathering itself from out of the plurality of its relation into “*pure being-for-itself*”, the negative unity or universality with respect to the many. Simultaneously again it understands the many (externals) as *its* positivity and on the basis of this understanding it becomes the action of the positive (labour)¹⁴⁷—on the ground then of this doubled unity of inner and outer that it

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. § 177, GW IX, 108.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. § 178, GW IX, 109. Cf. also SoL 160, GW XXI, 147: ‘I is for I, both are the same ... of the two, both are only for-one, ideal’.

¹⁴⁷ PhoS § 194, GW IX, 114.

has effected as which it is actuality, death must be called the 'absolute lord'.¹⁴⁸ It is the absolute lord as long as the moments of the unity of inner and outer that they present have not yet set their self but have it in that only in itself, while what it sets as self is another. In this state they do not have the courage to know their own individual action as thoroughly incommensurable and look at the incommensurability as still external. Death replaces their individuality—not only as representation, quite obviously but because it individualises.¹⁴⁹

On this level of phenomenological development the individual (and individualised medium term) is at first broken into two sides without for that reason ceasing to be medium term or also unity. It is now the *I* that is *we* and *we* that is *I*.¹⁵⁰ In this way then the particularisation of the universal is conceived

148 Ibid.; cf. further in the *Jena Philosophy of Spirit* 1805/6, GW VIII, 236, margin note 2; *Natural law essay* TW 2, 479 and the respective contexts.

149 In a real-philosophical presentation a reference to the phenomenon of the history of art may be allowed: the first figurative works of individual persons including the individual, material aspects are the Etruscan *grave portraits*. For the Romans the death masks of their forbears (*imagines*) are in fact representations of the selves of their descendents; thus not everybody is allowed to set them up but only those who hold one of the highest offices in Rome; they were held in front of the face in funeral processions. Aeneas does not descend into the realm of the dead out of sentimentality but in order to produce for himself the *imago* of Anchises as 'species being': 'tua me, genitor, tua tristis imago/saepius occurrens haec limina tendere adegit' (Vergil, *Aeneid* VI, 695 f.).

150 PhoS § 177, GW IX, 108. In the secondary literature on the self-consciousness chapter, it seems often to be an insoluble conundrum as to how plurality could emerge from the unity of self-consciousness, one we have tried to resolve. H.G. Gadamer, *Die Dialektik des Selbstbewußtseins* in his *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 3, Tübingen 1987, 47–64 understands the 'transition' as one of only hypothetical necessity, with which however it is precisely the problem of the assumptions that is not solved (53). That it is not the case is shown in Gadamer already in that he has to say that self-consciousness would have to find another 'which is prepared to be "for it"' (53 f.) (that the first would already have recognised!) but which is also 'free' to 'decline to accord it its recognition' (54). Under such presuppositions it remains contingent as to whether it reaches self-consciousness at all; what is externality presupposed with the hypothetical form will no longer be superseded. W. Marx's (loc. cit. note 142) explanation also remains inadequate when he states that the 'object' of self-consciousness reveals itself to be an "object" of the type of being of self-consciousness' (50); one cannot seriously claim that self-consciousness is a 'type of being', for this begs the question as to the many cases that would lie therein and whose possibility is precisely to be determined. Marx's explanations of the 'unity' in the 'plurality' thus end up relying on *conscious* relations, as which misunderstood friendship, love, family etc. must remain *arbitrary*. For a solution to this problem G. Römpf in his *Ein Selbstbewußtsein für ein Selbstbewußtsein, Hegel-Studien* 23 (1988), 71–94 suggests a concept of 'internal exteriority' or of an 'exteriority developed from the internal dynamic of the self-consciousness relation' (85, 93), a development which as absolute reflection would have to exclude external reflection and which certainly may not be understood as a merely external *setting*,

logically which Hegel can also call the ‘absolute particularisation’¹⁵¹ and which solves the problem that consciousness *qua* understanding had with its laws. Thus the plural “we” is not additive but a matter of something that is self-differentiating and to remain with the mathematical simile, it is a relation of derivation. What is being thought here is the form that itself arrives at its own content. In Hegel as we already know, this is the absolute form. Individuality as the absolute moment of knowing has emerged in it as we now know it: the form of the self-conscious world. It was the ground from which cognition knows life or inheres in this and simultaneously the life that lives the known or exists as it. Subject and predicate functions complete themselves as the individual interweaving of inner and outer in the absolute. Logically this interweaving is the truth of the concept. As spirit it is *language*.

which, besides the set externality, would still persist in itself—e.g. as an external self-consciousness (which for Hegel would be a *contradictio in adiecto*).

151 Cf. the statement already quoted at GW VI, 183.

Absolute Individuality

1 Individualisation of Cognition

a) *Absolute Inversion*

The question as to the absolute or genuinely philosophical language form is inseparable from that of actual cognition, that of the cognition of absolute actuality. Clearly a philosophical methodology that has to make the criteria or moments of this form explicit cannot retreat back into positive and merely external form characteristics but instead has to present the entire self-relating of form in its self-differentiation, i.e. systematically. The moment of *actuality* or also of absoluteness in form can only be demonstrated by showing that all thinkable and representable determination has itself become one of the form reflection. Determination in external reflection fixed as external is now cognised as absolutely reflected and as reflection of the “inside”. At the same time however it is also the case that the universal of form has absolutely particularised itself to determination, that it is that itself, for which reason cognition no longer has its truth in anything “beyond” its own action, only in itself. The cognition of absolute form is the syllogism formed of the premisses opposed in absolute determination, which only in this way become *its* moments while simultaneously achieving their true *being*, which they only have in the opposition of cognition itself. Inner and the outer, along with their immediate inversions into each other in the totality of true knowing, this switching itself as present being [*Dasein*] and as the process character of the absolutely negative individual, explicated as moments of philosophical form will make it possible to determine their structuring in Hegel and Kant more precisely in terms of agreement and difference. This in turn will then enable us to explain in greater detail what for Kant are the form performances and for Hegel the objective form moments: actuality, possibility and necessity.

The methodological criterion of absolute form, which Hegel deploys with special emphasis and which we have at least *en passant* already mentioned, says that with the absolute form progress into *extension* must simultaneously involve an associated gain in *intension*, or alternatively that the diremption into determination immediately corresponds to the reflection-in-itself of form.¹ The actuality of cognition is initially nothing other than this immediate “simultaneity” of the mutually opposed “directions” within the form unity

1 Cf. SoL 841, GW XII, 251; see also 27 note 54 above.

itself. Looked at from the isolated extremes, from the content as being-for-itself or from the abstract formal unity, this simultaneity is absolutely indeterminate and with respect to them incommensurable; it is infinity or what is from the standpoint of their one-sidedness, the inexpressible, 'nameless middle term', whose position however as Aristotle remarked, for that reason in no way 'stands free'.² Hegel's methodological conception has not without some justice been referred to Fichte as the presentation of the attempt conceptually to unite the first two principles of the *Wissenschaftslehre*.³ For one can certainly understand the content of these principles as in each case individually for themselves commensurable; they express in distinct ways the identical and the differentiated forms of determination. Already here however it is important to note that they respectively have their *determinate* meanings only in *opposition* to each other or that they are statements expressing for themselves what is identical only in their difference. The force of their *meaning* is as it were not expressed in themselves but then is fundamentally not expressible in a determinate sentence. Fichte sought in the *third* principle to bring the absolute unification of the two principles in their pure *meaning* to a commensurable determination (to the finite, divisible I), to express them thus as 'something', which in fact pure meaning can never immediately be and which also the absolute I for Fichte essentially is *not*.⁴ The something remains stuck in the ought of having to present the true relation of the first two principles; it only ever reproduces its own finitude. Such a relation of intension and extension that remains an *ought* is at any rate not that of actual knowing.

The *individual*, for Hegel the absolute form and, as it has emerged for us, linguistic self-consciousness—the individual then, despite the fact that it is not to be brought to any positive concept, cannot be a finite I in Fichte's sense that can be subject to an ought. This already suggests that the position of pure meaning that is not determinate meaning, not something but the power of the something, must logically be the individual. In self-consciousness it turned out to be an inversion and switching, ultimately of cognition into life and *vice versa*. What something is or means disappears in the individual inversion, which, precisely for that reason is for positive speech "ineffable". Nevertheless all

2 Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* IV, 10 (1125 b 17 f.).

3 Cf. B. Bourgeois, *Dialectique et structure dans la philosophie de Hegel* in *Revue internationale de philosophie*, no. 139/140 (1982), 163–182, esp. 165. Cf. on the more general problem of method also 167 f, 176 and *passim* (Bourgeois argues against an external 'teleology' in the progress of philosophical determination).

4 On the critique of Fichte's third principle cf. also R. Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, Tübingen 1977³, vol. I, 430 ff.

meaning is only given thanks to that individual inversion. In the introduction to the *Phenomenology* Hegel states that ‘the new object reveals itself’ in the forward motion each time as having emerged ‘through an *inversion of consciousness* itself’;⁵ which establishes philosophical knowing as the individualisation of consciousness through the abandonment of determinate contents, which however only happens in the continuation of the activity of self-conscious meaning into the other determination. That this involves an individualisation of consciousness can be easily proved by the fact that consciousness does not invert consciously or solely by intention but that it must be inverted from its absolute logical ground, in relation to which it is more than just consciousness and much more *actual* or is individual.⁶ As we were able to develop it then, struggling consciousness has its individuation principle, or the ground into which it declines, as death still perceptibly outside itself, indeed in itself that was its absolute reference point, such that its struggling, the presentation of its incommensurability, was thoroughly self-conscious and had to be taken as its implicit recognition proportion. As *consciousness* it clearly has no intention of becoming *spirit* but it is already gripped by the latter as soon as it determines itself in the struggle of life and death in relation to the absolute inversion that is death.

It has sometimes appeared to recent interpreters objectionable that Hegel determined the first so-called “encounter between human beings” (in consciousness there was *no* such thing, nor indeed could there be) as the struggle for life and death, clearly too near to its *etymon*, to its “opposite”. Could he not, recalling the surging emotion of his youth, have conceived of it as love etc?⁷ Do we not have to get serious about urbanising Hegel for times that are in principle fundamentally nice? Hegel certainly declined to begin with *indifference* in the development towards the concrete form of spirit (also that of the spirit of love), which might have been expected given that he in no sense defines recognition

5 PhoS § 87, GW IX, 61.

6 In his preface to Hinrichs' *Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel wrote on the relation that ‘formal reflection’ could take to religion, ‘For the philosophical treatment it is of interest ... to note a switching, unexpected for reflection itself, into what is at enmity with what is its own work,—a switching that in fact is just the peculiar determination of reflection itself’ (TW 11, 50).

7 Cf. just L. Siep, *Anerkennung als Prinzip praktischer Philosophie*, Freiburg and Munich 1979, 36 ff. and the contributions of L. Eley and A. Peperzak in L. Eley (ed.), *Phänomenologie in der Enzyklopädie philosophischer Wissenschaften*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1990. That the ‘life together of human beings as a beginning of *states*’ emerges from out of the ‘struggle of recognition’ (not ‘for’ recognition!) ‘and the subjugation under a lord’ is stated in Encyc. § 433 Obs.

fundamentally from some kind of equality but starting from *difference*. This is why Hegel does not fall into the somewhat laughable situation of many of his interpreters, who have to explain what a hand stretched out in reconciliation ought to mean where there has been no struggle at all? Moreover what does constitute the real quality of the spiritual-intellectual relation if its negation is not constitutive for it.⁸ Against this one may not hesitate to dub that struggle of life and death or implicit recognition as the present being of absolute form in the determinate context that has to be elucidated in real-philosophical terms. The struggle is the absolute form. It is absolute negativity in the eradication of all positive representations in the simultaneous knowledge of the negative unity maintaining itself absolutely therein, indeed *finding itself* only therein, which thereby also shows itself to be the truth. Consciousness arrives at the knowledge of being the infinite difference to positivity and as such the individual. It thus gains itself via the externalisation of what is external, through the radicalisation of externality and the relation to this: through its sharpening to death. As reason absolute form will presuppose this, that externality has been gained for the concept and has been individualised, which was precisely what consciousness could not assume. For consciousness was itself the externality devoid of truth for whose immediacy even death had to appear to be only a positive fact, not an individual relation. In the same sense however one cannot say of consciousness that it externalises itself; for when it appears to speak, then what expresses or externalises itself is not it, for a general representation simply remains as external as it already is. Consciousness lacks a self that could externalise itself. But then it would not have the strength by itself to relate the real difference of inner and outer in a self-externalisation that would be just as real, to be inversion and infinite motion. What holds for the individual is precisely this, that it is individualised and particularised precisely in that it *externalises*, i.e. *expresses itself*. For consciousness with only general representations it must appear as if the individual were merely a contingent singularity;

8 All interpretations that seek in the *Phenomenology* not real-philosophical constitution of determination but 'ideal types' of historical, sociological or psychological 'structures' and their 'mechanisms' in particular tend to impose normative-ethical viewpoints on the text. 'Intersubjectivity', which it is believed one finds even in the self-consciousness chapter, is ultimately also one of these. This representation assumes separate subjects, who then *ought* to agree among each other on a further representation, namely that of their 'equality' in their separation. The moment of genuine individualisation is missed and instead an abstract-universal 'structure' is set up. Then just at the point of breakthrough to self-determination in the inequality with itself instead the subsumption under something external is asserted. For the critique of this we refer to J. Simon, *Intersubjectivität bei Kant und Hegel?* In L. Eley (ed.) loc. cit. (footnote 7 above), 313–338.

for in externalising itself the individual exposes itself to finitude or the perceptible externality of its externalisation, its expression. It can do this on its own because it has comprehended itself as infinite determination, because it thus knows that it is individual and not contingency and hence does not lose itself in becoming finite but rather finds itself therein.

The concept of the individual is distinct from the logical concept of the subject in that it is capable of a determination in relation to *nature*, thus to strictly dispersed being, so that it can present the immediacy of subjective negativity as natural being.⁹ Death for instance has then a meaning in terms of the philosophy of spirit as in the *Phenomenology*, where it belongs to the constitution of the self-conscious person but it also has a natural meaning or, as will emerge, a meaning in relation to nature *in general*. Death *is* in general *only* as the death of the individual but although the logical determination of the subject can certainly run through the form of the infinite proposition, it cannot “die”, while the person only has death among its premisses, which means it has already superseded it. The individual is in general the *middle term* of subjectivity and personality and is also amenable to treatment as a topic in the philosophy of nature in terms of the immediacy of the inversion in its being as medium term. Hence the concept of individuality plays no small role in Hegel’s philosophy of nature. We shall soon take up the individual as a natural organism because here too the relation of self-externalisation or self-expression can be understood as the present being of the inversion of inner into outer and conversely. Only in ‘illness’, which Hegel can hence call ‘hypochondria’, does ‘the organism feel nausea for the external world’, so that the ‘goal of healing’ is appropriately ‘that the organism comes out of itself’.¹⁰ Illness means an indeterminate remaining-within-itself, the loss of the *limit* or *border* with and hence of the *relation* to others. In illness the individual loses itself as one could say in the two

9 Individuality (the ‘original determinate nature’ PhoS § 398, GW IX, 216) is thus above all spatially representable. As ‘not free, self-determining spiritedness but naturalness developed into spirit’ (TW 12, 293) even in terms of its most excellent expression—sculpture, Greek individuality remained according to Hegel bound to space, although ‘the lightning of individuality’ (TW 13, 118) did first strike in this art form. The Greek individual is moreover the ‘pure form of substance’ (PhoS § 467, GW IX, 253) as in general what can be called ‘the *standpoint of the individual*’ is to ‘grasp the inner substantial spirit’ but still be ‘within the whole ... like blind people in that’ (TW 20, 461). It is first the ‘freedom of the I within itself, that certainly must be distinguished from individuality’ (TW 12, 340), entering the world through the Roman principle of law and especially through the Christian concept of subjectivity, which eliminates from nature its independence in individual mediation and sets it much more as medium term in the sense of *spirit*.

10 M. Gies (ed.), Hegel, *Naturphilosophie* vol. 1, *Die Vorlesung von 1819/20*, Naples 1980, 144.

sides that it mediates; in the natural dispersion or the pure lack of relation and in the inside of the spirit; this like any other loss of the relation is concentrated within itself as pain.¹¹ But for Hegel the individual is '*originally ill*' and has the '*seed of death*' already 'in-born' within it.¹² The truth of the individual, to the extent that it is a *natural medium term*, is that it is instead not a medium term but nature, dispersion. In its naturalness it only completes its in-born death, *which ultimately triumphs* against the immediacy of natural-individual mediation. The *nature* of the individual *becomes* in this way *natural*. The individual is not this nature but a *natural medium term*. Just as death consummates the naturalness by externalising the external, so does it also mediate the medium term to the extent that it is being-within-itself [*Insichsein*] with itself. Or rather all that happens is that this medium term is mediated with itself passing through and beyond death, so that death has no power over it but is only the completion of nature. Death is the self-relation of variety, by passing through which the true connection arrives at itself. For only through the absolute inversion passing through the natural medium term does individuality or absolute form prove to be absolute mediation, against which ultimately *no* absence of relation is an objection.¹³

Reflection is particularly susceptible to regarding man as determinate in natural terms even if it has no determinate knowledge of the action of doing so. For every finitely determinate concept to which man is supposed to be reduced is necessarily only a natural term or a being external to him. When Heidegger tries to reduce man to the term *Dasein* then the vital point is to remember that philosophy is better off not presupposing any determinate concept of man and instead holding him to be capable of absolute form. At least there is consistency in continuing the beginning made with a natural term in

-
- 11 The remedy is 'means' to the extent that it forces the limit, on which the healthy organism as it were unquestioningly relies, thus forcing the organism into a contradiction: it is something '*external* and alien ...', against which the individual has to pull itself together and enter into a process through which it returns 'to its feeling of itself and to its subjectivity' (*Encyc.* § 373 Obs.). N.b. on the spirit sustaining itself in '*infinite pain*', *Encyc.* § 382.
- 12 Cf. *Encyc.* § 375. J. Van der Meulen, *Hegel. Die gebrochene Mitte*, Hamburg 1958 speaks of the 'ontological illness' of man in which the contradiction of nature 'only here fully' breaks out (257, 259). One can call the 'seed of death' in the individual an 'ontological possibility, if in this the aim is to emphasise the difference with Heidegger's merely existentially reflected death-possibility'. We avoid the expression 'ontology' because we are here not concerned with the philosophy of essence.
- 13 In the death of the natural is for Hegel 'the last dispersion of nature ... overcome' (*Encyc.* § 376). Death is the sole *complete* disjunction of nature and for that reason also the moment in which its (finite-antinomical) appearing ceases and the breakthrough via the contradiction to absolute form happens.

what follows to take nature, e.g. time, for being and the natural end, death, for the essence of man. Heidegger understands 'the end of *Dasein*', as he can call death, as 'the own-most, non-referential, certain and as such indeterminate, unsurpassable possibility of *Dasein*'.¹⁴ *Dasein* ought to grasp this its end in order with the help of an "existential possibility" *consciously* grasped in this way, the possibility that is of a preceding "being unto death" attaining its "whole". It then reflects out of this 'possibility' each finite moment it possesses, i.e. it "exists" *as conscious as possible*. It should be noted in passing that this possible immanent loosening of the rigid finiteness of naturally determined *Dasein* through reflection, even by means of the totalising aspect that reflection has in itself, is not to be compared with Hegel's concept of death in relation to the individual. Death is not possibility but *actuality* of the self-particularising individual. Nature completing itself as nature does get to the point that an individual dies *its* death, that it presents *itself* as the relation of death *qua* self-completing absence of relation. The *nothingness* of nature is immediately *being*. It is the beginning of spirit's state of having returned back to itself that elevates spirit out of the disjunction of on the one hand what is different that has gone into itself and on the other what is not different that has similarly gone into itself, which breaks up the self-external, natural medium term to which it no longer immediately returns.

Self-consciousness generates itself as relation to this meaning of death, which in fact already means a "death of death" (but certainly no proceeding to the end of *Dasein*). By recourse to the actuality of death of the natural-individual form, it circumvents the entire complement of representations within natural consciousness.¹⁵ The individual that has become the spirited medium term is capable through this internalisation of death in its form of cutting itself off from the positive representations it has and to let them take their own course as mere nature. But in this it also remembers that it can *externalise itself*: that every "death" into the finitude of an externalisation is only the

14 Cf. M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen 1972¹², 258 f. (italics in original). We will not go into how one can bring together the various predicates of the death-'possibility' in *one* context—what might 'certain and as such indeterminate ... possibility' etc. mean? Another difficulty is that the '*Dasein*' for which § 9 of *Sein und Zeit* claims unmistakably reflexive or self-like form moments, which then later in the quasi-teleologies of e.g. 'anxiety' and 'understanding' become more explicit, is supposed to produce its totality from a *finite fact*.

15 Cf. Hegel's statement in the Göschel review (TW 11, 372 f.): 'The speculative concept grounds everything in the process of the self-alienation of natural being and cognition of man and makes this process of spiritual rebirth into the correct content of the exposition of true knowledge and the sole actuality of spirit'.

means by which spirit manifests itself, just as the external, shed here in this *as* external, belongs only to natural representation, which in itself always comes already superseded. That representation or consciousness as such *understands* is due to the *clarity* that is what is individual, what is still spirit even if naturally *alienated* spirit. For Hegel:

‘the term of spirit is ... *manifestation*’, i.e. ‘not any determination or content whose externalisation or externality would be just a form different from that ... such that it did not reveal *something* but instead its determination and content is this revealing itself’.¹⁶

It will turn out more precisely that spirit in this determination presents the logical absolute, the purely negative in-itself or showing of everything determinate. What makes the individual’s death *its own* is its ‘being absolved’ from individual form and the resulting freedom to take on any determination.

From all this then it is clear now why the criterion of absolute form introduced above—that every move into extension is just as much one into intension—in real philosophical terms is rooted in the superseding of the natural medium term by the one of spirit and in general can be connected to the form of spirit. For it is that original aspect of the individual, that of spirit and absoluteness, in its self-conscious relation to death which ensures that the diremption of the individual externalisation into determination is absolutely held together. Determination here is on the one hand something different and external in its own right, plural and with content, and on the other something in its own right reflected in itself or inner, identical and form. Indeed that holding together absolutely is original meaning and clarity and is only a form function of the simultaneously active individualisation, of inhering in absolute negativity. If the extension or “surface” is isolated, on which individual expression seems to produce something finite, the resulting situation would be as follows. On the one hand the finite expressions here would still be quite as external with respect to each other as the representations of consciousness

16 Encyc. § 383; cf. also below 177. It hardly needs stressing that the individual is itself not only ‘something’; only ‘in the metaphysics of being’ is for Hegel the ‘individual’ ‘something strictly determined’; otherwise it ‘is certainly *more* than just what is limited on every side’ (SoL 114, GW XXI 101). It is fundamentally ‘relation to itself through setting limits to everything else’ (SoL 113 f, GW XXI, 101), it is ‘this ... maintaining itself in relation to the other’ (PhoS § 247, GW IX, 141). ‘For instance the differentiating characteristics of the animals’ are for that reason according to Hegel ‘taken’ from their ‘weapons’, from their ‘claws and teeth’ (PhoS § 246, GW IX, 140; cf. SoL 805, GW XXI, 219 and *passim*).

are, which would not get beyond the aporias of external reflection (e.g. in view of the relation of universal and particular). On the other hand too one would have to accept that the individual in fact does not express itself, does not *speak* and instead as “inside” with respect to its positive speech, merely suffers an abstract death. But in the absoluteness of what is individual, inner and outer are not to be separated. Forms of scepticism that seek to tear apart the unity of the individualised and for that reason meaningful word, such as attempts to separate the external, material sound as “significant” from its “inside” or meaning, the *significat* (which isolation shows that it is the product of bad metaphysics), are confined to the simplest philosophy of consciousness there is. Indeed *nolens volens* (as attempts to imagine what is self-external) they are similarly confined to philosophies of nature that seek to use this approach for opposing the power of *what is individual* precisely by individualising it through opposition and to “make it theirs”, i.e. to use it themselves to oppose the spiritual. They may believe themselves to be saving the singular with their representation of the self-sustaining difference of their abstractions; in fact they only attain something abstract and speechless, while philosophy recognises *language* as the individual in which as such there are indeed no abstract moments like the two named and instead only the meaningful form that clarifies itself within itself, self-determining form that determines itself to content, form in which nature has already disappeared. There is no point here in raising objections to a philosophy that explicates the contradictions by resort to antinomies. The point of the contradiction, ‘the point that is negative within itself, as point of the spirit, as the self-conscious individual which out of itself links the infinite space of representation with the time of sound’ and hence inverting inner and outer, links them in this way to the absolute form in language, ‘to the *word*’.¹⁷ What was merely different dies into this connection and comes individualised to itself. The immediate connection that is immediately devoid of determination in the infinitely determining inverting however is the individual as μεταβολή.

b) *Infinite Proposition*

That which is individual purely as “metabolic” form and the immediate, inexpressible character of speech emerge into prominence in a special way in

¹⁷ TW13, 122. The *word* is distinguished from its phonetic natural aspect, a noise understood as a mere natural event, by the negative unity of the *voice* which ‘stresses’ it into a *tone* such that in this already it has advanced to the ‘fact of self-expression as such’, to the ‘form of being meaningful as such’ (!) (cf. J. Simon, *Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel*, Stuttgart 1966, 61).

the speculative topic of the infinite proposition.¹⁸ In this it appears paradoxical that the “indivisibility” of what is individual should enter into the form of (ur-)division ((*Ur-*)*Teilung*), what we might call *dividuality*, which hardly seems capable of being appropriate to the matter. But in the infinite proposition as Hegel sees it in fact the form of division divides itself, namely in the complete absence of any relation between the subject and predicate spheres.¹⁹ One can thus also say of the infinite proposition, that it is *not a* proposition at all. Instead it releases subject and predicate into the absence of relation or into their ‘determinate determination’.²⁰ Now released from the division of the proposition in this way subject and predicate are also no longer proposition functions determined with respect to each other; they are instead—considered from the proposition totality expressed in the copula—*nothing* at all any more. The copula could even be said to be “cut apart” and abolished as proposition totality. It is this according to Hegel however from out of itself, so *the fact that* it abolishes itself is to be understood as an infinite affirmation. We will take some time over this important point.

In his table of judgments Kant assigned the infinite proposition its own position under the title of quality, stressing that this happens according to the demands of *transcendental* logic. In contrast ‘general logic’ as he states ‘abstracts’ ‘from all content of the predicate (even if it is negating)’, so that it ‘correctly’ counts the infinite proposition among the affirming propositions.²¹ The ‘function of the understanding’ that the infinite proposition gives expression to is of transcendental relevance; because it is ‘limiting in view of the content of knowledge as such’ it ‘can be important’ for the understanding ‘in the field of its pure knowledge *a priori*’.²² In the framework of our interpretation it is easy to see that this anticipatory reference to the restriction thesis as grounded in the function of the infinite proposition can serve to make it conceivable that the limitation on the understanding’s possible knowledge to experience or on experience itself to the idea or the individual comes *from out of itself* and is grounded in the understanding itself. The infinite proposition is that (in objective cognition categorial) moment in which the understanding relates to itself. In infinite propositions according to Kant ‘negation’ ‘attaches to’ ‘not

18 H. Schmitz, *Hegel als Denker der Individualität*, Meisenheim 1957 refers to this, cf. esp. 105 ff. (cf. above Intro. note 48).

19 Cf. SoL 641–643, GW XII, 78–80; GW VII, 88 f. and *passim*.

20 SoL 642, GW XII, 78.

21 CpR B 97/A 71; cf. also K. Reich, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, Berlin 1948², 91 ff.

22 CpR B 98/A 73.

the copula but the predicate'. Kant's preferred example here is the sentence 'the human soul is not-mortal';²³ quite distinct from the negative proposition which for clarification can be written "the soul is-not mortal", in that on the predicate side it draws on the *principium exclusi tertii* or the disjunction mortal/non-mortal, with the help of which a predicate *in form* positive ($\neg A$ is formally speaking just the general expression for B, C, D, ...) is produced, although the original material position is *materialiter* negated. The infinite proposition thus expresses only that the subject has its *truth* in the *limit* of the disjunction, that it lies *outside* a given positive concept but *not* in another. It articulates 'the *limitation* itself';²⁴ it is the presentation of the subject as *other as such*. Setting alterity or the indeterminate limiting is itself 'a positive action' and 'for that reason limits are positive concepts of limited objects'.²⁵

Trendelenburg referred to the fact that formally infinite propositions in their *use*, e.g. in colloquial speech, do not have a truly infinite sense in designating the limit of disjunction or contradiction purely as such. His example is the negative proposition "He does not call me", which becomes infinite by applying the negation to the object term ("He does call, (but) not me"). For Trendelenburg in this colloquial usage there is in no sense any intention to express an indeterminate "calling"; instead what holds is 'the tone sharpens the negating to an opposition and thereby instead of an infinite possibility precisely the most determinate is indicated and taken beyond the sphere of what is comparable ("he does not call me but you")'.²⁶ Similarly one could show with the Kantian example, in pragmatic as well as formal logical terms, that the sentence "the soul is immortal" is usually not an infinite but a thoroughly positive proposition, saying *something* to which in one's behaviour one can relate to and rely upon. Taken more generally, Trendelenburg's statement that the *tone sharpens* the as it were static disjunction into an opposition asserts that the

23 *Jäsche Logik* § 22 (AA IX, 104); the same example at CpR B 97 f./A 72 f.

24 *Jäsche Logik* § 22 note 1 (AA IX, 104).

25 Ibid. It turns out that here already the infinite proposition presents the qualitative concept of the other as relation.

26 Cf. A. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1, 1879³, 280 f., quoted from E. Heintel, *Grundriß der Dialektik*, Darmstadt 1984, vol. 1, 77. The weakness of Trendelenburg's example is clearly that it operates with a compound predicate not completely negated in rendering the statement infinite and determined with respect to the sphere of the subject; even without any pragmatic consideration, 'he does not call me' still says *positively* 'he calls' or 'he is calling' and is as such a simple positive proposition. Purely infinite would be an example like 'he does not call, (but does something else)', even purer 'he is not calling, (but is something else)'. It is in the bracketing 'but' that the difference with the negative proposition lies, namely the *relation* of the subject beyond the determinate predicate in which it *completely particularises*, i.e. individualises itself.

proposition attains a *negative* unity in speech that is not expressed in its terms, from out of which the negative determination of the predicate is *turned back* into itself and with that means *something* it does not say immediately in terms of its own determination. Even from this viewpoint, an affirmative meaning for the infinite proposition still presupposes individualising it.

This all becomes clearer in Hegel's theory of the infinite proposition, which in certain ways reaches further than Kant's. The step beyond Kant is announced already in the treatment of the negative proposition. If the *positive* proposition, regarded in terms of its moments of the concept, says that this singular subject is something universal (e.g. the rose is something red), while at the same time it is also itself something universal ('substance') in relation to its determinations (e.g. the rose is *also* something red, something fragrant, thorny etc.), then for Hegel this difference of form and content of the proposition becomes *set* in the *negative* judgment.²⁷ According to the principle *omnis determinatio est negatio*, especially prominent in Hegel's *Logic of Being*, the positive proposition is "in itself" also negative, as already the partitive "something" in our formulation "the rose is something red" shows. The rose is something in that it is determined on the one hand by the division of the predicate sphere, thus negation of the totality of the sphere, and on the other through subsumption of the predicate sphere, thus the overcoming of its immediacy. The negative proposition expresses logically precisely this: that the *connection* between the two terms in the proposition *consists* in the fact that it is *negative*, that therefore the determination or the content of the proposition is negative and with that a *form* relation.²⁸ The negative proposition then is, again in terms of the moments of the concept, '*the singular is a particular*'.²⁹ Hegel now shows that despite the particularity of the predicate—e.g. in the proposition "the rose is not red"—this remains a universal against the subject, namely in the respect that the sphere of the colour red (and of the not-red), of colour in general, is not overcome and continues to hold. For Hegel in the negative proposition the negation is explicitly connected to the *predicate*, not only, as in Kant, to the

27 Cf. SoL 636, GW XII, 64.

28 Hegel emphasises (similarly Kant: CpR B 140 f.) that the determination as content of the proposition is not already given simply from the fact that in general two terms are connected. They all have to be related in contrary determination as moments of the concept, in which the contrareity is the form moment generating the content (cf. SoL 636, GW XII, 64; above 65-66). Thus the proposition difference is not a simple '*count*' (ibid.) but the relation of terms determined by each other in opposition. Correspondingly Plato requires of determination (πέρας) that, as e.g. τὸ διπλάσιον (the doubled), it be a πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμός or a μέτρον πρὸς μέτρον, thus a *relation* of simple terms (Phil. 25 a f.).

29 SoL 637, GW XII, 65.

copula; the general justification follows from the *relation concept* necessarily underlying the proposition concept and as such leading back to the dialectic of self-doubling opposition.³⁰ 'What in the proposition is the *determination* of the extreme is just as much *determinate connection*.'³¹ Precisely because in Hegel's logic the copula is not an abstract third in the proposition,³² but the relation itself of the relata, the logical qualities of the relata mediated by it hold also for it, indeed in the sense that it is the *validity* of the qualities itself and conversely its determinate validity is also mediated in the relata and holds in them. If the predicate is a negation of the subject, the status of this negation as a setting in the negative proposition can be seen as a negation of the negation, so that this can be a position (e.g. 'the rose is something specifically coloured'), which can appear 'only again as a *first negation*'.³³ 'But it is not this',³⁴ for in this semblance the *self-mediation* of negation with itself is only formally carried out and not really *presented* as propositional content. Only in the negative proposition is it set that the *set* (first) negation (set by the positive predicate that is) has its in-itself (in the sense of *δύναμις*) in the copula or in the proposition's totality. The positive of the negative proposition consists in the fact that this connection between the set negation and the negation as being-in-itself has *only* just been set and hence must appear as a *positive identity*—precisely the general sphere of the predicate.

In Hegel's logic the infinite proposition has to face the challenge arising from this. It destroys that kind of positivity that can only maintain itself with the claim that the two negations in the negative proposition were not on the same logical level but were instead complements. What is supposed to reveal itself alone in the infinite proposition is this: that a complementarity of negations is not a positive present being [*Dasein*]. This assumption is made for instance by the abstract metaphysics of the *arbor porphyriana* when it treats

30 Cf. above 77.

31 SoL 638, GW XII, 66.

32 This is also correctly asserted by M. Theunissen, *Sein und Schein*, Frankfurt a. M. 1980, 395 f. Unfortunately however the attempt to verify this state of affairs with 'empirical linguistics' (396) falls immediately behind what Hegel had in mind, because the copula is taken as a *positivisable* totality of the proposition. Theunissen's thinking is totally unhegelian here when he writes that the copula is 'the merely *negative* unity' of the proposition and has to elevate itself into 'the *positive*, encompassing unity' *qua* totality of it (396). In fact, it is *never* possible to understand the (quantitative) term 'positive unity' as itself the 'encompassing', total unity; instead totality is clearly determined as the positive unity that has become negative (cf. just SoL 164 ff., GW XII, 151 ff.; GW VII, 7 ff.).

33 SoL 641, GW XII, 68.

34 Ibid.

conceptual spheres as mere givens. Instead what happens in our case is that it is a *present being of negation* and indeed a present being of negating, which is also why the proposition of reflection emerges from the infinite one. Now the negation *present* in the infinite proposition as negating the positivity emerging from the first negation through its setting is none other than the—to use Henrich's expression—*autonomous negation* itself. Its present being is, as Hegel sees it, immediately *nonsense*,³⁵ and it is no coincidence that already the sentence “there is this autonomous negation” is an infinite proposition.³⁶ Immediately referred to present being, it can only be pure destruction. Ultimately, it cannot be clad in the abstractions assumed by formal logic (not to mention the intensionality of judging); but if it were somehow conceivable that this situation could be explained in formal logical terms, one might perhaps try working with the junctor in binary-statement calculus known after its creator as the *Sheffer stroke junctor*. This operator “absorbs” all other operators of the calculus, including simple negation, in the sense that they are all definable by it. It brings the different junctors together in a unity or a simple expression, thus making all forms of operation in the calculus reducible to a *single* form. As “alternative negation”, it means that in the relation of p and q at least one of the formulas must be negated if the whole relation is to be posited. The relation reaches its truth then when either p or q takes itself out of it, i.e. if between p and q as positive values there exists no positive relation.³⁷

Hegel complains that in the ‘common logics’ it ‘certainly does’ not ‘become clear’ just ‘what is going on’ in the infinite proposition.³⁸ At any rate it has

35 Cf. GW VII, 88; SoL 642, GW XII, 69. Infinite propositions are in both negative and positive forms nonsensical, because in them the sense repels itself from itself. When Düsing (e.g. in the Kantian sense) claims that negative infinite judgments are not nonsensical because they keep off contradictions, Hegel concedes that on the one hand when he calls these judgments ‘correct or true’ but then not without adding that they are ‘despite such truth still nonsensical and absurd’ (SoL 642, GW XII, 70). On the other hand it must be said that excluding a contradiction is a perspective (e.g. pragmatic) external to these propositions bringing them into a negative unit of meaning that is not its *own*. In speculative logic forms are not considered in terms of their utility but in their own terms (cf. K. Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik*, *Hegel-Studien* suppl. 15, Bonn 1984², 258 note 148).

36 Cf. the well-known examples from the PhoS (‘the self a thing’, PhoS § 344, GW IX, 191; ‘being of the I a thing’, PhoS § 790, GW IX, 423 and *passim*).

37 To the Sheffer stroke (|) corresponds the junctor ‘common negation’ (↓ in the sense of “possessed in common”), from which similarly all operators can be derived. For all relations of p and q in which it is not the case that both are negated, it produces the truth value ‘false’. For our analogy it is sufficient that Hegel distinguishes two forms of infinite judgment, the positive and the negative.

38 SoL 642, GW XII, 69.

already emerged that he does not accept without reservations the Kantian view of it, according to which it is the positive concept of the limit of the mediation of determination. For Hegel it is in the first instance a *negative* infinite proposition, i.e. the overcoming of the entire sphere of the predicate. In the language of the *Jena Logic of 1804/05* this means the subject B too is no longer, as still in the negative proposition, 'by A itself' connected to 'the non-A set opposed to A, as C, and to the higher sphere of A and C'.³⁹ That the soul is not-mortal can, in terms of Hegel's concept of the infinite proposition, only be a negative proposition. The indeterminacy in the contradiction, e.g. of mortal and not-mortal, is in Hegel's theory of the proposition only a completely formal indeterminacy presupposing 'that in the *negative* of a concept only the negative is fixed'. Hegel criticises this referring to the concept of becoming in the logic of being and emphasises that in a logic that thinks the forms as genetic definitions of their content this must be unacceptable.⁴⁰ It would mean fixing the opposition of the contradiction instead of recognising in it the moving extremes of the motion of the whole relation, in which as a whole it is certainly the case that the subject actually governs the one extreme. Kant's example sentence 'the soul is immortal', could then appear for instance in a context in which the '*immanent* nature' of the soul is considered as a categorical proposition.⁴¹ In Hegel's negative infinite proposition in contrast generally speaking the 'content ... [is] too limited for the subject', which is why 'the entire sphere of the predicate ... is overcome',⁴² as in examples like 'the understanding is not a table' or 'the spirit is not six feet long'.⁴³ This overcoming means that 'in the infinite proposition ... a universality (is) required, that is not just a single determination'.⁴⁴ Although the infinite proposition still belongs to the class of the propositions of present being, here it turns against that completely. What it says is that the being of the subject not only cannot be uttered with a determinate determination of present being, it cannot be uttered with any determination of it at all. Instead it returns here in its immediate manner, which to that extent still belongs to the sphere of being, to the 'absolute determinacy'⁴⁵ of the subject. If it expresses this immediately, then it is a positive infinite proposition or (as it is called in the *Phenomenology* and in the *Nuremberg school*

39 GW VII, 88.

40 Cf. SoL 638, GW XII, 66.

41 Cf. SoL 650, GW XII, 77 f.

42 TW 4, 144 f.

43 SoL 642, GW XII, 70 and GW VII, 88.

44 TW4, 145.

45 SoL 641, GW XII, 69.

logics) an identical proposition.⁴⁶ In reference to the moments of the concept the positive infinite proposition says '*the individual is individual*' and '*the universal is universal*'.⁴⁷ Our examples from the *Phenomenology* made it easy to see that it is not concerned with tautologies but with the production of absolute quality or in general of the absolute out of 'absolute disunity'⁴⁸ (formally of the *proposition form* itself) in which consciousness is fundamentally situated, namely as appearing spirit. The required universality which is not just single determination is 'immediately absolute equality with itself', 'pure mediation of pure self-consciousness with itself'⁴⁹—*unmediated identity* or, as we said, the present being of autonomous negation.

Only the presentation of Hegel's concept of the absolute can really put us on the path to a sufficient understanding of this constellation. Nevertheless from what has been developed up to this point already we can elucidate this situation, and even something of its fundamental methodological significance, in the context of Hegel's thinking. Above all, the examples from the *Phenomenology* make it clear that the positive utterance of the disunity, according to which e.g. self-consciousness is a 'bone',⁵⁰ not only make no sense but in specific contexts can actually take on a certain *extreme* sense. Absolute mediation as something immediate, that thinking is a being, for Hegel this is immediately the thought of the *category*. The inversion happens when the statement, mediation *is*, immediately means, *mediating* is, and this in the absolute sense that the sides of the *most extreme* opposition are related in it. The speech that *utters* the most extreme opposition, namely the opposite of itself or speechlessness, the inability to speak at all, this speech speaks indeed as such and is itself pure identity into which, as in an infinite proposition, that inability has already been inverted. Less extreme examples of positive infinite propositions than those of phenomenological disunities are the common metaphors. What makes them infinite propositions is that for the unity they produce between predicate and subject there can be no sufficient positive concept.⁵¹ Like all

46 Cf. PhoS § 520, GW IX, 282, PhoS § 538, GW IX, 291 f.; TW4, 108, 144 f., 198.

47 SoL 643, GW XII, 70, cf. already SoL 641, GW XII, 69. The transition to the reflection proposition of singularity follows from this; in the *Jena Logic of 1804/5*, the infinite 'is equivalent to' only the singular proposition (cf. GW VII, 89); cf. on this note 55 below.

48 PhoS § 520, GW IX, 282.

49 Ibid.

50 Cf. PhoS § 344, GW IX, 191.

51 Maimon undertook the highly interesting attempt to order metaphors and positive concepts together under negative concepts, the so-called 'transcendental expressions'. These expressions in his theory are forms of the self-connecting of the cognition faculty as such (cf. S. Maimon, *Versuch über die Transzendental-philosophie*, Darmstadt 1963 (reprint), esp. 303 ff.). As connections *actu* the transcendental expressions are naturally infinite.

infinite propositions, metaphors can in specific contexts be, as Hegel puts it, “tasteless”. This might be said when in the context of the methodical development of a procedure in geometry, the question as to the definition and the properties of the right-angled triangle is answered by saying “it is a lion among the triangles”. In contrast when the question is how did Achilles fight in battle, the answer, he was a lion, could well be the only appropriate one. This answer may be the only one that does justice to the character of Achilles, exactly by turning the speechlessness inspired by the hero around. Indeed the rhetorical definition of the metaphor as an ‘abbreviated comparison’⁵² clearly shows the reflection status of this trope. When the metaphorical mediation succeeds in resolving a specific speechlessness, then its result is in formal terms a single proposition that is determined by the incapacity itself, i.e. it is the reflection-in-itself of this determination. Such effective and indeed ‘finished’ metaphors can then also become common stock, even if they are no longer *infinite*. What is infinite in the metaphor is much more the μεταφέρειν itself, not as an arbitrary or technical (e.g. ‘poetological’), regulatable action, but, to the extent that, as Aristotle puts it, it contains a δηλοῦν.⁵³ Pure manifesting that is not yet specific deixis is in fact what holds the ‘leap’ of the leap-trope together; it is only secondarily, namely after success, that the semblance of reflection establishes itself, that what is mediating in the metaphor was not the mediation *indifferent* to all determination but the conscious comparison of ‘*similia*’.⁵⁴

The immediacy the infinite proposition has in the present being of pure identity or of absolute negation is not immediately that of being but an

52 Cf. H. Lausberg, *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik*, Munich 1984⁸, § 228.

53 Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1404 b 2. Aristotle is at this point certainly not speaking about metaphor but of λόγος, in fact however there is no opposition in Aristotle between the two termini, rather an inclusion of the former under the latter. Thus in the *Poetics* the clearly most important metaphor is that of the κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον (1457 b 9), i.e. that which follows an identical λόγος (cf. 1457 b 17 ff.). It must be kept in mind that the meaning of λόγος for the Greeks was never that of a determinate concept with positive content but in general that of ‘relation’. This has been shown above all by Fränkel as well as by Schadewaldt, who translates λόγος according to its basic meaning with ‘proportion’ (cf. W. Schadewaldt, *Die Anfänge der Philosophie bei den Griechen*, Frankfurt a. M. 1979 2, esp. 182 ff, 370 ff.).

54 Suffice it to say that the transition from ‘being’ to ‘essence’ or to reflection in the sphere of judgment is made with the infinite judgment. Indifference is the last term of being; in the first edition of the *Logic of Being*, indifference is still explicated under the ‘more positive’ heading of ‘independence–Selbständigkeit’. In contrast in the second edition the negative terms become more prominent, e.g. that of ‘its irreconcilability with itself’, which is so important for the infinite judgment (SoL 384, GW XX1, 382). Despite that in 1812 too development, especially of the ‘emergence of essence’, is effected in terms of the logic of negation (cf. GW XI, 230 ff.).

immediacy doubled in itself, thus the immediacy of *reflection* as the “absolute counterthrust”. This is shown by the fact that for Hegel there are, starting with the *Phenomenology*, not only two kinds of infinite proposition (negative and positive) but now also—which was not yet the case in the *Jena Logic*⁵⁵—the already mentioned two reflections-in-itself (that of the single and that of the

-
- 55 The proximate ground for this is the divergent construction of the Jena table of judgments; there the infinite proposition is presented as the second level of the realisation of the predicate and as transition to the disjunctive proposition. The deeper ground for it is surely that this theory of judgment does not yet presume the later concept of the concept, which has to be assumed in Hegel from the *Phenomenology* on, that consequently, while it assumes infinity as such, it does not yet have absolute negation. The fully developed concept of the concept is indispensable for the completely determined concept of the infinite proposition. Three observations on this: 1) That absolute negation is not presumed determines the entire conception of the *Jena Logic* (*qua systema reflexionis*; for this title of the logic section in the system cf. the lecture course announcement for the summer semester 1802, e.g. in Hoffmeister ed., *Briefe von und an Hegel*, Hamburg 1952 ff., vol. IV/1, 80) up to its transition from proportion into metaphysics, in which the term *content*, still as the identity of its universality and its particularisation that is not mediated in itself, is set opposed to the in-itself of mediation, to *cognition*, which hence first makes metaphysics as the self-development of cognition from out of itself in the sense of the absolute form a necessary requirement. Thus the Jena table of judgments is as such subject to the distortion of the relation of content and form, addressed by the method chapter (proportion) (cf. GW VII, esp. 116 ff.). For the chronology of the new logic conception we follow O. Pöggeler, who sees it emerging ‘at the time of the writing of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*’ (cf. Pöggeler, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Freiburg and Munich 1973, 269). 2) If this is the case, then the general thesis of H. Schmitz’s *Hegel als Denker der Individualität*, Meisenheim am Glan 1957, namely that in his thinking in Jena Hegel proceeded from the principle of the infinite judgment and its ‘sharpness of opposition’ (111), thus still in greater proximity to Kant (cf. 168), and that it was only the later Hegel who was instead focused on ‘mediation’, runs into the serious problem that the Jena Hegel did *not yet have* the complete concept of the infinite judgment at all. W. Bonsiepen pointed out against Schmitz, that in the first Jena writings rather than the infinite judgment, Hegel speaks far more of the antinomy (cf. Bonsiepen, *Der Begriff der Negativität in den Jenaer Schriften Hegels*, Hegel-Studien suppl. 16, Bonn 1977, 219, note 21). So Schmitz’s thesis needs to be reversed to say that Hegel’s pre-phenomenological thinking *logically* was stuck in the status of the infinite judgment, while the *concept* of this judgment had to assume the supercession of this status, so it is the *Phenomenology*, precisely because it *draws conclusions* on the absolute form (cf. just PhoS § 789, GW IX, 422 f.), which first knows what is going on logically in the infinite disunity of consciousness. 3) The return to the table of judgments with four terms starting with the Nuremberg school logics in contrast to the Jena table is not to be understood as an external return to Kant (to whose table, by the way, the differences in the details are obvious) but similarly as a consequence from the new insight into the negativity of the concept. As the form of the opposition, the proposition must realise the opposition too as in itself doubled. More precisely this means that after the proposition of *being*, two terms of *essence* (reflection and necessity) follow and then again one of the *concept*; essence is the broken medium term of the entire

universal). The infinite proposition is the unmediated identity of these two totalities of reflection; in this—if the totalities are understood in each case as identical propositions—it is *not a* proposition, since it is instead immediately *two* propositions or the immediacy of the doubled opposition.⁵⁶ The two propositions are in this *identical*, since they immediately *repel each other*, just as the indifference at the end of the *Logic of Being* was the identity of total repulsion. In this the two propositions relate to each other *immediately* like the two *premisses* of the conclusive syllogism, which, as we have already seen, only then lead to the *conclusio* when their determination is driven into antinomy and actually *consists* in this. The infinite proposition is thus the immediate presentation of what is conclusive in the syllogism, or it is in general the *absolute exigency of the syllogism*.⁵⁷ In a marginal note, one could say that this makes the infinite proposition a language form that inseparably belongs to the present being of the absolute form or of philosophy itself. If external reflection,

proposition relation, namely in a refraction of immediacy (reflection) and of mediation (necessity) or of the relation as being-in-itself and of the relation as setting.

56 In sum one can say that the first immediacy of being is that of the *start*, the second of reflection is that of *starting*. A third immediacy, namely that of the concept, would be the self-conscious insight that the start quite simply is starting, which itself would then be strictly just the start. The positions of immediacy within the three books of the SoL in each case fundamentally have the meaning that immediacy has in the book as a whole, so then present being is a start, existence is a starting and objectivity is the conceptual “and” of start and starting. The *Logic* thus has to mediate these levels of immediacy with each other, such that each always says something other than the others. The start of present being is thus a beginning that is simultaneously an end, the starting of existence is simultaneously a ceasing of this starting (e.g. in passive thinghood), the “and” of start and starting in objectivity is simultaneously a differentiated “and” or one of the content or of the in-itself, not of the form. One can, with Henrich, certainly say that the meaning of the term immediacy has been ‘shifted’ between being and essence, which however initially is a problem for the immediacy of the comparison; from the standpoint of the concept it has to emerge that this ‘shifting’ was in fact the absolute inversion of the concept in itself; cf. D. Henrich, *Hegels Logik der Reflexion* (1965/7) in his *Hegel im Kontext*, Frankfurt a. M. 1981³, 95–156, esp. 110 ff.; his *Hegels Logik der Reflexion. Neue Fassung in Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion*, Hegel-Studien suppl. 18, 1978, 203–324, esp. 235 ff. In these studies however Henrich was not satisfied with the assertion of a ‘shifting’ but has dealt extensively with the systematics of the immediacy forms (cf. first version esp. 114 f.; new version 266 f.; for the interpretation of the immediacy aspects of self-relation of the other cf. also the studies given in note 37 above and *passim*). It should be noted that in his study *Formationsbedingungen der Dialektik in Revue internationale de philosophie*, No. 137/140 (1982), 139–162 on the issue of logical ‘meaning development’, Henrich arrives at the formulation ‘it is to be grasped as an *ordered suspending* of meanings and functions of expressions’ (160).

57 The infinite judgment is in this way the ‘need for philosophy’. Its fundamental separation from the syllogism, as Schmitz presents it, is not given from this point of view either.

adopting an attitude it considers “critical”—which given its lack of system in no way obtains—directed itself to the immediate determinations of the present being of philosophy in order to show for them precisely this, that they are immediate and finite, the only immediate response of philosophy would be to reject these finite determinations and declare them to be non-philosophy. It would thus repel all determinations of being and with that itself would no longer appear to be. Looked at exoterically, i.e. in an environment of determinations that merely possess being, this makes philosophy infinite judging, tasteless and laughable. It cannot and indeed may not answer the questions put to it for its own sake positively. But in this silence it remains silent according to the logic of the infinite proposition or it is *philosophy* itself staying silent. This means it is being in its pure beginning.

The presentation of the proposition relation presupposed by the infinite proposition in terms of the logic of negation produced the result that the setting of negation present already in the inherently positive proposition generates a new positivity, namely that of the general sphere of the predicate. One can sharpen this result by saying that in the negative proposition the first negation could be set *only in the form of the* proposition, i.e. of the immediate or linear opposition, so that the incommensurable opposition of in-itself and setting was *finitised* to the simple *antinomy*, namely either to the subcontrary (the rose is not red) or to the contradictory (the rose is not-red). From this one can see once again why for Hegel, Kant's (and Trendelenburg's) “infinite” propositions are only negative. Still now one understands also the meaning of the statement that the infinite proposition is *not a* proposition any more. It has left the form of the finite opposition, which no matter how “sharp” the contradiction, still remains merely *formal* and, which amounts to the same thing, *positive* or much better: exploded. For inherent negation (the predicate) and the set negation (explicit in the process of predicating), the extremes are now no longer devoid of contact but repel each other and negate each other. The predicate is now negation that is simultaneously inherent and set, so that its whole sphere falls away, and likewise the process of predicating is no longer merely one of the setting of negation but is in itself negation, so that the whole relation of subject and predicate within it and through it falls away. Just as the table of propositions as a whole as realised concept has four titles, so the infinite proposition has four negative moments, and it is as their negative relation to each other that it is *itself* in *counterthrust* against this realisation, while precisely in that *maintaining* itself *simultaneously* as a moment of the concept. It is the realised *alterity of the concept* in the following senses. 1) *Alterity* of the concept a) on the one hand in the sense of the state of *being* negated of passive being (function of the set negative predicate; e.g. “the spirit is the *nothingness*”).

of the green”), while b) on the other hand the set negation *is a relation* to what is simply negated, i.e. as expressing being *qua* activity (function of the in itself negative predicate; e.g. “the spirit *is rendering* the green *nothing*”, spirit is *in itself* its reflection). 2) Alterity of the concept a) in the sense of that which the concept taken absolutely is only as $\mu\eta\ \delta\nu$, *its* alterity against its own mediation (function of predication setting itself negatively: “the *non-being* of the spirit *is* being devoid of totality, e.g. greenness”), b) on the other hand this alterity as *its* own alterity summarised in it or its self-relating summarised as a moment of the total relation, where the two moments are related to each other through this relation ($\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$) and only in this have their truth (function of the in itself negative predication; e.g. “the spirit *is not*, since the green in itself is not”—both nots are the same). The infinite proposition summarises the whole proposition of present being, indeed such that it simultaneously produces the moment of present being of the other in its own right and realises it in the concept. It is that which maintains itself with the force of absolute negativity as other;⁵⁸ it

58 Theunissen, relying on Schmitz, attempted to defend the view that Hegel who ‘regarded’ the infinite proposition ‘as negation of the negative judgment’ conceded to the former ‘no affirmation’, which was then even a ‘proof of the fact that the negation of the negation originally was no kind of double negating at all’, or that ‘in any case ... *now* negation’ is supposedly ‘freed’ ‘from the semblance of a negating negating itself and as a result inverting into an affirmation’ (cf. Theunissen, loc. cit. 451 f.). To the extent that the misunderstanding is not completely explained by the reliance on Schmitz’s deficient concept of the infinite proposition, it in any case overlooks what the affirmative of the self-completing proposition can alone be—not a simple, finite ‘*sic*’ but the affirmation of the *counterthrust* whose external form the proposition as such is. The negation of the negation of the proposition is the inversion of the opposition into oppositionlessness as such, something which above all in the examples of the positive infinite proposition in the *Phenomenology*, which Theunissen fails completely to take into consideration, can hardly be missed. But then Theunissen is also not interested in the logic of the infinite proposition as such, referring to it only in the context of his attempt to contest Hegel’s conception of absolute negativity. As far as this contesting is concerned, unfortunately it is not always conducted in arguments but often only in assertions, as when with turns of phrase meant suggestively or even as defamation, the innocent principle ‘*duplex negatio est affirmatio*’—which by the way nobody in the tradition of philosophy has ever understood to be a linearly understandable technique for doing anything arbitrarily with negation—is called an ‘old grammatical’ ‘rule’ (e.g. 378), a ‘dogma’ (and for that reason obviously false; *ibid.*) etc. But then philosophy will probably be able no less easily to accommodate itself to the *new* grammarians as it (in this point) is able to do with formal logic, when Theunissen more or less expressly claims with them that the negation rule is also formally false. Clearly one could turn initially to the intuitionistic sentential calculus in which, while $\neg\neg p \rightarrow p$, the converse implication, $p \rightarrow \neg\neg p$, is not a valid sentence. But already in the (stronger!) system of the classical calculus, a strict law of double negation is most certainly *valid*, moreover it is in this calculus that the strength of the modal Lewis system’s ‘S 5’ is grounded. By the way, if one interprets $\neg\neg p \rightarrow p$ in terms of modal

is in this way the realisation of the subjectivity of the concept as that which in indivisible unity with itself is other to itself. It is what is *individual*.

That the infinite proposition as formal “body” of the individual is simultaneously infinitely affirmative has already resulted from the consideration of its positive infinite moment. To draw once again on the example given above, one can say the individual is present as language in metaphors. In them both assertions hold: *individuum est ineffabile*, for it completely destroys the sphere of the predicate, and *individuum est suum fari*, not in the sense of the positive that it *has* said but only in the sense of destruction in speech itself, which is simultaneously pure manifesting, again not of something and not for something but instead the pure present being of negativity. In the *Phenomenology* the ‘absolute negativity of everything determinate’ ends up in the infinite point of

logic as $LMP \rightarrow p$ (with L for necessity and M for possibility), the result is interestingly a sentence that is no longer accessible to any formal interpretation, just as Hegel's principle of negation supersedes on its own the spheres relating to it merely formally or externally, which is the principle of in Hegel's sense intensional logic. In Theunissen's contesting of double negation it is certainly not about knowing philosophical form as strongly as possible, but, as is easily seen, it is far more about the attempt to reduce philosophy fundamentally to a positional ‘thinking’, taking of positions, making claims etc., in which it is then only all about (what is then certainly an arbitrary) ‘something’ (the positive). On his own account, Theunissen sees himself in the line of ‘protests’ against the ‘imposition of having to regard the self-negation of autonomous negation as affirmation’ (378); in this line are supposedly also Kierkegaard (with his category of the individual, which, it should be noted, certainly does exhibit a-reflected-form of absolute negativity) as well as Adorno. It is indeed the case that the latter in his *Negative Dialectics* attempted to maintain the positivity of simple negation in order to be able to make the negative ‘identifiable’—ultimately promoting this positivism of negation at *any* price, even that of the loss of the philosophical topic (cf. here E. Heintel's critique in his *Grundriß der Dialektik*, Darmstadt 1984, vol. 1, 89–104), or even that of desperation. That the positive is positive and the negative is negative and beyond that there exists no relation between the two is obviously the prerequisite for what the determinate notion as Theunissen thinks it, as explained in the contesting of the speculative form moments, is all about: the prerequisite of a domain of ‘communicative freedom’ (cf. e.g. 45 f.). In this ‘the one experiences the other not as limit but as condition of the possibility of its own self-realisation’ (46). Now in Theunissen's favour, we would like to assume, although it is not expressly stated, that the relation between one and other is meant to be *reciprocal*, that the one does not simply positivise the other as condition of its own self-realisation, so that the other is experienced *seriously* ‘not as limit’. For *limit* is the other insofar as he does *the same* as the one, which indeed in the sense of recognition, he *must do* in order for self-consciousness to be given, as far then as the positive is in the moment of its positivising the negative and conversely. If this were not valid, then we would have the situation that Hegel cites as a ‘more realistic example’ of the infinite judgment: ‘a crime’ (SoL 642, GW XII, 70).

the conscience.⁵⁹ In *conscience* (*Gewissen*), knowledge is *identical* with itself; the infinite proposition has become identical,⁶⁰ and, presenting this identity to itself, the proposition of reflection of singularity is the reflected relation of all to the absolute singular. Certainty (*Gewissen*) the individual has in itself, as not being expressible but simply speech. This it has in common with all certainty (*Gewissen–certum*) in general, hence also with the certainty of the *conclusio* in the concluding syllogism; we have already referred to the relation of this to the form of the infinite proposition.⁶¹ This latter thus makes recourse to the certainty of all mediation as such. For this reason Hegel can say that the ‘idea’ is the ‘*infinite proposition*’, each of whose ‘sides’—the disjuncted spheres of subject and predicate—is ‘an independent totality and precisely for the reason that each completes itself to that, each has just as much transited into the other.’⁶² For the logical method this statement is of the greatest relevance, as we shall see below when we come to the development of the absolute from out of appearance; but it also indicates that the idea itself, to the extent that it is the unity of opposites, refers to the moment of its own individuality and presents itself as individual. The idea has set itself as this individuality as absolute idea, as the:

practical, in and for itself determinate, objective concept, which as person is impenetrable, atomic subjectivity,—equally it is not exclusive singularity but is for itself *universality* and *knowing*.⁶³

With this it is in conclusion stated what would mediate the infinite proposition and what simultaneously is most difficult to bring into the common understanding: that knowledge is only completed and concluded in that, concluding itself and repelling external reflection—which is the only way it becomes *actual*

59 PhoS § 648 f., GW IX, 350; cf. also Luther’s phrase: *via in coelum est linea indivisibilis puncti: conscientiae* (Martin Luther, Weimar ed. of his works, XL/1, 21, 12).

60 The singular proposition emerging from the identical infinite proposition is called in the *Logik für die Mittelklasse* of 1808/9 also ‘the *individual proposition*’ (TW4, 109).

61 Cf. above note 48 and 116.

62 Encyc. § 214 Obs.; cf. SoL 758, GW XII, 177: ‘absolute proposition’.

63 SoL 824, GW XII, 236. The consequences lying in this for Hegel’s concept of God, incomprehensible without the concept of the individual, is explained by J. Simon in his study *Hegels Gottesbegriff in Theologische Quartalschrift* 162 (1982), 82–104; the absolute individual is *capable* of infinite ur-dividing (*Urteilung*), which is why God too is perceivable in finite representations, cf. esp. 101 ff. For this entire chapter cf. further F. Ungler, *Individuelles und Individuationsprinzip in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’*, habil. Vienna 1983; on God as no longer finite (exclusive) being-for-itself esp. 530 ff.

cognition—that it is itself individualising knowledge or is itself the knowing individual. All bad universality, e.g. even that of the “objective spheres” of the predicate in the old species-genus dogmatism, has seen its own downfall in absolute particularisation only to produce itself from this to become true universality, namely as interrelation of all that is known by the individual, who first defines this in the absolute horizon of individuality. “Absolute form” and “individual” are interchangeable terms.

c) *Cognition as Process and Definition*

The idea in Hegel is in its “middle” not only immediate negativity, as which it exhibits itself as the infinite proposition but also the immediate position of its whole relation or *process*.⁶⁴ Through the middle term, process,⁶⁵ the differentiated sides, whose relation is set by the infinite proposition as overcome or indifferenced, are from then on simultaneously the real determination of the idea, for that reason also set *in the plurality* of the moments. Plurality here not in the finite sense of determination, not therefore in the meaning of *separability*, as it is expressed still with the simple form of the proposition; plurality instead in the sense of totality, in which everything determinate, as it is also itself in each case individualised, refers to the individual middle term or the absolute form as unity. Real determination *qua* process is in each case absolute determination, concluding syllogism and actively revelatory middle term, which for its part is only expressible in the reflection of its opposed premisses and is set in the semblance, in the work of the spirit on the differentiated sides possessed of being.

If one can take “process” in Hegel, as we would like to state in advance, in no other way than as the self-presentation of absolute determination in the immediacy of the positive plurality of the determination components, i.e. as the positive immediacy of the absolute middle term of the matter itself, then this clearly establishes that a theoretical *object* cannot be meant, thus indeed not an objective determination or a *result*. Processes as objective affairs, as elements or also as the universal “element” of the “world” are quite well-known from

64 Cf. Encyc. § 215; SoL 759, GW XII, 177.

65 ‘Processes’ take also externally a position in the middle of the system, thus in mechanism or in life (SoL 714 ff., GW XII, 136 ff.; SoL 728 ff., GW XII, 149 ff.; SoL 769 ff., GW XII, 187 ff.). The respective *results*—e.g. the solar system as ‘absolute mechanism’—are the conceptually mediated ‘individuals’, which naturally are not again processes but are ‘above’ process as the *conclusio* is to the syllogism. Thus e.g. the *genus* is never a possible object of ‘processes’ without thereby not already being regarded as species instead beside (its) other species. The true universal does not become something other but is itself absolute othering, varying, changing.

notions of the individual sciences, as well as from more universal views with philosophical claims (e.g. of the Whitehead kind). They have enjoyed some popularity since the nineteenth century—and indeed not without demonstrable contacts with more dogmatic varieties of Hegelianism—from which above all the view stems that it is possible, using the process notion to investigate “objective” spheres of the “world” theoretically. Especially influential was the application of this notion as a methodological principle in the study of history; for it seemed then acceptable to relate mutually *free* forms in “chemical” immediacy to each other and to develop them out of each other with a certain necessity; that this necessity then was itself hypostasised, and e.g. could turn into a badly understood “*Weltgeist*”, certainly belongs to the unfortunate consequences of the form of the notion or representation, which the advocates of this approach *themselves* sometimes became aware of.⁶⁶ The hypostasised necessity reveals itself too easily as just the excluded third of the relation, so that neither of their relata can be completely inhering in it, i.e. capable of arriving at themselves and their immediate existence only from out of infinity; nor can it be conceived of actually as absolutely determining or individualised. Thus it cannot be subject but at most the mediating substance of its *different* accidents. ‘A connection between merely *different things*, not *opposed things*’—and the deficiency of the opposition to substance means that the accidents too are not really opposed to each other—which for Hegel gives the ‘*formal process*’.⁶⁷ A whole series of process notions remains, still on this level, especially,

66 E.g. history as a reflection in terms of an established discipline would have to come into conflict with the dogmatic notion of world historical totalities, which can be illustrated by the “epoch” concept, at once as popular as it is unavoidable, or vice versa, which produces a kind of Kantian antinomy. On this (and, by the way, also on Kant’s own conception of the philosophy of history) cf. G. Schmidt, *Kausalität oder Substantialität? Zu Hegels Ontologie der Geschichte* in H.-Chr. Lucas and G. Planty-Bonjour eds., *Logik und Geschichte in Hegels System*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1989, 147–171. For the external respects of the conceptual historical context of the chemical process concept cf. K. Röttgers’ article *Prozeß (I)* in J. Ritter ed. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 7, Darmstadt 1989, col. 1543–1558, esp. 1548 ff. For the dogmatic understanding of the conception of process by Hegel himself in his ‘school’, here we refer only to K. Fischer, who believed he could reconstruct Hegel’s ‘identity philosophy’ by taking it as a ‘monism’ that one could set up beside his and his contemporaries’ thoughts on the ‘world development and evolution of all phenomena of the world, especially all phenomena of life’ (cf. Fischer’s *Hegels Leben, Werke und Leben*, 2 vols, Heidelberg 1901, 219, 231, cf. 1174 ff.). At the end of his book, Fischer goes so far as to summarise: ‘Hegel ... is the philosopher of the nineteenth century, for he is the philosopher of the theory of evolution, although he was himself not a critical mind’ (1176). One can only say that this mind was fortunately critical enough not to have been taken in by any ‘philosopher’ of the theory of evolution even in the nineteenth century.

67 N.b. Encyc. § 327.

“processes” that are only supposed to occur between terms that are terms of reflection. These determinations have the form of being intendable; they give together an “objective” series of finite determinates, which at the end is supposed to produce a complete objectively processual calculation of the world and which is thought of as in principal realisable in determinate methodical iterations—e.g. through the application of the process notion even to the relation of “observing understanding” and observed process itself. In fact however such a formal process is so selfless that it cannot depart from its own simple linearity and is instead appropriate only to a *reductio ad indefinitum* or can maintain finite determinations only as infinite as such, i.e. it has to change them into something bad. Our attempt to draw on Hegel’s process concept, which, as we said, belongs to the middle term of the idea, for the concept of absolute form might shed some light on unphilosophical notions of process.

When Hegel himself calls process ‘an activity grasped in terms of the determinate moments it passes through’,⁶⁸ then this already suggests that process achieves its determination positively, namely in the moments, without itself being a positivity but that instead *it is* the *connection* of the positive to *its* absolute other *in* the relation of the positive plurality. Process *is* then clearly what is intendable in it but *it is* that as *absolutely* reflected, i.e. equally it is *not* that. It is further the mediation (the activity) of the moments, which is not to be considered as immediate. But then it is these to the extent that they determine themselves to be that in their own particularisation, to be *wholly* in each of the moments. What falls away is what is abstractly reflected (the *subjective* representation of the moments in *external* understanding), like the abstract being (the hypostasis, the unknowable totality of the process whole etc.). For these reasons, in Hegel’s process conception “objective” and “subjective” forms of processuality cannot be distinguished, just as the immediacy of the process is neither that of being nor of reflection but certainly already absolute immediacy, i.e., as mentioned above, that of the *idea*. Now the one-sidedness of the process concept is indeed that it does not simply know or present activity actively (absolutely negatively) but immediately fixes the *determination* of the activity—that, as one can say, it gets to see the refraction of the middle term and expresses it, instead of letting the mediation simply *be*.⁶⁹ Since the refraction of the middle term through its *moment* of externality can always be

68 TW11, 404; cf. there in context, also the remarks on the process concept within the mediation of certainty to truth.

69 In the sense of this ‘lack’ one can understand the whole need as well as the form of philosophical presentation. This is process in the speculative sense but in absolute terms simply activity that requires activity.

interpreted in the sense of *nature*, *hardening* itself into a spatial or temporal interval in which nature can maintain itself as interrupting, as a pure keeping open against the self-opening of the true middle term, thus also consummating the “germ of death”, the result is that the deficient process notion has an indirect support in the lack of process and indeed has in those terms as one could say its relative right. But then it is possible to demonstrate precisely in what the differences between the representation and the concept of process consist, especially in relation to the logical determination problem. Here we will consider the three aspects of the form of opposition of the process components, the continuity problem and the “teleology” of the process.

The components of the process as representation are *externally* determined with respect to each other, determinations which in the *actuality* of the process are destined to suffer the violence of becoming *something other* than they were. It has been attempted in relation to the essential *pastness* of a something that is a process component to doubt in terms of representation the sense of terms like “being” and “substance”, as if the fact that something becomes something other would already lead us out of the logic of being, which according to Hegel is also the logic of infinity. When A transits into B here, it becomes essentially simply negated, – A with alien terms, namely those of B. The transition in the process is one *that is external* to A and B, the process itself one that is alienating or also external to itself, which in each of its moments has something immediately alien. Since it is arbitrary whether – A is presented in B, C, D or in whatever else, it is clearly about the *formal* process mentioned above. If on the other hand a determinate opposition A and B (*qua* – A), which clearly introduces the external third, identical either in the sense of the external hypostasis or of the external understanding, then the result is the process notion of *linear* development, of the series of successive others with each against each in finite antinomy mutually repelling each other. This series must in terms of the logic of representation be *open*, since each “last” point as a simple other with respect to its predecessor must be the immediate generation of *its* other in equally finite form, thus the third point. In the series open in this way of the finite something in process, as each has its separate position, the contradiction is *avoided*. It is avoided in that A and – A are certainly opposed but these are only E for an external comparison or for the understanding, which E must be the same with respect to A *and* – A. If E were not the same in relation to A as well as to – A, then for E these would not be opposed at all, i.e. not included in the linear process.

In stark contrast, the speculative process is neither finite becoming other nor does it avoid the contradiction, whose absolute self-presentation it is. Indeed it is in this manner the presentation of the form of individuality in the

immediate plurality of its own particularisation. In metabolic *coincidence*, the different process components are no longer abstract externals to each other; as they are completely disjuncted through the contradiction, i.e. without *tertium*, the process of the idea makes them absolute relata. Their relation happens in the doubled or overlaid opposition, which is to say in a form that does not *simply* distinguish the *unequal* ($A = -A$) from the *equal* relation (E to $A, -A$) but is instead a form which shows that the inequality is itself simultaneously equality. In that A transits to $-A$ (which however is precisely to this extent no longer an abstract $-A$ but other to A , absolutely *determinate* negation and with that B), so also does E transit into this transition; it becomes this becoming and arrives in that at itself or at absolute identity.⁷⁰ As one might put it, the crossing of the opposition turns purely within itself and, rendering the form of externality itself a moment, also sheds all external criteria of its motion. What was reflection of the externality of A and $-A$ becomes, so long as A and $-A$ *qua* B are recognised as the true contradiction, a moment of the self-determination of the matter and in that also a moment of the form of its truth. Thus:

‘the idea [has] ... for the freedom that the concept achieves in it, the *hardest opposition* within it; its state of rest consists in the security and certainty with which it, the idea, eternally generates that opposition and eternally supersedes it and goes together with itself within that opposition’—and in terms of this claim to form ‘the *identity* of the idea with itself’, it is ‘one with the *process*’.⁷¹

The as yet ‘unfulfilled point of the absolutely free self’,⁷² as it were the idea that in this point is purely immanent ‘before’ its expression or ‘before’ the ‘exploding’ of the ‘point of negative unity’,⁷³ is simultaneously the totalising moment

⁷⁰ Of course for the reflection-logic aspect of the situation naturally the contradiction chapter (SoL 431, GW XI, 279) has to be consulted. The account of this chapter by M. Wolff, *Der Begriff des Widerspruchs*, Königstein Ts. 1981 is highly inadequate. In Wolff’s attempt at a reduction of the speculative content to formal ‘structures’, the turning point of from and content, which should have been demonstrated in the contradiction as reflection of reflection, is missed and instead of that all that is spoken of is Hegel’s ‘ontologisation’ of the contradiction (cf. 169). For a detailed critique cf. U. Richli, *Dialektik in Sinn der Betrachtung der Denkbestimmungen an und für sich in Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 14.2 (1989), 37–44.

⁷¹ SoL 759, GW XII, 177.

⁷² PhoS § 590, GW IX, 320.

⁷³ Cf. the context of the logic of being-within-itself (*Insichsein*) of 1812 (GW XI, 66) and on the other hand SoL 824, GW XII, 236.

to which also the *reflection* of the processual $A = B$, which, *knowing* the process and simultaneously releasing it into its *being*, comes back when it grasps the activity of the process in the moments passed through. The 'metaphysical point' of the process however is to itself as such 'freedom' and 'immediate *personality*', spiritual individuality 'as the infinite point of *in-and-for-itself-determining*'.⁷⁴ Moments external for the imagination have in infinite μεταβολή arrived at the actuality of their self.

This also indicates how the question of *continuity* of the process is to be answered. The problem of the process notion is always that because of the exclusion of the middle term, either the other terms are only externally mediated, i.e. brought into a continuity that is not already reflected into them, or they have to assert their discretion as an external setting (of the on-looking understanding), so that in no case a genuine *determination of the process* is expressed. In Hegel's terms, it is in contrast clear the extent to which the components can be both completely discrete and completely continuous; for A and B are in his treatment only totalised *within* and *as* the contradiction or their complete disjunction to $A = A$ and $B = B$, i.e. they are *identified* as well as being *rendered moments*. In the sense of the method criterion of absolute form each is reflected into itself only such that it is simultaneously reflected into another or that conversely the gain in extension is simultaneously a deepening in intension. The continuity "between" both discrete process components lies then in the real difference between them itself, through which the unity of the *matter* or activity of the process (of the idea) is relation and determinate unity. Fixed in this way, continuity is the reflection of the negativity of the unity on the level of positivity. But the absolute ground for claiming the continuity is at the same time identical with the actualised discretion of the components, it thus proves itself immediately to be the negativity of their discrete self-relation. In the form of the idea the realisation of the universal and of the individual are absolutely identical. The process notion now finds itself in a double difficulty, for saying $A = A$ does not enable it simultaneously to say $A = B$, while correspondingly it cannot understand one side as *only* reflection and the other *only* as being. The continuity of the process as immediate unity of being and reflection remains in any case outside of A, B and their relation. The promise of nevertheless catching up with it through iteration of the application of the process notion, as already indicated, has to fail on the similarly iterating finite form. Moreover the promise of presenting the "universal" process is no more

74 TW4, 433. On '*the free universal*' as 'point of individuality' cf. also the context of the philosophy of right GW VIII, 262 f.; further on the 'spirit' as 'living union' in opposition to 'its structure' also the *Systemfragment* of 1800 (TW1, 421).

than the uttering of a name, for the actual concluding universal form could only be the *individual form*, which in no case results from the summation of finite processes to “universality”, because all its moments are themselves already individualised. This is why it must be required of philosophy that each “single” process has to show itself to be absolute universality and is not merely to be placed “in” a universality. Only in this way is it possible for Hegel’s conception of world history to be completely free of all that latent totalitarianism of dogmatic philosophies of history. For Hegel every historical moment is an absolutely free existence of world history, which does not have to be capable of being presented “as a whole” in order for its value and meaning to be determined.

Now it is also possible to present the process itself as well as the moments as self-purpose and as such to answer the teleology question. If world history has to be thought of as happening as it were in each moment, indeed when it means only the moment of completion of the historically actual that it has within it, then with the individual form of the process is also expressed the pure immanent τέλος, while every *external* teleology (also that of the “will to make” history) is denied.⁷⁵ Process notions which reckon to their credit a form that avoids the teleological moment suspected of being “metaphysical”, with e.g. the course of the moments is conceived of as *purely* temporal, i.e.

75 That Hegel does not let himself be taken as favouring a technical-practical ‘relation’ to history, society etc. ultimately does not escape M. Theunissen in his *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat*, Berlin 1970. Indeed he waxes polemical against Hegel, supposedly validating the linear progression of the understanding against Hegel’s concept of philosophical form (cf. e.g. 337 f., 343 and *passim*). Theunissen claims things to be obvious that are not obvious at all and speaks of praxis in general, where only a *determinate* praxis is meant. In this spirit he wants to reproach Hegel for having a ‘tendency to release philosophy from the duty to political praxis’ (373), himself writing for ‘practical and political people’ (46). Now it is the case that the Hegelian philosophy is very sceptical of all that, because for it, on logical grounds, no individual consciousness as such, nor indeed any collection of such “individuals” can ‘make’ history in the realm of appearances that is history, which, precisely because it is appearing, is always conditioned by natural immediacy. Mere consciousness is in this sphere in general only a historical moment insofar as it contradicts itself, i.e. in itself *is* something that it does *not claim* to be. This corresponds to the common experience of every abstract willing in relation to history, that the *opposite* of what is consciously intended is what actually happens. Only the ‘world-historical individual’ in Hegel’s sense does and wills in appearance consciously that which is simultaneously his absolute self; he realises the self, as should be carefully noted not in the sphere of absolute spirit, where it would have no external difficulties but in the domain of the finite, precisely of historical relations. One can say that Hegel is sceptical about an unwelcome demand like that of Theunissen, because he has strong doubts about the significance of writing philosophical books whose study could make the reader a *truly* ‘political-practical’, i.e. a ‘world-historical individual’.

imagined as the extensive alienation of the knowledge of the relation, fall into a problem of determination, which is above all now one of the discreteness of the moments. With respect to abstract processes devoid of substance, from the standpoint of philosophy it should be stated that they are only constructs derived from a secondary disintegration of cognition, which relate to the process of the idea like an endless counting of curve points to their presentation by means of the function itself. Clearly, counting alone comes to no integration of the *concept* but it is also not possible really to know what one is doing in this, since the derivation values only say *something* to the extent that one already knows the universal of the function or connects an interpretation with this. Thus even a thesis on merely occurring “processes”, whose “goal” and totality are supposed to be hidden, certainly says *nothing* as long as there is no reference to some kind of totality that only realises *itself* in the change that is only continuous by virtue of the form of that totality. Isolated “process moments” *without* relation to the middle term (and that means to the logical beginning and the logical end) of the process are immediately in no way simply *something*. Instead what happens is the decay of their determination unavoidably both as determination of being as well as that of reflection. The former reduces in any case to mere determinability, since it could only be mediated by the process that is claimed to be not knowable and which is thus, to the extent that it is nevertheless qualitative, a semblance and belongs as such already to reflection. But even the determination that the subjective understanding in “world making” is oriented to its “interests” would only knowingly communicate the moments that remain in themselves hidden to it and could have no persistence or maintain itself as a term of process determination. In fact only the constructs enter with their creator themselves into the process in that they would no longer satisfy it and turn out to be *not* what they are *supposed* to be and lose discrete unambiguousness. Even in such freedom from “objective” teleology whose truth moment is the contesting of the hypostasised external teleology, representation sinks into non-knowing, namely precisely the procedure from the first to the second “world picture”. *Philosophically*, as we can summarise, the form of the process can never be ‘ $A = B$ because and to the extent that $A = C$ ’ (no matter whether here C is claimed *materialiter* or is assumed to be fundamentally unknowable), instead it is always, as one can say even in face of the danger of a misunderstanding formalism, an ‘ $A = B$ because and to the extent that $A \neq B$ ’.⁷⁶ Thus is the $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ neither external violence nor

76 The infinite judgment basically revealed nothing other than what this expression of the process in the form of the contradiction also says. Since we are concerned here with philosophical methodology and not with particular applications, in the presentation of

has it dissolved into indifference (e.g. the natural notion, time). It is what is actually present as form of the individual. It is the process itself, which is the diremption of the individual point to—according to Hegel's image—a circle, its own process of coming apart into externally incommensurable extremes.⁷⁷ The point as *middle term* of the external extremes loses itself no longer in these as it got lost in the infinite line; as far as the temporal relation of its moments is concerned, these relate to each other as a system of what is external to itself, as individualised dispersion, as σφαίρα, which is the Greek image of the αἰών.⁷⁸

One can illustrate very effectively the meaning of the determinations attained with what happened in Hegel's own logic conception between 1804/5 and the later versions. It could be called a breakthrough to absolute form in logical method too, for which only a small step was necessary, which also related to the absolute meaning of the μεταβολή. As mentioned above, the

the form we will dispense with examples of such content. To orient ourselves on what a determination of absolute form like the one just given actually means, it may be useful to refer to the representational and conceptual determining of historical processes. One cause of the downfall of the Roman empire (to take an extreme example) is considered by historians to be the elevated lead content of Roman drinking water. This might be expressed as follows: $A = B$ over a determinate C , which, without being an abstract teleological 'principle', intervenes in the course of finite things. The philosophy of history in contrast must show that the Roman empire, in order to be what it was ($A = A$), at once both *was* its other ($A = B$) (according to Hegel the 'Germanic realm', cf. *Philosophy of Right* § 358) and *was not* ($A \neq B$), which Hegel does by reference to the 'infinite disunity of ethical life' (loc. cit. § 357) that drives the 'spirit driven back to itself' into the 'extreme of its absolute *negativity*' to the '*turning point* that is in and for itself' (loc. cit. § 358) and thereby through the at least indirect presentation in the form of the negative/positive infinite judgment. Bringing out the inner form reveals the τέλος of the Roman empire to be that of the German realm, which is just the positive presentation of what is for Rome the negative principle.

77 The line is measurable with the point delimiting it and commensurable for itself; a musical interval is generally determined by the extreme tones. In the square the limiting lines are commensurable, while its "middle", the diagonal dividing it into two congruent triangles, is in contrast incommensurable and as it were the "individual interior"; correspondingly in the triad, the third is initially ambiguous and the individualising moment of the harmony. In the circle conversely, the "thrown out" middle, the periphery, is the incommensurable and individual aspect of the figure, while what is commensurable in it is the radius, as what could be called immanent externality. Correspondingly in the cadence the individual tones and also the intervals no longer have the general meaning persisting for itself, for they are "bent" into the harmonic centre (sometimes with the help of the temperature), and are thus only moments of the individual harmonic context, whose inner "diameter", e.g. the determination of the cadence as plagal or authentic, can again be called commensurable.

78 Cf. on this G. Böhme, *Zeit und Zahl*, Frankfurt a. M. 1974, esp. 71 ff.

concluding determination that the *Jena Logic* offers with respect to time and which it according to its own conception has to resolve is cognition itself.⁷⁹ In the section headed 'COGNITION is set', '*reflection describes itself*', while—in stark contrast to the later *thoroughgoing* automotion of the categories—previously it had been '*our reflection*', i.e. '*a dialectical treatment*, that developed the oppositions which were undeveloped as present in the settings'.⁸⁰ Cognition here is initially subjective reflection in fact mere 'treatment' or only the *demand* for a necessary transition from the set *this* (the simple concept) to its realisation or particularisation.⁸¹ The logical method proceeds thus initially itself as external reflection or in the form of defining, i.e. as setting of an immediate *one* in the 'this' of the definition, in which in general the plurality or determination is attached in the *construction* hypothetically.⁸² In the as such clearly subjective action of construction the 'this' or the universal of the definition is supposed to be presented as 'in its own right divided, as an indifferent being, that remains itself in plurality'.⁸³ Construction as itself a subjective form is thus supposed to bring the subject to determination, relating it to the plurality already presupposed by its differentiated form and thereby making the *disjunction* that every true definition expresses in the *definiens* possible. The disjunction is as form precisely that of the predicate⁸⁴ or the 'objective' form; it is complete if it sets a third to its opposition, a (formal) subject. In our context, this subject is understood by Hegel as the returned *definitum*, while this now is understood as 'ground' and 'comprehensive sphere' of the whole disjunction,⁸⁵ which still as simultaneously a third or immediate demands a new definition which cannot be the first one. In this however the whole *form* of cognition repeats itself with a new *content*, as indeed Hegel's *logical* method in 1804/5 operates with a persistent externality or subjectivity of the *procedure* with respect to the terms of thought.

79 The only extensive commentary on the *Jena Logic* of 1804/5 up to this point is that attached to the Italian translation in the edition of F. Chiereghin et al., Hegel, *Logica e metafisica di Jena* (1804–05), Trient 1982. On what follows cf. 404 ff. as well as K. Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik*, *Hegel-Studien* suppl. 15, Bonn 1984², esp. 176 ff.

80 GW VII, 111 f.

81 For what follows cf. also the theory of the hypothetical proposition, GW VII, 85 ff.

82 On the subjectivity of the definition due to its 'external start in the singular' n.b. also Sol 795, GW XII, 210.

83 GW VII, 113.

84 On the realisation of the predicate in the disjunctive judgment in the *Jena* theory of the judgment cf. GW VII, 89 ff.; on the leading role of hypothetical and disjunctive judgments in the *Jena Logic* cf. the commentary of Chiereghin, loc. cit. (note 78), 365 ff.

85 GW VII, 113.

Even if the countervailing motions of subjective construction and objective proof amount to only an externally formal return to the subject from out of determination, and with that becoming incapable of fulfilling Hegel's later method criterion of absolute form, they are nevertheless of some significance in terms of the connections emerging from them to the two system components of Kant's first critique (the transcendental analytic, its constitution theory, and the problem of the transcendental dialectic), as well as of those to the last term of the logic, of the *systema reflexionis* this side of metaphysics. One can more precisely illustrate the concept of cognition, as it is set with the definition, by developing the first definition of Euclid ('a point is that which has no parts') to the formulation: 'If something is a point, then it is the ground of the difference between the divisible and the indivisible'. Construction proceeds to the conditioned element of the general character of the point, to the difference between divisible and indivisible; then from out of the plurality (and with that, as Hegel notes, also possible observability)⁸⁶ that determines itself to be disjunction, the point returns, one could say, as from now on itself formally conditioned, while nevertheless remaining a universal subject. Kant's philosophy of the hypothetical form, starting with the theory of the transcendental ideal all the way to the theory of self-affection in the *Opus postumum*, remained throughout a searching for this complement to form in the transcendental philosophy, which however can only be reached dialectically. Complementarity, as Hegel develops it in the logic of the definition, is, by the way, certainly not as such a final word on the matter, because the presentation of the *definitum* as the ground of division (of the subject as of the truly universal concept) is initially only an external step towards 'bringing the division in the construction back to the unity of the definition' in the '*proof*'.⁸⁷ The externality of the beginning with respect to what is mediated means that this proof, which must set the being of the given concept and the reflection of the constructive concept in *one* concluding relation, only leads to *another definition*, with which the constructing procedure and the procedure of proof must begin again in order once again just to produce a further definition. The ground's immediacy thus produced presents itself as determinate *content* which is not the same thing on the level of content as the first immediacy. Continuing with our

86 The one of the *definitum* is in general related to determination as 'an infinite amount of qualities', which 'together' constitute 'the whole of so-called empirical intuition' (GW VII, 114; cf. marginal remarks 1). If the phrase used occasionally by us above of "a comprehending defining itself to become intuition" requires explanation, it could be illuminated in this sense from the speculative concept of the definition.

87 GW VII, 113.

example from Euclid one could say that the proof of the definition of the point is the concept of the line. For the line is according to its concept the *unity of the disjuncts* in the definition of the point, of the divisible and the indivisible. It is vital to note here that the determination of the first definition provided it with the observability, which *immediately* both of the disjuncts of the definition contain—the point itself, e.g. as limit of the line (Euclid's third definition), and the divisible or the overcoming of the point, e.g. in the continuum of the line (its length, Euclid's second definition). The immediacy of the unity of the disjuncts contains to that extent also both the reality as well as the ideality of the first definitum and is thus not equal to the first immediacy. The moments of the realisation of the first immediacy, its subjective transition into plurality, which has become the determining opposition of the disjuncts, are indeed precisely themselves from now on 'ideal' and even 'deleted' moments of the new sphere,⁸⁸ which produces itself from out of them. Since cognition has now become 'deduction' but in the sense of the transition to the other definition, that first, from which it began, surely *consists* or *persists* further (just as the line consists of points) but as such only as a moment—for simultaneously it also persists *no longer* (instead the line is the overcoming of the points into the ideally divisible continuum).⁸⁹

The motion of constructing and of deducing, of realising and of idealising or also that of reflecting into another and of reflecting into itself generate in the mediation of cognition a doubled or broken middle term, and this is clearly demonstrated in this context by Hegel.⁹⁰ 'The two paths of rising and descending meet and cross each other in the middle, which is ... the particular.'⁹¹ The middle term is thus in general already known as the crossing point of the self-developing opposition of determination in the functions of the named motions. This means initially that the content is completely *known* and—especially the particular is also expressly named—in those terms could be *individualised*. But wait: precisely the particular is here determined to be 'the bad reality' and the meeting in the middle is consistently characterised as happening 'not in the absolute middle.'⁹² This eccentricity of unsuperseded logical cognition is precisely the point where the Jena systematic conception encounters the need for the transition into metaphysics, which is the science of the self-knowing

88 Cf. GW VII, 119.

89 Cf. Ibid. 119 ff. Cognition is as deduction a circle that remains equal to itself 'but the content is another and becomes unequal to itself' (GW VII, 120).

90 On the phrase 'broken middle' cf. above 20 as well as note 47.

91 GW VII, 120.

92 Ibid.

of cognition becoming concrete in itself to itself. For reaching “the absolute middle” in knowing would mean in general that cognition knows itself, which one could call the Socratic recalling of the whole of philosophy. For cognition to cease in this way proceeding exclusively through eccentric middles, so that it only ever has successively distinct content, whose *mere* form comes down to the fact that it thus would be ‘absolutely not formally’, the concept of the content, ‘it would have to be itself its own content’, i.e. also ‘be its moment and the moment in this way distinguishable from the whole or from the universal’.⁹³ Cognition in this logic, as also in the form presented of definition and deduction, is already:

‘the universal as totality, in that in it the whole content of the universal presents itself as developed’, indeed ‘it is the whole reflection, which in its variation remains strictly equal to itself’, and ‘the nature of the content’ on the basis of this in itself already absolute meaning of cognition is determined as ‘the same as that of cognition’.⁹⁴

Cognition is to that extent already more than *mere* form. This is shown at the end of the *Logic*, where only it continues in *all* content overcoming this ‘as indifferent’, while for its part ‘the indifferent content’ has only ‘emerged from it’.⁹⁵ But the reservation that has to be made is still that it is not that the *content continues itself within itself* but that in cognition it is always only externally *other content*, which appears as a mere *series* of contents, whose end is not foreseeable from within it, other content, which appears as the finite difference with respect to the formal indifference. The self-altering of the content is thus here still not grasped absolutely; for the content only then becomes another when it does not become simply other or its other. Correspondingly the complementary motions that are supposed to meet in the middle are not yet true complements or absolute disjuncts of form. What remains to be done is that the change of the content or its variation has to be understood in the sense of absolute individualising and its principle, the μεταβολή. Only in this way, i.e. in absolute form, was it possible to know how *individual* cognition in truth knows itself and *for that reason truly* knows the *other* of cognition. As the last residuum of external reflection and hence of bad subjectivity, the presupposition of abstract otherness of the

93 Ibid. 123.

94 Ibid. 122.

95 Ibid. 123.

content had to be discarded in order to attain absolutely free individuality, absolute form.

Hegel gave expression to his insight into the universal meaning of absolute-negative form and its more precise structure for the first time in the *Phenomenology*. It was still new then, for he only gained it towards the end of his time in Jena.⁹⁶ It is there in his first great masterpiece that we find the liberation from external reflection happening through pushing finite inversion to the extreme, to infinite inversion.⁹⁷ This is what made it possible for Hegel to present systematically the death of 'natural knowledge' or of finite determination within absolute form, which as individual was always silently assumed.⁹⁸ What emerged in this way was a free speech that knows the infinitely self-conscious world and, without an abstract beyond, utters it individualised. Cognition is in this way as free speech simultaneously the freedom of what is uttered, and only as this equivalence to freedom can absolute truth be understood. This insight into the "science of absolute form", as Hegel calls his *Logic*, is presented in finished, as we might say, implemented form. A logic understood in this way seeks at the same time to be the knowledge and the absolute actuality of the spoken language.

2 On the Way to the Predicate

a) *Reality of Perception*

Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories had to show that:

96 On the dating of the new conception cf. also W. Bonsiepen, *Der Begriff der Negativität in den Jenaer Schriften Hegels, Hegel-Studien* suppl. 16, Bonn 1977, 81–124.

97 Examples of geometrical definition given above are not very useful to illustrate infinite inversion, because they rely on an essentially observably *persistent* middle, in contrast to which the concept remains just as essentially *external* (moreover the geometrically defined concepts 'in fact' cannot be presented in perception or cannot be 'adequately' drawn). Hegel understands 'the admiration for mathematical proof' as the 'recalcitrant dissatisfaction' about the fact that construction in fact does *not* achieve the 'transition' into difference (cf. GW VII, 117 f.).

98 'Natural knowledge' (n.b. the already quoted text in TW11, 372 f.) is obviously not abstractly negated, which could only produce natural non-knowing or even natural madness, instead, as already occasionally emphasised, it is totalised and treated as a moment of absolute knowing. Philosophy does not deny that there is 'something' there when it seeks to direct attention to the logical limit of finite inversion; it denies this the less as it in fact treats 'something' as a category. But then one important point here is that what is not 'something', that from which 'something' must yet emerge, must also be grasped in its freedom from finitude.

all possible perceptions, hence also everything that can ever reach empirical consciousness, i.e. all appearances of nature according to their connection stand under the categories.⁹⁹

Perception is hence, despite all positivistic attempts to abbreviate Kant's philosophy, neither in general something abstractly immediate, nor specifically an immediate communication from the imagined external world. For Kant it is instead only through subjective synthesis possible and even synthetic at all. This is no obstacle to it being intuitable; for:

is itself already the *unity of synthesis* of the manifold outside or inside us, hence also a *connection* that has to accord with everything in space or time that is supposed to be imagined as determinate, *a priori* as condition of the synthesis of all *apprehension* already given *with* (not *within*) these perceptions simultaneously.¹⁰⁰

It would be hasty to assert, as Kant himself supposedly does, that one would have to proceed from a generally subjective "modification" of the immediate and then consider more closely how this would be composed—about which perhaps the physiology of perception or even the psychology of perception might offer some elucidation. But in the *transcendental* concept of perception, it is certainly not about which *representations* arise from something called perception and claim natural scientific *objectivity* in e.g. the named disciplines. The only reason they speak at all is due to the general manner of speaking about a something as of something other than the transcendental philosophy, in which respect the concept of perception only enters the field of view as a *moment* in the mediation of the determination of something, a moment that gains its determination in the logic of experience and not—as in those sciences—*through perception*.

The determinateness of perception according to Kant lies in that it is a 'representation accompanied by sensation',¹⁰¹ or as it can also be described, it constitutes a 'consciousness' 'in which simultaneously there is sensation'.¹⁰² Perception for Kant is initially the unity of heterogeneous things, namely that of concept-free sensuous affection on the one hand and of the general medium

99 CpR B 164 f.

100 Ibid. B 161.

101 Ibid. B 147.

102 Ibid. B 207. Cf. further AA VIII, 217: 'The consciousness of an empirical observation is called perception'.

of the concepts, of consciousness on the other. These moments are in terms of their “content” necessarily external to and can hence in no way replace each other. But then they are also *connected* in perception—even if, as is clear, *this* connection is not the *logical* one, for the sake of whose possibility according to Kant it must rise all the way up to the transcendental apperception. At first then, we have to look at what kind of connection it can be in which a sensation and a consciousness belong together in perception.

Perception refers to external objects, *because* the two moments joined in it are mutually external and underivably separate. It however is clearly “internal”, namely fundamentally understandable. Already the older theory of “inner perception”—which goes all the way back to Augustine and through which alone external perception first became meaningful—attempted to encompass the hiatus between the externality and interiority of perception. Now on the question as to how then “external” and ‘internal’ perception are supposed to be “equivalent” to each other, the first problem keeps on cropping up. This can be generally described by the logical opposition of an external mediation-free and, as such, immediate moment and an internal, reflexive and in that mediating moment. In the *unity* of this opposition, whose possibility is being questioned, the external has gained a *form* through the power of which it is *for another*, just as the inside or the reflection has gained a *content* with which that reflection is *by another*. Moreover through the form the external has become something, in general “matter” (*res*), just as through the content the inside has attained determination (reality). This is how for Kant perception has the function of imparting original determination to thinking, as it obviously in general is a *middle term*. From these simple considerations alone, it is clear that in Kant there can be no fundamental difference between concept and reality.¹⁰³ The sometimes tortuous discussions as to why it is then that “reality” is a category and which thus could belong to the concept, as a rule come down to questions posed falsely. That perception however in general can be a “carrier” of determination, again logically looked at, is grounded in the conjunction that it is *within itself doubled*, plural, dispersed or sensual, while *simultaneously* being the unity of this plurality, which precisely because it is unity (of internals), can also be comprehended in concepts.

¹⁰³ H. Holzhey in his study *Das philosophische Realitätsproblem* in J. Kopper and W. Marx (eds.), *200 Jahre Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hildesheim 1981, 79–111, e.g. 85, believes he has found such a problem in Kant. In fact there is no proceeding from the concept and ‘going out’ in Kant, because the concept would already contain the reality (cf. 103). The concept ‘relates’ it and *all* externality to reality in terms of form.

To say that perception is comprehended means it is in consciousness. It appears that this does not lie in the Kantian presupposition immediately, according to which in perception sensation merely ‘accompanies’ consciousness.¹⁰⁴ Still the other formulations mentioned are clear enough in showing that sensation apart from its relation to the consciousness of perception is not something indeterminately other. Neither is there any danger that, because perception is “immanent to consciousness”, we might lose our grip on the external. It is originally grounded in the logical constitution of perception and “inheres” precisely *as* “existing” in the process of understanding. It is the external of its consciousness within consciousness. Once again this cannot mean that it would be “only thought of in this way”, as if it were something external and not the external itself. This is clear already from the fact that although the unity of sensation and consciousness in perception is certainly made conscious, it cannot be consciously *made*. This however makes the unity itself ambiguous. It is given in perception *and* it is the given as understandable or as in consciousness. That *and* is where the problem of the unity of what is heterogeneous in perception, and with that the question as to the original location of empirical determination, reaches its sharpest form.

The unity of perception as understandable says that it has a *meaning* in consciousness. Against the standard of transcendental and not only logical content in contrast the isolated sides of perception, sensibility and representation, each taken for itself, mean *nothing*. One cannot even say that they refer to each other, such that sensibility already prefigures its concept or that a concept demands precisely this particular sensation.¹⁰⁵ In general terms, as a concept of a colour the logical representation “red” clearly analytically contains the extension and hence also spatial intuition; but that a *specific* section of space is to be determined as “red” lies only in the unity of perception itself. Hence the form of perception *a priori* of space can certainly in general be constrained but what does not lie in that possibility is precisely which quantum of it is capable of a *real* determination. If however a quantum of space and the representation

104 Naturally ‘in consciousness’ does not mean that consciousness would be objectifiable as may happen in e.g. a natural scientific approach. For this reason in one context which in a certain sense can be set parallel to our approach, R. Reininger has suggested that we not say representations are ‘in consciousness’ but are ‘as “conscious”’ (cf his *Metaphysik der Wirklichkeit*, Vienna and Leipzig 1931, 26).

105 What can be anticipated ‘in an unusual sense’ according to Kant is not the *quale* of sensation but its form of appropriateness to the whole perception relation, its *character as moment* in the same, and this according to its possible *degree*. Sensation does not insinuate itself absolutely into understanding, it does so instead in the form of a divisible scale (cf. CPr B 207 ff./A 166 ff.).

of the colour red are *factually* conjoined in perception, then in this union both the form of intuition and the concept have moved out of their universality and are instead *individualised* to this so that they have a real meaning in the relation to each other. Analytically the relata include the possibility that they can also mean something else than that to which they are factually determined, which however only means that their respective formal universality remains conserved for reflection. But then what happens here is that in reflection they present the other of the individual perception reality but not the external other as a moment of reality and thus also of the individuality of perception; instead what we have here is the other of their determination in relation to which it is known to be devoid of reality. The form of perception repels as the *unity* of many, or of content, the *mere* form, into meaninglessness—always in relation to real determination. It turns out once again that precisely in this perception has determination and, which means the same thing, is out there by an external something in general, that their isolated sides relieve themselves of their universality and, respectively in relation to the other side, *are for themselves particularised*.

In perception, then, the understanding, the inner, is external to itself, i.e. by the external something, just as the external is external to itself, namely in understanding. At the same time however the inner is within itself, i.e. understanding in general, while again the external is within itself, or purely external, i.e. it is *as* (sensual) dispersion. This four-fold total shape of perception is, as we have seen, as a whole simultaneously *given* and *reflected* in “intuition” *and* in the “concept”, or this conjunction, this *and* itself is *being* and *set* and is therefore a *conjunction* that is related to one immanent to itself and hence is an *and* that is differentiated within itself. The *and* of perception switches within itself between its two sides; it is metabolic form and precisely in this it is individual unity superior to the unity of, say, a mere (logical) representation, whose determination is only a simple identity with itself that is analytically free of contradictions. In the *and* of perception in contrast the contradiction is expressed. *Which is why* Kant says that ‘the power of imagination’ is already ‘a necessary ingredient of perception itself’.¹⁰⁶ It lies in perception as a spontaneous ‘function of synthesis’,¹⁰⁷ a unifying activity that clearly cannot have its own content but instead constitutes the *condition* that perception can present a content in the sense of real determination and—looked at in the broader context—can offer it to the making of experience. With respect to the power of imagination

106 CpR A 120 note.

107 Ibid.

perception is hence simultaneously conditioned; Kant's hypothetical form can also be presented in it. Thus if we do not positivise the power of imagination within the framework of a faculty psychology but instead understand it with Kant (in the quotation above) as a synthetic *function*, as form activity, then it must be said here that the power of imagination is the essential condition of the whole perception but it is at the same the unconditioned, not further reducible condition, and hence the overcoming of the whole relation of perception explicit to itself in the moments given. We had a similar result already for the I as the highest condition of thinking in Kant.¹⁰⁸ This parallelism is not coincidental, for giving the logical form of the completed condition relation to the *and* of perception that is differentiated within itself, to the individuality of the switching of intuition and concept in the unity of the power of imagination as a synthesis function, means giving it the form of (Kantian) subjectivity—the form in which the subject shows itself to be the power over the predicate that it first sets (“If *A*, then *B*”). By means of the power of imagination conceived in this way as its highest condition, perception is then also “in the midst of the I” or, as we have said in *consciousness*. It is their *logical constitution* that lets them be there and nowhere else, and any logically grounded siting of what is perceived anywhere else than “in consciousness” is philosophically speaking necessarily inadequate. Any other grounding would have to refer back to intuition, which is itself a moment of the whole relation of perception, so the question naturally arises as to how it enters into consciousness. That perception is “I-like” may not be simply imputed to it but must be demonstrated in terms of its *concept*; it reveals itself to be inherent to this in its hypothetical form.

Since it is by virtue of the *form* of the power of imagination that perception is conscious¹⁰⁹ and in itself presents an inside, the question arises of how to make this inner as such precise in terms of its relation to that “other” inner, which we have already gotten to know as a moment of four-fold differentiated perception. More precisely a double inner of perception also emerged, one in which it was external to itself, by the something lending it reality. Perception also turned out to be as such in understanding, not simply something but something *clear*, self-showing, understandable. If the first interiority mediated the real determination or meaning that perception in each case has, then one can call the second the *activity of meaning* that perception in each case *is*. This concept of the activity of meaning is grasped purely philosophically only then

108 Cf. 77 above.

109 At the same time it is clear why it cannot be consciously produced: the moment of unconditionality belongs to the power of imagination, thus to the *individual* switching of intuition and concept into each other.

when from it all something, indeed even the relation to something itself—as if it were about the activity of meaning *of* something or even *for* something—is excluded. At the very least, it is a moment in perception only insofar as it designates the pure reflexivity of the inner, just as this *is there* and does not contain the relation to another or, as will have to be demonstrated in another context, contains nothing that *is other* than the activity of meaning. In confrontation with all specific meaning, the moment of the activity of meaning itself is, as indeed it is also in its philosophical isolation, infinite; for it is in no specific, meaningful relation an other. It is always purely *itself*. Nevertheless it is capable of infinite real meaning and determination and this precisely because these are no others to it. It is infinitely synthetic. Thus this is the moment in perception in which the power of imagination, which simultaneously constitutes the unity of perception as a whole, “emerges” in perception as a moment at all. But then the power of imagination is in no sense divided into a unity of perception and “beside that also” a moment in its own right; instead this moment is simultaneously not only moment, but, by virtue of its form, also the whole relation, the inner, which, as the infinite potentiality of relating another, is itself the switching into the other but in identical clarity: the total relation as a *motion of the moments*, which thus in fact first makes of them moments. With respect to the moment of determination in perception then, the power of imagination is the *universal* of the relation, indeed that as true universal, i.e. capable of determination, because it presents in itself the moment of the relation to determination *in repulsion* from it.

The individuality of the switching of intuition and concept within them makes perceptions necessarily *singular* forms; as determination of something outside, their singular determination contains no relation to another determination, which is also why no perception is on its own related to another perception. Therefore propositions of perception are, even when they encompass *many* cases of perceptions, always only *particular* propositions and never universal ones. The intuitions contained in perception are for Kant different from logical ‘individual representations’.¹¹⁰ Neither is the constitutive connection to individuality eliminated by the subsumption of many singles under an external universal concept, as may happen in judgments of perception. Even when perceptions stand under the condition of a synthetic function, they are conditioned still in relation to the material aspect of sensation, individualising what is *only* dispersed and hence, according to its determination,

110 Cf. Kant, CpR B 136 note; also B 40: according to Kant intuitions contain infinitely many representations ‘in themselves’ but concepts only ‘under them’. Cf. *De mundi sensibilis* 11, § 12 (AA 11, 397).

not derivable from the condition, which is valid only for the *form* of determination. This is why the perceptions have a predicative value at all. Now in terms of the representation of this matter, the content is the outer (sensual existence), while the form of the content is simultaneously content of consciousness or subjective, thus the content of the perception is *appearance*. As appearance, the outer is but outside itself, not by it *itself*; immediately as Kant has it, the outer as appearance presents its externality *quantitatively*.¹¹¹ For Kant then, 'when an appearance is given to us', and precisely for that reason, we are 'still completely free as to how we wish to judge the matter from that'.¹¹² The predicative value of perception is not as such an objective predicate, rather it remains under the hypothetical form completely on the side of conditionality, and is thus subsumed by the subject of the entire relation. The subject is in the most universal terms transcendental apperception and as such is the condition of objectivity in *propositions of experience*. Experience however is the form under whose condition the singular of perception and the particular of the perception proposition can be universalised. It is the determining form of the material of perception; that is logically more precisely: such that experience is form because it is *unity* of the execution and incapable of being a plural, while perception under its unity is material, because it is in its own right plurality, dispersion devoid of relation; in short, it is the aggregate of manifold perception. For this reason, Kant determined experience in pregnant terms as 'knowledge through connected perceptions'.¹¹³ Indeed in terms of form, the connecting happens also in the proposition of perception; there however as the aggregation *external* to the perceptions, which immediately has double meaning. It is the aggregation in a *determinate* subject, not in *the* subjectivity strictly speaking but as such it has at most "private validity", which knows itself as such, i.e. which knows that *other* subjects are *external* to it. Then again it is in terms of form but *logical* connection, i.e. only internal to the understanding, not that a ground was available for going out of this immanence and regarding the connection as in its own terms *objective*.¹¹⁴ The latter is supposed to happen in propositions of experience that presuppose

111 Kant, CPJ B 84: 'Appearance, therefore also a quantum'; also *Metaphysics* Pölitz: 'Each appearance is thus a quantum of the continuum' (AA XXVIII, 204), further esp. CpR B 203 f./A 163.

112 Kant, Prol. § 13, note III (AA IV, 290).

113 Kant, CpR B 161; cf. Prol. § 5 (AA IV, 275). On the unity of experience cf. above 55-58, as well as 60 note 37. In the *Opus postumum* Kant explicitly rejects the plural use of the word 'experience' (cf. AA XXII, 471); experience means 'absolute subjective unity of the manifold of representations of sense' (AA XXII, 97).

114 Kant, Prol. §§ 18-20.

the switch—Kant speaks of ‘transformation’¹¹⁵—in that form in which, no longer aggregated externally in the perceptions, they are taken hold of *by their insides* and from out of these insides are then determined to a unity that is simultaneously universality and according to our expression introduced above is genetically defined totality.

Exactly what is going on here with this inside of perception has already emerged for us. It is the inside of the power of imagination, or of the internally differentiated “and”, containing both its unity and its own specification. It is in this inside where the genetic definition of the totality of experience begins; the singularity is supposed to be turned into this inside, as when Kant demands that in objective determination ‘perception is related to everything else according to the rules of the experience totality’.¹¹⁶ For the representation of positive totalities, as Hume for instance did it with sceptical intent, that expression ‘to everything else’ will always be objectionable; for ‘everything’ is quite simply not ‘something’, and for that reason also not positive. The affirmative use of the totality concept in the critical philosophy is however not to be taken in the sense of its capacity for being rendered positive. When, as Kant understands experience, *two* perceptions are related under a specific category ‘according to the rules of the experience totality’, then *all* perceptions are related to that, because categorising is the one and only context of all perceptions. There is no question of arbitrariness in the use of the categories, rather the thinking here is of the *pure subjectivity* as the highest and itself unconditioned condition of all predicative setting as determinate. The result of the transcendental deduction we are proceeding from, namely that even perception is not possible without the presupposition of categorial form, looked at from the standpoint of perception, means that, instead of the inside relating itself to itself or of the pure *activity of meaning*, this now has the moment to which not only it as a whole ‘turns’, and for that reason is in consciousness but which it turns to in such a way that it becomes meaningful in *all* consciousness. Perception is in its own right motion into unconditioned clarity.¹¹⁷ In this the relative determination emerges from out of its own functions, the determination it represents as external appearance, and is taken up into a motion of objective integration, into a motion that according to Kant is an ‘activity of the subject’, which, since it happens ‘through the productive power of imagination’, is the

115 Ibid. §§ 18 (AA IV, 297).

116 Kant, CpR B 523/A 495.

117 In the *Opus postumum* Kant for that reason calls perceptions occasionally also ‘subjective moving forces in intuition’ (AA XXII, 469).

absolute motion individualising the experience totality that belongs 'to the transcendental philosophy'.¹¹⁸

b) *Categories and the Context of Experience*

Kant's concept of nature in material respect is that of the 'summation' or of the 'whole' of connected objects, or with reference to the gnoseological status of the objects, that of the sum of connected appearances. The 'capacity for connecting' and the 'intelligence' as which the understanding knows itself are for Kant the same, for it is more precisely the moment of 'spontaneity' in the connecting which 'enables [me] ... to call myself *intelligence*'.¹¹⁹ The I is essentially the '*actus* of determining', i.e. the inserting of a *relation* of experience into appearances that are in themselves unrelated, or also into the manifold of the ideal forms of intuition.¹²⁰ In fact Kant claims distinct categorial forms in which determination is articulated and derives them 'metaphysically' from the table of judgments. Holding to the table of categories is not a bad idea given that in a proposition, as of course the copula says, the subject term *is* in the predicate term and hence real predication does happen. For Kant the judgment is 'the action by which given representations first become knowledge of an object'.¹²¹ This makes it a *middle term* between the *faculty* of cognition in general and the objects set necessarily in determinate determination; it is the 'intermediate knowledge of an object, therefore the representation of a representation of the same'.¹²² Its forms could for that reason be supposed to be at least forms of the categorial middle terms. Kant goes a step further beyond that

118 Kant, Cf. CpR B 154 f. with note. The treatment of transcendental motion in terms of the logic of experience will be concerned to exclude its objectification; such a fate is not always avoided by the otherwise, it should be said, partially accurate remarks of F. Kaulback in his *Der philosophische Begriff der Bewegung*, Cologne and Graz 1965 (cf. e.g. 143 ff.).

119 Kant, CpR B 158 note.


120 Cf. *ibid.* In a wider context it would have to be shown how, from the standpoint of the function of intuition in experience, a new concept of the *concept* is prepared, which no longer comprehends its content through subsumption under it, encompassing it instead 'within itself' (cf. above note 110). Of course Kant lays great weight on the strict opposition between *intuition* and *concept*, if occasionally turns of phrase can be found in his writings which are not completely consistent with that opposition (cf. CpR B 195/A 156, where space and time are called immediately 'concepts'; in Prol. § 39 they are called 'pure elementary concepts of sensibility' (AA IV, 323)). It is also true that Kant's intuition forms contain even infinite-external manifold elements within them, and hence are not self-determining but require external determination.

121 Kant, MAdN AA IV, 475 note.

122 Kant, CpR B 93/A 68.

to claim the deduction of the determinate categories is ‘extremely easy’, ‘because it can be executed with a single syllogism from the precisely determined definition of a *judgment* in general’.¹²³ We take the view that Kant here is not claiming too much and will now proceed briefly to carry out the deduction of the determinate categories.

If the *definition* of the judgment or proposition is that it is an ‘action by which given representations first become knowledge of an object’, then we have here two extremes to be distinguished. First ‘given representations’ that are *not knowledge* in the sense of objectivity, and second the action effecting the knowledge of the *object*, which in the judgment clearly is indicated by the copula. Looked at logically, the first extreme is that of the *plurality* of the representations and, since they are not knowledge, that of their externality, materiality, sensibility or however one wants to put it—the words themselves are of no great importance here. The second extreme is that of the objective unity effected by the *action*, which naturally is merely form activity, thus the extreme at the same time of the inside, of subjectivity (as form of reflexive self-referentiality) or of intelligibility. Unity through action is *unification*. This unification happens between the many as its “as” of unity. If we now take the three elements of the definition of the proposition—the many, or the outside as such, the unity, or the inside of form, what is reflected-in-itself as such, and the “as” of mediation, the Kantian copula—then there are exactly four modes of joining these elements together:



It is easy to see that these four combinations of the moments of the proposition express the titles of the Kantian table of categories. In relation to the terms of quantity and quality one can add that the inside, which by virtue of its reflexivity is determined as a moment of relation, is completely external to quantity, while under the term quality, the thinking here is of a simple *connection*—itself not yet related in the inside—of the relation-like to what is essentially devoid of relation, which simple or *singular* connection expresses the

¹²³ Kant, MAdN AA IV, 475 note.

Kantian presupposition of intuition as a single representation, while quantity treats intuition as a manifold, thus one could say immanent.¹²⁴ Concerning the more precise differentiation of the titles into categories, this is no less easy to present. One only has to recall that, in the logic of synthetic form, the example which for him is κατ' ἐξοχήν the proposition, Kant sees the triadic form of the relation of condition and must see that: the condition confronts its other, the conditioned, as dichotomy but then sets this other up as also *its* conditioned or as derivable from out of it, which derivation relation, as the quintessence of the whole, constitutes the third moment.¹²⁵ This is why the formal requirement obtains to give three moments under each title. The material aspect of each of the titles has to stand in the second position, namely that of the conditioned, as is also required by Kant's logic of synthetic form, in which the conditioned is always the set content of the form-subject. The material aspect of dispersion as such is however *plurality*, which in order to be capable of being thought already *presupposes* the form of unity; for plurality means, when it is actually plurality and not merely indifference, *many ones*. Now the summation of a unity that presents itself as plurality is totality. Moreover the material aspect of the quality term is not, as one might perhaps think, reality or affirmation but negation. This is because according to our determination of quality via the "outside as inside", the essential aspect of this title is the *negation* of the outside as such. This entails *presupposing* that the outside is form, i.e. set in the first moment of the title, while the concept of a positive whose content it is to be negation, thus the derivation of negation from position, leads on to the concept of *limit*. The material aspect of the inside or of what is relation-like as external is, clearly, an external connection that does not reach out to encompass the relata but only relates "to" them—*causality* or the form of external necessity in the hypothetical proposition, which form connection however presupposes

124 This can make Hegel's critique of presupposing intuition clear; he sought to demonstrate, especially in the *Being* sections of his logics, that there cannot be a simple connection that is not already relation-like. Cf. above 70.

125 Cf. above 46. The deduction by K. Reich, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, Berlin 1948², claims to be able to proceed for the most part analytically, because he is not engaged in a deduction of *categories*. Reich goes so far as to regard the transformation of given intuitions into concepts also as an analytical operation (cf. 34). We on the other hand proceed on the view that the proposition must be treated as a synthetic form, and hence is also capable of deriving all twelve forms (not only ten as Reich claims). Indeed Reich's four 'quadrants' (28 ff.) are, with some modifications, compatible with our four moments. On the other hand we see no pressing necessity to include the 'I think' among these moments; the term 'inside' is for us sufficient and has the advantage of being so universal that the quadrants cannot only be executed on the I but just as well on perception or also on appearance, as we will briefly demonstrate in what follows.

the conception of necessity itself as form or the conception of the categorical form of substance. Still the exclusively inner (formal) necessity that externalises itself and gives a content to the other, connecting in that two mutually external extremes to each other, i.e. itself and its other, thus makes it disjunctive unity or *community* in the relation. The material aspect finally of the relation connecting to itself is its *actuality*, in the Kantian sense the categorical “that it is”, absolute position, which however in formal reflection *presupposes* the *possibility* of itself and for the summing presentation of a possibility as form of an actuality may make claim to the *necessity* concept; for in what is necessary all externality of the relation is discarded, including that with respect to itself, which on the last level was the “alienation” of form and content of the relation as possibility and actuality.

Since mediation in Kant is essentially “as”, in the experience relation what is real in perception does not cease to be appearance but indeed is as such confirmed. In fact it is only objectively determinate appearance, or for the fourth title ‘appearance as appearance’, because this title now expresses the *meaning* of perception as a meaning which sets the “as” as *appearing* itself.¹²⁶ The four moments of the category titles are similarly necessarily presentable in terms of the concept of appearance, for appearance is only the summarised totality of a proposition and logically the *same* as this.¹²⁷ Appearance is first something as outside itself or in general quantum, as we have already seen. It is further this something as *realitas phaenomenon* for another or *quale*. Thirdly, it is relation within itself, namely on the most general level between noumenon and phenomenon, which however are imagined as mutually external and irreducible with respect to each other, that is as relation external to itself. But then fourthly, it is, as already stated above, appearing itself, the *sylogism* of the three moments noumenon-phenomenon-understanding into the *actuality* of appearance. The problem that even objectively determinate appearance initially leaves remaining is this: as *determinate* appearance it necessarily in its own terms marks the plurality of appearances, and with that the externality of the appearing elements with respect to each other. What remains is the problem of the *sum* of the appearing elements or nature as presented as the context *among* appearances. According to Kant this context is mediated by the *principles* of pure understanding, thus by not only general but by the

126 For the modal term cf. just the title ‘phenomenology’ in the execution of the categorial systematics in the fundamental concept of the empirical, namely motion, in Kant: MAdN (AA IV, 554). There Kant speaks again of ‘transformation’, in this case of ‘appearance into experience’ (AA IV, 555).

127 Cf. on this above 29.

transcendentally most general judgments, not immediately by the categories, which indeed have their application as such only in the single experience proposition. The *principle* distinguishes itself from the proposition in that it has neither its *ground* nor its *object* outside itself. It is, as one could say, the abbreviation of a syllogism, or in Kant's own usage of the term "principle" as the first premiss of a syllogism, of a syllogism of experience that is.

If principles are supposed to make even the plurality of appearances objectively determinable, then it has to be required of them that they contain a concept of the externality of the appearances with respect to each other. One quickly realises that this concept of the externality that the principles presuppose, and which they make use of for totalising appearances to a general objectivity, is the respective *schema*. If it is possible to rise above schematism out of the particularisation of appearances to their possible general form, then Kant's knowledge of experience disposes over a moment that makes it superior to Leibniz's knowledge of the monad. Kant's own remarks on Leibniz show also that this superiority was very important to him. In Leibniz a gradual distinction of the knowledge 'types' according to their degree of clarity served to maintain the *lex continui* also in the domain of the *cognitio*.¹²⁸ It is the (negative) unity of the monad that requires it to be able to present all its modes of self-clarification in perceptions as modifications of the *one*, qualitatively identical relation of original clarity, which is what the monad itself is. The monad is the complete mediation of all that is "in" it or of what is "for it" but this, what is within it, is simply everything, and more precisely everything under determinate modifications of the "*point de vue*", which however cannot condition any real opposition to what is knowable, no "untruth". For Kant in contrast it is important to bring sensibility into opposition to understanding:

'since it is obviously transcendental and does not merely concern the form of clarity or unclarity but their origin and content' the 'difference between sensibility and the intellectual' can only be taken such 'that we by means of that first form do not know the constitution of the things-in-themselves merely with unclarity but that we have no knowledge of them at all'.¹²⁹

The superiority of the Kantian proposal for the knowledge of experience over Leibniz's "intellection" of the appearances¹³⁰ is precisely this, that cognition

128 Cf. e.g. Leibniz's *Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis* of 1684 (Gerhardt IV, 422 ff.).

129 Kant, CpR B 61 f./A 44; cf. the parallel statement in his Prol. § 13 (A IV, 290).

130 Cf. Kant, CpR B 327/A 271.

with the moment of sensibility or receptivity¹³¹ *contains* a non-knowing or a relation external to it. Leibniz sought:

to know the inner constitution of the things by comparing all objects only with the understanding and the separated formal concepts of its thinking.¹³²

He remained confined to the simple principle of mediation—of the ‘windowless monad’—and was able to grasp the difference between those to be mediated only in external reflection, to which belong e.g. the principle of pre-established harmony as well as the comparison contained in the statement that all monads know the same things, indeed even the assumption that there are many monads at all.¹³³ Leibniz’s concepts, which according to Kant are not capable of externality, thus have no ‘position in intuition.’¹³⁴ In contrast the knowledge of experience under principles which are schematised in their own right, i.e. which refer to externals, are precisely characterised by the fact that things in this way can also be known as plurality or dispersion (in intuition) and not only be compared within the understanding. Nevertheless *the* experience is a unity; a unity however which has overcome and incorporated the difference into itself, not the unity of a reflection distinct from the object.

Sensibility as a simple connection to externals is external to itself. The immediate expression of this situation in Kant lies in the fact that he has to introduce *two*¹³⁵ senses. The relation between ‘external’ and ‘internal sense’ in Kant touches also on the question of schematism, as the provision of the medium term between mutually external appearances, and the immanence of the process of understanding. In the literature, there has been a preference in relation to this imbalance in favour of the inner sense and as a result the question has

131 *Receptivité* means in Leibniz a passive *potential* in the sense of Aristotle’s νοῦς παθητικός, thus an active suffering, not simply a capacity for reception (cf. *Nouveaux essais* II, 21, 1).

132 Kant, CpR B 326/A 270.

133 ‘Leibniz compared ... the objects of sense as things in general merely in the understanding among themselves’, Kant, CpR B 327/A 271. On the ‘pre-established harmony’ cf. B 330 f./A 274 f.

134 Kant, CpR B 327/A 271.

135 More precisely there is *one* inner sense but there are several external senses, cf. Kant, *Anthropologie* § 24 (AA VII, 161) and §§ 15 ff. MAdN AA IV, 476 (the object, external nature, is also one such ‘external sense’). ‘Nature’, as the sum total of what is external to the subject, is for Kant only knowable as *determinate* nature, i.e. either as such of the inner sense (in psychology) or as that of the external senses (in physics); in the singular, i.e. as not already showing the absence of relation by itself, nature is only a ‘word’ or also an ‘idea’ (cf. MAdN AA IV, 468 f.).

arisen as to whether it is not the case that even a priority of principles of the senses starting from the inner sense has to be assumed.¹³⁶ Kant's criterion for the greater weight of the the form of time over the intuition of space is this, that *all* sensuous objects are referred to time as the 'correlatum of the determination of an object',¹³⁷ while only certain objects of sense have a spatial extension. Time is the form of *total* or self-totalising sensibility:

There is only a sum containing all our representations, namely the internal sense, and the form of that *a priori* is time.¹³⁸

Time is for that reason 'the pure picture ... of all objects of the senses ... in general';¹³⁹ whatever we regard as objectively determined, we determine *ipso facto* also in time. Kant does not 'know' this from experience, for time and space are not 'objects' of experience; he knows it rather from the logic of experience, as this necessarily structures itself on the principle of hypothetical form. This form realises the subject *as setting* the predicate, not however the sphere of the predicate as such, which is indeed immediately presupposed as opposing the subject. *Space* determined as immanent absence of relation stands in opposition to the possibility of being set.¹⁴⁰ When Kant abandons Newton's concept of a positively given absolute space, this is identical with the proposal of an intuition of an inner absence of relation, which is fundamental to Kant's

136 In earlier literature there is a tendency to order the external senses beneath the internal sense. R. Reininger, *Kants Lehre vom inneren Sinn und seine Theorie der Erfahrung*, Vienna and Leipzig 1900. P. Baumanns in *Kants Begriff des inneren und äußeren Sinns in the Akten des 5. Int. Kant-Kongresses*, ed. G. Funke, Bonn 1981, 91–102, wants to claim for the inner sense the status of 'elementary sensibility' as opposed to space as a 'complexion of time' (98 f.), where the focus is on the unity of sensibility in general (97). With observations on the concepts of affection and feeling, Baumanns indirectly emphasises the requirement that a unity of the two senses, for which he draws upon the *logical* distinction between principle and principled (99), cannot be presented without reference to the synthesis of the two senses in the *concept of motion*.

137 Kant, CpR B 184/A 145.

138 Ibid. B 194/A 155.

139 Ibid. B 182/A 142.

140 Conceptual *differentness* demands in intuition spatial presentation: 'We are not capable of thinking a difference without simultaneously spatially schematising it' (J. Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, Berlin 1969, 13 f.). B. Liebrucks, *Sprache und Bewußtsein*, vol. 4, Frankfurt am Main, 1968, attempted to present spatial intuition as fundamentally rooted in the linguistic-logical relation in his interpretation of the transcendental aesthetic: 'The inner person does not point in space but points such that the pointing is the articulation of the conceptual quality of difference into a spatial quality of difference'; space is a 'result of language', 'produced by speech' (334).

concept of space. Space is thus a critical conception against the understanding's unambiguous determination of something 'as' something; it releases what is simply determinate, what ought to refer to it in opposition to determinate others, from the apparent finality of its determination and leaves it instead to the making of the experience of it.¹⁴¹ In contrast then, time is the form of the performance of experience or of the transition from subject to predicate in hypothetical form, which happens *to the extent* that the predicate is something determinate 'as objective' through experience, and this means that the independence of the predicate sphere is *negated* and the externality of space is transformed into the *inside* of the empirical. The negating force of time constitutes its advantage over space in terms of the logic of experience. Already the individuality of perception, the μεταβολή of *sensuous* and *concept* into each other and their mutual particularisation in that, contains as the moment of motion the possibility of explication in terms of time. Perceptions of the inner sense on the other hand are in no way susceptible to spatial interpretation. In the μεταβολή of appearances in experience, at least according to Kant, the presentation of made experience in the proposition of experience is in any case stigmatised with respect to time, for it is relations of time to which the principle in its application must be able to refer back. The "is" of the proposition of experience is always an "is in time relation to", which however means: it has the form of the performance of the subject-predicate connection such that, as in a performance, it contains the *antinomical* extreme. We have seen that in the proposition of experience, subject and predicate have to be opposed functions in order to express transcendental reality. Similarly this makes it possible for this performance to be graphically presented *free of contradictions*.

The *one* single experience moves in Kantian terms as an ideal subject through potentially infinitely many predicates, with which it gains determinate objective reality. The pivotal point of their motion is their own reflexive interiority as the moment in which *meaning* as such is found. Experience 'turns' as a structure of reason within itself. But since for Kant it *also* has an outside, its turning remains generally referred to a predicate sphere and does not generate

141 In *spatial* terms what is objectively determinate is capable of plurality, just as one does not eradicate a concept through its own division but only partially negates it; the space judgment is as it were singly negative. On the other hand the *time* determination of an object is an infinite proposition in Kant's sense; for the *time limit* A is only a limit between A and -A. The 'smallest time part' is merely limit, and as this, it is nothing 'single' (positive); cf. esp. Kant, AA VIII, 202 f. This holds in Kant also for the smallest part of space; but it is important to note that spatial determination is one of *extension*, while time determination in contrast is one of *limit*.

it. In the turning of experience the predicate is only *modified*. The being in which the moved experience, as in its (proposition) relation to the predicate, or better: in which experience sets this as its self, is *modal being*. Experience ‘turns’ in *modality*. The schema of modality is the *sum total of time*.¹⁴² What can be said in different modalities are differences in the realisation of this sum in relation to the predicate sphere. What modalities in this way in general determine is the *context* of experience, the strictly non-positivisable condition of the generation of the positive reality of experience. In context, experience is referred to itself, it is for itself or “individual”. Contextuality of experience immediately anticipates the whole, undivided idea; but it is refracted by the abstractly presupposed predicate sphere such that the mediation is not pure idea, *remaining* instead merely idea given in the finitude of time. Nevertheless the modalities gather together what is dispersed in time into the unity of experience; we will call them fundamental categories of *contextualisation*. As such they are immediately idealising terms. Just as in a time sum not only all time but with that also the overcoming of time is set, so that in modal terms what is objectively determinate is not only the finite but immediately also something *meaningful*, something overcoming itself into the ideal infinity of the activity of meaning or of what inheres as being-related-within-itself. The modalising of appearance regarded “as determinate”, means that not only is appearance an appearing, this appearing as internal to itself, inside of the self, at least *in general*, is the *activity of meaning*, clarity, pure as such, the activity of understanding. The *refraction* of this clarity happens in Kantian terms in every determination into which it ought to shine; this is in Kant *qua* determination already finite determination and according to the restriction thesis—according to the function of the Kantian infinite proposition—it succumbs to what is essentially external, to the empirical, and can only be set as limited in time. Hegel saw clearly that the Kantian ‘*finitum non capax infiniti*!’ was only then to be superseded if the concept of *determination* could be conceived of as itself containing infinity. This means above all that the concept of limit is no longer taken as merely simply positive limit, but—as in Hegel’s infinite proposition—must be capable of being understood as internally differentiated, absolute limit, as limit of the individual itself. Kant’s ideal, single experience does not actually individualise itself in its determinations; it is merely finitely restricted by them. Nevertheless from the antinomy of the form of the idea and this restriction, it generates the

¹⁴² Cf. Kant, CpR B 184 f./A 144 f. Only from the *sum total of time* is it possible, under certain circumstances, to claim what Heidegger does for time in general, namely that ‘Kant claims the same essence predicates for both time and the ‘I think’ (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main 1973⁴, 186).

conception of *another* idea, which itself would be the setting of its limits. This is the 'idea *in individuo*'.

c) *Transcendental Ideal*

The true determination of the individual cannot be any concept external to it. A concept external in the absolute sense is one that is external to itself, divisible and as such overcoming individuality, a merely abstractly universal concept. Kant accommodates this by letting the concept of the individual be characterised through the totality moment of 'thorough determination'. In this he is basically following the determination of the school philosophy of *omnimoda determinatio*.¹⁴³ Even the CpR cannot do without the conception of thorough determination even if that thought is also, as Kant notes, 'even further than the idea' appears to be 'distanced from objective reality'.¹⁴⁴ Still the idea remains a rule for summarising propositions of experience, i.e. objective connections of subject and predicate functions, down to *one* concept, even if we know that this one concept of many objective connections is not itself presentable as a positive experience. The transcendental ideal of the thoroughly determinate ideal single has for its content the *predicate sphere* itself, the presupposition of the hypothetical form, together with the absolute *possibility* that *there are* predicates at all (the plurality of determination). The transcendental ideal considers according to Kant:

each thing still in relation to the total possibility, as the sum of all predicates of the things as such, and, by presupposing such as condition *a priori*, in this way it represents each and every thing as deriving its own possibility from the part it has in that total possibility.¹⁴⁵

Hypothetical form merely presupposes the content aspect as a moment of the conditioned, or from its own immediate difference. Indeed the ideal is the attempt to bring into view that content aspect itself in its own synthesis form in which it realises *itself*. In a broader framework, this recalls the complementarity of hypothetical and disjunctive judgments in the Jena Hegel, or the motions of the definition that run counter to each other. In his conception of the ideal, Kant links up to some extent with the (pre-critical) notion of the

¹⁴³ An individual is according to e.g. *Metaphysik Pölitz* (AA XXVIII, 560) that which 'is in itself thoroughly determinate'; cf. Kant, CpR B 604 f./A 576 and *passim*, also Chr. Wolff, *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia* §§ 226 ff.

¹⁴⁴ Kant, CpR B 596/A 568.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. B 600/A 572.

omnitude realitatis. Still it remains the case that the principle of 'thorough determination' relates to 'the content and not merely the logical form'. It is all about:

'a principle of synthesis of all predicates that should make the complete concept of a thing and not merely of the analytical representation', which principle 'contains ... a transcendental presupposition, ... namely, that of the material of *all possibility*, which *a priori* ought to contain the data to the *particular* possibility of each thing'.¹⁴⁶

Under this 'transcendental presupposition'—ultimately of the absolute predicate, the *ur-subiectum* of each disjunction of the possibility or determination—are 'not only predicates logically among each other but the thing itself with the sum of all possible predicates, transcendently compared'.¹⁴⁷

One can differentiate the 'that' of the absolute predicate, of the 'ur-concept', as Kant can say,¹⁴⁸ for the presentation of the form of its synthesis or of its self-mediation. The former refers back to the pre-critical problematic of the proof of God's existence and to the topic of the fourth antinomy.¹⁴⁹ In his *Einzig möglichen Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes*, Kant still wanted to infer from the (inner, Leibnizian) possibility of something to (one, whatever) existence in general, to the absolute position. Possibility means in the sense of the Leibnizian criterion 'thinkability'. But if only the determination presents a true disjunction, from the reflection of determination (reality) of the thinkable follows the transition to an immediate as third, which Kant understood as existence in general in the sense of the absolute position. Thus from the immediacy of mediation in this way is inferred the immediacy as

146 Ibid. B 600 f./A 572 f. That the 'thought of material ... totality as the highest prerequisite of our knowing' is relevant to the question of the 'synthetic judgments' was noted by H. Heimsoeth, *Transzendente Dialektik*, Berlin 1969, 428 f.

147 Ibid. B 601/A 573.

148 Ibid.

149 For the relation between the fourth antinomy and the transcendental ideal, which we will briefly discuss, cf. P. Baumanns, *Kants vierte Antinomie und das Ideal der reinen Vernunft* in *Kant-Studien* 79 (1988), 182–200, esp. 195 f. We agree with Baumanns on the relation of equivalence of subjective extreme in the 'I think' and predicative extreme in the ideal but would prefer a formulation like an 'analogy between *ens realissimum* and original-synthetic unity of apperception' to that of a 'projection of the original-synthetic unity of apperception onto the *ens entium*' (cf. 193 note 6). The latter could in fact come close to Kant's own interpretation of this but would not express the given logical necessity of proceeding to the ideal.

such (*ens necessarium*).¹⁵⁰ The critique no longer allows such an inference, as indeed its criterion of possibility is different. In the critique one cannot infer existence in the sense of absolute position from a determinate concept, neither from the sum of all possibility or the concept of an *ens realissimum*, because from that point on it has its criterion in the connection of perception to sensuous externality. Now mediation as hypothetical form has the existence of the determinate outside it. So when setting determination, which is indirectly always referred to perception, it is certainly legitimate for mediation to utter 'being' in the copula of the proposition but then that entails facilitating no inference back to the absolute 'being' of what is 'thinkable' through the connection in the proposition.¹⁵¹ If however the proposition of experience expresses only a reflection of the subject term into the predicate, the transcendental ideal recalls the reflection of the predicate term into itself—or, also in consideration of its regulative function, that in the interest of a closure of experience the predicate must be simultaneously reflected in the subject. The ideal recalls the absolute "that" on the predicate side and demands the return from out of this assumption of the form of *subjective* mediation.

The fourth antinomy had already left the possibility open that the "that" of an *ens necessarium* be left standing beside the total mediation hypothetical form demands from itself. The fourth antinomy's 'series'—the idea as ought explicates itself in Kant serially—is 'in fact only that of concepts',¹⁵² because it concerns the empirical as a *whole* and no longer inner-empirical problems, like the other antinomies; so it basically asks the question as to whether the opposition of empirical determination, the opposition that, expanded to world totality, always shows the (finite) antinomical tendency, is sufficient or even requires us to transit to a substrate of determination beyond the singular, conditioned empirical determinations. Indeed according to Kant, reason 'drives us' to make this transition,

for the existence of the appearances, which is in no way whatsoever grounded within itself, but always conditioned, demands of us: that we

150 Cf. on this T. Pinder, *Kants Gedanke vom Grund aller Möglichkeit*, diss. Berlin 1969, esp. 190 ff. Kant's later critique is legitimate in that a merely reflection syllogism from the immediacy of reflection to the absoluteness of the immediacy of being cannot be possible. In his *Nova dilucidatio* eight years before the *Beweisgrund* essay, Kant inferred from the concept of possibility not only the *ens necessarium* but also the *omnimoda realitas* as its 'content', and hence to the *ens realissimum* (cf. Prop. VII, AA I, 394 ff.).

151 On the assignment of the concept or reflection to the predicate and of intuition (determinability) to the subject of the judgment cf. above esp. 68 and Kant, CPJ B 340.

152 Kant, CpR B 587/A 559.

look around to find something that is distinct from all appearances and hence is an intelligible object in which this contingency ceases.¹⁵³

The transition thus has as it were a logical form and is no longer simply the question of the possibility of a persistence beside each other without relation of the empirical and intelligible worlds, as in the third antinomy. The determinacy of the transition now consists in the fact that the sought after 'object' has to have the determination of what is for us merely the transcendental and unknown 'ground of the possibility of the series of sense in general'.¹⁵⁴ The form of unity of the empirical is the hypothetical form; the unity itself is already the unconditional with respect to everything that is singular and empirical, to that unity as conditioned. In the cosmological representation in contrast it becomes the possible "that" of an *ens extramundandum*, which as absolute ground of empirical mediation would indeed still have to include the mediation of this mediation. The absolute middle term is, for Kant, certainly a transcendental semblance; but "that" of that middle term becoming *thinkable* declares that the merely subjective middle term knows its own formal limit.¹⁵⁵

Turning to the second aspect, the transcendental ideal's own form of synthesis, this is the *disjunctive* form. Already according to the (initially only formal logical) 'principle of *determinability*', it holds 'that only one of *two* mutually contradictorily opposed predicates ... could apply to' a term, which in this formality 'rests on the principle of contradiction'.¹⁵⁶ In this way a formal system that is investigated as to its completeness must meet the (syntactic) criterion of consistency.¹⁵⁷ The internal differentiation of the *transcendental* sum of all possibility or, using our expression, of the predicate sphere itself, which in the transcendental dialectic appears as absolute being, happens according to Kant

¹⁵³ Ibid. B 594/A 566.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. B 592/A 564.

¹⁵⁵ From the thesis side the transition to what is in this sense the absolute middle term of the empirical fails because the unconditional ought to enter into a *finite* relation to the empirical, i.e. it falls under its own conditions, while from the side of the antithesis that happens because here a non-finite relation in general is taken as no relation at all. Kant thinks the infinite relation in the relation of condition itself; in it the unconditional, given an infinite plurality of the conditioned, can be its complementary condition without becoming one of that plurality. It should also be noted that the 'ground' of the fourth antinomy is that of the highest condition, while that of the ideal will become the ground of disjunction or of the contradiction. Between antinomy and ideal then, the concept of ground undergoes a logical re-interpretation.

¹⁵⁶ Kant, CpR B 599/A 571.

¹⁵⁷ On the immanent difficulties of the formal proof of completeness (Gödel!) cf. below 201-203.

not by means of a merely formally contradictory opposition of conceptual characteristics (A and – A), as an understanding abstracting from the logic of concept contents would assume. The ideal is rather ‘a transcendental substratum’¹⁵⁸ and divides into ‘substrate-like’ intensional concepts which ‘in themselves already’ express ‘a being’¹⁵⁹ and for that reason are called realities. It is of the greatest importance that for Kant such real concepts determine themselves in the limitation of their determination not via merely logical negation but by ‘transcendental negation’. For Kant, ‘transcendental negation’ means ‘non-being in itself’¹⁶⁰ and is *determinate negation*, which Kant explains with the terms of privation, of Aristotle’s στέρησις. The disjunction of transcendental affirmation and transcendental negation is no longer a finitely contradictory one but a disjunction that is itself the unity of its own opposing terms.¹⁶¹ The reality of knowledge is not only formally opposed to ignorance but is the *latter’s* reality, since the concept of ignorance for itself is in terms of content certainly not a concept. Kant saw that for the notion of a predicate realising itself that would be the solution to the problem of particular laws,¹⁶² he needed a concept of determinate negation in which the *determination* is no longer positive limit or finite determination but itself the *setting relation* of itself and its opposite. This conception is unavoidable if the ideal is supposed to be an *individual*. For, from now on, the ‘all of reality’ is no longer divided through a kind of space intuition by means of external and always contingent ‘cuts’, instead this happens by virtue of the fact that it relates itself to itself as well as to what it is not. It is itself the power over its limits, or it *divides itself*. It is in this ‘single case a concept universal in itself of a thing thoroughly determined by itself and recognised as the representation of an individual’!¹⁶³

From Hegel’s position it is easy to see that Kant in this ‘single case’ had grasped the concept of an infinite limit, even if he did that only with the reservation arising from his fixation on hypothetical form that it at most comes down to a ‘semblance’ to be valued as regulative. But that he grasped it logically is shown in the consistency of the execution of the ideal even more clearly.

158 Kant, CpR B 603/A 575.

159 Ibid. B 602/A 574.

160 Ibid.

161 Cf. Kant, CpR B 603/A 575; there also the example that we will refer to in the following. Aristotle says of the λόγος that it explains both the matter (πρᾶγμα) as well as its στέρησις and hence is the capacity (δύναμις) for *both*. Privation is removal (ἀφαίρεσις) of the opposite (ἐναντίον) or the first negation (ἀπόφασις); cf. Met. IX, 2 (1046 a f.); further on this see E. Heintel, *Grundriß der Dialektik*, Darmstadt 1984, vol. I, 264 ff.

162 Cf. on this aspect also Baumanns (loc. cit. note 149), 197 ff.

163 Kant, CpR B 604/A 576.

The strict singularity of the ideal that relates all real predicates to itself is this infinite relation of the predicates and it results for Kant exactly as 'the concept of a *thing-in-itself*' is grasped in the ideal,¹⁶⁴ so that the differentiation of the sphere of appearance comes to an end. Moreover this concept is not a universal of subsumption, but, because of the infinite form of its realisation, a sum that actually 'comprehends *within it*', instead of '*under it*';¹⁶⁵ i.e. it has a self as such. For that reason Kant, goes so far as to remove the notion of a '*restriction* of its highest reality', insofar as it could 'be seen as it were as a *division* of that'.¹⁶⁶ The 'ur-essence' would then not be an individual but at most 'a mere aggregate of derived essences'; for Kant then it should be more appropriate:

as a *ground* and not as a *sum* at the foundation and the manifold (of the things) ... should not rest on the restriction of the ur-essence itself but on its complete consequence.¹⁶⁷

That 'complete consequence' is itself a 'deducing' in the sense of a 'derivation of all other possibility',¹⁶⁸ a particularisation of the universal by itself. This is the point to which Kant takes objection; for Kant, 'also our whole sensibility, including all reality in appearance must belong'¹⁶⁹ to the 'complete consequence' in the sense of one that we could call *omnimodo determinare*. Starting from the predicate side, one would have to arrive at the copula of the proposition of experience. The copula of the hypothetical form, which expresses a 'setting as determinate' in the *one* direction from subject towards the predicate,

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. B 605/A 577.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. B 607/A 580. The complete lack of understanding, and more the ineffective metaphors, that M. Wolff in his *Der Begriff des Widerspruchs*, Königstein Ts. 1981, esp. 40 ff., exhibits in his handling of the theory of the transcendental ideal rests precisely on the fact that Wolff is incapable of departing from the perception of something externally divisible, and with that from the merely formal-logical perspective.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. B 607/A 579. One can refer to the fact that the late Schelling, partly relying on Kant, reaches a similar more precise determination of the 'sum of all possibility', which according to him should consist in an 'absolute what' beside the 'absolute that' of God. The 'universal essence, the indifference to all possibilities', their 'ground', 'stuff', their 'material' stands in an incommensurable relation of the '*nescio quod*' beside the pure actuality of God. Cf. Schelling, *Abhandlung über die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten*, SW V, 755 ff., loc. cit. 770, 766.

¹⁶⁸ Kant, CpR B 607/A 579.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. Kant says *ibid.*, the reality of sensibility could not belong 'as an ingredient' to the 'idea of the highest essence'. God should be pure immanence, incapable of being external to himself, although the concept of transcendental negation in fact had already said *that* he is external to himself.

would *break up* in this opposed direction. If it should bear both directions simultaneously, then it would have to be understood in the sense of absolute negativity. Being would be absolute being, instead of merely immediate absolute position refracted into the positivity of finite determination, as in Kantian modality. It would be being as *act of being*, absolute relation of the extremes in the concept. Kant himself turns away at this point to the transcendental semblance, because he wants to hold fast to hypothetical form as the form of the 'one all-encompassing experience'.¹⁷⁰ This he can do so long as when the disjunctive form of conceptual development is set *immediately* beside hypothetical form, it is not superior to this. But this means that on its own it cannot take over the characteristic achievements of the hypothetical form, which is what the CpR was all about. The form immediately superior to all form is not disjunctive but absolute form. Kant's attempts to make the 'natural illusion'¹⁷¹ of the ideal understandable after his retreat from the ideal into the totality of experience exhibit a certain helplessness. He falls back behind his own insight into the non-objectivity of the transcendental ideal as the ground of complete consequence, instead of as sum, when he says again that the move from the sum of reality to the 'hypostatisation' of the idea happens because:

we transform the *distributive* unity of the use of experience of the understanding into the *collective* unity of a whole of experience dialectically, and then we think of a single thing with respect to this whole of appearance.¹⁷²

On this issue it was shown above that the unity of the ideal at least was not that of an aggregate; it was a matter of determinate negation being deployed for differentiation defining itself genetically, so that the collective unity can also not be a question of all terms of the concept being completely collected as finished *results*. Moreover it was also shown that the ideal must be not appearance but thing-in-itself; and finally that it was in general not a 'thing' but merely the pure determining of the ground of all reality, and hence also nothing determinate in the sense of representation. When Kant says that the 'subreption' of the ideal consists in the fact that a 'thing' would be thought 'which stands at the summit of the possibility of all things, to whose thorough

170 Ibid. B 610/A 582.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid. On Kant's language of distributive (disjunctive) vs. collective cf. also CpR B 672/A 644; MAdN AA IV, 526 as well as Heimsoeth (loc. cit. note 146) 457, note 80; also *Metaphysik Schön*, AA XXVIII/1, 505.

determination it gives the real conditions',¹⁷³ then the *conceptual* moments of the concept of the idea *in individuo*, as they were previously developed, are precisely not found therein but at most only its intuitive representation. Put in extreme terms, Kant argues from the semblance of his own form against the logical reality of another form which, considered in its own right, may under no circumstances be confused with this semblance.

Kant refused to admit the concept of the individual, at least as a theoretical concept, and this exclusion must be kept in mind as an essential limitation on his thinking. We have certainly encountered traces of the principle of individuation in his work, as in the individuality of perception whose inside is simultaneously (self-)external; in the concept of experience too which in its context, i.e. what is as such not experientiable, relates itself to itself and totalises itself; and finally in the highest rational demand for the conclusion of the world of experience, i.e. for superseding the merely finite determination of this world. That he however himself sets up the concept of the *individual* as a limit of theoretical mediation understood in terms of the transcendental philosophy, viewing it initially logically differentiated within itself and hence—even if, as he says, only as semblance—by means of reason, is an indication that Kant had completely taken the measure of his own form of thinking and on that issue at least, as he knows himself, left little remaining to do. Thinking of individuality as more than a semblance, far more as absolute actuality, demanded then a form of thinking distinct from Kant's—of course not any old form but the form of the *matter* that it is all about: the absolute form.

3 Hegel's Category of the Absolute

a) *The Absolute in the Logic*

Hegel's logic requires its interpreters to consider categories *in their own right*. The prerequisite that the interpreter has to fulfil "subjectively" is fundamental and strict, that for him "natural knowledge", of which we have already spoken, is not to be taken without more ado for "the truth". Fundamental to effective interpretation is also the ability to discard any representation or association that may occur to him immediately at the mention of a category. The same holds for all reflections on "applicability" of the category outside of philosophy, including anticipations of its formations in real philosophy and so on. This certainly does not forbid the use of examples for what has to be *comprehended*

¹⁷³ Ibid. B 611/A 583.

in logic; Hegel himself gives examples in the observations attached to the main logical treatments that illustrate the category and its use. But then clearly, the category must already be comprehended in order to be recognised as realised in the example, since an example devoid of concept will ultimately not be able to indicate exactly of what it is an example. And only when it knows what it is about *with itself* does it bring the logical self, the category, and by means of this the absolute form clearly into view.

For the chapter with which the final third of the *Logic of Essence* opens bearing the title *The Absolute*, this reminder is surely more pertinent than at other points in the text. It must be kept in mind precisely here that the thematic logical category of the absolute, as it stands in the logic, like everything else logical, initially only answers logical questions. One question appropriate to the absolute will be that concerning a constitution of the concept of *determination* that can be thought of as infinite, and as such completely permeable to form until in the set, individualised result of the absolute, the *concept*, determination will be recognised as set infinitely by means of form. Hegel's fundamental attempt to present with the category of the absolute a strictly determinate logical matter of immediately total negativity, or of the in-itself in strictly logical terms, is even found in the *Jena Logic* and may not be overlooked. The fact is however that interpretations of Hegel have preferred in the case of this category¹⁷⁴ to do everything else but logic with it. This arises from various motives. Some certainly do not involve any problem essential to Hegel, while others at least concern the question of an external approach to Hegel's thinking, and some relate to questions of presentation in his work. We will here allow ourselves a digression on three points, which may be useful for the matter at hand.

In a late book review in Berlin, Hegel had a hard time with an anonymous author who failed in his attempt to make polemics against him, because he ignored certain elementary issues so that in philosophy 'the mere concept is distinguished from its *realisation* and from its *idea*'. It was thus hardly to be wondered at when he also did 'not distinguish the indeterminate absolute and the absolute spirit ... from each other'.¹⁷⁵ The series of misunderstandings found in this anonymous author could also be found in the works of well-known names. Perhaps the characteristic feature was by turns introducing and then again excluding real-philosophical or even unphilosophical aspects, carelessness which hardly allowed for much logical clarity, especially on particular

174 In the case of the logic of essence one should more precisely speak of 'term of reflection' rather than 'category' (cf. Hegel, SoL 555, XI 394; TW4, 298).

175 Hegel, TW11, 408.

parts of the *Logic* (e.g. our chapter on the absolute).¹⁷⁶ Hegel's critic addressed in the Berlin review, the one who did not distinguish between indeterminate absolute and absolute spirit, had further the real-philosophical concern that Hegel's concept of God could be corrupt. The reviewer points out to the author that he in fact 'substitutes ... *God* for *substance*',¹⁷⁷ he sets the concept in a logical relation through which it is, viewed from the standpoint of Hegel's developed concept of God, hopelessly *underdetermined*. Substance is an inadequate determination of God because it has immediately only an abstract, external relation to the concept, so that it excludes the form in which clarity grasps itself and is simultaneously other to itself, this form that substance logically presupposes. God is for Hegel 'the highest thought and simultaneously unseparated present being ..., a present being ... which without separation is thinking',¹⁷⁸ the illumination of the concept in being *qua* infinite activity, for God is 'free activity relating itself to itself',¹⁷⁹ infinite differing of difference, incommensurability as total. *Representation* which persists in projecting onto its 'God' what it imagines no matter what, and thus has already made it commensurable, obviously is not concerned with any of that. So when it calls God 'the absolute' perhaps it intends to say something sublime. All it has expressed however according to Hegel, is 'that abstractum God to which the theistic mode of imagination clings, the *highest being*'.¹⁸⁰ The logic of such imagining falls outside of the logical treatment of the category of the absolute, and is in no way the explanation of this *category*. Logically it is about 'the highest being' in terms of, among other things, 'his negation resolved into it',¹⁸¹ of which situation the dogmatic or also enthusiastic representation 'of the absolute' can have no adequate concept. If we take the trouble to keep the category free from representation, e.g. of God, this does not mean that this determination does not make its contribution to the more precise development of Hegel's concept of

176 M. Theunissen hoped to be able to present the absolute in real-philosophical terms rather than logically. In his *Sein und Schein*, Frankfurt am Main 1980, the absolute is supposed to house a 'universal communications theory and theology' (50) (however these two may come together). How Theunissen hopes to understand even one of the simplest of Hegel's determinations of the absolute, namely that it is 'the *void*' (Hegel, SoL 530, GW XI, 370), how to keep all that image-like ballast without doing *violence* to Hegel's terms remains as unclear as his confident assertion of the 'abundance of the absolute' (304).

177 Hegel, TW11, 413.

178 Ibid. 404.

179 Ibid. 368.

180 Ibid. 424. The concept of the 'highest being' is already used in the Jena period categorially and free of representation; e.g. in the *Metaphysics of 1804/5* it is grasped as a determinate thinking and in no way any longer as a simple other of thinking (something represented).

181 Ibid. 424.

God—just as basically every category does. But exactly what this contribution is, must first *emerge as a result*.

That the “absolute” in Hegel means a categorial term and not any kind of objective representation emerges clearly from the use of the term in the Jena period. In the *Logic and Metaphysics of 1804/5* as a rule it means the totalised or total *in-itself*, the point of unity of even the most extreme oppositions. The definitional statement of the *Logic* is to be understood as saying ‘that which is infinitely simple, or the unity and plurality that are one, is the absolute’.¹⁸² We have already spoken about its ‘metacategorial’ status of infinity,¹⁸³ i.e. that it expresses the in-itself of the simple relations. Now what we have here is also the coming together of infinity with the concept of the absolute, for it is ‘the pure absolute motion, the being-outside-itself (*Außersichsein*) within being-within-itself (*Insichsein*)’, just as there can ‘be no talk of the absolute going outside itself’,¹⁸⁴ but instead at best of a semblance that an opponent *is* (finitely) against it. Terminologically, Hegel has thus created the possibility of speaking of a logical content as it is ‘in relation to the absolute or in itself’,¹⁸⁵ while metaphysics sets up the general programme, that ‘philosophy studies the in-itself or the absolute’.¹⁸⁶ At the end of the *Logic*, cognition emerged as a total in-itself; this, as will emerge later, considered *as such* in a certain respect is itself the absolute, which indeed has yet to be known in metaphysics but with that the absolute will be known. It is no longer only the absolute as being-in-itself but also as being-for-itself,¹⁸⁷ which however according to the dialectical concept of being-for-itself, must certainly include the capacity to be known. Hence even in Hegel’s *Difference essay* the absolute can in relation to consciousness mean ‘knowledge’, e.g. of the unity of the total opposition of necessity and freedom, thus the being-for-itself of the in-itself of these concepts. The abstract definition of the absolute in the *Difference essay* is ‘the identity of identity and non-identity’¹⁸⁸—a determination which, by the way, once again illuminates not only the categorial but also the “metacategorial” status of the concept. It is first in this way that the necessity emerges of posing questions

182 Hegel, GW VII, 34.

183 Cf. above 70 as well as note 66.

184 Hegel, GW VII, 34.

185 Ibid. 15 f. (emphasis in original).

186 Ibid. 133.

187 Hegel refers to this distinction e.g. in the indifference chapter at the end of the *Logic of Being*, cf. SoL 383 f., GW XXI, 381 f. In the corresponding text of the first edition of 1812 he says of Spinoza (cf. on Spinoza also SoL 383, GW XXI, 381), that he conceived of the absolute ‘only as *being-in-itself*, not as *being-for-itself*’ (GW XI, 229).

188 Cf. Hegel, TW2, 27 f. and 96.

logically about what the thinking of the absolute *thinks* and consistently to hold mere representations at bay.

Unfortunately these first prophylactic observations do not really concern problems that would be bound to arise from Hegel's standpoint but only the external approach to his philosophy. The second point related in contrast only to a presentation problem in his work. In the *Nuremberg Logic*, the absolute is a *thematic* category as a determination of essence, to which are referred determinate positions like *limit* through the context. At first this suggests regarding the categorial *ab-solutum* in opposition to its surroundings in which it is all about relations (essential and absolute relation) as well as about the *relative* terms within these relations. Thus we have here Hegel speaking in a school logic at the end of the treatment of the *essential relation*, which he has explained after *condition* and *conditioning*, thus about what in 1813 is called 'the absolute' but here under the title 'the unconditioned'.¹⁸⁹ As a category in the thematic sense the absolute means initially nothing other than a concept one would have to interpret as 'devoid of relation' or 'which is non-relational' (namely in total terms). Simultaneously however the absolute also has in both editions of the *Logic*, as well as especially in the *Encyclopaedia*, not only this determinate *thematic* sense but also the *operative* sense of describing the logic of presentation.¹⁹⁰ This refers back to the "metacategorial" in-itself of the *Jena Logic*. Hegel speaks of the fact that the 'concept of the unity of being and non-being ... or of identity and non-identity' could 'be seen' as 'the first, purest, i.e. most abstract definition of the absolute', which would be followed by 'richer' definitions. In the *Encyclopaedia*, all terms are fundamentally regarded as respectively '*truer definitions* of the absolute', beginning this time from being itself and going all the way to spirit.¹⁹¹ In this operative perspective, or that of the logic of presentation, 'the absolute' is as it were the one ὑποκείμενον of the entire systematic mediation and as such not to be confused with the thematic total unrelational absolute of the *Logic of Essence*; for it would be nonsensical to regard the concept of the idea as a 'definition' of a concept, which for its part excludes the concept. As the "substrate" of philosophical mediation, the

189 Hegel, *Logik für die Mittelklasse* 1808/9, TW4, 99.

190 For the difference between *thematic* and *operative* categories in terms of content in Hegel cf. U. Richli, *Form und Inhalt in G.W.F. Hegels 'Wissenschaft der Logik'*, Vienna and Munich 1981, 42 ff. In his study Richli, with good reason, clearly distances himself from the use of this distinction in W. Becker's writings on Hegel.

191 Hegel, Sol 74, GW XXI, 60; Encyc. § 87 Obs.; cf. § 86 Obs.; § 99 Obs.; § 213 Obs.; § 384 Obs. and *passim*. Such statements are lacking in the *Philosophy of Nature* in the Encyc., which is concerned with absolute definitions of what is not absolute. Cf. Encyc. § 85.

absolute recalls each time in indeterminate summary the *whole* of the system and is as such either anticipation of the progress or recapitulation of what has already been attained. But then as a whole of mediation it is *also* itself what is determining or genetically defining in the respective term, such that the expression “definition of the absolute” involves both an objective as well as a subjective genitive. Further however the *whole*, self-determining mediation is nothing other than the *absolute form*. This is concealed behind the name of a progressively determinate absolute, and indeed precisely behind *this* name, because it is in terms of the logic of presentation, with respect to all individual terms of philosophy taken for themselves, their *essence*,¹⁹² while the simple totality of essence is the absolute. It is very important to be clear about the fact that in terms of the logic of presentation, the absolute is no representational content but the expression of an application of the logic. Absolute form or the whole mediation *doubles* itself as essence to the in-itself of all content and the pure for-itself of form and its self-determination. Insofar as *in* the presentation according to these essential aspects it *appears* separated, it is “only” the absolute, namely absolute essence of pure indeterminacy or identity *qua* “content” of all determination and absolute essence *qua* pure determining or differing as ‘form’ of determination. Indeed Hegel never does “logic of presentation” as an end in itself, and even then not without a certain reluctance and rather in exoteric, didactic intent. Thus in the quoted text from the first chapter of the *Logic of Being* in the second edition too, even after the appearance of the last version of the *Encyclopaedia*, he can still say one ‘could’ speak of definitions of the absolute, ‘if it were really about the form of definitions and about the name of absolute’.¹⁹³ Operative categories are essentially *names*; their philosophical sense can only lie in making themselves in the real execution of form, *superfluous*.

Absolute form is both *form* and *content* of the *whole* philosophical mediation. If one wished to assign to it *immediately* an absolute, i.e. a concrete content complete within itself, which would be *against* the absolute form ‘object’, then one certainly could, with Hegel, call it ‘God’.¹⁹⁴ This absolute of the absolute content immediately set opposed to the absolute form is neither the absolute of the *Logic of Essence*, thematic in the narrow sense, which, as Hegel says in fact immediately has the ‘determination or destiny’ of ‘being the *absolute*

192 One recalls also the operative use of the concept of essence in the *Phenomenology*.

193 Hegel, SoL 74, GW XX1, 60. Cf. also on this Encyc. § 85.

194 Cf. Hegel, Encyc. § 85 in this sense; further TW13, 139, ‘philosophy has no other object than God, and is hence essentially rational theology’.

form.¹⁹⁵ Nor indeed is it absolute form as essence of all terms in operative respect. As the “third” absolute, he is instead in general what is *absolved* of this form and *absolved* in relation to it, its *other*, which it sets free from *insight*, just as it is within the insight into it free. In this immediate opposition to form, God can again be called ‘the absolute’, because he is the *essence* of absolute form—the essence or in-itself precisely of its freedom. Grasped in absolute form the being of freedom contains the “ontological” proof of its essence. This freedom itself *would* not exist without its essence. Its freedom is essentially being-for-itself; but being-for-itself is already in the *Logic of Being* essentially what Hegel calls ‘being-for-one’ [*Sein-für-Eines*, lit. being of a kind]. The ‘for’ here is the broken middle term, which in the infinite mediation of absolute form implies the being of essence and is there also the first concept as being.¹⁹⁶ Grasped finitely all ‘being-for’—e.g. the ‘what-kind-of-being’ (*Was-für-eines-Sein*) of Kant’s hundred taler—is mere present being, from which, as in Kant, all that can be proved is that it can also *not be*. Being-for-itself however grasped under the determination of freedom, which cannot be assigned to any *present being*, and thus not to the taler, in the *for* that *is*, has immediately entered into the reflection of this being, i.e. into the essence, just like a concluding syllogism that treats the being of the premisses immediately simultaneously also as reflection, which lets them *invert*, thereby proving the *being* of reflection. With this the relation as such of absolute form to absolute content is determined by the principle of individuation, by the μεταβολή. The relation to God is a purely self-individualising one. It *is* the individuality of form itself. What is meant by the “third” absolute is thus again no representation. It is absolute self-relating as life that *is* truth. For this reason one could say that Hegel’s philosophy, insofar as it concerns itself with the being of God, presents an *argumentum ex individuo*.

Following on from our determination of the different usages of the title ‘the absolute’ in Hegel, we have to say something here about the fact that the “first” absolute, the thematic category of essence, has disappeared without

195 Hegel, SoL 531, GW XI, 371.

196 Cf. SoL 159, GW XXI, 147: ‘God is thus *for himself* insofar as he himself is that which is *for him*’. The following statement in the lectures on the philosophy of religion can be understood from the logic of being-for-itself: ‘man only knows God insofar as God within man knows himself’ (TW17, 480). In addition the absolute idea must be referenced for the no longer finite being-for-itself (cf. SoL 824, GW XII, 283). On the question of *freedom* as the present being of absolute form, the theory of the *free spirit* should be further investigated. With good reason A. Peperzak says of it in his *Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten*, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt 1987, that with it ‘the centre of the universe and of the system’ has been reached, the middle term between ‘pure thought’ (form) and the living absolute thinking itself (content) (57). Cf. also Encyc. § 571 Obs. on thinking *qua* form.

trace from the *Encyclopaedia*, and that right from the start with the Heidelberg edition of 1817. Perhaps the exoteric and the total systematic ambitions of the *Encyclopaedia* caused the other two usages of the term to predominate, so that the philosopher decided not to highlight the merely immediate absolute in its determination in the *Logic of Essence* on its own. When the Heidelberg *Encyclopaedia* speaks in the transition paragraphs from the chapter on religion to that on philosophy, of the ‘revelation of the absolute’,¹⁹⁷ that could have led to the misunderstanding that ‘the absolute’ in terms of its logical content has indeed already been developed and for that reason also could even be considered “obvious”. But there is no need to be satisfied with such considerations. A closer look at the chapter on actuality in the *Encyclopaedia* reveals that changes have been made not only to the chapter on the absolute. Starting with this work, all that appears in the contents under the actuality chapter are the terms of the absolute relation.¹⁹⁸ In a certain respect one is reminded by this of the *Jena Logic of 1804/5*, which similarly contained no independent chapter on the ‘absolute’—at least not foregrounded¹⁹⁹—and which treats the modal concepts under the relation of substantiality.²⁰⁰ As far as the latter is concerned in the *Encyclopaedia* these are *placed before* the moments of the absolute relation; in the introductory paragraphs of the chapter they are presented under three numbers and essentially with less sharpness than in the *SoL*; substantiality, causality and reciprocity fall under their last term, that of necessity, and one almost gets the impression that the *tour de force* through the modal categories serves only the explication of actuality as necessity in order then to present the moments of relation on that foundation.

197 Hegel, *Encyc.* (1817) § 471. Later this phrase is replaced by ‘revelation’ of the ‘spirit’, cf. *Encyc.* § 571. What is meant here is at any rate the ‘third’ absolute.

198 This was referred to by G. Baptist in a lecture in Chicago, *Ways and Loci of Modality* (mss. 1988). In her developmental study the author comes to the conclusion that one has to reckon with ‘a splitting of the modal problem in the corresponding or related parts of the real-philosophy’—the category of contingency for instance moves into the philosophy of nature—but also with a ‘splitting ... on the basic logical level’, where the terms of the absolute and of actuality would be transferred into the *Logic of the Concept* or into the chapter on teleology (mss. 11). We do not share the author’s view that such a tendency of Hegel’s is expressed ‘to ontologise actuality’ (mss. 12) in the Aristotelian sense, at least not as a positivising of the concept of actuality, which has to be understood purely in terms of the logic of negation. Cf. note 202 below.

199 As we have seen the absolute is dealt with as a whole together with cognition and hence is related to the concept of infinity, to cognition at the end of proportion, i.e. to the metaphysics.

200 Cf. Hegel, *GW VII*, esp. 40 ff.; further explanations also emerge from the relation of causality.

But from the SoL we already know that these moments are ‘the unity of the absolute and its reflection’.²⁰¹ They could be said to be the resumé of the absolute, in which it is there *positively*—to the extent that we can speak of positivity here at all—while together with actuality, possibility and necessity, for an understanding that regards them as modalities, it appears instead to belong to reflection, in contrast at least to the supposedly graspable nature of substance or causality. One can now in general observe that the *Encyclopaedia* is, almost consistently, concerned in its summary of the *Logic* to *avoid* all matters that are only developed in terms of the *logic of negation*. This is so in the case of the end piece on the absolute in the *Logic of Being, indifference*. It also clearly holds in the *Logic of Essence*, above all in the—naturally highly speculative—*modes of immediacy* of essence, i.e. the entire chapter on *semblance* including the section on *reflection*, that is apart from its function in the absolute and in actuality. Note that both the terms *semblance* and *reflection*, as we shall see, are indispensable in the development of the category of the absolute. It holds finally for the *concept of contradiction*, which can be understood as the immediacy of the ground and clearly presents the centrepiece of the exposition of absolute negativity in terms of the logic of reflection. To that extent one can assume that the *Encyclopaedia*, probing the limits of this possibility, strives to give a “positive logic”—hence the positive immediacy concept, existence, is maintained in the *Logic of Essence*. Under these circumstances it appears to us that no implications can be drawn back from the *Encyclopaedia* to a fundamental restructuring of the chapter on actuality or any other parts of the SoL, as they otherwise might have been presented in the second edition of the second (and third) books.²⁰² It is not only clear from the matter itself that Hegel had no need to impose any more limitations on the negation concept once he had grasped it completely but it is also adequately documented in the new edition of the *Logic of Being* of 1832, in which quite clearly in comparison to the first edition the logic of negation is further *strengthened*.²⁰³ If one recalls further that Hegel refers the

²⁰¹ Hegel, SoL 529, GW XII, 369.

²⁰² G. Baptist (loc. cit. note 198 above) in contrast does expect changes in a new edition of the SoL (cf. mss. 11). She relies also on unedited lecture notes by Carl Hegel of Hegel's *Logic* lectures of 1831, in which the chapter on actuality recedes further into the background ceding to ‘the problem of history and the present’ (ibid.). At this point we would like to thank the author for several suggestions. Her study is now in print in G. Di Giovanni (ed.), *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, Albany N.Y. 1990.

²⁰³ Hegel's new observations on the quantitative infinity are pertinent here, for ultimately they all focus on the concept of contradiction. Cf. also SoL 142, GW XXI, 129, where in the *new* version the infinite progress is understood as ‘reciprocity negating itself and

writer of that book reviewed in 1829 mentioned above to the logical chapter on the absolute,²⁰⁴ then we feel completely justified in declining to treat this chapter as a *delendum* and in being confident that it would have found its place in a new version of the *Logic of Essence*.

Finally a third preliminary observation on the matter. Among the various approaches to Hegel's *Logic*, *illustration* of the respective material from the philosophy of history has always—and not entirely without justification—enjoyed special popularity, and that not only among beginners. Even Hegel himself occasionally promoted this as we have already stated in principle not illegitimate procedure. Thus in his observations in the books on *Being* and *Essence*, he refers to Parmenides and Heracleitus, in the section on being-for-itself to the 'noble Malebranche', and in the section on the absolute to Spinoza and Leibniz.²⁰⁵ This possibility of reading Hegel as it were 'backwards' or from 'below' in fact overshoots the framework it seeks to set up when it claims to have named everything it encompasses in its perspective. Approaches to the actuality chapter as a whole have been influenced by the claim, made directly and categorically, 'that here it is all about Spinoza's system'.²⁰⁶ Given the echo that this claim has found,²⁰⁷ we have to state clearly on the contrary there is no doubt that at this point it is *not* about 'Spinoza's system', but—initially and decisively—it is about a section from Hegel's *Logic*. Fleischmann's study, where the claim originates, despite evincing an interest 'in the history of Spinozism in Germany',²⁰⁸ does not really investigate the significance of Spinoza for the

its negation', as 'the *contradiction*' but 'only as *present*', and with that in the determination 'the negation as *being*'. Compare in the first edition of the *Logic of Being*, GW XI, 92.

204 Cf. Hegel, TW11, 424.

205 Cf. Hegel, SoL 83, 151, GW XXI, 70; SoL 536 ff., GW XI, 376 ff.

206 E. Fleischmann, *Die Wirklichkeit in Hegels Logik* in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 18 (1964), 3–29, loc. cit. 3.

207 E.g. L. B. Puntel, *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur*, *Hegel-Studien* suppl. 10, Bonn 1981², 73 has accepted the view of Fleischmann, ultimately indeed from his own interest in seeing in the absolute an 'interruption' of the logical course, and then to make 'breaches' in the 'real systematic' of the *Logic* identifiable (cf. 72 ff.). Now in this Puntel uses 'the absolute' in the sense of the *operative* concept, of which we have spoken above, under which assumption however every category can be handled as a 'real-systematic ... interruption'. H.-Chr. Lucas, *Wirklichkeit und Methode in der Philosophie Hegels*, Diss. Cologne 1974, also refers to Fleischmann in his considerations of method (cf. 117 ff.), emphasising the parallels in Spinoza but he recognises the autonomous sense of Hegel's categories and with that their critical force.

208 Fleischmann loc. cit. 4.

development of Hegel's thinking;²⁰⁹ on the other hand he does include some parallels from various writings and letters of Spinoza to the actuality chapter in the *Logic* which are not without interest. Fleischmann does not overlook the fact that Hegel's development of the categories in our chapter as a whole is a (philosophical) Spinoza critique, rather than in any sense a reconstruction of his thinking. This already makes it questionable how far the reference to Spinoza can really be an *explicans* of the logic of this chapter; for the critique of Spinoza already presupposes logically grounded thinking, i.e. independent of Spinoza. Moreover against the one-sidedness of a reading of the chapter in terms of Spinoza, it should be remembered that the observation including the reference to Spinoza is in no way restricted to him, for beside the 'oriental image of emanation' it also refers to Leibniz.²¹⁰ Indeed in the secondary literature the chapter that Fleischmann claims for Spinoza has also been regarded as a Leibniz chapter;²¹¹ moreover, interpreters have also found there, to confine the discussion to the most important examples, a critique of Kant,²¹² and even one of Schelling.²¹³ Magnanimity might suggest a general statement to the effect that in *every* logical category *all* philosophers are addressed and criticised. But in order to see this one must have grasped the sense of the category

209 Indeed this ought indeed to be required; for *if* Hegel ever was a 'Spinozist', then in Frankfurt or even in Jena (cf. above 71 along with its note 63) but no longer in Nuremberg, Heidelberg or Berlin; the indisputable dividing line is the *Phenomenology*.

210 Cf. Hegel, SoL 538 ff., GW XI, 378 ff.

211 Thus extensively M. Kusch and J. Manninen, *Hegel on Modalities and Monadology* in Knuuttila, ed., *Modern Modalities*, Dordrecht, Boston and London 1988, 109–177.

212 On the other hand Fleischmann himself refers to J.N. Findlay (cf. loc. cit. 3) but cf. especially B. Longuenesse, *L'effectivité de la Logique de Hegel* in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 87 (1987), 495–503, where she explicitly highlights the relations to Kant; further G. Baptist (loc. cit., note 198), e.g. mss. 2, 8. Starting points for the reference to Kant can always be his table of categories, Hegel's remarks on the modalities starting from the *Difference essay*, or the closeness of the actuality chapter to Kant's antinomy problem documented in Hegel, *Logik für die Mittelklasse* of 1810/11.

213 Thus the commentary of J. Biard et al., *Introduction à la lecture de la Science de la logique de Hegel*, Paris 1983, vol. II, 278. That the contingency concept solves systemic problems in Schelling and Fichte is shown by G. Di Giovanni, *The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic* in W.E. Steinkraus and K.I. Schmitz, *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, New Jersey and Sussex 1980, 179–200, esp. 179 f. Other philosophers to whom the actuality chapter has been referred are above all Aristotle (Mure, Marcuse etc.) and Descartes (Baptist for the absolute). If some kind of completeness were desired here, then one could, without saying anything false about Hegel's text, without more ado include Plato in the aureole with the idea of the good understood as the absolute (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), the determinate ideas as its attributes, and μέθεξις according to which the idea of the good is always already by the individual as the modus.

in its own right first; parallels alone are never enough. For these reasons we will, with all necessary attention that cannot be denied e.g. to Spinoza in our context, still concentrate on working out the profile of the category itself, to let the category *speak* in order at last to recognise only this, its own speech, as its *sense*.

b) *Interpreting the Absolute*

For Hegel philosophy is ‘absolute *science*’²¹⁴ because it finds and knows the ‘absolute’. With the absolute cognition now has an ‘object’ that is no longer *simply* its intensional ‘other’ in the sense of the ‘objectivity’ of the *Logic of Being* and that of *Essence*. Neither is cognition in its position to *this* ‘object’ merely a ‘species’ of knowing, such as the cognition of finite or mathematical objects. In relation to the category of the absolute, both specifications, namely that on the ‘side’ of the object as well as that on the ‘side’ of cognition, fall away; likewise, alternatively as one could say, the specifications ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’ with respect to each other. The course in the *Logic of Essence* up to the category of the absolute ultimately had the significance of overcoming the difference in reflected thinking between the mutually distinct reflections of the object into itself on the one hand and that into another and *within that* into itself on the other. The ‘location’ of a specification of object sphere and knowledge sphere in themselves and with respect to each other was the first section, *Determination*, of the *Logic of Being*, which itself turned out to be a *syllogism* between the extremes of *character* of the matter and its *constitution*, according to which latter it is for another. In determination as being, something related to something other; in reflected determination the assumption of determining related to determining *actu*. In the first the determinate *was content*; in the second it was overcome into the negation of thinking, or it was not that positively without simultaneously being correlated to the negative *form*. With respect to determination as being, the content in the second aspect, in which it is not without immediate correlation to the form relation, has in no way lost any “solidity” of being, as even an unbiased imagination might possibly claim. It *is*, to use a Hegelian expression here, in essence all the more ‘obstinate’; because as immediately loaded with the form relation, and hence as it were, *forcing* a determinate thinking of itself, it is something that no content as being could be, namely ‘*something identical to itself*’,²¹⁵ or also *something existing* in the ‘world of positivity’ (as Liebrucks would put it), something grounded in

²¹⁴ Cf. Hegel, GW VIII, 286 (also the context).

²¹⁵ Cf. Hegel, Encyc. § 113 Obs.

that, which cannot be said of anything that is mere being. In these terms being (positive immediacy) and reflection (negative immediacy but of mediation) in the *Logic of Essence* no longer appear separate. Their relation was initially only immediate and for that reason devoid of the concept; the *semblance*, e.g. as immediate identity of the two immediacies, is precisely for that reason only *in itself* the truth and the infinite difference to set or known truth.²¹⁶ The specific *complexion* in the *Logic of Essence* of the immediacies moves equally towards the truth and it does this out of itself. The immediate knowledge of essence is that of the existence of mediation: the knowledge that the truth lies in the *χωρισμός*. Correspondingly the development of essence is the logical series of attempts at determination of the *χωρισμός*. The attempt is made to utter the truth essentially. It also has to be understood as such an attempt even when the thing is set as appearance—e.g. in Kant. Kant regards the difference between subjectivity and objectivity as mediation (as *as*), so that uttering transcendental truth means regarding appearances as totally determinable in the hypothetical form, i.e. in an asymmetry in favour of mediation. Hume ‘interrupted’ Kant’s ‘dogmatic slumber’²¹⁷ with the claim that relation itself is only immediate being, because it awoke in Kant the contradiction *of the matter*, where positive and negative immediacies *repel* each other and, in terms of the finitude of the understanding, enter into the inherently infinite relation of the transcendental form, while, for the infinity of reason, it takes on the form of the *antinomy*. What woke Kant up was the automotion of the contradiction, the present being of absolute negativity in reflection. In the *Logic of Essence* in a very specific sense *contradiction* is the genuine motive force. It drives simple contradictions, valid as mediations of truth in that they *hold* the categorial contradiction *back*, up to doubled opposition²¹⁸ thereby letting them become *self-like*—just as in the *Phenomenology* the opposition of consciousness is driven by the contradictions or the crises of intending into self-consciousness. Similarly in the logic of the Kantian contradiction—set up for the sake of the truth—between appearing world and the world in itself, the dissolution of appearance requires it to be rendered infinite. Like all of the

216 It is not always taken into consideration that *semblance* in Hegel is not an immediate *oppositum* of truth but rather of this in the determination of the in-itself. Semblance is not the ‘untruth’, which it can only be for conscious intending of it; in absolute knowing it is a necessary moment of truth. It is for Hegel the *being* of spirit ‘eternally to set this semblance to itself of having finitude only as a shining or seeming within it’ (Hegel, TW11, 531; cf. also SoL 825, GW XII, 237).

217 Kant, Prol. AA IV, 260.

218 Cf. on this above 35 and *passim*; cf. the method observation SoL 323, GW XXI, 320 on the ‘double transition’.

antinomies, according to its 'regulative' resolution the fourth is supposed to stand in the service of a thoroughly unambiguous, empirical determination, and had at least brought the possibility of an unconditioned ground of unity of the two totalities of the phenomenal and the intelligible worlds into its purview. In the antinomy itself, it is shown that such an assumption of the unconditioned, if it is related immediately to the conditioned (the empirical), *contradicts* this. In the regulative interpretation of the contradiction, this is as it were rendered compatible with experience, when it now says that e.g. in the regress of conditionality the same thing that previously was regarded as *cause* should now be seen as *effect*. The contradiction is in this sense still the *inversion* of meaning from something into its opposite but it is this only for the subjective status of appearance as determinate. Simultaneously however it contradicts this determinate subjective status' claim to knowledge; it reveals that it had regarded something as cause which was instead effect. Kant would certainly have responded to that with reference to, above all, chronologically distinguishable aspects. But the question remains as to the ground for inverting these aspects. Subjectively speaking this ground is itself the understanding interpreting itself as context of experience, which as such emerges as the unconditioned opposing everything empirically determinate. Through its contradiction however the fourth antinomy has also revealed the possibility, at least in an 'arbitrary assumption',²¹⁹ of thinking an objective ground, which, as we have seen, turned out to be capable of explicating itself as the idea *in individuo*. In this ground the *matter* itself would transit from the term of the effect into that of the cause and *vice versa*, just as it sets all terms in their own right and overcomes them. But as the unconditional, this ground would be the same for the one knowing as for the matter.²²⁰ The inversion effected by the one knowing would no longer be 'only' subjective, and the redetermination of the matter would not be only for another but just as much for it. It would be the *determination* as absolute and with that self-individualising, whose outside (composition) would be immediately the inside (character) or its inner unity would be the external plurality (e.g. of the previous "aspects"). It would be individualised cognition, and hence that of *actuality*.

219 CpR B 590/A 562.

220 Cf. on this J. Simon, *Die Bewegung des Begriffs in Hegels Logik in Hegel-Studien* suppl. 18, Bonn 1978, 63–73, esp. 65: 'The so-called subjective motion has the same ground as the motion of the matter itself with respect to its categorial determination'. For our overall Hegel interpretation, moreover, Simon's immediately following assertion is very important: 'To the extent that the motion of the concept in the ground thus is negation ..., it is no motion and hence requires no ground' (67).

The absolute as the immediacy of actuality is introduced by Hegel from out of the essential relation, in which the already uttered contradiction of actuality as such, once again in apparent extremes given for themselves (just before as inside and outside), is supposed to be avoided as a totality 'determined as two *totalities of content* of which the one is *reflected in itself*, the other *reflected in another*'.²²¹ With this the reference is already made to the significance of the internally differentiated concept of *reflection*, and by means of that to the whole issue of determination itself. The totalities are those of positive reflection or reflection as being, and that of reflected or negative reflection, each of which for itself has given itself the form of the conclusion. Here in the conclusion already:

'in each' was available 'immediately its opposite ..., and their common relation *to their third*' Kant's unconditional might illustrate this—'or much more *to their unity*' (526, 366).

Related to the unity in this way, they set themselves as moments of this and with that also in relation to each other; their determination is mediated by the whole into the opposite. But then since both sides are totalities, the mediating 'third' is no longer 'something' outside them. The third is *only the relation itself* as, just as it *is there*, 'unmediated *identity of form*' (526, 367).²²² Now according to Hegel, the individuation principle of the μεταβολή is expressed in them: their 'immediate inversion of the one into the other' is already the 'determinate one (sc. connection) of absolute form' (526, 366). For Kant, the absolute form was still concealed in the representation 'limit of an objective third'. But once one has grasped the "ontological" third as the contradiction to each positive determination that seeks to be 'something' for itself, then it is

221 Hegel, SoL 529, GW XI, 369. Subsequently direct references in the text will be given in all commented parts; thus numbers in parentheses refer in this chapter to the *Logic of Essence* in the following form: (SoL page number, GW XI page number). Other quotations are referenced as usual in the footnotes. The contradiction of actuality is immediately that against *all* determinate determination, because it is the *pure* in-itself or absolute.

222 Cf. on this expression, which in terms of the logic of the judgment expresses the infinite proposition, also Hegel, SoL 120, GW XXI, 108. Further, for the determination infinity his *Scepticism essay*, TW2, 454 and 502 as well as the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, TW17, 446 or in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* for the term self-consciousness 'where subject and object are without mediation one' (TW20, 427). Cf. also the justification for hereditary monarchy in his *Philosophy of Right* § 280 as well as GW VIII, 262 f. Schelling's principle of the 'integration by means of the unity of opposites' (cf. just SW 111, 4777) lacks the μεταβολή or individuality and remains (like Schelling in general) still in *antinomic form*.

only the 'negative unity' of the inversion itself. It is brought into relief against the essential positivity, 'the simple point devoid of content' (526, 366) as absolute resumption of determination. The worlds as extremes of the essential relation collapse as it were into the single unity devoid of extension, as into *the* determination (πέρας) as such, for which then initially the term 'point' stands. The need to say something with this initially only indirectly significant term, or rather simply to speak at all, is as always a 'beginning of the matter' (cf. 526, 367). From the single, new meaning the attempt to utter the truth in world totalities the one of which should be mediated by being and the other by reflection is known as past and as *only* essential; immediately there is only the need itself of speaking in distinction to the repelled totalities. With this *total* difference the term 'point' names the need for mediation of *actuality*, of immediacy, which is simultaneously with respect to the totalised relations of being and of essence *absolute*, in which corresponding to itself 'all determination of *essence*, as well as of *existence* or of *being* in general, as of *reflection*, have been resolved' (530, 370).²²³ This shows that it is already known that one can utter actuality *neither* in the sense of a world as being-for-itself that would *not* simultaneously also be for another, *nor* as a world as it is *only* for another (e.g. as appearance). The words that mean only the one or the other world, and indeed only *mean* that in the sense of *designate*, essentially lack self and the power of language, which would overcome the *condition* under which alone such words can be valid, in the performance of actual speaking. What has been needed up to now is precisely the linguistic relation that is to be realised, which in speaking overcomes all limitations rendering them finite with respect to its possible truth and eliminates them—the relation in which the matter can be thought of in this way, e.g. the objection that it treats something *only* as thought of, is rendered impossible. It is about the need to break through appearing, or merely intelligible, worlds made only in fantasy or even in technology into the world that is essentially one and self-sufficient, into the self-conscious and self-determined world, into what is in the full sense a linguistic world.

Interpreting the absolute means uttering the word as λόγος itself. This can give us a good initial preparation for the language of logic turning at this point. What we have here is an external preparation for the the transition from this point on to the 'genuinely' logical forms; forms the *Logic* no longer merely considers but in which it itself *speaks*, thus the forms of concept, judgment, syllogism, genetic definitions of objectification and the idea including the method. These forms are all of them set absolute form right from the start. In order to

223 The sentence is quite obviously chiasmatically structured.

be able to set them and hence to speak in them, the *Logic* must previously have stood before the *in-itself* of all speaking, before its pure possibility and power (δύναμις); before its speaking-being. This resulted as a problem in the collapse of being and essence *qua* reflection. The problem is one of the *pure* in-itself—for it is this in relation to the preceding determinations or to determination itself—the problem of the *ab-solutum*, of what is unconnected in determinate language; which should simultaneously be the actuality of speaking. The difficulty of the problem consists in that this in-itself *necessarily* is concealed to all *conscious* speaking. There is an assumption here that cannot be thematised. In no explanation of ‘something’ can the *clarity* itself be explained. Each claim of a word from the most common and most finite to the fullest of the absolute form presupposes that within it speaking itself comes to speak—in finite determination unmediated and without insight into the self-mediation of speaking, while in logical determination it is the absolute knowing of this self-mediation, which has consciousness only as a moment. Up to this point the *Logic* was able to maintain itself in all its determinations, in which it had to believe that it had a content. Now however it is confronted with the difficulty when standing immediately before this in-itself that it as it were *sees through all* determinations to the one determining in-itself not uttered in them, and in fact as it also knows, it no longer sees a something there. Like Faust in the realm of the mothers, to illustrate this situation with a literary metaphor, it sees the ‘nothingness ... in eternally empty distance’: it must ‘learn the void, teach the void’, and if it appears to see something here, what it sees are but ‘schemas ... of all creatures’, reflections which know themselves to be externals and acknowledge themselves to be such.²²⁴ The absolute is immediately ‘the void’ (530, 370). And the λόγος finds in this domain of being-in-itself its own Helen, and she is: *absolute form*.

The logical problem of how to get from the *exigency* of the absolute at the end of appearance through to set absolute form in the concept comes down to *turning* the necessity, into which finite determination drives it, by means of an *individualisation* of the void of the *being* of precisely that necessity. This being will experience its reflection (cf. 529, 369) in Hegel’s ‘modal concepts’, becoming an objective individual of the absolute relation until its own individuation principle reduces the form of ‘objectivity’ of the individual to a semblance, thereby revealing the individual to be *concept*. On the level of the concept, the definition of the individual is its own *speech-individuum est suum fari*. But the *est* in that has transited into activity, and therefore it expresses *no*

224 Cf. Goethe, *Faust II*, verses 6246, 6232, 6290, 6289.

determination of the individual *as being* but instead as the power to negate such determinations. In the interpretation of the absolute, determinate speech experiences initially that it itself is negated. Simple determining is—as we have tried to show with the *Phenomenology*—the attempt to understand predicating as *forma veri*. Confronted with the absolute, predicating focusses on which predicates here occur to it; as such it is—and in the search for notions occurring to it also explicitly—‘*external reflection*’ (cf. 529, 369). This reflection intends to ‘consider’ the absolute (ibid.). But here there is nothing to see. The motion of considering, as Hegel refers to it, is now comparable to the theological *via negationis*; the absolute reveals itself to be ‘the negation of all predicates’ (530, 370). The intention of external reflection, of the *via negationis* is in no way simply to say nothing. Instead the subject of the determining should be held fast to as identical in the transition from one apophasis to the next. The identity of the *subiectum* of determination only *emerges* here *through* the motion of external reflection; it is, as Hegel says, ‘solid identity’ (ibid.).²²⁵ This identity now grows out of all predication so that external reflection, which is still trying to catch up with the in-itself of determining, vaguely imagines it ‘as the totality’ (ibid.). Based on this hazy thought what is unconnected in the determinate determination however is also ‘uttered as the position of all predicates’ (ibid.).²²⁶ Determining’s subject existing in itself is thus ‘the most formal contradiction’ (ibid.) of two motions, one of which absorbs all determinate predicates, while the other equally expels all determinate predicates from it. The non-connecting subject proves to be only in this contradiction unconnected; for it is only to the extent that one cannot determinately, explicitly say what it is; it is as such *the other* of determinate speech. Through the absolute’s own *being* then, *the entire sphere* of determinate speech is overcome. The being of the absolute *against* the speech about it is *contradiction*. In the contradiction, the external interpretation sees nothing more and suffers its demise. But it is in the contradiction that the ‘*showing*’ of the absolute, ‘its *own* interpretation’ (ibid.) of itself, *begins*. Its being is its showing but as the showing that is no longer *determinate* showing, it is instead clarity itself. As non-connecting showing, it is not showing ‘of’ and not showing ‘for’ but showing as δῆλωσις, not deixis. In order to bring this in-itself of mediation, of speech and of all determinate meaning into the field of view at all and to understand it as the

225 That ‘solid’ still in the one-sided determination of passive having-become; cf. just the expression ‘*a solid substance*’ in the Jacobi review (TW4, 433).

226 In Kant in line with the ur-division of the idea, both sides are separate: the unconditional of the fourth antinomy is indeterminate in terms of content; while the ideal is only determining.

decisive problem of a speculative logic, i.e. the logic of the production of all content out of the logic of form, it was important to have discarded for the 'absolute' all representations including the abstract theist kind. This representation too still clarifies 'something' in a clarity that its form itself does *not* mediate. Its logical problem is not, as may appear to a weltanschauung, that as such a theistic notion it wants to say *something*, its problem is that it wants *to say something*, that it relates something set finite to the infinite being-in-itself of showing in general, thereby staking its claim to it—just as, by the way, the opposed finite representation does too—ultimately then that its something is *one shown*. What is shown is supposed to be being, 'unreflected immediacy' (ibid.). It is thus, as has been shown, and it is, because it is shown thus, not only so in representation but 'outside', the being is 'the *outside*', 'but with the essential qualification *related to reflection*' (530, 370), i.e. being shown. Conversely, the essence is the *inside*, what is mediating in this relation, *what shows* or the proof that representation believes it has. But then a finite representation holds the two apart: it gives the showing proof for the 'inside' of the process of understanding in which is supposed to be understood that what is shown is not only an inner but *is* 'outside'—or also conversely: the proof is external to the something because it is just the inside of the process of understanding, while it is supposed to prove that the something is something internal to itself or essence independent of whether it is externally understood or not.²²⁷ The finite representation of something distinguishing between inner and outer in this way names the third, the difference itself, which is supposed to be 'agreement', the truth. Now the truth as a *third* can itself only be an external or, what is the same thing, one solely inner, so that it *as* third expresses the finitude of the representation. The absolute in contrast is not a representation of something precisely because it is itself the unity of inner and outer, of the showing and of what is shown, namely itself only *showing*, 'manifestation' (e.g. 541, 380) and as such it is 'the absolute unity of the two' first named terms (530, 370 f.).²²⁸ The category of the absolute is immediately the philosophically unavoidable concept of the destruction of all finite representation (δóξα) by the inherent showing, which certainly does shine also in the representation,²²⁹ but which nevertheless is a

227 The dialectic of the inner and outer is for Hegel a favoured example for the form of unmediated identity; cf. above note 222 and additionally Hegel, Encyc. §§ 139 ff.

228 Cf. on the concept of manifestation as *pure* showing the already quoted § 383 in the Encyc. In the case of the spirit the outer overcome has the real (intuitive) sense of nature, the inner overcome only that of 'inner universality' and '*negative power*' of life, Encyc. § 374 and the context.

229 In Hegel's *Jena Metaphysics of 1804/5* the 'absolute concept' is also called a 'simple destroy-ing within itself' (GW VII, 134). According to the course of the *Logic* but especially through

moment not of it but as has to be demonstrated, of the *concept* (λόγος). This is why Hegel says already at this point, which is still purely negative dialectic in the development of the absolute, that it is its 'destiny ... to be *absolute form*' (531, 371). As we have already seen in the concept of the individual, the negative unity or identity and the totality defining itself genetically are form moments of this form. Every determination of absolute form is not 'simple determination' but present being of the absolute particularisation under the principle of individuation of the μεταβολή, such that each or *the* determination is strictly now 'itself the *totality*' and 'the complete *content* of the whole' (ibid.). The content is itself relation but as active relating of the *limit* as medium term of determination against its sides. As content now of the absolute or of the total in-itself, the limit is not only *formal* totality, as it could still be expressed by means of self-determination via simple determinate negation. The limit is much more determination of the 'absolute content', character of the determination *as such* and for that reason the 'negative form connection' intrinsic to it (ibid.); in *every* content of the *absolute*, as one could say, all content as such disappears. An arbitrary determinate something shown, understood as content of the absolute, which thus that *form* has in its own right, through which it *shines* in the showing as such as the pure indeterminate identity of all clarity, this something shown displays intrinsically the *method* of reduction of the determinate to the in-itself or the '*one* substantial identity' (ibid.). It is comprehended in every determinate 'that the determination as such [is] a strictly transparent semblance' (ibid.). We shall see that with this expression of determination as a totality, namely that it is *semblance*, it attains the best of what the essence has to offer it: the inversion of merely passive being into active *Seyn* or action of being, activity. If determination as such becomes semblance, then this does not mean that the former 'apparent' determinations now stand in place of the 'correct' ones. The former 'reflected determinations', which appear 'to the imagination or the faculty of representation as true being valid in and for itself' (ibid.), disappear in the absolute, i.e. in the showing instead of the showing of themselves. This demonstrates that the determination as such only says *something* because its antinomical doubling is broken *enough* to let showing itself appear as the ground of determinate determination. Determination in general enters into the absolute in-itself by showing

the determination arrived at in it of the absolute form, the absolute of the SoL is already the in-itself of the concept or of free speech, which according to its logical constitution is in the right if it destroys all finite determination *logically*, not as 'formal, unsystematic dialectic' of external reflection (SoL 530, GW XI, 370). The right of destroying lies not in some sort of subjective, arbitrary volition but in absolute negativity.

intrinsically that it is the form of determination *as such*, through the power of which everything that is determinately determinate goes into its absolutely determining ground.

The section of Hegel's *Jena Metaphysics of 1804/5* that is the best candidate to be regarded as the forerunner of the chapter on the absolute in his SoL is the 'System of principles'. Here for the first time the in-itself of the logic, cognition, presents itself as 'a system of absolute being-for-itself',²³⁰ and here also are presented the three moments of the absolute as knowing through the principles: identity (interpretation of the absolute), exclusion of the third (absolute attribute; opposition), and ground (modus). In these principles, knowing is self-equal and self-sufficient.²³¹ According to the Jena programme, it is taken from the motion of the logical dialectical course in these principles, which are the forms of self-sufficiency of the 'absolute I',²³² with the qualification that now the logic can also be recapitulated as a knowing of its terms out of absolute totality. In the mature logic programme of Hegel's SoL, those principles are presented not only considerably more differentiated, they are also no longer immediately the moments of the absolute or of the in-itself of all determination; instead as terms of reflection or essentialities they belong to the immediacy of the mediation of essence, which just as immediately has the first immediacy of being outside it. *Nevertheless* the terms of reflection are recapitulated in the absolute and indeed as has already emerged, what comes first is *identity* in the interpretation of the absolute. In *identity*, the totality of showing is set in all determination. But this side concerns in the SoL only the previous 'inner' or 'essence', which now as essentiality arrives completed at itself. The earlier 'outside' or 'being' is also recapitulated in the absolute and in fact as absolutely identical with that 'inner'. The showing is initially

230 Hegel, GW VII, 128. In an approximate ordering the topics of the *Jena Metaphysics* correspond to those of the actuality chapter and of the concept taken together, thus those of absolute form as being in itself and of the set absolute form. The 'metaphysics of objectivity' would correspond in this to the moments of the absolute relation; similarly in Kant the forms of the syllogism correspond to the topics of the *metaphysica specialis*: soul-substantiality; world-causality; highest being-reciprocity (disjunction). What is still lacking in Jena is the absolute interpretation of the 'modalities', which would have been difficult to accomplish without the developed concept of absolute negativity.

231 That the principles are easily related to those of Fichte—with, importantly, decisive re-interpretation of the third—is obvious; cf. the remarks on this by F. Longato in the commentary edited by F. Chiereghin, *Logica e metafisica di Jena (1804–05)*, Trient 1982, 444 ff., who also makes the connection to Hegel's critique of the 'philosophy of reflection'.

232 Cf. Hegel, GW VII, 127. It already became clear in the Jena metaphysics that the category I according to Hegel's insight is at once unconditioned and *deducible* (namely as cognition in its own right).

not only total identity but with that *ipso facto* also total quality or content.²³³ The logical status of the absolute is that the first true mediation of the two modes of immediacy at the beginning of the book on essence emerges here. The problem of essence is: how can an immediate thinking possibly utter the truth about immediate being? It is in itself solved when the determination of thinking is so constituted that it is overcome into absolute quality—the understanding thus is in itself rational—and conversely the determination of being is overcome into the absolute identity or more precisely *is as this*. The problem is *in itself* solved, for the solution is given only for a reflection that knows itself to be external, which immediately is intrinsically not absolute identity but is a manifold of determination and correspondingly does not utter the absolute content, instead obstinately persisting in a mere formality. The logical status of speech ‘about’ the absolute is thus being-external-to-itself, the motion *only* in semblance, which this *only* knows without immediately knowing how it was able to get outside it. External reflection is in Hegel’s argument not arbitrarily set opposed to the immediate absolute, e.g. in the sense of an external method conceived of ‘teleologically’, in which it indeed must ‘somehow’ move forward. It is much more about seeing that the language status, which knows itself *in general* in view of the in-itself of speaking according to its *setting*, is necessarily the knowledge of the alienation of all determinate speech. Thus Parmenides in knowing the ὄν knew also the δόξα.²³⁴ Correspondingly the further motion of the absolute all the way to the concept is *just as much* also the motion of external speech into the concept. It is the same self that becomes linguistic form distinct from itself from out of the concentrated content of the absolute just as much as it is that which gathers itself into the comprehension of the concept from out of the immediate selflessness of reflection. Now the notion that it instead is *only* the motion of the absolute to its setting but not also, conversely, the motion of the setting into its in-itself is the last *objective* semblance that still has any standing left in essence. In this semblance, *being* is once more given precedence over its being-known, which last in fact rather

233 In Jena the principles were still assigned to the terms of quantity: unity, plurality, totality. Especially in the second case however the qualitative re-interpretation of plurality by means of the concept of the other of itself is not to be missed (cf. esp. Hegel, GW VII, 133 f.).

234 Parmenides can equally with Spinoza be drawn upon for the beginning that absolute form makes with the absolute; in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel stresses that Parmenides was thinking of the ‘strictly absolute necessity determined within itself (ἀνάγκη, δίκη)’ and hence ‘went beyond the desolate concept of infinity’ (TW18, 289). The δόξα is in contrast simple nothingness, first negation in the sense of the *determinatio* of Spinoza (cf. Hegel, TW18, 288).

completely divests itself of itself as such. This *completeness* however is the point of the turn into the self.

What external reflection knows in view of the absolute is this, that *in itself* the truth has been uttered. That reflection lies in the 'beyond' of this in-itself and is the 'motion' of the 'diverse differences and terms' the absolute for its part has 'behind it' (531, 371). The truth about the absolute and reflection would be that they both have *their* beyond in each other and hence inherently *no* longer have *any* beyond. To reflection, the absolute shows itself as its beyond in that all reflection's terms 'have been submerged' into the absolute as if into an 'abyss' (532, 372). Meanwhile it turns out that just as in the transition from the negative to the positive infinite proposition, this loss of determination has:

simultaneously a *positive* side ..., because in suffering its downfall, the finite demonstrates that this connection to the absolute lies in its nature or that in its own right it contains the absolute (ibid.).

That unassuming phrase *in its own right* is the decisive term according to which the absolute is already there or is already 'by us'.²³⁵ It is in the *semblance* character of determinate speech there, for the semblance is the broken medium term that leads determination on the one side into the 'abyss—*Abgrund*' and on the other into the 'ground—*Grund*'.

Semblance is not *nothing*, rather it is reflection, *relation* to the absolute; it *is* semblance to the extent that *the absolute shines within it* (ibid.).

The *persistence* of semblance is nothing other than its relatedness to the in-itself. The measure of the common claim that the sphere of semblance is that of motion is only taken by referring this motion to what is at rest but now the motion no longer has that only outside it. For the 'rest' of the absolute is that of motion, which is shown initially by the fact that external reflection holds fast to the finite determinations as in motion, although still as determinate determinations, so that reflection 'thus still preserves the finite from its disappearing and considers it as an expression and image of the absolute' (ibid.). The reflection that knows itself only externally knows that it always only has something 'preliminary' to say, because it regards the forms of its speech themselves as in motion, and yet believes that with every something it mentions it is capable of 'picturing' the absolute. It forgets, however that an '*in-itself*' cannot

235 Hegel, *PhoS.* § 74.

be pictured, that in fact the in-itself brings out the 'modesty' of that preliminary nature of a 'persisting' of something as presumption:

the transparency of the finite ... ends in complete disappearance; for there is nothing to the finite that could contain a difference with the absolute; it is a medium that is absorbed by that which shines through it (ibid.).

Nothing finite says the in-itself, not even 'provisionally'. More precisely it does not say that as long as it attempts to save the finite *as such* with its tentativeness. What is only finite is *not* supposed to be the semblance of the absolute. But it is already known that 'being' here can no longer mean anything other than semblance of the absolute as of absolute quality; 'the positive interpretation of the absolute is thus itself only a shining, a seeming' (532, 372). Everything 'wanting to be other' than this *seeming* is 'a nothing the interpretation takes up *from outside*' (ibid.). It is an arbitrary beginning of the interpretation or of the making-to-seem but *as* arbitrary, the beginning is 'a term' that does 'not have its beginning in the absolute but only *its end*' (ibid.).

Being able to begin with a 'term external to the absolute' (ibid.) as such still means being able to begin there where there is *only* an end of the absolute. Just as the status of the merely identical in-itself required the status of the mere formality of speech in order to let itself be developed, so the status of the finitude conscious of itself—e.g. Spinoza's—is a finitude *of the absolute*. Alienating itself in view of the absolute means having caught sight of an absolute that is also only the absolute of *this alienation*, 'only *the absolute of an external reflection*' (533, 372). Looked at in terms of the logic of reflection, the in-itself of identity goes on to the in-itself of difference; in terms of the logic of being, absolute quality goes on to absolute alterity. In the consciousness of the emptiness and vanity of its own action, determinate in each case, external reflection had pointed to *the* showing. That was reflection pointing equally to 'the void'. With that it pointed to an in-itself that bore the determination of its own action on it, while absolute identity was also confirmed by that. *Identical* with the pointing to the showing however the absolute points to *itself* in that it is pointed to from outside it. The externality is *its* externality and the 'interpretation of the absolute [is] *its own* action' (532, 372), i.e. it is itself in the *refraction* in which the pointing to the pointing is *outside* this; it is in the *refraction of determination* in general and with that 'in a'—better here would be: in *the*—'determination or it is *attribute*'. The *division* (*tribuere*) of the attribute lay as a *self-division* essentially already in the determination of *seeming*. A seeming is a connecting of two opposed immediacies into each other. Formerly the *one* immediacy—that

of the external reflection—only went *into* a seeming that itself was the absolute medium term; it only arrived and the determinations from which it departed and which it brought with it were made to seem by the absolute seeming; to that extent the absolute was as a purely *identical* pointing, ‘only the *negative* of reflection’ (533, 372).²³⁶ But then the *other* immediacy goes in the same way into the seeming: the pointing itself is determined by the *seeming* relation to reflection as *being* its (first) negation; with this it is as such in a determination, which is in fact the absolute determination. According to its *concept*, it is *for another*, i.e. determined to be not simple seeming: this seeming proves to be the medium term of the mediation of conceptual particularisation in the pointing. Since the particularisation simultaneously happens through the seeming of pointing, it is particularisation (‘interpreting—laying out’ now as *actual* path into the outer) as *self-determination*. The absolute is with that ‘itself absolute form’, the power of its own particularisation, which is ‘what makes it seem in itself and determines it to be the attribute’ (533, 373). Absolute seeming has *disjoined* itself to absolute determination, for it is the *two* immediacies of seeming that have from now on given themselves a medium term of their connection in the determination or in the attribute. What is unconnected has become self-connection, even if this is initially only the *determinate* negation of unconnectedness.

We proceeded on the assumption that the logical question of the absolute is that of inherent, pure mediation *as such*, of the *speaking* of language, of the *clarity* of what is clear or of the *act of meaning* in all meaning. Pointing’s transition to the attribute as such confronts us with the task of thinking the difference within it in general. Methodologically, Hegel’s path to it was that of holding what is purely different from pure identity at bay from it in which however it turned out that the abolition of the difference in what is different turned out to import the difference into the absolute, making it into one differentiated. Clearly then, an in-itself is differentiated as such and not at all ‘everything’, although the logical reference to the total in-itself proceeded from the assumption that even all set determination meant *nothing* to it. In the attribute, its for-itself stepped out of the absolute and—which is here the same thing—its being-for-another, or it stepped *also* into it, for in the case of the absolute, as we have already referenced, there can be no talk of a going out;²³⁷ it is already absolute relation and only immanent connection of its extremes or moments. Expressed in terms of the light metaphor suggested by Hegel

236 In the Jena text parallel to this we find a ‘negation of reflection in general’ (Hegel, GW VII, 130).

237 Cf. once more Hegel, GW VII, 34.

himself: the taking back of all finite visibles into pure light sees in this pure light *nothing* and knows the finite as the shining of the light; but *that* it sees nothing is itself the determination of pure light, the side of its being for itself and its being for another, not an οὐκ ὄν but a μὴ ὄν and the potentiality not of finite visibility so much as of infinitely rendering visible as of the *other* of pure nothing *itself*. Purity turns from the nothing of mere abstraction, which it immediately is, to the nothing of mediating. It is a medium term, not an extreme and in that sense the attributive division into the extremes as such.

c) *Absolute Attribute*

As attribute, the absolute as such is cognised in its determination; it has the character of being absolutely formal content. The attribute is not one of the earlier determinate determinations, from whose finitude was explicitly abstracted; instead it is 'the absolute in a *form term*' (533, 373) expressing its *inner* form. Those finite terms were not attributes but mere predicates that suffered their downfall in their subject, because compared to it they were only capable of a semblance of independence. As *inner* form, the attribute is 'what is the same, only *externally*' (ibid.); it is *determination* of the absolute but as '*determinate* form or negation in general' (ibid.). For the absolute or the in-itself, the attribute is the language form that has firmly established itself as this *form*. It is form because it has set the in-itself in the first negation. It was able to set it because the content of the in-itself was itself the first negation; as such the attribute *corresponds* to its content as well and is 'the whole content of the absolute' (ibid.).

As essential characteristic differentiating from the simple determinate predicates, it is from this content that the attribute assumes the *totality form*. It is what 'earlier appeared as a world' (ibid.) and *persists* as totality, essentially thus as allness of predicates, as a *sphere* or *horizon* of predication. Traditionally the theory of the concept regarded *attributes* as essential characteristics that followed from the *absolute* determination of a concept and were set opposed to the *extraessentialia*, the *modi* and *relations* of the concept; indeed Kant too in his *Logic* differentiated the level of determination of a content or concept in this way.²³⁸ For attributes of substance modern philosophy since Descartes has had *extensio* and *cogitatio*; Spinoza designated his substance (or

238 According to Kant the 'constitutive' characteristics of a concept are those that belong to it as '*essentialia in sensu strictissimo*' or in itself (absolutely); none of them is derivable from another. The *attributes* in contrast are 'only derived' from the absolute characteristics, 'as e.g. the three angles in the concept of a triangle are from the three sides'; *modi* are inner, *relations* outer extra-essential characteristics, e.g. for humans erudition (*modus*) or '*being lord or bondsman*' (relation), Kant, *Jäsche Logik*, Introduction VIII (AA IX, 60 f.), *Über eine Entdeckung* AA VIII, 245 f., and *Metaphysik Pölitz* AA XXVIII, 553.

God) certainly as '*constans infinitis attributis*' but he allowed only the two Cartesian terms to be knowable by the human understanding.²³⁹ In his doctrine of the concept, Hegel, who, we recall, treated the in-itself in the actuality chapter, continues the tradition with the characteristic deviation of only speaking of *one* attribute.²⁴⁰ Logically, this is completely consistent, for through the simple negation of the in-itself what has positively emerged in the attribute is only the *simple* horizon of the setting of terms, whatever they may be in general; the totality of this horizon or of the attribute sphere 'is set as its (sc. of the absolute) *true and sole persistence*', it is 'set as the absolute' totality (533 f., 373). Fundamentally speaking however one can just as well assume '*several attributes*' (534, 373); indeed taking Spinoza's *infinita attributa* seriously, one could also claim infinitely many, for the positive terms by which they would be distinguished from each other *all* fall into the *one sphere* of settings and this itself presents the positivity of the absolute. 'Thus are in them all terms *set as overcome*'; they are but their own '*inessential*' persistence, while their content is that of the universal essence.

The positivity of the sphere of the attribute is, as positivity of *the absolute* or as the setting '*total in-itself*', only 'the positive semblance that the interpretation gives itself through the attribute' (534, 374), which is not in any sense that superseded positivity, of existence or of thinghood but instead that of the semblance of the absolute, at least insofar as this semblance is taken as not silent but as the medium term of a speech capability connected to the in-itself. By means of this medium term, the form of language was able to fix itself, and this is the whole positive that this is all about; but it is fixed in absolute seeming and 'hence also set immediately as mere semblance—the negative as negative' (ibid.). Moreover the positive *determinatio* of the absolute is *negatio*; but as determination of the $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon$ of the in-itself, that *determinatio* is *inherently* already *negation of the negation*, except that on the level of the attribute still the immediacy of the shining or seeming stands between negation as being-in-itself and as set, through which both appear unrelated to each other, while attributing can maintain itself immediately as the inner form of the absolute essence.

239 Spinoza, *Ethik* I, prop. 11; ibid. II, prop. 1 f.; for the whole cf. H.K. Kohlenberger and L. Oeing-Hanhoff, article: 'Attribut' in *Hist. Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol. 1, cols. 612–614.

240 On the claim that 'thinking and extension or being' are 'strictly one' even before the *Phenomenology* cf. his *Jena Metaphysik* GW VII, 152. The logical argument for the coincidence of the *many* with the *one* attribute is the coincidence of absolute difference with absolute identity. The determinate difference, in which the attribute as *only* form term merely shines in each side, still makes itself absolute immediately, i.e. without mediation of the determinate determination successively in each side.

Still the immediacy of this maintenance is only that of the seeming, i.e. it is *inherent* to this; the attribute disappears because it persists in the seeming, also in the same way 'in the *simple absolute*' (ibid.). With the attribute all that has been said is *that* the absolute is capable of determination but then also as *its* determination it is identical with the absolute and hence returns back into it. The in-itself is now expressly the in-itself of setting as a whole, which, Nevertheless still does not make it a *determinate* setting. The attribute expresses the absolute as a *universal* power no longer only of absorbing but also of setting determination; this as absolute difference is again only the absolute identity in which *all* form of determination setting is 'in itself null, an external semblance, or merely ... a *manner*' (ibid.). The externality of reflection continues in the contingency of such a modus that vanishes completely in the absolute, which as '*relative absolute*' (533, 373), as a referencing devoid of reference, is its *universal* relating to the in-itself in which it suffers a destiny *identical* for all modi.

Just as the absolute initially was inherent identity, so is the attribute now just inherent difference. The determination of the attribute as the *horizon* of all predication makes it easy to explain this. For the horizon of showing in general is only the showing *as* showing, as identical to itself in all difference. Positively, the horizon is the limit, the form or determination of inherent showing, and it is within this limit that the showing itself is expressed or set. Negatively, however the limit is simultaneously nothing external to the showing but has already been taken back into it; the limit is the showing itself. In terms of the meaning that the limit has as set in the individual and at the same time as overcome by it, the weight of the determination of the attribute is already clear here. The concept as existing truth is individualised in its horizon but in such a way that this horizon is the concept *itself* as well as being the form of setting of its other without being *objectifiable* for another. For the attempt at objectification, the horizon or the attribute vanishes again in the identity of indeterminacy. In the concept, the showing is not accomplished without a horizon but instead precisely *mediated* by it as by the principle of differentiation. But then the horizon is never shown as such, for if it were passively *shown*, then it would cease to be a horizon. Unity and singularity of Hegel's attribute are in this way maintained; for if the horizon as such is not showable, then it also has no showable determination—or also: it has an infinite determination, namely only again that of the pure universality of its *self-determination*. The positive determination of the attribute, which again vanishes into identity given in itself, can be deceptive as to what is going on once the limit is gained; it may seem that it is indeed once again only the first identity—and indeed it is *also* that. The fact is however that it is the power of difference or the capacity to be related to another without losing itself in that. This fact is still concealed in the

attribute as it has been considered up to now because the self has not yet truly emerged, obstinately remaining instead within the in-itself. It emerges once the horizon is no longer only determination *qua* simple negation but can be determined as a moment of absolute negativity.

d) *Modus of the Absolute*

The section in Hegel's SoL on the modus of the absolute opens with a highly illuminating presentation of the attribute as a *syllogism*. The attribute is two extremes and similarly also their medium term. On the one hand it is the unrelated in-itself of showing:

‘as in the simple *identity* with itself’ and on the other, the set horizon of this showing as determination of the showing, the showing set as showing, simple *negating* of the showing itself and this ‘as negation is formal reflection-in-itself’ (534, 374).

That the two extremes—identity and reflection-in-itself of same—emerge both as terms of *essence*, corresponds to the status of the attribute as merely form of the absolute or only the relative absolute. The syllogism of the attribute has the one-sidedness of being a syllogism of form or of reflection but not yet of showing that the absolute is just as much set quality, i.e. being in the determination of being. When it is said of the syllogism's ‘*medium term*’ that in its determination the attribute ‘is both the absolute and the determination’ (ibid.), then in the determination, first it mediated as a term of reflection and only indirectly as a term of being. In other words: the determination that the attribute gives to the absolute is itself still immediate *medium term* of what is given as determinate or only its *reflection universal*. This means that showing has a horizon in which everything determinate as such shines or seems, hence it has the *reflex* of the absolute in it but what is simply shown within this horizon maintains in this reflecting an immediate passivity making it the mirror of the absolute, which shows only the absolute—but *not* this, that it is a mirror or its being. The determination of the absolute is ‘the *negative* as *negative*, the reflection *external* to the absolute’ (535, 374). It is undeniably *its* determination but *only* as reflection (negation), and for that reason external to it. The modus which determination shows only in its own right, shows the *reflection* of the absolute as external, and ‘this is how it is the being-outside-itself of the absolute’ (ibid.). Once again it is important for understanding Hegel's method in the development of the absolute to the modus to keep in mind that it is not as if the modus is *linearly* deduced from out of the absolute. Hegel's philosophy is at no point a ‘system of deduction’ in the sense of the finite representation of deduction

in the understanding. It is also not anything like what only remains left over after a treatment of the category of unrelational in-itself as it were falling from the table. It was on that basis that the misunderstanding could arise that Hegel considers the absolute thematically, and as such by sleight of hand *presupposes* as a whole the sphere of the modi or of modality, precisely the externality with respect to the absolute, in order to pull it out of his sleeve when the occasion arises, when stuck in the immanent deduction of the absolute, using it as an external solution to the problem of progressive determination. Against that view, we have already said that the logical status of the indeterminate absolute and the status of external reflection as external to itself are *the same* status, so that also the compressed content or the absolute quality of the in-itself, which is as such in its own terms immediately the *void*, is identical with the self-externality of reflection, its emptiness, which indeed with this disposes over all terms of content. The logical precursors of the absolute and its own determinate logic allow us to assert the same thing as being or as essence so long as each is thought of as a total in-itself. What emerges in the presentation of the absolute is in fact only this self-like quality which becomes explicit and which then is called *actuality*. But then it is fundamentally *not* possible to say that Hegel shows how the in-itself or what is unrelated *moves towards* reflection or to the understanding as modus,²⁴¹ which motion would only be that in the logic of being into essence. Neither can one say that Hegel seeks to show how the modus or reflection *moves towards* the absolute or makes itself conformable to this, which was in fact the whole motion from the beginning of essence all the way to the absolute. As happened in the transition from the essential relation into the absolute, now reflection understands, because of the logical character of its object, that it no longer understands anything, no longer actually thinks the object 'adequately' in the sense of the objectivity of the understanding. If one wishes to orient oneself to these two motions, one must assert the following as logically appropriate: *both* motions *simultaneously* happen and they *are the same* total but internally differentiated motion. The absolute is neither the subject of this motion nor is it the modus. It is vital now that the absolute subject be thought of precisely as *the motion itself*, the *relation*

241 That the modus can be taken as finite understanding finds its immediate and external justification in Spinoza (the *intellectus* is determined in Eth. I, prop. 31 dem. as 'certu(s) tantum modu(s) cogitandi', thus as the attribute of the 'cogitatio', beside that there are other 'modi cogitandi' like 'cupiditas' and 'amor'). Now the logically material right is this: that the modus in Spinoza is 'id, quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur' (Eth. I, def. 5), *being-for-one as being-for-another*, and with that the given expression of understanding. Cf. also Hegel, SoL 537 f., GW XI, 377.

of these extremes—ultimately, taken for themselves, mere semblance—the first *total* relation that Hegel's logic thinks. In the section on the absolute, the total relation, the *essential* determination of the absolute form, is still only *in itself*; in the chapter on the modalities, it undergoes its reflection and is hence *being-for-itself*; in the terms of the absolute relation, finally, it is *truly set* and all that is left is that it bring itself together out of this setting as self (abolish the semblance as if 'relatedness' in its total aspect were still an objective determination) in order to become the concept.²⁴²

For the concept of modus at this stage, this assessment of method means that the two following statements simply mean the same thing. First: modus has the determination of the absolute only in it, it reflects it but in the reflex does not utter its being. Second: the modus is already outside the absolute (clearly not that it is possible to explain how it managed to get there), or in its whole sphere, it is the being-outside-itself of the absolute. The first of these statements describes the status of modus and the second that of the absolute but the important point remains that they essentially mean the same thing. Modus is:

'the loss' of the absolute 'into the variability and contingency of being, its having transited into the opposite *without returning back* into itself; diversity in the terms of form and content devoid of totality' (ibid.).

But the 'loss' of the absolute has immediately two aspects. The absolute is lost in the modus—by the way its reflection but this as the 'variability and contingency of being' (!), and conversely the modus is lost in the absolute—this understood as its being confronting it now under the term of reflection of identity and absorbing its determinate determination. In the double sense of the loss of the absolute is expressed the insight that the basically active nature of losing is the relation of the two extremes and that *this* constitutes their real *medium term*, which in the attribute was only one-sidedly expressed and for that reason could only appear as a positive medium term. With reference to this *whole*

242 If the representation of God were substituted for the categorial absolute, the result would be the not inconsiderable problem that this empty God would indeed be so empty that it would not be the subject of the logical development but only a moment in it, thus something would be done to it by the logical subject. Hegel does not criticise the notion of substance in Spinoza by somehow *replacing* it with another; what he does is demonstrate that this as a category, which is strictly irrefutable as a representation, is not capable of adequately constituting the concept of God, instead being only a determinate moment of it.

relation, the modus is 'externality *set* as externality', as one in contrast could call the absolute the interiority *set* as interiority, namely of the same relation. Both sides are '*the reflection of the form*'—previously the attribute—'*in itself*', both are '*identity with itself*' and for that reason, according to the term of reflection that which '*the absolute is*' (ibid.). In this way modus presents the absolute in itself, so it is also its truth just as the absolute was previously formally the truth of modus.

The expression of the *truth* of modus must be that it 'is the semblance as semblance' (ibid.) or, more appropriately, '*seeming* that is *set as seeming*' (535, 375). Already in the term of '*mere manner*' (535, 374) lies for Hegel the expression of the truth, for it talks about a self-relating, which certainly is other ('type' or 'manner') but in that nevertheless itself, so that the alterity is in fact what is untrue or mere semblance that is known to be such. The truth of the attribute was the formal or immediate correspondence of the outer, of the form term with the inner as the essential content. The truth of modus turns out to be in contrast *self-mediation* of content by itself with form, producing thus as it were its own proof. The semblance that is *known as* semblance is no longer only the negative as negative, i.e. the absolute negating of the in-itself as determination in itself set as in the attribute. Instead it is 'self-relating negativity' (535, 375), i.e. the negative in-itself set as negating the negative (determinate) setting, and just as much, conversely, the set determination as negating of the merely inherent indeterminacy. As single the semblance is an immediate simultaneity of immediacy—which simply is—and of its overcoming; a coffin dodger has immediately the characteristics of a corpse but is in fact its overcoming, namely living vitality. In the semblance as semblance the immediate is known as immediately negated, thus as having transited from being into essence, at the same time however the essence is regarded as this immediacy, and consequently also has transited from that to being. In the example vitality in general must be understood as *capable* of the characteristics of the corpse. The truth can only be *produced* through the double transition of each into each and only as such *is* truth; for themselves, the extremes of being and essence are respectively untrue, because each immediately negates the other and makes it disappear.

It should also be taken into consideration *what* self-referential negativity actually brings out in the complementing transitions as the truth. Neither the mere in-itself nor the setting can, as we have said, present the truth; with respect to each other, they are extremes but in the sense of a complete disjunction. In the example of the expression "coffin dodger" the determinations *constitutive* for it—"dead" and "living"—relate to each other such that they admit

of no third; the third is only their determination “coffin dodger” itself, which is their διαίρεσις in this way presented as their relation. The *connection* of the complete disjunction to the *unity* of the meaning or determination is immediately the contradiction of their determinate moments *with respect to each other*. The truth which the semblance known as semblance expresses with this is nothing less than the autopoiesis of determination, producing itself as ‘genus’ of completely opposed moments and as such as true connection—true *because it contains the contradiction*. The truth is a new universal that in this way was neither in the indeterminate absolute nor in the externality of reflection. It was only in them as *in-itself*, while now it is *set* as absolutely absolute, namely as the absolute relation of the two sides. This total relation moving out of the semblance as semblance is immediate *actuality*, which now is more precisely determined in terms of its character as *contradiction*. It is the contradiction as ‘absolute being’ (535, 375). Indeed it must be kept in mind that actuality came out of *semblance*. Only the semblance as semblance could overcome the independence of both being and reflection, leading both into their *negative* universal. The universal of the absolute relation is for this reason initially only *negatively* set; the ‘modalities’ are the total reflections of this *negativity*, which immediately is indeterminacy, and it is only in these reflections that the negative universal emerges as determined by itself or as *affirmative* universal (substance). What is going on here as a whole however is this: it is about bringing the absolute difference or complete incommensurability between the non-referential in-itself and the sphere of relation or of being-for-itself as a whole to categorial terms. One may not set Hegel’s modalities lower than this. They present the sides of this absolute difference constituting the absolute break in determination, the broken *medium term* of determining, and they do this as totality forms. They will therefore already include thematisation of the individuation principle of self-determination in the μεταβολή; for the individual is only actual in a self-determination realising the in-itself (possibility), the setting (actuality) and then the true relating of both (necessity) of these sides of the absolute difference or this relation’s pure indeterminacy.

One understands now why Hegel can say that the absolute only gains ‘absolute form’ through *determination* and is ‘not what *is equal* but what *sets* itself *equal* to itself’ (ibid.). As determinate determination, it had to appear initially as ‘most extreme externality’ (ibid.), as the finitude that only vanishes. One can illustrate the logical relation with the struggle which in the *Phenomenology* the Enlightenment or insight enters into with determinate—indeed all too determinate—faith. The Enlightenment perhaps still relies on an abstract ‘être

suprême’, which however because it is determined as only ‘*the void*’,²⁴³ has nothing but the status of the absolute of the logic of essence. This certainly suffices to enter the fray against the determinate determinations of faith according to their finitude and to make them vanish into the void. What the Enlightenment has on its side comes from self-consciousness, which for it is indeed only the ‘simplicity of *negativity* reflected in itself’,²⁴⁴ while faith in itself was already ‘*all content*’,²⁴⁵ just that it confused *the* matter (the self) with *many* determinate matters, which was why the Enlightenment understood it as solely superstition. What the Enlightenment has not comprehended is that the matter or the self is capable of determinate determination at all; thus it goes beyond its logical right as soon as it supposes for each determination as such that it is *eo ipso* about ‘semblance’, ‘impure intention’,²⁴⁶ priestly deception but in no way about the self. By falling for the gesture of ‘scrutinising’ as putative wisdom, it makes wisdom itself impossible for it and instead can only make, as Hegel says, ‘noise’.²⁴⁷ The vanishing of wisdom on its side announces itself above all in that it arrives ‘at the in itself null and void position of sense certainty’,²⁴⁸ and then becomes effectively positivist; with that however it perpetrates against faith ‘the injustice of grasping its object as if it were its own’²⁴⁹ and as such very easily graspable. Thus what is for faith a sacrament becomes merely a ‘piece of bread’;²⁵⁰ a work of art becomes the reproduction of everyday banality or a human face becomes an “ensemble” of social, biological, psychological, historical, economic or whatever other finite *conditions* and with ease of comprehension ensured by the mediation of the empty absolute, science enters into long-standing institutionalisation. Nevertheless despite this massive regression, it is important to note that the Enlightenment, the recourse to the indeterminate absolute and its attribute, is in the right against immediate determination. Once infected by the Enlightenment, faith cannot maintain itself in that first immediacy; instead it has gathered for ‘faith together only its *own thoughts*’,²⁵¹ which previously lay strewn throughout the manifold of determinations. What is philosophical in it is precisely that the determinations of faith are *inverted* by the Enlightenment; for it sees ‘in a *determinate* moment the whole’ and

243 Cf. Hegel, PhoS § 562, GW IX, 305; PhoS § 559, GW IX, 304.

244 PhoS § 546, GW IX, 295.

245 PhoS § 541, GW IX, 293.

246 PhoS § 556, GW IX, 301.

247 PhoS § 547, GW IX, 296.

248 PhoS § 553, GW IX, 300.

249 Ibid.

250 Ibid.

251 PhoS § 564, GW IX, 306.

brings into play 'the *opposite* to each moment', through which it 'brings out the negative essence of both thoughts, the concept'.²⁵² Thus the Enlightenment achieves in the spirit what the inverted world did in consciousness: it *individualises* through inversion to the concept. On the other hand it is clearly not enlightened about itself; it understands itself only in determinate opposition to faith, while in truth the Enlightenment is identical with faith. This is ensured by the 'absolute ... opposition of the concept', which it certainly 'does not know' but nevertheless produces,²⁵³ because in *utility* it finds the form of being-for-another—just as the absolute in the attribute was formally for-another—a form that however inverts itself into being-for-itself or into the self with the 'modus' of the single person setting itself absolutely free and in its will arriving at its *negative* universality, just as the logical modus found it in actuality.²⁵⁴ The turn *had to* happen in the determinate determination of the 'given concept' in the 'self-equal, pure personality',²⁵⁵ in order to reach the 'principle of *actuality* or certainty of itself as this *singularity*'.²⁵⁶ Logically speaking we have found here the principle of actuality in the modus in its relation to the principle of individuation.

With the negative true universality that the modus arrives at as determination in self-referential negativity, the '*interpretation* or *laying out* of the absolute .. has completely run through its moments' (535, 375). It has arrived at the true identity of the '*reflecting motion itself*', equally at this identity as 'return into itself', i.e. as the overcoming of reflection, and hence at 'absolute being', into which the counterthrust of reflection now repels *itself*, and finally at the truth of that identity and this being: self-like, i.e. *self showing*, modus that has become 'transparent externality', a 'being-towards-outside', which 'is just as much the interiority itself and with that equally a process of setting that is not merely a setting but is absolute being' (536, 375). The modus is another one to itself—alterity as the distinction of its disjunction, unity as this disjunction *qua* self-determination itself. *For this reason* the modus has for the external question—so what are you?—no passive, determinate content; instead it only contradicts this question through the negative universal of its self-showing,

252 Ibid.

253 PhoS § 566, GW IX, 307.

254 Faith itself, which has accepted the teaching (*Lehre*) or the emptiness (*Leere*) of the Enlightenment now becomes '*pure longing*' and believes for its part in 'the absolute devoid of predicates, unknown and unknowable', with which—Hegel is thinking of the poverty of content of the 'theologies' of the 'absolute' in so-called early Romanticism—it cannot be satisfied and for that reason sinks into world pain (PhoS § 573; GW IX, 310).

255 PhoS § 580, GW IX, 314.

256 PhoS § 581, GW IX, 315 f.

which, as the absolute was the showing, is 'absolute *content*' (536, 375) of itself. Self-showing is 'expression, externalisation, not of an inner, not against another but only as absolute self-manifestation for itself' (536, 375). In being 'the *modus*' had 'the determinate meaning of being *measure*';²⁵⁷ while in measure the externality or visibility of being began to get lost in *independence* in order then in this way 'to be identical with itself in the immediacy of determinacy'.²⁵⁸ The *modus* as in-itself of the concept is similarly independence but one that "consists" in the fact that the self shows itself. This can only mean that the complete *modus* is precisely no determinate measure, and is instead what is purely *incommensurable*, *absolutely* incommensurable, whose proximate laying out or interpretation for this reason will also be contingency. The term contingency is the one in self-showing that common sense also grasps. But this understanding is put in its place by Goethe's statement 'the more incommensurable and for the understanding ungraspable, the better'.²⁵⁹ It is not about finite needs here but about the self-presentation of the absolute form, i.e. of the individual. This latter reveals itself to be its own measure, its own horizon (attribute) of determination, and its own inherently given power of showing (of the absolute). It is self-reference and as such relation to another,²⁶⁰ but

257 Hegel, SoL 329, GW XXI, 325.

258 Hegel, SoL 330, GW XXI, 326.

259 Goethe to Eckermann, 6.5.1827. The context is 'poetic production', thus absolute form in the sensuous.

260 In the observation to this chapter Hegel shows the deficiency of Leibniz's 'principle of individuation' as lying in the fact that, while the monad is for itself 'revelation' (167), as such without passivity, it does not also have in the differentiated determination of revelation (of its individuality) its in-itself. In reference to that it remains passivity with respect to the central monad, which is only imagined or represented by it (cf. 168), and which here only assigns it its place in pre-established harmony. God too is only imagined because he is not capable in the form of 'self-referential negativity of repelling himself from himself', i.e. for his part he is neither a self nor does he have self-like others outside him. This lack of alterity reveals itself according to Hegel in terms of content in that Leibniz can only say anything about the relation of the central monad to the different monads in external reflection, that is in terms of the other of thinking (cf. 169). The question of alterity versus absolute has been raised in recent times once again by W. Cramer in *Das Absolute und das Kontingente*, Frankfurt a. M. 1959. The other of the absolute Cramer sets in the—as such insufficient—*quantitative* term of the 'many'. Looked at from the absolute of the 'correlation philosophies', this 'many' is usually understood as merely a moment thus losing its independence, while Cramer wishes to claim that independence as original to it (cf. 21). For this reason it would end up, like Spinoza, conceiving of only *one* substance. Before their dynamic context the many substances are supposed instead to be thought of as 'without context, unrelated' (cf. 15 f.). This is supposed to ensure that the moment of totality is taken out of the absolute, although Cramer's absolute is at the same time in terms of possibility indeed again supposed to be totality, namely the 'capability'

only from its own unrelatedness. It exists in that it purely inheres within itself. It is 'self-sustaining motion of the interpreting, of the laying out' (536, 375). Everything subsequent in the *Logic* depends upon *the fact that the self sustains itself*. This alone is the gathering point of individuality just as in relation to the system as a whole, the single point to which the truth, as well as freedom and its *bonum*, ultimately are that on which the true *pulchrum* could be grounded. For the form bearing them all is absolute negativity.

Hegel's derivation of actuality as the incommensurable of self-showing already indicates that as such actuality is the immanent power of inversion and no dead identity, that it has to be in the highest sense vital and living. In terms of its determination of content in relation to which the question was: what does it show?—it falls behind present being (*Dasein*); but it does that because the beginning with it no longer tolerates any progress in the sense of the simple determination of being or essence. The progress is in fact already immanent and for that reason in terms of the logic of totality the differentiation of actual self-relating to itself. The sequence of Hegel's 'modal' moments of differentiation possesses a peculiar closure but also a speculative completeness the like of which is hard to find anywhere else. Certainly Kant's theory of modality is also of great systematic weight for the entire transcendental philosophy; life is to be encountered in it too, namely that of understanding itself. In it also the moment of totality—namely that of the context of experience—comes into the foreground; moreover, even the self reveals itself here to a certain extent in the reflection structure, i.e. that of experience. Absolute form presents itself as conditioned form.

for alterity, 'self-determining', which 'more and more' 'alienates' itself and is in confrontation with the other, an 'element' of alienation (cf. 66, 76 ff., 81). Self-determination is even supposed to be the 'inexhaustible principle of differentiating from others, the generation of the many' (84). Cramer wants to think that one cannot *begin* with the mediatedness of the many; their lack of mediation is supposed to stand against the 'freedom' of the absolute of being able to 'generate' its other (80). It is however actually not clear how Cramer can claim to have understood Hegel, whom he counts as among the correlation philosophers (cf. 17 and *passim*). His conception of the 'other of itself' really means that at a stroke all of Cramer's concerns are accepted and developed, indeed all that without having to distribute activity and passivity so unequally as Cramer does it and also without seeing the externality disappear in the (understanding's) construction of 'correlation'.

Kant's Modal Concepts

1 Logical versus Ontological Modality

a) *Kant's Concept of Logic*

In the synthetic form, which is what most interests Kant in the judgment, the *copula* expresses in terms of content a *being* and in terms of form a *binding*. Formal logic has in recent times raised certain objections to the modalities. Its reservations however have more to do with its own reflection status and the assumptions it draws from that than with the issue itself in the philosophical tradition and hence also in Kant. The important point is that the modalities are not terms of the judgment subject in the predicate, instead their determinations relate to the copula. Grammatically speaking they appear thus in the first place as adverbs and only in derived form as adjectives. This fact brings out clearly the difficulties involved in focussing upon them as such. They are terms relating to the copula, and more precisely to it as expression of the synthetic unity of *being*, *binding* and their *unity: ground*, as mediated by the proposition form, so the modalities require from the start for their adequate presentation a dialectical concept of the concept. At any rate, the notion that in them ultimately simply finite, linear terms of 'something' are to be found has to be abandoned. One should recall here that Aristotle did not regard the concepts of δύνάμις, ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια as common or garden objects of philosophy. He treated them as philosophically central relations of being and could not present them dissociated from the *concept of motion*. Ignoring the Aristotelian speculative claim leads ineluctably to one-sidednesses by isolating from the doubling of the modal synthesis one or other of the fixed extremes. This is what happens to being when dogmatism hypostasises the 'possible', either as a kind of material principle that is simply 'given' or as the Megarian or Hartmann's 'real possibility', in which the latter in any case falls together with 'what is given', if not in the consciousness of the viewer.¹ This is what happened to the *binding* when it became the pure

1 N. Hartmann, *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*, Berlin 1966³, relies expressly on the Megarians (cf. 174 and *passim*) for the 'real sphere' of his modi, where only that is supposed to be 'possible' in which all real conditions are fulfilled according to the 'totality law of real possibility' (cf. 147). Hartmann overlooks the fact that *single* 'conditions' as such belong *only* to reflection and their *present being* must mean a subreption from the totality reflection of the *matter*, which itself is more than mere present being.

possibile logicum (of Duns Scotus for instance) as a mere 'modus compositionis formatae ab intellectu'.² The attempt could indeed also be made to make the inference immediately from the one to the other conceptually complementary sides, of which we find in Leibniz's ontological interpretation of formal modality the most important example. Kant gave the modal problem a fundamental turn in several ways, relating it so decisively to the entire transcendental revolution in the way of thinking that almost the whole of this revolution found its summarising expression in the modal problem, making it a candidate for the touchstone against dogmatic tendencies. The modal proposition moment alone ensures that a proposition of experience is integrated into the context of experience and therefore also totalised, i.e. only then is it conclusively and as such actually *determined*. This modal moment is simultaneously the critically grasped relation between subject and predicate as well—on the level of reflection—between subjectivity as *conditioning* form and objectivity as the quality of bearing content *conditioned* by this form in the hypothetical-synthetic relation, which contains the *derivation* of the determinate content *actu* and the self-realising quality of totality of the relation of experience concentrated together.

The totalising modal functions have, as is well known, their transcendental meaning only in their use in propositions of experience, outside of which they do not modify any being. Apart from this use there is no modally mediated unity of the *binding* of the proposition and the *being* of the copula. As far as being goes, according to Kant the proposition of experience stands under the conditions of intuition such that through this latter subject and predicate functions are first determinable with respect to each other and become distinct sides, while the judgment gains transcendental reality (mediated determination).³ In contrast the form of the binding in general whose *functions* are the categories, considered *for itself* and without reference to its use or its transcendental unity, is the object of logic in the Kantian sense. The understanding is there concerned with itself; not with itself as an *activity* as in a transcendental logic but with itself as an *aggregate* of distinct forms of activity claiming universality against all particular content. The understanding undertakes in the *Logic* 'formal philosophy' ignoring the 'difference to the objects' but still 'from principles *a priori*',⁴ namely from out of itself in principle.

2 Duns Scotus, *Quaest. in I lib. Sententiarum* 2, 7, 10., quoted from J. Stallmach, *Dynamis und Energieia*, Meisenheim am Glam 1959, 18 note 19, which discusses the point of contact with Aristotle's *Organon* (*De interpr.* 12 ff.).

3 Cf. on this above 64–65.

4 Cf. Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Preface (AA IV, 387 f.), further CpR B 77 ff./A 53 ff. As well as CPJ B XI. In logic the understanding 'has only to do with itself and its form

The problem that arises at this point and which above all Hegel pointed out, is the question as to how then does a formal logic, pure in this way, arrive at *its own*, logically distinct contents. Indeed in Kant's *Logic*, even in the most complete and finished form in which it is available to us, namely in the edition produced by Jäsche, no deduction of the logical forms will be found but rather an inventory of these forms oriented moreover to the text of Meier's *Logic* on which Kant's lectures were based. But then it is also clear that Kant was at least aware of the fact that the exclusion of particularisation of content from formal logic is simultaneously its particular characteristic, and with that it stands under a specification principle that can bring its formality into a new light and, at least in an external manner, can even have consequences for the presentation of the pure forms, as will have to be shown in the case of the modal terms.

For Kant logical knowledge is not arbitrarily another matter beside the claim to knowing with content of the propositions of experience. Logical criteria and forms are 'certainly not sufficient for objective truth' but they do relate to this truth, namely as '*conditio sine qua non* for it'.⁵ The original specification of logic is this: to be the condition of material knowledge and for that reason to stand quite generally in relation to it.

For faced with the question: does the knowledge agree with the object, this must be preceded by the question, does it agree with itself (in terms of form)? And this is the matter of logic.⁶

It is in philosophical terms the truth of logic to be the logic of the truth of knowledge. According to the critical insight into the lack of a material truth criterion, knowledge cannot do without its logical *condition*. As *condition*, not already as itself material knowledge, logic is however according to the idea of rational knowledge as a whole, for its part related to what it conditions. It is under this idea then that each part, the logical as well as the material, does its own such that it can arrive at an 'agreeing or harmonising' of knowledge. Modal logic is the constantly controversial border region between formal and intensional logic but also between logic in general and rational knowledge of the matter, and for Kant there is no coincidence about

and nothing further'; at CpR B VIII f. this is called a 'restriction' as well as being the reason 'why it is so successful'.

⁵ *Jäsche Logik*, Intro. VI (AA IX, 51).

⁶ *Ibid.*

the fact that modal logic is about 'agreeing'.⁷ For in the modalities there is always presaged the idea.

b) *Kant and the History of Modal Logic*

Kant's acceptance of the modal moment into the table of judgments, and correspondingly into the table of categories, was neither as such nor in the form in which he carried it out something immediately self-evident. As for the table of judgments, already G.F. Meier's *Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason*, on which Kant based his logic lectures, states that the 'iudicium modale' contains an:

'indication of the manner in which the predicate applies to the subject or does not', and hence expresses a '*term of the binding concept and of the negation of that*', being as it is '*an impure ... judgment*'.⁸

Meier's assertion can be summarised as stating that the modal proposition looked at more closely contains two propositions: one presenting the objective predication itself and a second assessing or judging this predication. This doubling can also be understood as the self-referentiality or subjectivity of the proposition, in which obviously also the impurity of the proposition could be seen to lie. Kant made a note to himself on these paragraphs in Meier's logic: 'Without modality no judgment is possible; so the modal judgment is not impure'.⁹ But also after Kant, whose table of categories was generally regarded as at least a point of orientation, what was considered self-evident in the reception ran up against its limits early on in the fourth title of the table.¹⁰ Even if the three terms (and their three negations) in the table of categories were historically not completely unprepared,¹¹ Kant's form of exposition of modality in a

7 Cf. e.g. R 4581: '... being possible means in fact as much as: agreeing'; similarly R 5163 and *passim*. In agreeing is already expressed the *relation*, which in actuality becomes what is determinate and in necessity itself determining.

8 Meier § 309; text according to the quotation in AA XVI, 662 f.

9 R 3111; according to the dating suggested by Adickes, as well as in terms of content, clearly from the critical period.

10 Problems have particularly arisen from the modal titles in the MAdN, from its *Phenomenology* but principally among readers who thought they would find in this work of Kant's statements on *matter* as the *object of experience*, thus ultimately physical notions rather than statements on establishing the nature of experience of the external senses as a principle; examples are given by P. Plaaß, *Kants Theorie der Naturwissenschaft*, Göttingen 1965, 106.

11 Kant's forerunners for the *triplicity* of the modalities are above all Crusius, who in his *Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis* gives three terms, which however belong rather to 'modus' in the sense of the theory of concepts or characteristics

'declination' is in many ways a *novum*. The most general concept of 'modality', in the theory of the proposition, says it is a determination concerning the entirety of a proposition, which also leads to the presentation of modality as a double proposition. Modalities in the general sense in Ockham for instance expressed not only the 'truth' or 'falsity' of a proposition but also its 'familiarity' or 'unfamiliarity', 'orality' or 'written character'.¹² In Kant's modal concept the moment of determining remains secure in objective propositional determining, while his catalogue of these concepts is restricted to the three or six given. This too is prominent since Kant obviously does not relate to the tradition deriving from the Aristotle commentaries of the modal square but lists modalities whose provenance goes back rather to the Aristotle of the *Metaphysics* than of the *Organon*. This is shown not least in the fact that the three modal concepts are not supposed to be expressible by each other and indeed are not so, while the converse has to be the case for those of the modal square.¹³ Kant assures us that the modalities do not attach something additional and

(cf. above 186–187 esp. 186 note 238) but also Lambert, who in his *Neuen Organon* gives the Kantian trias in inverted order, referring to *concept* modality (cf. R. Specht, article on *Modalität* and A. Menne, article on *Modalität (des Urteils)* in the *Hist. Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol. 6, cols. 9 ff. and 12 ff., here esp. 10, 14). Lambert does not wish to let the modal terms be dependent 'merely on the external form of knowledge' but wants to integrate them into the *Ontologie* (cf. *Neues Organon*, Leipzig 1764, reprint Hildesheim 1965, § 137), so he distinguishes them further as 'certain very general terms ..., accompanied by that little binding word' (ibid.) from other adverbial terms to the copula that lack 'ontological' foundations and thus the inner determination of the matter (cf. § 138). That to these latter 'countless terms' of the 'manner' (ibid.) belongs, e.g. *temporal* qualification, is on Leibniz's premisses not surprising but it shows at a stroke the difference with Kant for whom the object of experience is determined in the transcendental use of the modalities precisely in view of the time totality.

12 Further examples of Ockham-style 'propositiones modales' can be found in Menne, loc. cit. (note 11), col. 13; cf. also I.M. Bocheński, *Formale Logik*, Freiburg and Munich 1956, 216 f. with similar examples from (pseudo-)Scotus.

13 Like all *categories*, the modalities too are 'ancestral concepts of pure understanding' (CpR B 111) and not linearly derivable from each other; their relation is much more that presented in the hypothetical-synthetic form with an essential *complementarity* of their three moments. But even in the *Logic*, Kant claimed no such derivability of the kind found in the modal square. In the square derivability is expressed by the fundamental axioms $Lp \text{ iff } \neg M \neg p$ or $Mp \text{ iff } \neg L \neg p$ (where L is necessity and M possibility). The obstacle to adapting Kant's logical modalities to the modal square lies in Kant's concept of *logical actuality*, which could only be integrated into the square by doing violence to it. This was shown—at least *e contrario*—by H. Poser's attempt to do just that (cf. his *Die Stufen der Modalität. Kants System der Modalbegriffe* in K. Weinke (ed.) *Logik, Ethik, Sprache*, FS for R. Freundlich, Munich 1981, 195–212). After rejecting the principle of sufficient reason, Kant's own criterion of logical actuality, as 'ineffective' (199), Poser in fact gives *no* term of his own by which the logically actual could be clearly distinguished from the logically

objective to the object.¹⁴ Still it may appear confusing at first sight that he gives *proposition* modalities without one being for that reason justified in assuming that in Kant modality is found only *de dicto*. In transcendental terms what the object acquires in modality is certainly not 'something' but instead the *form* of something in general, its objectivity. From this point of view the modalities do speak *de re* or *de realitate transcendentali*. The binding of the 'ontological' with the purely apophantic modality of the judgment in Kant's modal concepts is most simply explained if one recalls that the *judgment* in Kant is always a *synthetic* form. It is, according to his logical 'explanation':

the representation of the unity of the consciousness of different representations, or the representation of the relation of that, to the extent that they constitute a concept.¹⁵

The proposition is the *presentation* (dictum) of a *concept qua* relation (res) in such a way that presentability and matter do not come together in agreement merely *per accidens* but rather express the transcendental *synthesis* of thinking and being that "is found" nowhere else than in this proposition. In the judgment this synthesis is *only* in its subjectivity (as logical form), i.e. in

necessary. For even if actuality additionally refers to the form of necessity, as what for it is the necessary if not sufficient condition of freedom from contradiction, and then can be expressed in Poser's formula with $N \text{ XX } a \rightarrow W \text{ XX } a \rightarrow M \text{ XX } a$ (W: actuality) (200), in this explication it is in no way stated (and there is no attempt to state) the fact that for necessity what does hold is not precisely the same as this. If it indeed should be a worthwhile project to look for a formalisation for Kant's logical modalities, then instead of forcing Kant into the modal square, it would be more appropriate to look for a system that perhaps does *not* contain the implication $\neg M \neg p \rightarrow Lp$, with which then one could say that the space for Kant's own independent logical actuality concept is provided. Such a system does indeed exist: A.N. Prior's so-called 'Q'. Importantly Prior does not interpret the *context* of a statement statically like the modal square but as *temporally* refracted such that—in our language—the modal contextualisation of the statement involves the totality of the time sequence and not only the synchronic extension of modal model 'worlds'. Thus a statement can be *true* at a specific point in time without having to be already *necessarily* true. Here one may recall that the 'modalisation' of objectively valid statements in Kant is schematised in the sum total of time, which also makes it plausible that the Kantian logic conceived its modal differentiations from the start with reference to the real, and hence also temporal, meaning of judgments. Cf. A.N. Prior, *Time and Modality*, Oxford 1957, esp. 41 ff. As well as the brief presentation of G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell, *Einführung in die Modallogik*, Berlin and New York 1978, 269–271.

14 Cf. just Kant, CpR B 99 f./A 74 f.; B 266/A 219. On the formal logical difference between modalities *de dicto* and *de re*, cf. Hughes and Cresswell, loc. cit. (previous note) 161–165.

15 Kant, *Jäsche Logik* § 17 (AA IX, 156).

the moment that lends the modalities expression but not in univocal objective terms. From his point of view it is no longer surprising that Kant can *bind* the modus of the theory of the concept in a certain way to the judgment modi, thereby also *binding* the “metaphysician” Aristotle with the logician. It is characteristic of traditional logic, up to immediately before Hegel, that deriving the modus of the theory of the concept from the absolute essential and the attributive features is impossible. As synthetic form the proposition is itself *concept* and essentially not a statement of external reflection. In Kant this is most obvious in the irreducible *trichotomy* of the modal moments in the formal logic of the proposition, for which moments there can be no purely *extensional* grounds.

The formal modal logic of recent times has produced various studies showing that in its own way it has realised that the modal concepts persist on the borderline between the extensional and the intensional, or in Hegelian terms: that they contain *reflection* and *being* already as a whole relation. The first thing to note is that, by the application of Gödel’s theorem to modal theory, it has been shown that the purely *syntactic* interpretation of the modal concepts—a goal pursued by e.g. Carnap—according to which the truth of a statement must be capable of being interpreted as its formal derivability from the context of a theory, cannot be carried out because the mass of true statements of a theory cannot be brought to maximal consistency.¹⁶ Instead various proposals for a semantic interpretation of current modal systems have been made by Lewis and Langford, Feys etc.; the most important of these has been developed by Kripke with recourse to Leibniz’s notion of “possible worlds”.¹⁷ The assignment of truth values in the “semantics of possible worlds” happens here in view of (in principle arbitrarily specifiable) subsystems of a whole “model”, so that the modal operators qualify the truth value of statements once again in relation to their possibly different allocations in the individual systems (“worlds”). The *possibility* of a statement can then be formulated as that in at least one of the different worlds it acquires the truth value “true” and its *necessity*, that it receives that value in all the surveyed worlds. It has certainly been noticed that with that “survey” of the worlds, which initially presupposes the external standpoint of what is as it were an absolute context, can have its difficulties. Precisely for this reason the significance has been conceded to the relation

16 Cf. H. Weidemann, article *Modallogik* (11) in *Hist. Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol. 6, col. 23–41, there esp. 26 ff.; further G.S. Boolos, *The Unprovability of Consistency. An Essay in Modal Logic*, London and New York 1978, 19 ff.

17 Cf. on this Boolos, loc. cit. (previous note 16) 72 ff.; N. Rescher article *Modallogik* (1) in *Hist. Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol. 6, col. 16–23, there 18 f.

of *accessibility* between the different worlds of the factual use to determine once again the “modalisators”; since these e.g. in Lewis’ systems S 1–S 5, do not obey the same usage rules, these systems are interpreted such that respectively distinct accessibility relations are to be assumed in them.¹⁸ One can thus say that the “worlds” are individualised through their determinate correlativity in relation to each other, and at the same time the “absolute” context of the *whole* system lies precisely in the specific determination of this correlativity by the valid accessibility relation. The “survey” of the worlds is, according to the formal semantic concept of modality, thus overcome into each factually valid modalisation respectively. The modal concept has with this the sense of bringing the contextuality of a statement to an at least formal concept. At this point we will only note that it is *philosophically* insufficient, in the sense of this formal logic in general, to assume that statements with *identical* meaning can arise in various “worlds”, and hence that this meaning remains for itself devoid of context, instead only externally falling into a world context, without—e.g. in Leibniz’s sense—*through* this context being determined to material compossibility with *all* other statements contained in it. Kant’s treatment of the transcendental modalities will be our primary source in the search for what sense contextuality has to take on if the absoluteness of the mediation is to be explicitly expressed in language in the sense of the philosophical question as to the whole of our knowledge and its relation to the single item known, i.e. in the sense of self-differentiating form.

It should be added that also in relation to the problem of *quantification*, modal expressions turned out to be a characteristic problem of the intensional for formal modal logic. Quine, starting from the assertion that the substitution principle for expressions fixed as identical fails in modal quantification, tried to show in general ‘how modal statements ... come into conflict with the extensional part of the world (sic!)’ and that for that reason one must ‘purify’ the world of things with only ‘contingent identity’, i.e. that as variables of modal quantification only ‘intensional objects’ should be allowed if one is interested in a practicable modal calculus.¹⁹ The restriction which the formal operating

18 If one imagines to oneself the different systems, as most often happens, as “games” in which the players, using respectively distinct rules in relation to their own store of formulas and in relation to the affirmation or negation of the formulas, either confirm or deny the formulas called up by other players, then the relation of accessibility can be approximated sensuously as that of the visibility of other players.

19 W. van Orman Quine, *Reference and Modality* 1953; German in W. Stegmüller (ed.), *Das Universalienproblem*, Darmstadt 1978, 165–187, loc. cit. 193, 178. Under ‘intensional objects’ are to be understood single objects that are only individualisable in the context of several

with modal concepts thus underlies has its general philosophical equivalence in that the qualitative individuality of a matter as such (and as being) with respect to any quantification (reflection) in fact (to speak with Quine) is an 'opaque context'.²⁰ If, to use an example of Quine's, the number 9 is certainly necessarily greater than the number 7 (which in this case refers to being *and* reflection), for that reason however the number of planets in our solar system (external reflection of a being) is not 'necessarily' greater than 7 (there is no syllogism or inference from the necessity of the matter to a necessity of its external reflection!). In fact looked at more closely, this lies in the fact that in the number of the planets, regarded externally, there is always the contingent *individuality*²¹ of our solar system that expresses itself, while in the number 9 taken for itself what stands out is the lack of any individuality of the quantum devoid of context in general, which necessarily lacks the principle to specify itself to a determinate (actual) context. Philosophically speaking there is no actual context that would *not* be opaque for the externality of quantification. Contextuality is always self-presentation of individuality against externality, of subjective determination reflected in itself against the attempt at external determination. Philosophical modal concepts are concerned with nothing other than the development of such contextuality, with the actuality of an incommensurable by which we *understand* ourselves, namely as individuals. Formal logic may well then at least draw the problem of speaking of individuality and with that of its freedom into its purview *from outside*; in doing so however at particular points it ends up seeing nothing; the immanent development of this speech, its presentation *from freedom*, is what the *philosophical* issue would be.

objects or in a 'state' of this context (e.g. 'the highest card of a pile'; cf. Hughes and Cresswell, loc. cit. (note 13 above), 173).

20 Quine, loc. cit. (previous note 19), 168.

21 We are speaking here of "individuality" in the philosophical sense of course not in the formal logical sense, thus not of an extensional "individual", which through an "evaluation" would be brought under an "individual variable" but instead of individuality as the absolute form that maintains itself against any external state of having been "comprehended" or subsumed. The extensional (nominalistic) individual is precisely *something* to the extent that it is not reached by the external universal reference to it, while what is actually individual does not have to be anything for the external relation. In fact the nominalistic singular *is* only in the positive sense of being, as *setting* (e.g. as "appointment"), while the individual as essentially the overcoming of externally set being is *negation*. In Hegel's logic what is individual is expressed only with the self-showing of actuality, not before that, e.g. as present being or as existence (cf. F. Ungler, *Individuelles und Individuationsprinzip in Hegels "Wissenschaft der Logik"*, habil., Vienna 1983, e.g. 78 ff., 605), which, by the way, is a fundamental objection to the logical status of all "philosophy of existence".

The problems of semantic interpretation of modal systems and of modal quantification may serve as references to questions of intensionality, of contextuality and also of individuality generated by the modal concepts in as yet relatively great distance from their corresponding philosophical topics. Kant's *logical* treatment of the modalities is at most in the one respect a stage in the history of formal modal logic, as one can reference,²² that Kant was clearly the first in the modern period to carry out a purely formal consideration of the modal terms without taking ontological implications into account. That assumes of course that one does not take the view that his ultimately transcendental-logical based decision against the modal square should be called "ontological". Kant takes up the leading position here against the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, whose "intellectualism" perhaps never showed itself so sharply as in the interpretation of the modal terms.

For Leibniz formally presented modalities have immediately ontological meaning. This is perhaps somewhat surprising considering the consistency with which Leibniz pursued the formalisation of these concepts, an achievement whose great significance has been continuously recognised all the way up to the formal modal logic of our day. The principle to which Leibniz's formalisation fundamentally holds is that of avoiding contradiction, by which first the possibility concept but starting from that also the entire system of the modalities is determined.²³ This system is for God, even with only the principle of contradiction, already adequately defined and in his intuition "applicable", while for the finite understanding, reflections on the (speaking with Poser) "proof type" of the respective truth have to replace what eludes it in immediate evidence. But even in these reflections once again the principle of contradiction comes into play. "Possible" is here anything whose analysis cannot lead to any contradiction, e.g. because it is reducible to simple concepts that do not contradict each other.²⁴ "Contingent" is whatever requires an endless analysis,

22 I. Pape, *Tradition und Transformation der Modalität*, Hamburg 1966, 35.

23 H. Poser, *Zur Theorie der Modalbegriffe bei G.W. Leibniz*, Wiesbaden 1969, 124 ff. Poser, who repeatedly emphasises the special, and consistently maintained, significance of the principle of contradiction for the construction of Leibniz's modalities, notes further that the already mentioned *possibile logicum* of Duns Scotus was grounded on this principle (26). One could go back to Aristotle, indeed to those locations in *De interpretatione*, as e.g. 12, 21 b 18 f., where possibility and impossibility are discussed in reference to the ἀντικειμένης φάσεις and which not by coincidence became the starting point for the construction of the modal square (cf. I.M. Bocheński, *Formale Logik*, Freiburg und Munich 1956, §§ 24 and 29).

24 Poser states loc. cit. (previous note 23), 37 ff. against Russell, that Leibniz did not have to assume, as Russell claims, 'synthetic fundamental truths', when he starts from his simple concepts, from the indefinable 'prima possibilia', seeking to reach complex concepts that

which itself once again proceeds according to the principle of contradiction. “Necessary” means whatever is reducible to an identical statement or whose *oppositum* can be shown to be impossible.²⁵ For Leibniz with these syntactic rules for the explication of the modal concepts, not only should subjective principles of an external reflection on the matter (the *modalisandum*) be given but by means of these principles its being should also be stated. According to Leibniz’s ontology, anything that is according to the named criterion “possible” *eo ipso* wants to be: ‘omne possibile exigit existere’.²⁶ This statement is not an arbitrarily asserted metaphysical claim; in fact it finds its explication in the total context of Leibniz’s thought through the precise determination of the status of the modal statements. Despite its extensive formalism, Leibniz’s modal system is not a *static* one, but, as the quoted statement on the *possibile* indicates, relies on the concept of motion. More precisely the motion concept is the criterion of the “ontological” objectivity of the modalised objects to the extent that in the case of these objects it is definitely about what is contingent. This has to be doubly explained. In Leibniz’s sense motion is initially not, as in modern physics since Galilei and Descartes, only a matter of external state changes to substrates persisting independently of such change; instead it is essentially the “inside” of the things, the self-unfolding of substantial form. The monad is the dynamic unity of its perceptions; this is why the cognition of a monad finds itself confronted with what is for the understanding the unsolvable task of cognising the *motion* of this individual.²⁷ Moreover the object that

would not be merely conjunctions of simple concepts but which could also contradict each other in terms of possibility. Poser’s solution is to take on negation too in the construction of the composite concepts. It cannot be overlooked that negation then, just like the *possibile qua ens* (cf. Poser 36 note 6), acquires ontological weight, for the whole compossibility argument, in which it is to be taken as determinate negation, would be completely inconceivable without it.

- 25 For Leibniz there are no necessary *concepts* but only the necessity of ideas or statements (Poser loc. cit. (note 23 above) 51–54). Instead concepts are only possible when they as divine possibilities *tend* to existence. The necessity of statements follows from Leibniz’s inherence logic of the judgment, i.e. ultimately from the view that all true judgments are analytically true. The predicate expresses only an *inest* in relation to the subject, a true judgment is for that reason in both divine and human understanding true. It is at this point that Kant’s objection to Leibniz’s “intellection” of the world takes on clear contours; Kant’s problem of *synthetic* judgments is an objection to the fundamental assumption of Leibniz’s philosophy of immanence.
- 26 Leibniz, *De veritatibus primis* in *Philosophische Schriften*, vol. 1, ed. H.H. Holz, Frankfurt 1986², 176. Cf. for the context Poser (loc. cit. note 23 above), 61 ff.
- 27 For Leibniz’s concept of motion cf. F. Kaulbach, *Der philosophische Begriff der Bewegung*, Cologne and Graz 1965, esp. 36 ff. Kaulbach also goes briefly into the relation between the concept of motion and the conception of the infinitesimal calculus (cf. 44).

is in motion is precisely unknowable for the finite understanding, because the latter's consistency condemns it always to succumb to the paradoxes of Zeno. Confronted with a being *qua* in motion, the finite understanding would rather enter into an analysis continuing into the bad infinity, in which the understanding for its part gets stuck in the move from possibility to actuality. Finite, i.e. bad infinite analysis breaks the object down into a *being*, supposedly knowable according to the principle of contradiction and in fact already known (the *possibilia*), opposed to its *ought*, namely that of the complete knowability of the *contingentia* via which the transition would then be made to the complete determination of an actual being. Motion is an "ontologising principle", because it sensuously presents being and ought as a conceptual unity, while finite analysis does not bring them together at all. Motion in Hegel's way of thinking is the contradiction in the sphere of being, the true infinity. By means of the characteristic feature of being in motion, the contingent is broken down into *being* and *ought* not only for reflection, in fact it is in general broken into its reflection and its being, i.e. the refraction repeats itself on the side of being as that between factual determination and 'ratio inclinans' in the sense of the 'praetensio ad existendum'²⁸ of the possible. Leibniz's universe can hence be presented as a three-part whole: possibilities at rest in their simple identity (reflection side), the broken medium term of moved contingency, and the extreme of being also at rest, which however is not a dead extreme but is the individuality of God that has reflected in itself everything different. God's 'privilege' is 'de n'avoir besoin que de sa possibilité ou essence, pour exister actuellement'.²⁹ The possibilities are—in sensuous terms: in the "choice" of the best possible world—God's reflection. In the sphere of moved contingency that is both being as well as already finitely reflected there are found 'creaturae', whose 'existentia non sequitur ex ipsarum Essentia'.³⁰ The difference between possibility and actuality is conceptually presented as unity only in the concept of God, while in the contingent, it is only *sensuous* unity, and for that reason is only known as unity by God's sensuous understanding. Just as however the possibilities in their relation to God are not (however infinite) possibility reflections devoid of context but are related to the being of God, and for that reason "pretend" to be, the contingencies as broken unities of being and reflection in general are related to absolute unity in a similar way. This means that the context for them is similarly actual in a contingent manner, namely as the form of *compossibility* which everything created, i.e. all that has moved out of

28 Leibniz, *De contingentia*, ed. cit. (note 26 above), 180 and *passim*.

29 Leibniz, *Discours et Métaphysique*, § 23 (ed. cit. note 26 above, 124).

30 Leibniz, *De contingentia*, (cf. note 28 above), 178.

possibility, obeys. In God the form of compossibility is *actu* executed, i.e. he knows each compossible thing universally and with that also the respective ground—which is absolutely always the whole universe—from which the determinate actual exists. The human understanding, which can only arrive at the knowledge of the “that” of compossibility, consequently disposes only over a principle of sufficient reason, which it can generally presuppose, although the attempt adequately to determine the sufficient ground of something contingent would require infinite analysis—which would be simultaneously the interpretation of the whole universe or concept of the divine individual.³¹ Thus Leibniz’s modal concepts are for him the real key to the world; not only to the world as it is “for us” but as it actually is. Both in the *possible* in the sense of the “prima possibilia” and in the *necessary* that we think, we think the thoughts of God. From those thoughts we can still find the formal criteria for the intermediate domain of contingency according to which it is constructed, so that what is unattainable to the finite understanding, the knowledge of the thoroughgoing determination of contingency, can be neglected.³² The modal concepts give access to the *representation* of absolute form, of the divine individual.

Kant’s movement away from Leibniz and the Wolffian school philosophy happened in several stages and on different levels. In view of the fundamental significance of the modal concepts for Leibniz, it is not surprising that Kant’s moves with respect to Leibniz, directly or indirectly, always involve the reformulation of the theory of modalities. The critique of the objective totality representation in the transcendental dialectic is the summarised expression of the basic claim of the Leibnizian universe and presupposes that the modal concepts have been fundamentally freed from ontological implications. In Leibniz the ontological argument has acquired a form that relies precisely on these implications of the modalities.³³ Kant’s step by step retreat from this argument up to complete opposition in the *Critique* thus presupposes that the

31 The ground is logically a totality concept. But ‘in contingentibus’, the finite understanding attains totality not as set, for ‘progressus est analyseos in infinitum per rationes rationum, ita ut nunquam habeatur “plena” demonstratio, ratio tamen veritatis “semper” subsit, et a solo Deo perfecte intelligatur, qui unus seriem infinitam uno mentis ictu pervadit’ (*De contingentia*, ed. cid. note 28, 180). On compossibility cf. also Poser (loc. cit. note 23 above), 62, 67–75.

32 Leibniz, *De contingentia* (ed. cit. note 28 above, 182/4): ‘Quia non possumus cognoscere veram rationem formalem existentiae in ullo casu speciali, ... ideo sufficit nobis veritatum contingentium nosse a posteriori nempe per experimenta; et tamen illud simul tenere in universum vel generatim, quod et ratione et experientia ipsa ... firmatur, insitum divinitus menti nostrae principium, nihil fieri sine ratione ...’.

33 Cf. Poser loc. cit. (note 23 above), 52 f.

modalities first acquire a sense that does not allow for including in their *concept* a *being* or an *intuition*, as happens in Leibniz's interpretation. The expression of the unity of concept and intuition in the modal concept in Leibniz was its reference to the motion concept, for which one can also refer back to Aristotle. Modalities were in Leibniz moments of absolute motion of the universe, which had their starting point, and were at rest, in the absolutely necessary being, that is as motions in the creation of the world from out of the *possibilities* and as moved context of the compossible contingencies. Even before Kant is able once again to bind the modalities to the motion concept—this time however with the motion of the making of experience that creates its content from appearances and has its necessary essence in the point of the transcendental apperception—before he could take the modalities into the service of the synthesis problem directed against Leibniz, first he had to take them out of the binding with the ontological content, i.e. to *isolate* the *reflection* moment in them in order to be able to present them as “only” logical moments. This is precisely what Kant did. Kant's precritical writings, which may exhibit various deficiencies in relation to their content, show at any rate a progressive independence of *reflection* on the sciences, and especially on metaphysics, and indeed above all in methodological terms. Kant's first publication on the *Wahre Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte* relates clearly to the context of the question as to the determination of the motion magnitudes but despite that content, one perceives a general attitude directed against Leibniz and his followers that is characteristic for Kant when he says ‘We thus do not contest here in fact the matter itself but the *modum cognoscendi*’.³⁴ The treatise on the *Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und Moral* for the Berlin Academy, the consideration of the ‘nature of metaphysical certainty’ is explicitly devoted to methodology. For our context it is important that here the formal principles of identity and contradiction (which Kant understands to be ‘the first formula of all negating judgments’, not yet of all ‘truths’)³⁵ are distinguished from ‘first material principles of human reason’ which, as ‘many unprovable statements’, are introduced immediately standing under the highest formal principles, i.e. without a medium term, and at the same time are supposed to constitute ‘the foundation and solidity of human reason’.³⁶ The significance

34 Kant, AA I, 60 (§ 50 of the second main section). The most extensive investigation in terms of conceptual development on Kant's modalities, the book by S. Veca, *Fondazione e modalità in Kant*, Milan 1969, makes its claim of the epistemological origin of Kant's modalities by starting with this point.

35 Ibid. 294.

36 Ibid. 295.

of these principles lies above all in the fact that for Kant philosophy as a rule cannot begin with definitions but only with the concepts given for it, which it can explain with the help of material principles.³⁷ For our context two things are important. First Kant holds firmly to the formal principles *separate* from the material principles—one thinks of the later highest principle of analytical judgments. Those material principles on this level of still immediate contents of consciousness are ‘data’.³⁸ Indeed in a sphere that is devoid of content and merely thought, they are data of the mere concept, which for itself contains the possibility of tending to the most absurd inventions if it does not restrict its application to the material principles. With this Leibniz’s metaphysical meaning of the principle of contradiction is contested, an interpretation that was expanded into domains by Wolff and his followers, which Leibniz would rather have handled under the principle of sufficient reason. The material principles refer forwards to the later principles *a priori*, with the presentation of which Kant fulfilled his own early wish to see ‘enthusiastically a table of the unprovable statements’.³⁹ Moreover they are principles of explanation for clarification of *given* concepts, such that the material knowledge can also only happen in the domain of ‘givenness’, from Leibniz’s position thus only in reference to the contingent. Thus the *principles*, in material terms distinct and unprovable, are an attempt to *specify* the universal *princium rationis sufficientis*, in which however the claim to have accomplished the infinite analysis demanded for them by Leibniz in this specification is only refuted by the factum of the principles themselves, indeed through the admission that with these principles in no way is a “real definition” of the matter the goal. In principle then it is rejected as a claim that is really not to be asserted in the first place. What Kant holds open in this way is the *externality* of thinking with respect to its objects, which, by the way, in terms of its orientation, is the same as that of modern natural science to its objects.⁴⁰ It is in this externality too that Leibniz’s definition of the judgment via the *inesse* will no longer hold up; subject and predicate spheres separate from each other *fundamentally*, such that *principles* do not put them back together again. Holding together what is mutually external through the synthetic form becomes the problem of the transcendental analytic. Before that, the *dogmatic* beginning with the material principles must yet undergo its sceptical shock in order to make possible their return as *concepts*, in the

37 Cf. Ibid. 283 ff.

38 Ibid. 295.

39 Ibid. 281.

40 For this reference: E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, vol. 2, Darmstadt 1974 (reprint of the third ed. 1922), 402 ff., 590.

sense of the synthetic form, that generate the transcendental immanence of the judgment. Philosophy as a whole will then no longer wish to be, nor be able to be, as in Wolff, a 'possibility science',⁴¹ if by that is meant the formal treatment of the *possibiles*. It will however certainly be the science of the possibility of experience as synthetic form, and hence science of the possibility of questioning back behind objective representations into what generates them, i.e. into what is referred to itself and is for that reason for Meier an "impure" proposition moment. In transcendental modality absolute form will both conceal and announce itself by taking on a subjectively reflexive structure.

2 Differentiating Logical Modality

a) *Logical Possibility*

Kant's liberation of logic from ontological implications did not only affect the modal concepts but also the other forms, such as the principle of sufficient or determining reason. Nevertheless they could still only be completed in the modal concepts, which always contain a totality reflection and for that reason above all had to be indispensable for putting an end to Leibniz's intellectual "immanentism". Basically, Kant's liberation of logic opened the possibility for finding clarity about what the understanding always already *formally* thinks, if it thinks a content in general—no matter whether this content in another perspective, e.g. under the criteria of transcendental objectivity, is affirmed or negated. Even a statement not confirmed by experience, if it is thought of as true, obeys one and the same *form* of truth as a transcendently real proposition of experience; it obeys a *logically* determinate form. Making the characteristic features of this form explicit is the job of logic.

The logical features of the modal moments of the proposition are given in outline in § 9 of Kant's *Critique of pure Reason*. The moments themselves are from the table of judgments the *problematical*, *assertorical* and *apodictic*—moments by which 'nothing' is added 'to the content of the proposition' but only the 'value of the copula in relation to thinking in general' is determined.⁴² It must be stated in advance here that the term 'value' in relation to the copula should not mislead us into assuming that Kant is pursuing under the title of

41 Cf. in Wolff, *Philos. rat. sive Logica, Disc. prael.* § 29 (1728, 1740) and *passim*. On Kant's relation to school philosophy in reference to the modal problem cf. apart from Pape's book referred to in note 22 above also the essay by H. Poser, *Mögliche Erkenntnis und Erkenntnis der Möglichkeit* in *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 20 (1983), 129–147.

42 Kant, CpR B 100/A 74.

modal moments of the proposition a “logic of validity” in the sense in which the philosophy of science understands of the “degree of firmness” of already given statements in view of their theoretical applicability and utility.⁴³ The value of the copula is in any case not *extralogical*. As will emerge more precisely below, it is the copula’s logical degree of explication as binding in reference to the whole of the proposition relation; the logical question can only be, how and as what *thinking* finds itself in the copula? Kant interprets the logical modalities not only as functions of thought determined respectively by the *understanding*, the *power of judgment*, and *reason*.⁴⁴ This could make it look as if it were logic and not ontology that would still be hamstrung by the greater restriction of faculty psychology, although, above all in the transcendental deduction, Kant shows that and how he deals with such psychological constructions of representation. In addition to those three aforementioned associations Kant speaks of the ‘three functions of modality’ as of ‘so many functions of thinking in general’, in the series of which ‘everything ... is by degrees incorporated into the understanding’.⁴⁵ The term ‘incorporate’ recalls Kant’s criterion of systematic form in distinction to merely aggregative form, the ‘*intus susceptio*’.⁴⁶ Starting from the modal concepts, if not an actual deduction, then clearly what does emerge is a certain systematic of logical forms. It is important initially to state firmly on this that it is the one thinking that unfolds itself as logical faculties in the modal terms in its own inner distinctions. There is no arbitrary series of “modes” of thought in all this; instead what we have are moments of the one synthetic form of thinking, which cannot simply replace each other—not even through the addition of negation—but mutually require each other. In modality it is about the fact that in thinking in its unity there emerges a difference—e.g. the objective difference in real modality—a difference in the relation to the unity, or more precisely the claim is that it be determined according to the nature of its connection into that unity. In logic initially it is

43 D. Baumgardt, *Das Möglichkeitsproblem der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, der modernen Phänomenologie und der Gegenstandstheorie*, Kant-Studien suppl. 51, Berlin 1920, refers to Sigwart’s definition of possibility as ‘subjective undecidedness’ (24). This is surely worth studying also in Kant as a feature of possibility but it is in no sense its sufficient determination; possibility may not be made into an “objective” fact, namely of undecidedness or even undecidability for subjects. Fundamentally this holds also against B. Grünwald, *Modalität und empirisches Denken*, Hamburg 1986, where he attempts to correlate the modalities with ‘decision rules’ with which temporally differentiable states of ‘decidedness’ would be identifiable in the object (cf. esp. 72 ff.).

44 Cf. Kant, CpR B 100/A 75 note.

45 CpR B 101/A 76.

46 Cf. above 41 esp. note 3.

only about a formal difference, which naturally also then when thinking thinks material content must already be thought, since thinking without such a *form* of difference of which it is itself capable would in every immediate content simply come to an end without returning and would not be capable of being the concept of this content.

The other of thinking, what is different from it, must in general be plurality, since thinking itself is the unity of the concept. For Kant the modal concepts determine 'the relation of the many among themselves to the extent they are contained in one ... according to a rule: *order*'.⁴⁷ It should not be surprising then that in the discussion of the modal concepts not only the quantitative features of unity and plurality are drawn upon but also reference is made to the terms of relation. In the relations is expressed the immediate unity of the many or of the differentiated plurality and its unification.⁴⁸ Importantly, now thinking does not think *in* relations nor does it simply think *them*, instead it thinks them *as* mediations of the many to unity, i.e. as it relates once more to these relation forms and, simultaneously with that, to what it has thought as standing in relation to it. One could say that the copula of relations refers no longer only to the bound terms A and B but *just as much* to the binding or *to itself*. This latter is the point against which formal logic occasionally takes umbrage, which finds its extreme statement in the concept of truth (Kant's logical actuality); we will discuss this further below. Kant gives as examples the hypothetical and the disjunctive judgment for *possibility*, or the problematic proposition moment. It must be emphasised here that the hypothetical judgment is an example of *problematicity* and not of (formal) necessity. This is important because occasionally misunderstandings arise on this point, which easily happen when one fails to differentiate sufficiently between the simple, determining relation form and the determining relation in terms of its modality, i.e. its determinate difference character as "moment" of the thought unity.⁴⁹ The form "if A then B" is certainly immediately a determination of the many to unity but thinking or determining itself is with this in no way determined into accepting this term into its unity; – A could just as well be the case with the consequence that the entire hypothetical *reflection*—and no less than this is in play—does not hold. The possibility relation consists initially in the fact that thinking in general relates to difference and is as such certainly *capable*

47 Kant, R 575o.

48 K. Reich, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, Berlin 1948², speaks not very appropriately of a 'tangling' of relation and modality (52). Cf. for the relation just Kant, R 5562 and the letter to Reinhold of 19 May 1789 (Kant, AA XI, 44 f.).

49 This error is made also by e.g. B. Grünwald loc. cit. (note 43 above), esp. 56.

of that but only at the price that thinking *renders indifferent* the *differentiated determination* of the difference, e.g. to be A together with a consequence B. For Kant thinking has on the level of possibility ‘a free choice’⁵⁰ between the determinations, which however only means that it is not determined to something or other through these but remains the identity that it was before. According to the relation, thinking would thus be the “substance” that has arbitrary accidents; in terms of certainty it is the “subject” that utters opinions.⁵¹

The difference between the mere thought possibility, of the ‘empty’ or ‘inner’ possibility, and the possibility of an object is drawn strictly by Kant.⁵² The possibility of thinking is not simply that of what is thought of as an object, thinking of which for appearances is only possible for us in the receptivity forms of intuition, which as it were constitute the principle of the content’s passivity in the thinking of what is thought but which for things in themselves would require the insight into thorough (or self-)determination, and thus would presuppose what is for us the ‘dialectical’ possibility concept of the transcendental ideal.⁵³ In logical possibility thinking understands itself as a possible *concept* of something:

because we cannot think any thing without a concept, each single object that we are supposed to think must have a relation of agreement with the concept in general, i.e. must be possible.⁵⁴

The object is ‘respectively’ set by a possible concept of it, not yet ‘absolutely’ as present being.⁵⁵ The logical or inner possibility of thinking as of a concept

⁵⁰ Kant, CpR B 101/A 75.

⁵¹ Kant’s epistemological interest in the modalities, which can be clearly traced right from the beginning of his CpR, is completed in the treatment of the modi of holding opinions in its methodology section, thus the modalities are studied as integral components of the critical philosophy that are not restricted to treating the certainty status of the knowing subject accidentally. The critical philosophy no longer recognises any material truth criterion, so it has to regard this status itself as a necessary condition of all truth.

⁵² Kant can call the ‘logical possibility of the *concept* (since it does not contradict itself)’ a ‘deception’ (CpR B 302/A 244 with note B), because it facilitates the transition to the transcendental semblance—e.g. of Leibniz’s metaphysics. Cf. further CPJ B 453. In the following we will limit ourselves to a few references from the wealth of posthumous material. Plenty more are available, if they rarely offer more than quantitative additions. For a collation of Kant’s statements on modality cf. G. Schneeberger, *Kants Konzeption der Modalbegriffe*, Basel 1952.

⁵³ Cf. Kant, CpR B 599 f./A 571 f.

⁵⁴ Kant, R 4304.

⁵⁵ Cf. R 3813.

of something is determined according to the '*principles of contradiction and of identity*';⁵⁶ what is 'logical in possibility' is thus 'a relation of comparison'⁵⁷—of reflection, as we said; it is the 'truth ... contradistinguished', like the real possibility of actuality.⁵⁸ As a truth criterion the logical possibility reflection is merely 'negative',⁵⁹ i.e. holding falsity at bay but not setting any truth. Without that however it is not that something other would be thought but that *nothing* at all would be thought, so that thinking as (formal) totality emerges already in the possibility reflection, while at the same time it is expressed as indifferent unity. In Kant's table of nothingnesses the modal title is '*nihil negativum*', what is strictly other to thinking and knowing.⁶⁰ With respect to this nothingness the unity of the concept as presented by logical possibility is *qualitative* unity, while possibility as unity of the subject is formal unity of objectivity in the sense of the "transcendental *unum*", as Kant treats it in the CpR. In an important posthumous reflection, the three modal terms are not only tied to their logical criteria but are also related to the faculty of knowledge as well as to the transcendentals.⁶¹ This provides an initial starting point for a logically systematic interpretation of the modal terms.

b) *Logical Actuality (Truth)*

In the assertorical proposition moment, thinking shows itself to be a form of the connection to a *determinate* determination, no longer merely indifferently to determination in general; in this way it enters itself into difference. This is expressed in that the actuality criterion is '*the principle of sufficient reason*';⁶² for the relation to the ground is connection of one to another, in which however Kant emphasises the moment of binding itself. From Leibniz's point of view it is surprising to find the *principium rationis sufficientis* declared to be a criterion of actuality or truth. For Leibniz this principle was strictly confined

56 Kant, *Jäsche Logik*, Intro. VII (AA IX, 52).

57 Kant, R 3756.

58 Cf. Ibid.

59 Kant, *Jäsche Logik*, Intro. VII (AA IX, 51).

60 Cf. Kant, CpR B 348/A 291 f.

61 Cf. Kant, R 5734. 'Unity, truth and completeness (transcendental completeness) are the requisita of every knowledge with respect to understanding, the power of judgment and reason (the last requires apodictic certainty, i.e. complete truth). Everything derived from one. Everything bound in one. The one derived from everything. Unity of the subject (possibility), of the ground (actuality), and of the whole (necessity). There are three transcendental criteria of the possibility of the things in general. 3-fold formal unity'; cf. Kant, CpR §12 and R 4806, 4807.

62 Kant, *Jäsche Logik*, Intro. VII (AA IX, 53).

to contingency, and as such could at most have been a criterion of a degree of truth but not itself the form of truth; that would rather have been found in the infinite analysis, which again only provides adequate knowledge to God. With the the principle of sufficient reason certainly something is known about the truth of the being of the contingent affirmatively but the knowledge of that as of a determinate determination still remains to be decided. In the context of the principle of reason in Kant there is no such reference to that kind of analysis. When a statement is thought of as true, then all that must formally be thought is 'that the statement is bound to the understanding according to its laws'.⁶³ The formal criterion of logical actuality or truth is thus only that thinking is bound to a determinate something thought, or, equivalently, that thinking has a determinate (differentiated) connection to what is thought. We now have a distinct, logical actuality concept that cannot be reduced to the principle of contradiction, which, applied to the binding between something and another could only once again set the task of analysis. This suggests the presumption that Kant's *deletion of the ought moment* from the logical truth concept is already conceived in terms of real actuality, whose criterion is the context with feeling, which latter in opposition to the demand for an infinite analysis or any analysis at all would be absurd. Kant's logical truth concept is hence not that of analytical truth, as commonly used in formal logic. Reference to the facticity of the binding as truth criterion makes it also clear that it is not the traditional correspondence theory either, for which the question as to the knowability of the correspondence, and with that of the criterion, generates an infinite regress in the same way that Tarski's semantic conception of truth could only be sustained by an infinite regress of the 'metalevels', which it already presupposes, namely that one can claim that an X in the 'object language' in general is *mappable* in the 'metalanguage'.⁶⁴ For Kant the form of truth is *thought* when an assertion is made, thus when thinking the second premiss of a conclusive hypothetical syllogism ('that A'). With respect to this actual thinking or form execution, only external reflection could ask *whether* the assertion is true, which is to say it could once again render it problematical but to do that it would have to render the entire syllogism in the example problematical,

63 Kant, CpR B 101/A 76.

64 The simple change from the 'object-' to the 'metalevel' cannot itself indicate why the change is made at all and requires for that the third level etc., etc. It is only when the expression is known as *in its own right* another, thus e.g. in Kant as a *consequence* of a ground, with which it is thought of as ultimately standing in self-referential form, that the third (in Kant the binding) is again the first. For the critique of Tarski cf. just A. Kulenkampff, *Antinomie und Dialektik*, Stuttgart 1970, esp. 46 ff.

because external reflection is essentially inconclusive thinking. The form of truth itself however clearly cannot be rendered problematical, since as a form it is immediately other to problematising, which essentially has to attach itself not to the logical form but to the contents, thus always maintaining a (logical) externality to them, to the extent that they are not contents idealised through a truly universal form like the Kantian object of experience as content of the proposition of experience. The form of truth is thus logically gained through abstraction from problematical form, at the same time however in abstraction from the form of proof, into which both forms would be overcome.

What is thus demanded of the assertorical proposition is that in terms of form it is referred to one or more grounds. Thinking is as logically actual a determinate transition from one into another, from the ground into the consequence; it thus presents, looked at relationally, the hypothetical form, not the categorial form of substance. In terms of certainty this thinking is faith that takes its binding force from the *binding* to the ground, although it does not objectively utter the ground, which is why it stands back from problematising indifferent form. The independence of faith against opinion shows itself in this, above all, in that it can present consequences for which the latter offers no grounds, i.e. because it can justify actions that presuppose a sufficient, at least subjective ground.⁶⁵ What is equivalent to the form of truth in asserting in the certainty of faith is truthfulness: 'In the actions according to faith, everything happens honourably'.⁶⁶ The assertion is immediately only reflected in itself, just as also the certainty of faith only abides and justifies itself in its own horizon. It is certainly possible for an *opinion* of faith to be hypocritically held as theoretical content before others in terms of the externality of opinion but not certainty before itself.

Quantitatively speaking there can be many consequences of the assertion, just as thinking in its form in general is in difference or plurality. This plurality is however as a transcendental of '*truth* in view of the consequences' not a simple quantitative determination but instead a '*qualitative plurality* of features, which belong to a concept as to a common ground'.⁶⁷ Truth is fertile with consequences and sustains itself in this fertility. Only when a consequence of external reflection appears to be false can the ground and with it the whole

65 Cf. just Kant's criterion of gambling at CpR B 852 f./A 824 f.; further J. Simon, *Kants pragmatische Ethikbegründung* in *Archivio di filosofia* 55 (1987), 183–204 as well as his *Modalität und Kommunikabilität*, mss. 1987. Cf. also the observation Kant, R 2481 'Objectively there is no difference between truth and certainty'.

66 Kant, R 2451.

67 Kant, CpR B 114.

binding be discarded; the untruth is already this lack of binding, with respect to which the need arises to prove the ground relation and to present it as objective. This requires apodictic form.

c) *Logical Necessity*

The ought Kant removed from the truth concept returns again in the requirement of proof. In the apodictic statement, considering its determinate thought object, thinking shows itself as *self-determining*, while in the assertoric form it was the execution of a given determination or difference. It executed an inference, which certainly in its own right referred to the ground but had not itself generated that and to that extent also did not possess a concept of it.⁶⁸ In the apodictic proposition the assertion must now however through the 'laws of the understanding itself', be 'determined and hence *a priori* asserting'.⁶⁹ In Kant's language the laws of the understanding can be understood primarily as the three logical principles, which can also be called 'logical criteria of truth',⁷⁰ namely the reflection terms of the principles of identity, of contradiction, of ground and of the excluded third. Analytical propositions are thus apodictic according to the principle of contradiction:

All analytical judgments are judgments *a priori* and hold also with strict universality and absolute necessity, because they are wholly founded on the principle of contradiction.⁷¹

Apodictically valid are also statements that have a complete ground, i.e. that determine this ground from out of the sum of *all their* consequences, just as e.g. the pure principles of the understanding are *a priori* apodictically true, because they are the complete consequences of the faculty of the understanding itself as transcendental apperception in objective determining; the principles of the understanding are distinguished by 'necessity according to concepts', 'whose lack in each empirical statement, no matter how universal its validity

68 Cf. Kant, *Jäsche Logik*, Intro. VII (AA IX, 52).

69 Kant, CpR B 101/A 76.

70 Kant, *Jäsche Logik*, Intro. VII (AA IX, 53); cf. CpR B 350/A 293 f.: 'In a cognition that agrees thoroughly with the laws of the understanding there is no error'. *Logically*, i.e. for the form of apodicticity however fundamentally speaking it is completely irrelevant which rule set by the understanding itself the form agrees with so long as this rule has its origin only in the understanding *a priori*—at best also in pure intuitions, like the mathematical principles, whose apodicticity for Kant does not need to be proved at all (cf. CpR B 188 f./A 149; B 198 f./A 159 f.).

71 Kant, *Fortschritte der Metaphysik*, AA XX 323.

may be, will be easily perceived;⁷² and for this reason they conceal their confusion with merely empirical principles. Laws are in general apodictic grounds, for their concept contains 'the concept of necessity of all determinations of a thing, that belong to its present being'.⁷³ Ultimately then propositions are apodictic when they hold according to the principle of excluded third, like the *conclusio* of a syllogism that is 'always accompanied by the consciousness of necessity' and 'consequently' possesses 'the dignity of an apodictic statement'.⁷⁴ Correspondingly a proposition of experience that stands under a pure principle possesses apodictic validity according to this principle. That the criterion of logical necessity *as a whole* can be the principle of excluded third⁷⁵ should thus not be surprising, because in fact *each* apodictic judgment, no matter what principle it obeys, immediately says 'that necessarily in this way and in no other must be judged, i.e. that the opposite is false'.⁷⁶ It is known from thinking itself that this proposition suffers no more problematising and, correspondingly, external reflection (namely in the externality of the premisses) has been repelled; with their positively content-laden determination, apodictic propositions always also have an exclusionary negative determination in which thinking as it were by itself closes off its own sphere.

In the apodictic proposition are contained the external reflection and its indifferentiation as well as the unproved assertion as premisses. This becomes clear above all when external reflection attacks an apodictic statement not directly but only with respect to its premisses or in its content, while the forming form of these contents is in any case superior to it. Against a proposition of experience for instance it is not possible to bring immediately determinate truth contents that are supposed to contradict it, nor can it be required, in the sense of induction, to bring forth ever new contents in order in that way to increase its "truth". If a specific proposition of experience should be rendered invalid, it then must be shown in its own perception premisses that these do not fulfil the form requirement of the proposition of experience, thus do not fulfil the condition of the principle under which it is subsumed. If it is shown that instead of a claimed causality of A and B, in fact, as would be proved by other perceptions, A changes only after C, which in turn only changes after B, then the objectively constitutive status of the form of causality is not contested but only the capacity of determinate contents to fulfil this form.

72 Kant, CpR B 198/A 159.

73 Kant, MAdN AA IV, 468.

74 Kant, *Jäsche Logik* § 60 note 1 (AA IX, 122).

75 Cf. *Jäsche Logik*, Intro. VII (AA IX, 53).

76 Ibid.

If, as in the already quoted reflection from the *Opus posthumum*, the feature of necessity is the derivation of *one* from *all*, and hence is the presentation of the whole,⁷⁷ then what is equivalent to that is the transcendental of the

‘*qualitative completeness* (totality)’ or of the ‘completeness which consists in that ... (the) plurality refers back together to the unity of the concept and is completely in agreement with this and with no other’.⁷⁸

Thinking that on the possibility level was a simple indifferent concept ended up on the actuality level in a determinate differing or referring to something thought but now, since the modality of necessity is the concluding determination of thinking in general, it turns back to itself from out of the plurality of difference, to itself as unity of the concept, now as unity of the plurality or as totality of what is thought. In terms of the hypothetical form it is now the sum of its condition and its conditioned, of simple thinking and what is thought; as certainty, it is knowing, just as for Kant ‘only that one’ can be called a ‘*genuine science*’ ‘whose certainty is apodictic’.⁷⁹ The relation form “community” is doubly equivalent to the apodictic form. On the one hand from now on what is thought or the difference is known as itself a thinking, thus not merely what is passive in thinking but just as much its activity, while on the other through the self-restriction of the apodictic against non-knowing in the form “*index veri et falsi*”, thus making it that which is determining for both sides of the limit. Looked at more closely however both of these respects are identical, for thinking is only held back from determining its other as long as it remains something alien and other to that thinking, and only when it knows itself to be itself within that thinking, as its whole ground, does thinking determine itself also in limitation to its other, which it simultaneously determines as non-thinking.

d) *Logical Modality and Unity of Thought*

For Kant then the logical modal functions represent moments of ‘thinking in general’—not only, like the other proposition functions, ‘moments of thinking’⁸⁰—and simultaneous with the apodictic form, the category trias of modality is brought to its (synthetic trichotomic) concept.⁸¹ Furthermore, the form of

⁷⁷ Cf. Kant, R 5734 (above note 61).

⁷⁸ Kant, CpR B 114.

⁷⁹ Kant, MAdN AA IV, 468.

⁸⁰ Kant, CpR B 96/A 71; cf. B 101/A 76.

⁸¹ Thus correctly also W. Schindler, *Die reflexive Struktur objectiver Erkenntnis*, Munich 1979, 26. Schindler also refers to Kant’s trichotomic in our sense ‘principle of division’ (ibid.) as well as to the connection between the logical modalities and the transcendentals

necessity, the “sum”, or the formal conclusion of thinking in general is arrived at. This all suggests that a systematic of logical forms, as far as that can be produced in Kant, can be undertaken starting from the modal concepts, at least in outline. It has often been remarked that the table of judgments, as well as that of the categories, can be structured according to the modalities, for which a deduction is at least suggested in the notes to the *Phenomenology* of Kant’s MadN and can be carried out in detail, indeed attempts to do so have been undertaken in the past.⁸² There are also relations going beyond the tables. We present here in tabular form the moments whose connection to the modal concepts have already emerged, with Kant’s own references, for a clearer overview:

Differentiating logical modality

| Moments of hypo-thetical-synthetic form | Condition | Conditioned |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| Logical modality <i>qua</i> self-relation of thinking | possibility | actuality |
| Logical principle of modal self-relation of thinking | identity | ground |

in the sense of § 12 in the CpR. Schindler’s very instructive study also makes it easy to understand the ‘subjectivity’ of the modal synthesis, which is attached to thinking itself as a *form moment* for the logical modalities, not in the sense of the thinking of empirical subjects but as the logical subjectivity of thinking itself, its reflexive self-reference and limitation from its (in Kant certainly initially only logical) other. Schindler is thus correct to emphasise *systematicity* as a form of the presentation of thinking (cf. 13 ff.).

82 A simple assignment of the modalities to the category titles was undertaken by H.J. Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. 11, London and New York 1965⁴, 341. In *La théorie kantienne des modalités*, *Acts of the 5th Int. Kant Congress* 1981, Bonn 1982, 149–167, J. Vuillemin differentiates further in that he additionally parallels the modalities with the relation principles. In *Über die methodische Funktion der Kategorientafel*, J. Kopper and W. Marx (eds.), *200 Jahre Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hildesheim 1981, 43–78, 1. Heidemann refers to the note in MADN AA IV, 559 f. and starting from it takes up an assignment corresponding to one of Paton’s, only that now ‘the function of the modal categories’ acquires ‘its meaning ... from the statement required in reference back to the single classes on the certainty of the cognition with which concept formation in the sense of a definition is concluded’ (52). Finally in his study *Kategorien der Freiheit und der Natur* in D. Koch and K. Bort (eds.), *Kategorie und Kategorialität* (Fs K. Hartmann), Würzburg 1990, 107–130, J. Simon presents the *entire* table starting from the modal terms and with reference to the certainty moment also addressed by Heidemann in the manner given in his study referred to in note 18 (p. 49 f.) above.

Differentiating logical modality

| Logical form of presentation of self-relation | concept | judgment |
|---|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| ("faculty") | (understanding) | (power of judgment) |
| Relation form | categorical | hypothetical |
| Quantity moment (indifference) | unity (difference) | plurality as differentiated unity) |
| Quality moment thought unity | affirmation of thought unity | negation of thought unity |
| "Transcendentals" as terms of thought unity in objective reference | qualitative unity | truth |
| Proposition moment ^a | inside | outside |
| State of self-relation as certainty | opinion | faith |

^a Cf. 145 above. If one wanted to give the concept moments too, then one would have to mention universality, particularity and *concrete* singularity or *individuality*; cf. also the observation at Kant, CpR B 96 f./A 71 on the singular proposition.

These kinds of assignments cannot for Kant directly claim the status of an executed deduction of the logical terms from the concept of the logical itself; still they do show that the summary—to use Schelling's word: the 'syllepsis'⁸³—of the logical concept is prefigured in the modalities and these could be called in a determinate sense the systematic *definientia* of the single logical forms. One could even say that in this systematic assignment, each single logical form by means of its modal "character" or "index" shows in itself the degree of reflexivity of thinking, as it were the subjective "density" of the self-relation of thinking in them. In this sense the conclusion is then "denser" than a mere concept and for that reason also more autonomous; but then it is in this sense also that the "value of the copula" is to be taken, for it is determined by the modality and is hence not an "objective" but a reflexive fact of thought as the indicator of the degree to which it has been rendered subjective.

83 Cf. Schelling, *Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie*, SW 1, 146.

Just as each category title is included in the summary that is its third moment, so is logical necessity the conclusion of logical modality and the sylleptic expression of thinking in general; what corresponds to it is the form of reason and the formal autonomy of thinking that knows itself to be self-determining. Since thinking in this form responds to immediate external reflection repelling it, and since, moreover, its own sphere itself limits itself off from non-thinking or the logical *nihil negativum*, one could in a certain respect speak of a formal *individuality*, which thinking arrives at with the degree of subjectivity of the necessity level. That would mean that mere thinking for itself presented something which clearly could not become a theoretical object of knowledge; one could refer for this additionally to the fact that Kant can vindicate *absolute* necessity for the logical form, which is expressly excluded for all material knowledge.⁸⁴ Indeed thinking is not knowing, which, looked at from Kant's systematic, is the genuinely *actual* determination of thinking. Knowledge only arises when understanding and sense, thinking and intuition 'unite'.⁸⁵ The fact however that an actual other stands against thinking, this presupposition is the only thing that makes it meaningful that within thinking in general distinctions are possible: above all that between active thinking and what is passively thought. Without its determining other of intuition, the concept certainly would not be a differentiated concept but only a pure continuum of accommodation to the understanding; the concept would fall together with the mere 'possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use',⁸⁶ the simple point of the "I think" without differences. This point is in Kant the *condition* of objective knowledge. From this it emerges that thinking as such as a *whole* enters into the position of the condition, of possibility, identity, or of the concept having the material of knowledge as *what is conditioned* outside it. Whereas thinking in the logic *in general* took the standpoint of difference to another, *from this point on* it is an object of *transcendental logic*, because the transcendental philosophy determines the difference *systematically*, i.e. it takes it as a difference of the complementarity in the sense of its fundamental synthetic form. Transcendental logic treats it in the asymmetric condition status that is supposed to allow the limit to be regarded as a moment of a synthesis *a priori*. This amounts to nothing less than a reinterpretation of the other standing outside of thinking, from a simple non-thinking (*qua* οὐκ ὄν) to a

84 Cf. just the statements quoted above 220 note 71 as well as Kant, CpR B 621 f./A 593 f.

85 Cf. Ibid. B 75/A 51.

86 Ibid. B 131.

qualitative other of thinking ($\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon$), whose difference is amenable to mediation over the totality of form. In the position of the condition now thinking is still not addressed as an individual, since it is in fact only an abstract universal devoid of content. It is only a moment of the “individual” of experience, for whose predicative self-enriching—“*per intus susceptionem*”—it plays its *conditioning* but not sufficient, role. Meanwhile, it has become possible for thinking, by virtue of the fact that it can isolate itself from the difference of experience, also to think the thought of absolute necessity, for which it has an example in itself. It can however also think the totality of its totalising moments—the modalities—as complete in itself in such a manner that it ends up in a “dialectical” *overshooting* beyond the sphere of the condition of intuition, when these completed thoughts are treated as synonymous with theoretically mediated experiential objectivity. These thoughts of freedom from the sphere of conditionality, produced by overcoming it, the thoughts of freedom ultimately from the, as one must put it, thoroughly banal finitude of perception, the thoughts then that seemed to Kant to be only a semblance or chimera, find after “soul” and “world” their conclusion in thoughts of the idea *in individuo*, in the presented absolute necessity, *because* the one-sided motion of the condition from subject to predicate is *simultaneously* also one of *reversing*. We have already seen that with this form, which would have to “metabolise” the entire Kantian basic form of thinking, the limit of Kant’s thought is arrived at in the absolute form. Now while Kant does remark that the idea of reason treats ‘the origin ... of closed concepts’ as ‘completely *a priori*’,⁸⁷ which ‘concepts’ would thus in terms of form be systematically complete, i.e. syllogisms and conclusions, he adds:

pure reason has no other aim than the absolute totality *on the side of the conditions* ..., and that it has no business looking at absolute completeness *from the side of what is conditioned*.⁸⁸

Thus is the idea *originally divided* (*ge-ur-teilt*) against the thought possibility of the apodictic form—which is clearly not yet as such absolute form—under the auspices of the hypothetical form, and the exclusive right to the title of knowledge is conceded to incomplete contents (appearances). Once again this knowledge is summarised in its modality: the postulates of empirical thinking in general.

87 Ibid. B 390/A 333 (‘closed’ in Kant in the sense of ‘fully developed’ but indeed the ‘syllogism’ is also the form of the ‘conclusion’, its concept for that reason also ‘closed in itself’).

88 Ibid. B 393/A 336.

3 Postulates of Empirical Thinking

a) *Status of Modal Principles*

The making of experience—the one, ideal-real motion of the ‘enriching’ of our concepts in predicative syntheses—gains its necessity from the fact that its propositions stand under pure principles of the understanding. These principles are provided with proofs by Kant, at least in the second edition of the CpR, with the exception of those that correspond to the modal category titles, the ‘postulates of empirical thinking in general’; for these the proof is replaced by an ‘explanation’. Why this is the case is made clear at the end of the section on the postulates, which also explains the term ‘postulate’. Kant writes:

In mathematics a postulate is ... the practical statement containing nothing but the synthesis by which we initially provide ourselves with an object and generate its concept.⁸⁹

This quality of originality of the generation of the concept is the reason why ‘such a statement ...’ can ‘not be proven’.⁹⁰ For postulates all possess the *certainty* already within themselves, which it would be the task of the proof to produce, such that in their application they as it were ‘prove’ themselves:

A *postulate* is a practical immediately certain statement or a principle that determines a possible action for which is presupposed that the manner of executing them is immediately certain.⁹¹

And the aspect of the ‘action’, of becoming practical, the automotion of the knowledge faculty, is what makes it possible to relate it to the modal principles. These ‘say of a concept nothing other than the action of the knowledge faculty by which it is generated’.⁹² The conceptual *content* is not touched by them; the modal ‘predicate’ relates thus to no object *materialiter*, instead it relates only to its *formal* objectivity, to ‘the relation to the knowledge faculty’.⁹³ In fact this *relation*—expressed in the proposition as copula—shows, as we know from what has already been said, the *ambiguity* or *bivalence* on the one

89 Ibid. B 287/A 234.

90 Ibid.

91 Kant, *Jäsche Logik* § 38 (AA IX, 112).

92 Kant, CpR B 287/A 234.

93 Ibid. B 266/A 219.

hand, that it is an *existing* relation as well as being determined according to the 'manner of existing', and on the other that it is an *active* relation, an *action* of the knowledge faculty. We are not unprepared for this ambiguity. We have encountered the contradiction between being and reflection in the copula, or of propositional content and proposition form, which only the power of the imagination was capable of avoiding. We were able to demonstrate this ambiguity, or more sharply stated, antinomy, of a 'passive' and an 'active' immediacy in different forms in the traditional modal concepts. In Aristotle it was only sufficiently explicable by motion, while Leibniz believed it made it legitimate to draw ontological consequences from logical form. Hegel demonstrates that only under the assumption of the modalities' absoluteness can they withstand and indeed even relate to the entire contradiction or to the metabolic motion from the one to the other immediacy, as well as that this precisely is its absolute relation, its absoluteness. For Kant so much is clear, that the original self-giving of the object and the generation of its concept fall together in complete agreement, that the 'standing' of the object in its position to the understanding and the process of understanding *actu* of this understanding in real modality find a united concept—a unity however that is not a 'fixed' concept but a postulate.

It was with these presuppositions that Heidegger was able to develop the answer to the question of 'Kant's thesis on being' with good reason from the postulate section of the CpR. Heidegger poses this question in the context of the philosophical 'leading question' on 'thinking and being', in Kant especially of 'proposition and position', and this more precisely with the emphasis on the 'and' between the two, where the Kantian synthesis problem is found.⁹⁴ According to Heidegger, the genuine ambiguity lies then not in the modal concept itself but in that of *thinking*, which functioned as the 'horizon proposal for explaining being and its modalities as position' but simultaneously also as the 'reflection of reflection' presenting 'the organon of interpretation of the being of beings'.⁹⁵ Indeed this ambiguity is not to be rejected lightly; for the modal concept it should be a matter not of an abstract triplicity setting beside each other the thought horizon, the position of being in that, and the organon of interpretation of what is set but instead about giving the modal concept the 'fluidity' to think of all three moments as contained within it and realised in the execution of the modal generation of

94 M. Heidegger, *Kant's These über das Sein in Wegmarken*, Frankfurt a. M. 1978², 439–473 esp. 470 f. 455 f.

95 Heidegger loc. cit. (previous note 94), 471.

the objective concept. The modalities are genetic definitions of objectively determined concepts in the horizon or context of the one self-determining experience; thus they *measure* out the *horizon*—in the case of the postulates, that of empirical thinking in general—and they *fix* in that precisely where it makes sense to speak of “being” and in what “measure”. Still that sense lies neither in the for itself undetermined horizon as such nor in the immediate “position”, nor indeed in the objective terms that a concept contains but only in the interaction between these three, which is precisely simultaneously “something”—i.e. the present being of sense—and “action”, i.e. of the “play of this interaction” itself. In general all “voices” experience relies upon fall into this interaction, whose simple expression is the modal postulate. In it lies the medium term of its speech.

That Heidegger is not really very far from this view becomes clear when he says elsewhere that ‘the postulates’ ‘correspond’ to ‘the essence of that by which objects in general are determinable: the essence of experience’,⁹⁶ and this ‘essence of experience’ he says more precisely is:

an occurrence circulating within itself through which that which lies inside the circle is revealed. What is thus revealed however is nothing other than what lies in between—in between us and the thing.⁹⁷

With this is expressed the modality as *medium term*, and indeed as medium term between the ‘essence of experience’—‘man’ remains in Kant, since he cannot become an individual, essentially ‘essence’—and the being experienced through the medium term, called ‘thing’, which in fact is also an ‘essence’, the essence experienced. Modality is presented in this medium term as a *sylogism*, which is already indicated in Heidegger’s ‘opening’ ‘within the circle’. In Kant it is about the essence-sylogism of experience in which the subjective and objective premisses—understanding and thinghood, as one could say—result in the unity of having understood and the (modal) process of understanding *in terms of* experience *actu*. But this openness does not come only from the unity of the “subjective” and “objective” in the modal relation to their coming together; it spreads out also from out of itself—everywhere experience is “made”, that openness is also there and without it there is no experience, neither as the process of experiencing nor as what is experienced. The syllogism of experience

96 M. Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, Frankfurt a. M. 1984, 240.

97 Heidegger *ibid.* 244. On the ‘in between’ he adds that it reaches ‘out beyond the things’ and ‘back behind humans’ (cf. 246).

is the opening of the closedness, for which postulates are required. If under these requirements something experienced inheres into the openness, then its single-sense, unambiguous objective further determining is concluded, while simultaneously the renewed impossibility of its being understood pushes on into objective determination. The motion of experience comes to rest at the modal conclusion in itself.

Thus W. Schindler was correct in undertaking to illuminate the 'self-grounding of knowledge' according to Kant by starting from the postulates.⁹⁸ His investigation is founded on the subjectively synthetic function of the modal principles or, as Schindler can also say, their 'subject-constitutive meaning'.⁹⁹ It is important to see that the subject of experience according to Kant is not a dogmatically set something, e.g. a specific "faculty" present in the world, which then as it were beside its availability, also becomes active and begins to gather knowledge of other contents of the "world". Against such a world of what is available and an available world as a container of 'subjects' and 'objects', we have the critique of positive totalities, just as the precritical Kant already developed it for the concept of the world as such.¹⁰⁰ Fundamentally speaking such a merely positive world was already refuted by Leibniz when he reduced his conception of the *generated* 'best possible' world to the world grounded in the negative activity of the divine understanding; although Leibniz managed this only at the price that in general no external positivity could be thought of any more, for instead everything was reduced through its modal moment to the adequate imagining of God. Critically looked at, in Kant the making of experience only presents a dynamic moment of experience in its definitional generation of objective determination. His notion of the "world" has become a dialectical extrapolation from out of that making of experience, indeed such that the totality moment of the making, of this self-generating, autopoietic context of experience, is hypostasised starting from its mere concept to a possible, actual or necessary *existing* totality. It is in the second case, the actual

98 Cf. Schindler loc. cit. (note 81 above), esp. 67.

99 Schindler loc. cit. (note 81 above), 6. On the expression 'subjectively synthetic' cf. CpR B 286/A 233 f. Schindler was able to complete his project with such success, because in the postulates in the Kantian systematic the general form of subjectivity, which logically already lies in the hypothetical form as such, falls together with the time totality—the modal schema—thus with the pure subjectivity of intuition (of the inner sense). Schindler finds in each of the modal concepts a 'time structure sum' (cf. 54, 63) and understands the transcendental time term correctly as itself the 'horizon of the *one* experience', whose sum lies in the modal terms (cf. 63).

100 Cf. the requirement of the transition to the 'intellectual concept' of the world in *De mundi sensibilis* § 2, III (AA II, 391 f.).

totality, that it relates to the notion of the world. On the critical presupposition, one can then no longer say that subjects are “in” the “world”; instead it is much more the case that they produce their world individually, which is nothing other than the context of experience “filled” by material determination and realized by the individuals. Empirical subjectivity is *also* constituted precisely in this, which then through this determinate filling ceases to be only ‘the substantial that remains when I remove all accidents that inhere in it and have discarded them’, the ‘subject of apperception’, ‘the logical I’.¹⁰¹ Kant himself noticed the ambiguity of subjectivity—‘a double I’, as he says.¹⁰² In his philosophy the I is a condition in the sense of hypothetical form, i.e. in relation to the hypothetical form of experience, merely a *real possibility* of this experience, if also—according to our ordering above—mere concept, indifference and, as Kant at this point himself says, ‘substance’ of experience. At the same time however it is also given on the side of actuality, namely as having set *determinate* objectivity as ‘empirical consciousness’ that is ‘capable of diverse knowledge’.¹⁰³ ‘in that the sensuous I—I as time—is determined by the intellectual side for acceptance (i.e. of perceptions) into consciousness’.¹⁰⁴ This *determinate* and, according to the logic of form, *conditioned* I is the subjectivity of the predicate side of hypothetical form and can, because it is derived from their general condition, be called *constituted* subjectivity in the sense of Schindler. For Schindler in his attempt to derive empirical consciousness from pure consciousness, *time* plays the role of bringing in *difference*, which is indispensable to the self-differentiation of subjectivity and which Kant indeed imagines as an external development to difference (through affection). This all sheds new light on the second analogy of experience in which only the time sequence is the link and relation between what is different and remains external to itself, a light which illuminates its central meaning for what is simultaneously always only a provisional conclusion to the system of experience. It is as such form of a self-external subjectivity, which nevertheless remains the process of understanding in general. The second analogy of experience is drawn upon by Kant in the case of the necessity postulate in order to think in terms of the concept of transcendental philosophy a being that is necessary *and* understandable. Corresponding to this under the ought idea of the antimony of reason, once again it will be this analogy that presents the principle of forward movement

101 *Fortschritte der Metaphysik* AA XX, 270.

102 *Ibid.*

103 *Ibid.*

104 *Ibid.*

in systematic articulation of the one experience.¹⁰⁵ Being and reflection are *bound* in the form of the causal relation according to Kant as a unity capable of truth, even when this link is only hypothetical and the apodictic necessity of thinking existence is avoided. The three modal *summaries*—binding in general to proportion (possibility), set agreement *qua* determination (actuality), and determinate bind (necessity)—avoid in Kant ultimately the implication that those bound in them are *strictly* united, conceiving of them instead as localisable at different ‘places’ in terms of the logic of experience, the binding in general in the subject of experience, the difference in the external or in perception, and the determinate binding in that empirical consciousness which as a necessary proposition of experience *is there*.

In the modal concept itself all three moments have to find their expression, if each with their own different accents. For the modal concept is in each case a determinate “interaction” of the contents contained within it—i.e. of experience as being-in-itself and set experience, of “being” and “reflection” and of their unity. In this interaction is comprehended the named oppositions, no longer exclusive oppositions but together now a whole mediated within itself as the process of understanding in general, the ‘open’ and the ‘in between’ of Heidegger, which whole here first *is*. Formally speaking one could express the task and the value the modalities in real terms determine by saying that it is about executing and expressing the *proportionalisation* of the three sides. The proportionality lies for this reason in the matter because it is about the relation to a relation, or about the self-relating of the relata opposed *to each other*. Each

105 W. Lütterfelds, *Kants Dialektik der Erfahrung*, Meisenheim am Glan 1977, holds the ‘subject-object-link’ in Kant—and in general—for ‘irresolvably antinomical’ (5 and *passim*). The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand the ‘subject’ of a ‘given actuality’ more or less ‘constitutively’ ‘forces upon it’ its ‘transcendental structure’ (cf. 5, 464 ff.), while on the other, once again the actuality is not much affected by that but for its part invites the subject to ‘subsequently synthesise’ itself, thus arriving in the second analogy and in the postulates at the limits of its conception. As far as the first of these goes, he seeks from the difference between apprehension order and objective succession order of time—the latter of which means in our sense the proportioning of what is chronologically perceived in the self-determined experiential whole—to reinstate the ‘empirical causality as regular, ontic determination of reality independent of the subject’ (216), so that causal determination, against Kant’s own latent ‘idealism’, would be ‘extended’ ‘from the temporal to the ontic’ (227; cf. 454). He sees the ‘antinomic’ aspect of modal principles in the fact that present being in them would have been ‘treated’ simultaneously ‘under transcendental and empirical points of view’ (449) and as one of its conclusions the truth of the proposition would have been intended to express the actuality of the matter but then again also not to do that (cf. 448). The mediation of the moment of immediacy (of being, of position) and of the moment of mediation (of reflection, of the experience-‘proposition’) in the modal concept is not seen but ‘antinomically’ dismantled.

term, as 'devoid of proportionality' or as Kant says happening without modal 'character', cannot claim alone to be knowledge. It would be either a linear activity of the subjective *concept* not 'refracted' by the outside, as in dogmatic metaphysics, or a similarly merely linear objective predicating in the sense of the aggregation of perception predicates, which for that reason is neither refracted (reflected) in its own subjectivity nor with that simultaneously reflected in the object, because it is ultimately still of the opinion that the things of experience subdivide *themselves*. Looked at from Kant's concept of experience, it is rather the case that there is only one single self to which all subdivision belongs—which would be experience itself, and reflection in the identity of the subject *ipso facto* is the path to objectivity of what is different. This one 'self', which Kant knows as subjective reflexivity, is the original proportionality of experience, which through the actions demanded by the postulates transforms itself into set experience in such a way that simultaneously the subject acquires the transcendental certainty of its process of experiencing and what is experienced acquires its transcendental truth. The modal proportion is *unprovable*, because it is 'only' in the performance of experience. As performance it is action; but action is according to its concept analytically *actual*; however strictly speaking the actual can (and may) not to be proven, i.e. emerge to reflection, because it is that which *shows itself* and cannot be shown by another for another¹⁰⁶—at least not *to the extent that* it is actual. It is in itself a beginning. For this reason as one can say in modal proportion things known and knowing subjects exist in a state of beginning that is for both *the same*.

b) *Possibility Postulate*

The first modal 'together' in the proportion of 'already wholly and completely' determined 'concept of a thing to the understanding and its empirical use' (B 266/A 219) amounts to a matter of 'reaching agreement' or a simple 'agreeing'

106 Grünewald (loc. cit. note 43 above) proceeding from the on the whole hardly credible assumption that Kant's MAdN, which appeared in 1786, 'presupposes completely *different modal categories* than those articulated in the "Postulates of empirical thinking in general"' (4) (as again published in edition B of the CpR by Kant in 1787), has attempted to provide a new edition both of the transcendental postulates (152) and of the 'formal postulates of an empirical science' (cf. 165 ff.). In order to formulate these he proceeds from the universalised phenomenological *theorems* of the MAdN. These new 'postulates' are—despite their title—accompanied by *proofs* formulated retrospectively from the MAdN, where, as stated, they are again related to 'theorems', which, as such, are not only capable of but also need, proofs. This misunderstanding must result from Grünewald's fundamental assumption that modalities need to have had an 'objectively constitutive' meaning in order to be 'understandable'.

in general.¹⁰⁷ ‘What agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in terms of intuition and the concepts) is *possible*’ (B 265/A 218). The ‘objective form of experience in general’ is with that expressed—at once in the restrictive sense against every determining speech that is ‘not proportionable’—as the complete in-itself (δύναμις) of what is objectively determinable; for experience alone ‘contains ... all the synthesis required for the knowledge of the objects’ (B 267/A 220). Like the analogies, for Kant the postulates do not have ‘constitutive’ significance but only ‘regulative’ use in relation to the appearances.¹⁰⁸ While however the analogies are still objective rules for determining perceptions to the unity of experience, the postulates give that general “room for manoeuvre” in which all objective constituting and regulating has to happen, if it is also to have a relation to the subjective faculty of knowledge. The schematic-intuitive “foundation” of the room for manoeuvre is the *time totality*, which has to be modally differentiated. In terms of the possibility postulate it is not yet differentiated within itself; instead only *as a whole* is it a universal form condition. According to the schema, that is possible which can be ‘at any given time’, for the schema demands only an ‘agreement of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general’.¹⁰⁹ Time remains thus formally or only as being-in-itself a condition of the cooperation in terms of its possibility and is not a determinate (differentiated) determiner.

This latter is a fundamental objection to the attempt by Grünewald, as well as similarly intended Kant interpretations in the philosophy of science, to reduce the modal moment of Kant’s logic of experience, avoiding its universal and transcendental-logical function—and with that more precisely its function and meaning in the dynamic of experience—to a single and simple understandable determination. In order to arrive at such Grünewald forgoes completely the (negative) totality moment of the time sum, of the real modal concepts schematised by this and attempts to reformulate Kant’s postulates correspondingly.¹¹⁰ The determination which through it is also supposed to be communicated to the “matter” is more precisely one taken from the simple, assumed

107 The note at Kant, CpR B 287/A 234 f. orders possibility analogously to the note at B 100/A 75 to the understanding; the statement here from B 266/A 219 is correspondingly to be divided among the modalities.

108 Cf. CpR B 223/A 180.

109 CpR B 184/A 144.

110 Grünewald loc. cit. 152 speaks of a ‘search for the real “postulates of empirical thinking”’. The fact that already in the formulation Kant’s totalising qualifier “*überhaupt*”—in general, is left out (a formulation which, it should be noted, is also favoured by other authors) may not be completely without relation to the matter as Grünewald presents it.

time representation and its common three “dimensions”—a term according to the time claimed to be in its own terms different (and indeed *finitely* different or determined). Grünewald is thus of the opinion that the possibility postulate can be formulated in improved form as follows: ‘future contingent matters which have not already been excluded by currently given matters are at the present point in time merely possible.’¹¹¹ Formally this statement makes it clear that not only is it not a postulate in Kant’s sense, that it does not express cognition as a negative connection or activity (as only the self-actualising condition of the same in knowledge in the closure of the conditioned or of the known), articulating instead only a correctness of which one may doubt whether it is in general more than tautological. For it is hardly asserted any more that that which in the future (of which prudently Kant does not speak!) is *possible*, in it *is* possibly, that thus—as always in the case of modality—there occurs an identity of reflection and being which the understanding can also represent in what is possible in the future.¹¹² In our view the modal postulates are not simply

111 Grünewald loc. cit. 152. In the reformulation it is initially clear that there is no more talk of what is expressly stated in Kant, namely of intuition and concept as formal conditions of experience but only of a highly specific chronological-modal relation. Kant did indeed demand expressly of the postulates that they should affect ‘the synthesis of mere intuition (the form of appearance), of perception (of the material of it) and of experience (of the relation of these perceptions) together’ (CpR B 223/A 180). The fact that Kant was able to take a position on the modal status of pure and mathematical concepts under their assumption clearly shows that this requirement cannot be left aside without serious loss. Indeed this is especially so in relation to the status of empirical concepts, something that falls completely outside the framework of Grünewald’s new ‘postulates’. The chronological-modal relation itself, in which one proceeds from past, present and future as of *prerequisites* of experience itself and its possible making, fundamentally contradicts Kant’s ‘ideal reality’ of a whole of experience, in which the time intuition as a *whole* can only be a moment. The ‘dimensions’ of time relate at most to the relation of empirical subjectivity to positive (set) experience, not however to experience in terms of its *tendency* to coincide with nature as such in an individual unity. Grünewald would have been forced to acknowledge this fact if he had referred also to the *Opus postumum* for what he sought exclusively in the MadN.

112 It is apparent that Grünewald’s new possibility postulate does indeed define possibility under the assumption of the other modalities: contingency, impossibility (and with that formal necessity) and actuality (of the “now” time point) are used in such a way that the assertion on possibility cannot be formulated in any other way than tautologically. This assuming of modalities is all the more surprising because elsewhere, in his attempt to render Kant’s possibility postulate aporetic, Grünewald finds it among other things ‘confusing’ that this ‘implies *necessity*’ (cf. 14 f.). Grünewald overlooks the fact that the conditions expressing the possibility postulate do have to be capable of being *necessary* conditions e.g. of possible experience without for that reason already being the special form of experience *set* with necessity.

one part of the system among others but the crucial hub of the critical development of the concept of experience. So however one may judge Grünewald's intentions in the framework of common or garden philosophy of science and under its specific presuppositions, it is surely difficult to regard the proposed improvements to Kant's modal postulates as rising to the challenge of Kant's project, or even to take them seriously at all, let alone to accept them.¹¹³

For Kant himself, as we said, we have in the postulates the expression of the "room for manoeuvre" before us that experience furnishes itself with in respect of the determination that has to be set, and in which it once again relates to itself. The room for manoeuvre that the postulates of self-proportioning experience open up designates in this way also the limit 'within' which experience has to take place; this is why it has the significance of 'restrictions of all categories to strictly empirical use without admitting and allowing the transcendental [use]' (B 266/A 219). It is in the knowledge of this limit, which for Kant is a function of the infinite proposition,¹¹⁴ that experience totalises itself in such a manner that it simultaneously gains its truth:

in the whole of all possible experience lies ... all our knowledge and in the universal connection to that consists transcendental truth, preceding all empirical truth and making this possible.¹¹⁵

In this way then 'the form of an experience in general' is also given in the explanation of the possibility postulate as the condition of knowability of 'objective reality, of its transcendental truth' (B 269/A 221 f.), i.e. of object concepts. It is the condition of the persistence of the objective in openness. Now all concepts of objects that are not subject to this condition but merely 'fictional concepts', or also empirical concepts without *a posteriori* verification through experience, can have a certain formal clarity. They can have freedom from contradiction, as in Kant's example of the concept of a 'figure enclosed in two straight lines' (B 268/A 220). It nevertheless remains the case that this subjective clarity is still not the qualitative openness of transcendental truth, i.e. it has not yet arrived at the 'character' of being proportioned by subjectivity and its passive determinability in general, which is what the possibility postulate requires. Since possibility in the transcendental sense conceptually expresses the *entire* proportion of the one internally differentiated experience, Paton's assertion that Kant 'speaks of the possibility of a *concept*, implying that the concept of a

113 It is superfluous to give Grünewald's emendations to the individual postulates here.

114 Cf. above 109–111.

115 Kant, CpR B 185/A 146—perhaps *the* fundamental axiom of the CpR.

possible object is itself a *possible concept*¹¹⁶ is no surprise at all. It is always the one modality of the empirical in general that equally on both sides communicates with the thinking determining and the other of thinking that is to be determined. The modalities *generate* initially the *concept* of an object, namely as a moment in the whole of experience,¹¹⁷ and they give initially the *object* which as it were “lets itself be seen” in its proportion. Then transcendental truth does not mean that any old “object” is correctly “depicted” in its concept but this: that a subjective concept speaking for itself—speech it does not need to borrow from anywhere else, for it has it in *itself*—in the proportioned cooperation has its counterweight or its covering in something showing *itself*—in the self that shows itself.

If:

the pipe dreams ... whose possibility have no kind of distinguishing mark for themselves at all because for them one does not take experience as teacher nor does one take these concepts from it (B 269/A 222),

because they are not contextualisable in terms of experience, are strictly negated by the restriction on the limit of what is experientiable, then for the empirical concepts, of which Kant had already spoken, the problem is naturally quite different. They present a problem because, as it appears, their possibility of attaining objective meaning in the use of experience is not already sufficiently assured by the conditions Kant gives in the possibility postulate. For this reason it has been claimed that in relation to the empirical concepts one should speak of a second possibility concept.¹¹⁸ While it is advisable to have the matter present before one's mind before one introduces *praeter necessitatem* new modal *entia*, Kant considers two possible cases in which the

116 Cf. Paton loc. cit. (note 82 above), vol II, 346. *De dicto* and *de re* aspects cannot be abstractly separated on the transcendental level. Modality is the λόγος relating concept and matter to each other.

117 In view of a further misunderstanding by Grünewald it is important to note that according to Kant the concept of an object *as* proportioned component of the experiential whole is *generated*, i.e. its objective reality is set, by a modal postulate. Grünewald (loc. cit., note 43 above) is of the opinion that the *modality* is generated by the ‘procedure’ of the postulates (cf. just on the possibility postulate, 9 and 14), which is in fact the specific generator itself. It is precisely the critical concept of the modalities that they are ‘not determinations but modality of the position of the thing’ (R 5557), in which ‘position’ means also, indeed precisely, active *setting* with respect to the understanding. S. Veca (loc. cit., note 34 above) provides a comprehensive and detailed presentation of the meaning of the conception of ‘thetic categories’ for working out the concept of critical modality (cf. esp. 179 ff.).

118 Cf. Pape loc. cit. (note 22 above), 219 ff.

synthesis expressed by a concept is not to be taken as empty.¹¹⁹ When it is a synthesis 'on which, as condition *a priori* experience in general (the form of that) rests, then it is a *pure concept*' (B 267/a 220), and when the synthesis is 'borrowed' from experience, 'then it is called an *empirical concept*' (B 267/A 220). This is preceded by the statement that 'the objective form of experience in general' 'contains' 'all synthesis' (ibid.). This general form of all synthesis is the one and whole 'possibility of experience' in the *double* sense of the genitive, as is obvious from the meaning of the modal concept as containing both being and reflection in one activity. So we have to differentiate. In the first case, that of the pure concept, this the possibility of experience in the sense of the subjective genitive; it has in this concept a moment by which it possibly *is*. In the second case, that of the empirical concept, we have the objective meaning of the genitive, for experience has in that nothing that makes it possible but what it does have is a moment of determination that *makes* it possible in the real meaning and in which it is to that extent *reflected*. This is why Kant speaks of a 'borrowed' possibility. What is possibly made is *something conditioned* by experience, even if its whole *sphere* in general—that in general something conditioned is and, determined by experience, is grasped in empirical concepts—necessarily belongs to *actual* experience expressed in the set determination. That possibility doubles in this way, namely to appear simultaneously in the condition position (subjective) and in the conditioned position (objective), now means that one has two possibilities to deal with; the doubling is exactly the same as that encountered in thinking and subjectivity, which divided into pure and empirical variants. For only the fact *that* possibility is capable of dividing in this way makes it a category of 'empirical thinking in general', i.e. a *total* sphere as such and internally differentiable. Only in this way does it achieve independence or reflexivity and is the *absolute reflection* of experience. It grasps the determining and what is determined together in one undifferentiated unity. The possibility of an empirical concept, so long as we are not speaking about logical but of real possibility, is in it only the reflection of experientially set determination, the return from out of setting (of actuality) into the pure in-itself of experience, the possibility of objective reality in general, into openness as indeterminacy. It is the same indeterminacy which turns out to be both pure synthetic form, i.e. the condition for meaning, and reflection of the determinate and conditioned meaning of the empirical concept. As such, this unity of the *whole* relation with its set component—its 'example'—is the speculative tendency of the Kantian

119 In systematic terms possibility concerns the concept in general.

modalities. Clearly, the empirical concept is thoroughly and solely a conditioned concept—it does not essentially divide itself and is in general selfless—such that the whole ‘speculative’ relation of self-mirroring of the possibility of experience in its individual instance is itself conditioned or—corresponding to the descending incline of the hypothetical form—asymmetrical in favour of what is conditioning.

On the condition side are to be found not only pure concepts but just as much pure intuitions. This means that not only pure and empirical but also constructive concepts of mathematics have to be brought into the discussion. Kant approaches this in two ways. Initially it is shown with the example already mentioned—that of the figure enclosed between two straight lines—that logical possibility does not provide an adequate criterion even for this geometrical concept, because it is only the ‘construction of that in space, i.e. the conditions of space and the determination of that’ which have ‘again their objective reality’, namely ‘referring to possible things, because they contain within them the form of experience in general *a priori*’ (B 268/A 221), revealing the impossibility of the concept. One can thus say that geometrical constructive concepts are to be set equal to empirical concepts since they too have to borrow their possibility from an actuality but definitely not as such from the actuality of a perception or a given but from the actuality of an action, namely that of construction which itself happens under transcendental conditions while, if it is a *determinate* action, it also realises a conditioned possibility—just like the empirical concept. But then the condition doing the conditioning here is not identical with the construction, not only because it has its own determinations, as they were developed by the transcendental aesthetic but also because it is more general as the sphere of geometrical construction, i.e. it is valid in general for all external objects.

In the second section dealing with geometrical construction, the possible constructions are assumed. Thus it has:

the appearance as if the possibility of a triangle could be known from out of its concept in itself (it is certainly independent of experience); for in fact we can give it wholly *a priori* an object, i.e. construct one (B 271/A 223).

The argument is then slightly displaced in comparison to the first. This time it is not only said that the construction in space has to be possible, which presents simultaneously a universal condition of all experience (of the external senses); instead the construction is initially treated as ‘only a product of fantasy’, ‘of whose object the possibility remains still doubtful’ (B 271/A 223 f.).

This reminds us more clearly that the *determination* of the constructive concept is not the passive determination of the empirical concept in its relation to perception but the *spontaneous* one of the constructing action itself. Kant still does not regard a constructing in one sense only within fantasy as the 'possibility' of an object in the material sense, i.e. of an object in the whole of proportioned experience. A mere constructing would, for Kant, instead be a disproportioned action under a possibility concept that is at best a logical and a practical-reflexive one, namely one borrowed from the actuality of construction. For this is how the argument is to be understood that the triangle would become:

'a possible object' by 'precisely the same constructive synthesis through which we construct a triangle in fantasy, being wholly one with exercise in the apprehension of an appearance in order to make from that a concept of experience' (B 271/A 224).

Under the modal aspect it depends on whether the subjective side, as we said above, has a covering, that it is compensated for by another than itself and hence does not fall out of all relations. The agreement of the conscious constructive synthesis with the synthesis of space in all experience and hence with the synthesis of apprehension is what enables the constructing to move into the condition position and hence be in its performance 'connected' with the 'representation of the possibility' (ibid.). Now it becomes thinkable that constructive concepts:

precisely without experience put themselves forward, merely in connecting with the formal conditions under which in them in general something is determined to be an object, therefore completely *a priori* but indeed only in connecting with them and inside their limits (B 272/A 224).

and can be 'characterised' as possible concepts. One can express Kant's position on the possibility of mathematical concepts as follows, that the necessary condition of their constructibility—for mathematical concepts are 'the purest fictions'¹²⁰—has to be bound with a transcendental knowledge of the inherent universal of the 'stuff' of the constructions. Indeed it is through such knowledge, which certainly does not immediately present a postulate of application

¹²⁰ Kant, R 4288 (of the numbers).

to non-mathematical objects,¹²¹ that the constructing acquires its depth in 'objective reality' in general, also inserting the mathematical object by means of its modality into the fundamental openness of the middle term of experience. Only by means of its being in this openness does the mathematical concept have a criterion of possibility qualitatively distinct from the merely logical one and is qualitatively more than mere reflection.

This is another indication that the restriction bound to the possibility postulate, a restriction that is directed against the 'pipe dreams' of concept building, demonstrated by several examples, has not only the sense of formal-extensional 'exclusion rules',¹²² but that of the qualitative self-limiting of experience as an intentional context, which as a whole is a higher, 'truer' level of knowledge than what is excluded as free from context. The possibility postulate requires that everything determinate with a claim to objectivity be amenable to integration into the context of experience. Thus this even generates the level of transcendental truth in what is determinately objective satisfying its requirement, i.e. it generates the determinate object as possibly true. Precisely because it is an action of proportioning to the experience whole, it cannot be, as Grünewald claimed, a merely '*analytical consequence* from (the) highest principle'.¹²³ With his claim he not only misreads the status difference between a principle belonging wholly to the transcendental philosophy and a principle of the understanding, which is *actu* 'confirmed' in every realised experience but he also overlooks the fact that it is certainly not the case that an *action* can lie in an axiom like the highest principle, namely that of executing a postulate. The postulates give expression to this action moment as a condition, namely that the principle in general speaks of something and not of nothing. 'The subjective conditions of human reason are *postulata* of its use and not

121 Veca (loc. cit. note 34 above) interprets the section as an application (cf. 324 ff.), whose foundation is supposed to be the required agreement between categorial forms and forms of intuition. This view conforms to his (fundamentally not unjustified) interest in reading the postulate section as a theory of method. He understands the condition of constructibility as a '*controllo intuitivo*' (317) of the mathematical procedure.

122 W. Stegmüller, *Gedanken über eine mögliche rationale Rekonstruktion von Kants Metaphysik* in his *Aufsätze zu Kant und Wittgenstein*, Darmstadt 1974, 1–61, attempts to understand Kant's postulates as such merely extensional principles of an '*apriori* elimination' by which the 'structure types of possible theories' are supposed to be confined (34 f.). The qualitative moment is then additionally introduced by means of the claim that Kant's criteria are in terms of their content bound to Newton's physics, which is an old and well-known objection. In our proposal of the contextuality and proportionality of the theoretical whole of reason that is experience, which *closes* in the modalities, it is not necessary to elevate determinate theoretical *content* up to the level of principles.

123 Grünewald loc. cit. (note 43 above), 14.

axiomata’;¹²⁴ in use however reason and its theoretical structure, experience, are actual. The actuality of reason is not a consequence of transcendental philosophical principles—just as no philosophy waits to be ‘actualised’ in syllogisms from it, or better to be forfeited. In fact the actuality of reason is itself the return from out of actuality and indeed into its negative ground, so that the incorporation of the assumption from this ground does not present a “making” of actuality but the *concept* of its negative form, and hence the critical possibility of *distinguishing* it from what is formless. Applied to the postulates of empirical thinking in general, this means that these are fundamentally not the setting of the actuality of experience but are rather the concept of the form of this setting, which they *as* activity postulate. The form of this setting is thought of as active contextualisation in general, and hence exclusion of what is devoid of context but then ‘immanently’ as proportioning of the doubled subjectivity and objectivity. On the possibility postulate, up to now we have been speaking of the ‘first’ subjectivity as a pure interiority of experience or of this as in-itself. On the actuality postulate, we will have to deal with the status of the difference, i.e. that of the set experience as referred to *external* determination. This means that Kant’s ‘harmonism’ of experience as a consistent structure of reason that makes *itself* now faces the task of sustaining itself in what is externally determinate that is supposed to enter into the experiential whole.

c) *Actuality Postulate*

On the real level of their use, Kant’s modal concepts are concerned with the (subjective) synthesis of experience itself, which maintains itself identical throughout its motion through potentially infinitely many predicates according to its own conditions but also within each of the things conditioned by it (the objects of experience). According to the first aspect, this synthesis is its own *possibility* of its totality or of the total context and to that extent *concept* as such, while in terms of the second aspect, it is *actual* experience or set individual determination of one ‘position’ within its context and to that extent a determinate *proposition*. We encountered the copula of the proposition of experience above not only as an ‘is’ but as an ‘is as’,¹²⁵ by which the specific hermeneutic status of objects constituted in terms of experience *qua* consciously identically set objects should be characterised in distinction to a simple something of perception. This ‘is as’ forms an inseparable unity of being and reflection and as such is equivalent to the status of a *conclusio* in the syllogism,

¹²⁴ Kant, R 4568.

¹²⁵ Cf. above 74-75.

just as propositions of experience are in fact syllogisms, namely enthymemes that transit by the force of principles from the plurality of perception into the identity of the objects. Modality has already been characterised as the concept of this unity of being and thinking. The being of the objects of experience in Kant is always 'only' modified being, so that the real modalities can be seen as the specific refractions of being in general in the transparence of the 'inside' of experience determining itself materially. Possibility had the 'is as' of the experience proposition in reference to the "as" and the moments conditioning the whole experience determined within it. In the actuality postulate it is now about reaching the corresponding "is" by which being can acquire the specific meaning of a *moment* of experience—not as a 'contextless' immediate position. Finally the third postulate, that of necessity, will be concerned with the unity that has to be conceived in the simultaneity of "as" and "is" in the "is as".

The second Kantian postulate of empirical thinking in general is: 'That which stands in relation to the material conditions of experience (of sensibility) is actual' (B 266/A 218). The issue is how does experience arrive *simultaneously* at *external* and its own determination. External determination is brought in through the materiality of sensibility, while its own or internal determination comes into play in the relation concept of the context. This latter refers to the Kantian concept of truth, the former to the externality of perception discussed above. 'Sensibility' is not a kind of third term joining intuition and concept, as if it formed a third 'root' of knowledge; it is nothing more than the immediate transition of intuition and concept into each other held in subjective totality, which is why it can neither be intuited or perceived nor conceptually *made*. This means that an immediate sensibility would only be given in perception, while the rational structure 'experience' would immediately not have anything to do with that. Thus Kant says that in the actuality postulate it is 'precisely not immediately' about 'sensibility' 'of the object itself, whose present being is to be known' (B 272/A 225). When it comes to objects of *experience*, there is no immediate sensibility of them. If an object is immediately sensed or felt, then it is *only* an object of perception, while in *experience* the 'context of it with any kind of actual perception, according to the analogies of experience, which all present real connections in an experience in general' (B 272/A 225) must also be thematised. With this initially the distinction is clearly drawn here between the actuality postulate that is constitutive of experience, which is only regulative in view of the appearances, and the reality concept of the 'anticipations of perception' that is constitutive in relation to appearances, even if it does not immediately relate to experience. While in the sense of formation by the categories of intensity, what is 'real' is what determines the form of appearance in reference to its sensibility moment, i.e. to the gradual

proportionality of concept and intuition in their immediate transitioning into each other, what is actual in the modal sense is what is posited in the context of experience and has a 'position',¹²⁶ such that the objective concept in which it is expressed contains a *specifiable* path, namely one *mediated* by the analogies of experience, to sensibility. To clarify the difference between the two concepts then, the real, 'whose concept in itself contains a being' in relation to a sensibility whose 'synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general' 'has meaning',¹²⁷ while with 'actuality' a *determinate* context of experience is known as set. According to one of Kant's examples the category reality in its formulation as a principle makes it possible 'to set together and to give *a priori* determined the degree of the sensibility of the light of the sun from approximately 200,000 illuminations by the moon'.¹²⁸ Modality in contrast does not relate to the determinate intensity of the sensibility, in this case not to the number 200,000 but it does specify that Kant's example statement, to the extent that it is a proposition of experience, is necessary, or that the statement is actual that at a given time at a determinate location sunlight was in terms of intensity only half of what was usual. It is easy to see here that in terms of their function the two determinations cannot be expressed by each other. For a concept objectively determined in terms of reality can in relation to actual experience and its context basically take on all three real modi; conversely the actuality concept says nothing about the immediate form of perception but only about that of its relation to experience.¹²⁹

For the 'character'¹³⁰ of actuality or of present being in an object of experience Kant requires 'that the perception of it at least can precede the concept'

126 Cf. on this esp. Kant, CpR B 244 f./A 199 f.

127 Ibid. B 217/A 175 f.

128 Ibid. B 221/A 179.

129 In her study *Kants Qualitätskategorien*, Kant-Studien suppl. 65, Berlin 1930, A. Maier correctly emphasised in the reality category the difference between the intensive-formal and qualitative-content sides (cf. esp. 57 ff.). Unfortunately the immediate assignment of the form of the given to reality but of that of content to actuality (cf. 74) cannot be accepted. It is contradicted by Kant's statements such as that 'space and time ... are certainly something actual but not existing' (in the sense of reality) (R 6324). Moreover both terms—reality and actuality—relate to the sensibility content but this content 'interprets' the first in an objective form while it is set by the second as an 'indication' of the subjective form of experience. *Realitas phaenomenon* cannot become objective reality without a modalisation. This is also not recognised by H. Holzhey in his study *Das philosophische Realitätsproblem* in J. Kopper and W. Marx (eds.), *200 Jahre Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hildesheim 1981, 79–111.

130 On the concept of "character", with which Kant designates the modal moment of a concept, cf. H. Heimsoeth, *Transzendente Dialektik*, Berlin 1966 ff., vol. II, 356, note 244. According to Heimsoeth in the language of that time what Kant has in mind are

(B 272 f./A 225). If Kant previously emphasised that the conceptual determination can at best be so complete 'that nothing in the least is lacking in order to conceive of a thing with all its inner determinations', while the 'present being has nothing to do with all of that' (B 272/A 225), then this does not mean that even in our experiential knowledge the concept of a 'complete possibility' would be realisable.¹³¹ In Kant instead the fundamentally inconclusive conceptual-predicative determination is only concluded in an *intuition* as totality; for existence analytically includes the fact that all determinations of the possibility of a thing are fulfilled, which one can know without disposing over the "omniscience"¹³² of these determinations. Kant's requirement that perception precede the concept refers to the situation in the logic of experience when a positive totality for us can only be presented intuitively. The consequence is that the condition of the existence of a thing relies on the *logical* precedence of intuition over the concept. It is very important here to consider that the modal actuality concept, since it is a synthesis of experience and does not immediately concern appearance, requires for its criterion not immediate perception but only in general a 'regulated' context with perception. It is in this sense that for Kant a present being can also be known '*comparatively a priori*', 'if it is only with some perceptions according to the principles of empirical connecting of the same (the analogies), in relation' (B 273/A 225). The fact that it is required of the concept, in general—whether mediate or immediate—to be referred to perception in order to be able to identify an ingredient in experience as actual, means that the (empirical) concept must be able to maintain itself in the situation of the proposition, the situation that actuality presents, if it is to attain an experiential value. It must also as it were withstand a certain 'pressure' of perception and intuition that is not to have in these its 'ur-image' reproduced within it but certainly a 'counter bearing' of its intension. This is what enables Kant to exclude the roughness or fineness of our senses, which an external reflection on their capabilities might resort to, as a criterion for the substantiality of actual terms in experience, because in fact they have 'nothing to do with the form of possible experience' (B 273/A 226), if a concept set within this form only has to withstand the 'pressure' of perception. Every concept is actually determining and as such transcendently true, if it *withstands* such pressure at a determinate time—the modal schema of actuality—in relation with other

abbreviations rendered sensuous for 'relations that are on the direct path either hard or impossible to grasp'—in our case for modal proportion.

131 Cf. just Kant, R 6298: 'We never have insight into the complete possibility, because we cannot determine a concept thoroughly and *in concreto*'.

132 Cf. on this Schneeberger loc. cit. (note 52 above), 68.

empirical concepts according to the form of pure principles as the form of external determination. This makes clear the meaning Kant's concept of truth acquires in the real sphere. His truth concept is neither "correspondence-theoretical" nor formally semantic, nor indeed is it limiting to analyticity, the criterion of which latter was just the connection to any ground at all. The truth concept claims neither to stand in some kind of "depiction relation" to a something of perception nor to seek to be a mere contradiction-free implication from others; rather it has its criterion only in this, that it is in general linked to perception as the *ground* for its *usage*—not of its determinate intension—according to *a priori* rules of the experiential context. In this we have to be aware that Kant, thanks to his triadic modal concept, can address statements or concepts within them as *actual* determination of experience, which neither belong merely to the in-itself of experience or its possibility, nor indeed can they make the claim to be *necessary* truths of experience. This all means that the context of experience is not a realm of laws beyond actual appearances in motion but instead it is itself capable of this motion, that is of the alternation of empirical concepts and contingent statements of experience. Statements like the example given above on something determinate, not only concerning the intensity of sunlight, do not in general fall out of the proportion of experience but are actual moments of its mediation, thus also for gaining a particular law of nature from them and from empirical concepts that are not already formed according to the form of general lawfulness, it can be known that they are not yet for that reason "of lower value" but rather that at that point they take up an unacceptable position in the making of experience. Just as according to Kant a judgment of pragmatic faith has to withstand the pressure of the necessity to act without having to be a general law, all that is required of actually theoretical statements is that they capture perception in general 'according to laws of the empirical context of appearances' (B 274/A 226) and as it were incorporate within them the general form of experience. If they do not do this, 'then we set out in vain to guess or research the state or the present being of anything at all' (ibid.).

It should also be noted that the notion of a *ground* that is not to be incorporated, with which actual statements and empirical concepts, for which experience according to its own form is open, indeed which it itself necessarily must demand, is also the principle of the 'refutation of idealism' attached to the actuality postulate in the second edition of the CpR.¹³³ As far as this refutation

133 The 'refutation' at Kant, CpR B 274 ff. is developed from a claim in the fourth paralogism at A 376 ff.

is concerned, if the (chronological) inside of a *determinate* consciousness is simultaneously the knowledge of this inside *as* inside, i.e. the division of the general inside into this itself and a determinate inside or the doubling of subjectivity, of which we have already spoken, then it is simultaneously the setting of what is not inside, i.e. of the outside. The sudden change occurs through the *ground* of the determination, which as determinate and to that extent grounded determination, can be neither a simple self-determining nor a linear determining activity but the disjunction of determining in “active” and “passive” sides, which must necessarily be thought together. Looked at from Hegel’s point of view, one could say that Kant operates with the beginning grounds of the dialectic of the concepts of inside and outside (in his case according to the notion of respective ‘senses’), or that he refers back to the necessary doubling of ‘refraction’ of the concept of determination, whose immediacy he asserts against the one side (the chronological reflection-in-itself) *as* proof of reflection-in-another or of the obstinate other reflected-in-itself.¹³⁴ Hegel’s actuality concept is expressly the absolute unity of inside and outside, and for that reason can be thought of as purely self-grounded and no longer any different than as in relation to determination. Kant’s actuality concept in contrast in the *form* of proportion of reflection (context; inside of determination) and being (perception in general), certainly points towards this absolute unity, from which the proof of the externality of objects as a moment of their objectivity can be developed, while nevertheless separating in reflection the two sides as “for themselves” persistent. This corresponds to the fundamental ur-division of the idea in Kant, excluding on a fundamental level the conception of the actuality of the individual, in which the two sides would have to be thought of as transitioning into each other.

d) *Necessity Postulate*

What happens in the necessary “is as” of the proposition of experience is that the in-itself of experiential determining, possibility, and the actual determination of an empirical consciousness enter into a determinate unity, from out

¹³⁴ The connection to the logical dialectical relation of inside and outside is also supported by Kant’s discussion at B xxxix ff. There he states on the ‘one single experience’ (Kant’s relative absolute), that it ‘would not happen internally at all if it were not (partially) also simultaneously external’ (B xli). Hegel states that Kant’s refutation or the proof it contains can also be inverted to draw the conclusion from the motion empirically communicated by the outer senses to the persistence of the *inside* (cf. Hegel, TW20, 248 f.; for Kant compare CpR A 13). It is clear that it was important to Kant that he not presuppose the immediacy of external consciousness but rather prove it (cf. B 276 f. note); but then arriving at immediacy from concepts always indicates a speculative character of the proof.

of which neither being nor reflection can any longer depart. Outside of being necessary, both are at most still at least *not* moments of actual experience and hence stand under the fundamental exclusion of objective reality. We shall indeed see that Kant's concept of necessity is subject to a characteristic limitation that must follow from the systematic form in which Kant thinks. Nevertheless the summary of the whole of experience in the postulate of necessity is a point of densest mediation within the transcendental analytic. In general it is the transcendental logical concluding formulation with respect to the self-realisation of an experience that is a within-itself continuous and simultaneously determinable, that is a real idea, to the extent that is that in the case of a structure of reason, which should simultaneously be an ought, one can already speak of an idea. Liebrucks called the postulate of necessity 'the Athena of the *Critique of pure Reason*', leaping from the 'head', the transcendental apperception, the 'highest god' of critical awareness, 'in full armour'.¹³⁵ This is the image Schelling used to present his conception of the absolute form,¹³⁶ which for him emerges from the absolute point of indifference. One could say that in his concept of *experience*, proportioning itself within itself together with the conception of necessity as to the greatest extent encompassing being and content, Kant grasped the concept of a relatively absolute form, the articulation of which in view of a true absoluteness occupied him greatly without conclusion in the *Opus postumum* under headings like "self-affection" and "transcendental dynamic".

The postulate of necessity is:

Whatever's context with the actual is determined according to conditions of experience is (exists) *necessary* (*necessarily*) (B 266/A 218).

If the actual was the generation of a determination of experience under the 'pressure' of perception, the necessary is a term that, while maintaining that relation to that actual, is now set under the inner 'pressure' of experience and its context itself. Necessary experience is as it were experience with determinate (actual) experience. By adding 'exists' to the formulation of the postulate as an explanation of 'is', Kant emphasises that indeed he is here talking about a *real* modality, no longer of a modality of judgment, with which the explanation of the postulate is opened (cf. B 279/A 226). The same was true of the other postulates too but in this term it is sharpened in relation to the copula, which

¹³⁵ B. Liebrucks, *Sprache und Bewußtsein* vol. 4, Frankfurt a. M. 1968, 634.

¹³⁶ Schelling, SW III, 420.

makes the claim to be able to set it *as* being from out of the reflection of determining, sharpening the thought task that as Kant emphasises cannot be made easier by stepping back into the '*de dicto* modalities'. What has to be thought is that a *being* is being *thought*: that it is as being simultaneously *understandable* and as such still not only reflection but is *being*. In the actual the being of perception remained only generally something referred to the other of what is set; insight into *itself* was not required in order to be able to ground and sustain a determination of experience. Now however it is about insight into existence from the context of experience—the *complete* ground that according to Kant a determining demands as necessary.¹³⁷ Rendering being transparent in this way in its term as necessary happens for Kant:

never from concepts but every time only from connecting with that which is perceived, according to general laws of experience (B 279/A 227).

The 'counter bearing' with respect to perception remains, only now it is just the mediate point of connecting to the modal concept, which treats perception as no more than 'a part' 'in the context of experience' (*ibid.*), instead presenting this whole *context* in the individual determinate thing.

Because of the connection to perception the distinction between the actuality postulate and that of necessity has occasionally been felt to be problematical. Paton started out suggesting that in the case of these two postulates it is only 'a difference of emphasis', the emphasis on the material conditions of experience but then on the 'combination of formal and material conditions' of experience, finally he sees the difference as lying in the newly added term according to a form of experience.¹³⁸ Indeed the actual and its perception in postulating necessity has become a *condition* of the cognition of necessary existence—it is about a 'present being, which, under the condition of other given appearances, could be known as necessary' (B 279/A 227), about the synthesis of distinct perceptions that is capable on its own of setting the necessary existence of another moment of experience. This necessary existence that posits experience 'comparatively *a priori*' (B 279/A 226) by the power of its form can, for Kant, now only concern 'the present being of the effects from given causes according to the laws of causality' (B 279/A 227), not e.g. 'the present

¹³⁷ Cf. just Kant, *Jäsche Logik*, Intro. VII (AA IX, 52); Kant, R 5734.

¹³⁸ Cf. Paton *loc. cit.* (note 82 above), 342. Paton presents the difference as follows in the second analogy: 'An object possesses actuality, if, for example, it is connected as a cause with what is given as an effect. It does not however possess necessity, except insofar as it is *determined* to be the effect of a given cause' (*ibid.*).

being of the things (substances)' (ibid.). Kant denies that anything other than 'hypothetical necessity' is amenable to cognition; for the immediacy of existence always presupposed by the hypothetical form remains an external condition which cannot be encompassed into the form of the self-mediation of experience, which is precisely the hypothetical form. According to Kant's fundamental notion of determining, that namely this happens irreversibly in *one* direction from subject to predicate, the double motion of subject into predicate *and* conversely, required already in the concept of necessity can only be understood as 'blind' necessity because it threatens the model of understanding of the hypothetical form. Against the 'blind' variety then Kant is quick to move on to set 'understandable' necessity, which he will acknowledge as 'conditioned' but the only acceptable kind precisely because it is 'hypothetical' (cf. B 280/A 228).¹³⁹ It cannot be overlooked that this conception of necessity is cut off as soon as it requires thinking what, from the standpoint of Kant's form, is unthinkable—namely of the necessity of the present being of substance just as that of the community of substances, thus of categorial as well as of disjunctive form. Under these circumstances what we can know is strictly speaking not being as such but the being known *as* modified being or the 'state', and this in fact 'from other states given in perception according to empirical laws of causality' (B 279/A 227). 'Conditions' constitute the genuine 'is as', as which the copula of the proposition of experience in Kant is interpreted according to its necessity; in the 'state' the matter is not purely *for itself* but externally conditioned, standing *in relation* to others in general *for another* and *hence* understandable. External relations that are simultaneously capable of being presented as relations of conditions are according to Kant what we are capable of regarding as understandable from our ability to make connections, i.e. proceeding from the understanding. The necessary essence or being has in contrast expressly 'no state': God 'stands certainly in relation to external things but then these do not affect him'.¹⁴⁰ On these assumptions Kant certainly had no alternative but to elevate the principle of causality to the 'criterion of necessity' (B 280/A 227),¹⁴¹ to declare it, as one could say, the genuine and exclusive modulator of

139 Cf. on this also Kant, *Metaphysik Pölitz* (AA XXVIII, 558): 'Insight can only be gained into hypothetical necessity'. The 'blindness' of necessity is explained at ibid. 199: 'Blind means that one cannot see for oneself; but also that through which one can see nothing' (one thinks of a 'blind window').

140 Kant, *Metaphysik Pölitz* AA XXVIII, 564.

141 Paton claims loc. cit. (note 82 above) 363 note 4, that Kant could 'equally, or perhaps even better' have referred to the third analogy. In fact he could not have done that, because this analogy does not offer the possibility of a setting *from out* of unity; it is in general in Kant's conception a category of *plurality* and hence, as also in B, expressly limited to space, i.e. to

the objects of experience as necessary components of the one 'field of possible appearances' (cf. B 280/A 227) or of the context of experience. 'According to the dynamic laws of causality' (B 280/A 228) the 'positions' are 'conclusively' linked together in context in such a way that they can be understood much better as functions of the dynamised experience itself, as derivations from the whole of the context. It becomes possible 'from any kind of given present being (of a cause) *a priori* to draw the implication to another present being (the effect)' (B 280/A 228). The 'extremes' of this conclusion grounded in the dynamics of experience remain certainly different somethings, others; but their *limit* becomes the *medium term* of each of the *states* in which its being finds itself. It should be noted that Kant does not simply repeat the hypothetical necessity that already lies in the causal determination in place of the modal concept.¹⁴² Especially in the case of Kant's references to the 'natural laws *a priori*' as '*in mundo non datur fatum*' or '*non datur casus*', it becomes clear that his concern is in fact with necessity as the form of the pure *continuum* of experience, to which the objects of experience *a priori* have to be determined or set in harmony, or as it were "tempered", in order to be able to emerge in experience as well-proportioned ideal-real moments and determinations of themselves. For these laws:

unite themselves ... exclusively oriented, such that they allow nothing into the empirical synthesis that could break or interrupt the understanding and the continuous context of all appearances, i.e. of the unity of its concepts. For it is only in the understanding that the unity of experience, in which all perceptions must have their position, is possible (B 282/A 229 f.).

The four enumerated natural laws *a priori*, which can be put in parallel to the category titles, express four conceptions that overcome all contextuality and with that experientiability, and which are as it were moments of the 'other of experience', to the extent at least that this could be imagined in the unity form. The '*fatum*' would correspond to the (absolute) modality and blind (ununderstandable) necessity; it would be the '*nihil negativum*' of the idea of experience

the intuitive representation of the predicate sphere that remains other, while time is the representation of the subjective unification of experience.

142 Kant, CpR B 281/A 228. Here it is expressly stated that modality 'adds to the causal term the concept of necessity, which however stands under a rule of the understanding'; the necessity implicit to causality is only *formal* but not one of the objective reality of the object of experience.

in general and would be in the interest of the understandability of the world of experience (*mundus*) as in the hypothetical form of what is set from the standpoint of the subject, excluded from that.¹⁴³ The ‘*casus*’ as ‘contingency in all intention’¹⁴⁴ would overcome the conceptual nexus within the world of experience and hence generate an ‘*ens imaginarium*’; the ‘*saltus*’ would threaten the *lex continui*¹⁴⁵ in the variation of appearances and while it could as such have a concept, that would not be objectively fulfilable (*nihil privativum* of the unity of experience of concept and intuition); the ‘hiatus’ finally would mean a vacuum between appearances that would have to be filled with an ‘*ens rationis*’ under which form of experience it cannot be permissible, as Kant asserts in reference to this statement relating to the nothing of experience, however much such an emptiness could ‘be considered in the transcendental dialectic’ (B 282/A 229).

This limitation shows that in fact the entire being of experience, its ‘something’ and positive *quale* is made explicit via the modality, especially through its summary in the concept of necessity, and is distinguished from the nothing of experience.¹⁴⁶ Formal necessity within mere objective determination contains the term of relation of causality taken for itself. In contrast in necessity in the sense of the postulate, the issue is the thoroughgoing subjective-being, i.e. being-for-the experience of being in its contextual objective determination. In the modal being-for of what is also objectively already determined, necessity, with its criterion in the second analogy, is the form of the construction of the continuum of experience and this as already realised and simultaneously abandoned idea, which latter is only the imperative to thoroughly render

143 Through this as well as the following law according to Kant ‘the play of changes’ is subjected to the ‘one *nature of things* (as appearances), or which is the same [!], to the unity of the understanding in which they alone can belong to an experience as the synthetic unity of the appearances’ (Kant, CpR B 281/A 228). Within Kant’s self-totalising form of all acts of understanding, nature (*formaliter spectata*) and the form of its understandability gathered together in the modalities are the same.

144 Kant, *Metaphysik Pölitz*, AA XXVIII, 199.

145 Cf. Kant, CpR B 281/A 228 and the section *De saltu et lege continuitatis* in his *Metaphysik Pölitz* AA XXVIII, 200 ff.

146 The proposal to explain the four restrictive laws of nature in their content in terms of the relation to the table of nothings at CpR B 348/A 292 could also in a more extended framework be executed in Hegel with the four negative moments of the proposition arrived at above 19. This suggests relating the two ‘mathematical’ nothings to the in-itself or set negative predicate and the ‘dynamical’ nothings in contrast to the act of predication, so that e.g. the in-itself negative predicate would function as the *nihil privativum*, while set negative predicating on the other hand would make of the proposition a *nihil negativum*.

necessary all individual determination. The doubling of the idea can be referred to necessity with the help of a traditional distinction in the following way. This necessity is in equal measure “extrinsic” and “intrinsic”. It is external necessity remaining in itself external (cause and effect), in which respect it is clearly permissible under the regulation of the idea to insert the terms of cause and effect in the substrates so determined and with that to initiate the progress of experience. “Intrinsic” is necessity as the internal necessity of the form of the one experience itself, which mediated by itself has already realised itself or constantly realises itself *actu*. The modal concept comprehends thus on the one hand the real change of the determinations of experience or the constant motion through the empirical predicates, as it also presents the present being of the ideal unity of this motion or its state of rest within itself, the fulcrum of the continuous contextualising of “what is affecting” to the determinate being of experience.

That in his real modalities Kant was in fact concerned with the one and only contextuality of the knowledge of experience becomes clear especially from the discussion of the question as to whether the modal concepts can be distinguished from each other according to their extension, as might be suggested by e.g. Leibniz's concept of possible worlds. In this ‘the field of possibility’ should be imagined as being ‘greater ... than the field that contains all that is actual, and this again greater than the amount of what is necessary’ (B 282/A 230). Kant interpreted these ‘agreeable questions’ in the sense of ‘synthetic resolution’, thus not with Leibniz's formal means, which all in all rely ultimately on the analysis according to the principle of contradiction and relate more precisely immediately to the question:

whether all things, as appearances, in total belong in the sum and the context of a single experience ... or whether my perceptions can belong to more than a possible experience (in their general context) (B 282 f./A 230).

Put in this way, the question is indeed already as good as answered. For it is clear from both the transcendental apperception (of the pure synthesis of all conceptual functions to a unity), as well as from the highest principle of synthetic propositions (the principle that can be given in transcendental philosophical terms of all moves beyond single concepts under principles of the understanding), that there can be no other ‘possible experience’ beside the one, which in general mediates the ‘mineness’ of perceptions and makes them in ‘my’ horizon also into objects for the setting subject. The field of all possible as well as actual and necessary determinations of experience is thus the

one context in which the ‘one single of all encompassing experience’ (B 284/A 232) lays itself out or interprets itself,¹⁴⁷ which is essentially subjectively competent and has in the modalities the three moments of its unification or ‘incorporation into the understanding’. Despite the fact that they cannot be replaced by each other and have unambiguously differentiable functions in terms of the realisation of experience, the three concepts do relate to the same “field”, and thus are neither identifiable in the Megarian manner, nor are they distinguishable via their “objects” at all. But all this can only be made understandable from Kant’s dynamism of experience, from its dynamic unity which relates together everything determinate that is given, set or to be derived as to be set. For only within the motion of the unity of experience (subjectively) setting to itself objective determination can *possibility*—the universal, indifferent concept of all determination, *actuality*—the proposition of determinate determination, and the conclusive syllogism of a derivation of determination from the whole or from the two presupposed functions of modal unity be distinct *moments of the same whole*. Everything determinate in experience has that “underground” of possibility, so it is not completely encompassed in its own positivity—which, by the way, must be kept in mind against all attempts to make Kant a mere theoretician of the positive sciences. Moreover everything determinate within it is not understandable without relation to the difference of perception, the other of the mere interiority (being-within-itself) of the process of understanding. Everything determinate in experience is ultimately, at least according to form or to its own rational expression in the idea, also a moment of the whole context and hence also to be set *as* its moment. Against the traditional modalities, to the extent that they lack this dynamic contextuality, Kant limits himself polemically in two directions of attack. First ‘the poverty of our usual syllogisms, by which we produce a vast domain of possibility’—e.g. possible worlds—is ‘highly conspicuous’ (B 283/A 231); and what follows is a refutation of these syllogisms, developed by Kant on the basis of an inversion of the modal implication ‘everything actual is possible’—‘*ab esse ad posse valet consequentia*’¹⁴⁸—leading back to ‘(only) some things that are possible are actual’, thus, much that is possible is not actual. On the other hand Kant attacks Wolff’s theory of the ‘*complementum possibilitatis*’ as a something that has to be added to the possible for it to become actual with the argument that everything that ‘should be yet added’ to the possible, would be ‘impossible’ (B 284/A 231). No complement is added to the possible matter but only a

147 Cf. the expression in Kant, CpR B 610/A 582, ‘the one all-encompassing experience’ is that in which ‘what is real in all appearances is given’.

148 Cf. Kant, *Metaphysik Pölitz*, AA, XXVIII, 554.

perception is added when actuality is expressed.¹⁴⁹ Both positions, from which Kant distances himself, are in fact only defensible on the assumption of an *objective* meaning of the modal concepts and are given only for *this* extensional or intensional differentiation criterion; from the standpoint of Kant's modal concept clearly, this whole problematic as so conceived has become obsolete. There can no longer be any objective characteristic for that which 'constitutes' the self-showing of the object in the subjective relation to it, which is simultaneously a self-showing to it. What is important is rather that the sphere of the openness determined by experience in which all showing has to take place has to present itself, within which all individual determinations are both fundamentally absorbed as well as settable in the determining, as far as this setting can take place in the modal proportionality of understanding, outside, and the realised inside of the context.

The principle of the synthetic proposition was expressed by the highest principle but its determinate moments were still to be interpreted in the individual principles, until in the postulates the unity of the context itself was expressed as a moment of the opening of transcendental-real determination. Now posed within the relatedness of objectivity's self-showing in the universal contextuality of experience, thus in that ('practical') relating and ('theoretical') relational being of self-showing, Kant's transcendental question as to the possibility of a determinative moving beyond the subject term in synthetic propositions is finally answered. In his *MadN*, especially in its *Phenomenology*, Kant takes one more step towards the self-showing of the objective when he investigates the dynamics of the usage of empirical concepts, especially the external senses, in the sense of a contextualising in one of the individual sciences. But this critical clarification of the possibility of an inhering of determination in the fundamental context of all "standing open" and in that of all understanding capable of truth, this clarification is itself specified or extended. In fact from this point on these "moves beyond" enter into the domains of speech and appear to turn into purely objective determination. At least as long as the philosophical return to the root of all determining does not recall that these determinations can only be speech if they emerge from the self-proportioning unity of experience—thus not from something objectively determinable—but from that "fluid", precisely that modal "underground" in which all knowledge irrespective of the action of the faculty of cognition and the set being is *eo ipso* new cognition.

149 Cf. in Wolff, *Ontologia* § 174; also Pape loc. cit. (note 22 above), 218.

4 Absolute Modality

In the second edition of the CpR Kant followed the section on the postulates with a “General remark on the system of principles”, in which he started out once more by emphasising that categories are not as such possible mediations of objective reality but that in addition to every category there must ‘always [be] an intuition along with it’ (B 288). He goes on to strengthen this argument, recalling in a way the “Refutation of idealism”, by saying we ‘always need even *external intuitions*’ (B 291) in order to gain insight into the possibility of things. He sums up these arguments then in the conclusion that ‘all synthetic sentences *a priori*, indeed their possibility ... itself wholly’ ‘rests’ upon ‘the possibility of experience’ (B 294). Experience however is essentially a process of determining in relation to externals and what is externally *persistent*; persistent externality should be reinforced as a *conditio sine qua non* of objective-real syntheses by the emphasis on spatial intuition. In fact what Kant’s synthetic form presupposes without being able to encompass it within its own mediation is the difference in general between conditioning subject and conditioned predicate. While the activity of this form as mediation is a matter of “rendering immanent” of the difference and its overcoming into an “experience-as”, this overcoming is, as the third postulate has shown, on its highest level only hypothetical necessity which *keeps* its presupposition (the difference in general) outside itself—as the plurality of perceptions, as the empirical remaining indeterminate according to the principle of space, as the idea that only ought to be complete. Hence necessary being was grasped in the interest of its understandability as an “experience-as” or “state”, i.e. as “as” of the matter in distinction to itself,¹⁵⁰ but once again the difference remained with that, as if it were a kind of bad conscience of modality, thereby established the reputation of reason as an ought. ‘The modality of cognition of an object as a thoroughly determinate thing is *experience*’,¹⁵¹ and experience is modification, making consistent within a context, of which modality knows that its “temperature” obeys subjective conditions, thus generating appearances that are determined *against* a known ‘in-itself’, or in general against the self.

For Kant it is possible just from their concepts to think of the modalities without the limitation that they subjectivise and are modes of acquisition in

150 Liebrucks mentions loc. cit. (note 136 above), 635 f., that the Kantian limitation to states or ‘cross-sections of states’ revives the paradoxes of Zeno for necessity; one could also say that Kant gets stuck in Hegel’s first supersensible world.

151 Kant, *Opus postumum* AA XXII, 93.

a context alien to the 'things in themselves'. In this thinking of the 'absolute modalities' that set their object in all intention or *totaliter* as determinate experience would itself be like a perceiving self-relating to others known, as one could put it, as 'something wholly contingent'.¹⁵² In the conceptions of 'absolute possibility', 'absolute existence', and 'absolute necessity', all of which Kant uses repeatedly, reason protests fundamentally against the limitation of its autonomy by sense perception. Certainly the expression 'absolute modality', which became established in the literature on Kant, is not completely without contradiction; for the unconditionality of a *modus* would overcome it precisely *as* *modus* and would rather turn it into the presentation to which there is no alternative of the matter—a matter which in this respect would also no longer *appear*, which is why for determining appearances all necessity that is more than hypothetical must be for Kant 'blind'.

'Absolute possibility', which, as Kant adds, 'is in all intention valid',¹⁵³ was mentioned already at the end of the section on the postulates, where it was designated as having to be capable of being 'no mere concept of the understanding' from 'empirical usage.' While it is the case that neither empirical relations nor, in general, our relations to an object are sufficient to exclude this object from possessing 'absolute possibility', nevertheless this can certainly not be affirmatively asserted on the basis of this our relation to it. For that the relations of the object would have to be such that it is possible to oversee all of them, which in turn would mean that the object would be capable of being understood to the extent that it is for us 'devoid of context', i.e. not understandable.¹⁵⁴ The form of experience would have to be laid in the cognition of the absolute possible, so then that form would above all be the form of the discursive motion of the understanding that makes experience.

-
- ¹⁵² Kant, CpR B 765/A 736. In R 6214 space and time are called 'contingent forms'. Kant has a double concept of the contingent, beside the genuinely *modal* one also a *relational* one. In the first sense contingent is that which 'lets its non-being *think itself*' (CpR B 290; cf. B 486/A 458/60 and *passim*), while in the second it is that which 'can only exist as a consequence of something else' (B 290). Thinking the modal contingency overcomes the entire nexus of hypothetical necessity and is in fact the negatively summated thought of absolute modality; but then the thinking of relational contingency remains within that nexus.
- ¹⁵³ CpR B 381/A 324 f., here two meanings of 'absolutely possible' are distinguished. The 'internal' absolute possibility 'is *the least* that one can say of an object', that is that it can only be at all according to its own conditions, while the genuine absolute possibility is 'what in all intention is possible *in all relation*' and 'is *the most*' that can be said of a possibility.
- ¹⁵⁴ Only the converse conclusion is possible, that what is internally, or for us, impossible would be also absolutely impossible (cf. CpR B 381/A 325).

The greatest significance for Kant is attained by the concept of absolute necessity, which then leads on to the theory of the transcendental ideal as the divine idea *in individuo*. Kant's CPJ speaks of the:

relentless demand of reason ..., to assume any kind of something whatever (the ur-ground) as unconditionally necessarily existing, in which possibility and actuality are supposed to be no longer capable of being distinguished any more and for which idea our understanding simply has no concept, i.e. it cannot make out any way how it should represent such a thing and its manner of existing.¹⁵⁵

Precisely because such an essence would have negated all its external conditions in it, thus would no longer admit any (finite) question as to a 'from where' and 'why', it would then not only be 'ur-ground' but also 'the true abyss for human reason'¹⁵⁶—at least for this as Kant represents it. In the case of the absolutely necessary, reason faces the dilemma that all the understanding is capable of mediating as objective reality in terms of experience has to be regarded as contingent, conditioned, finite. This is why it needs to see it disappear into this abyss. Now the other side of the coin is that it needs this concept because of its own system character and the (at least projected) conclusion of its thinking. Thus in his "Concluding remark" to the *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant explains why reason both in speculative-theoretical and in practical usage 'restlessly seeks the unconditioned-necessary' and gives its 'essential principle' as being 'to drive its knowledge to the consciousness of its necessity (for without this it would not be knowledge of reason)'.¹⁵⁷ Reason follows this principle, although for Kant there should be no doubt that 'the unconditioned necessity of the judgments' is 'not an absolute necessity of the matters',¹⁵⁸ so that the rational conclusion in each case would happen only '*de dicto*' and this would be known.

Nevertheless the transcendental ideal sets 'the task', 'either find for absolute necessity a concept, or, for the concept of anything whatsoever, find the absolute necessity of it'.¹⁵⁹ This is precisely the task that Hegel will set himself—only with the reference that it indeed cannot be about the concept 'of anything whatsoever' but about the true concept, which is that of the individual.

¹⁵⁵ Kant, CPJ B 341.

¹⁵⁶ Kant, CpR B 641/A 613; cf. B 643/A 615.

¹⁵⁷ Kant, AA IV, 463.

¹⁵⁸ Kant, CpR B 621/A 593.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. B 640/A 612.

But then he will also think the concepts of actuality, possibility and necessity, which all belong to the domain of the total in-itself of the concept, already as presentations of the principle of individuation of the *μεταβολή* of thinking and being. Kant in contrast assures us that the task he set 'exceeds' 'completely all the most extreme exertions to satisfy our understanding on this point'.¹⁶⁰ He is confident of this because he is sure enough of himself in thinking his logical form that in that "Concluding remark" he can put limits even to reason:

It is however also an ... essential *limitation* ... (of) reason, that it can have no insight into what is there before us, nor into what should happen, unless a *condition*, under which it is there or happens or should happen, is laid at the foundation.¹⁶¹

For Hegel in contrast, already from the logic of the ground it is clear that each thinking in and under conditions represents nothing more than the self-alienation of thinking,¹⁶² as indeed Kant's assurance of the limitation of reason, which can hardly wish itself to be valid without restriction, could in fact only be the form of first generating restrictedness as such. If Kant's concluding statement on the modal resumption of being and thinking in the concept is supposed to be the utterance of limitations, then Hegel sets against this the assertion that the true thinking conceived of as *individualised* of the absolute form is also *infinite*, sustaining itself rather than hanging on conditions, and that it is true in its own right instead of, as Kant ultimately has to do, begging truth from imagined general conditions. What Hegel clearly has to take upon himself in order to do that is not only not to shy away from Kant's "abyss of reason" but in fact to immerse the entire Kantian "treasure" of positively secured experience in it. Only in this way can the absolute form as individual self-consciousness and as language show itself not to need any hold on positive, regulated awareness. Methodologically speaking one can imagine Hegel's procedure as that the positive *quale* of experience and its protected objective reality, in the sense of determinate negation, relates to the pure nothing of experience, thereby acquiring reason *qua* absolute negativity, which is the original making true of everything, even of such finitude as experience. As making true it is not Kant's 'unmovable rock of absolute necessity',¹⁶³ but in fact much more, in terms of its metabolic and metanoetic form it is *motion* in the ground

160 Ibid. B 641/A 613.

161 Kant, AA IV, 463.

162 Cf. Hegel, SoL 469, GW XI 314.

163 Kant, CpR B 612/A 584.

of all things, motion of the manifestation and of the concept as well as of the method. Kant certainly tried to think how one could hold the positive in the “open” and “in between” so that it attains its own original and self-proportioned visibility; with this question he is already beyond all positivism and univocal scientificity. But he wanted people to understand his conception of the matter of experience as fundamentally and imperishably held in the open, while maintaining itself in its finite determination. Against that, as Hegel knows, everything that does not already come from the open, must continually immerse itself in that without residue in order to become true. If Kant’s last word on the question of rational form is this, that because it is hypothetical form, it is only to be completed under a condition and is conditioned form, then from Hegel’s point of view it becomes possible to think that for its own sake philosophy has to depart from the Kantian ground.

Hegel's Logos of Actuality

1 Actuality and Language that Speaks

Under the modal aspect Kantian objects exhibit a peculiar and ultimately dialectical doubling. Their objective determinations and experience-based predicates are relied upon by the conscious understanding, as in the natural sciences. Then there is their not directly intendable affinity with the openness of the process of understanding in general, their contextual “proportion”, thanks to which for subjectivity they are “diaphanous”, so that specific moments of their predicative illumination of the immediate are in themselves incomprehensible. Only both sides together make determining *capable of truth* and elevate it from arbitrary talk up to objectively real, content-filled speech, to which the *certainty* corresponds of having said something and to have given expression to the matter. Scepticism wanted to suggest that it must “in fact” say “something quite different” in order to be with the matter and in “truth”. Certainty of the language that speaks is deployed to refute scepticism and supersede it as an unphilosophical treatment of differences. Kant's modalities open up language to a determinate speech, i.e. one standing under conditions.

In the *Difference essay*, Hegel identified the specific defect of Kant's modalities, that ‘in them essentially’ is expressed ‘the non-identity of subject and object’.¹ It is indeed the case that “subject” and “object” are assigned different “loci” in the logic or the topics of experience and constitute, not “without residue”, only moments of *one* total relationality of thinking and being, which in Hegel is thought of as the absolutely absolute, the modus as pure self-showing of its own unity. The difference relates to the asymmetry of subject and object in Kant in their forms of condition and conditioned but also to their determinate linking in the copula—to the “is as”—which, as in particular the problem of absolute modality has shown, could always only be modal, appearing, not “absolute connecting”. In the *Encyclopaedia* Hegel completely rejects speaking of actuality, possibility and necessity as ‘modalities’ if with that is supposed to be meant ‘a mere *manner* for another’, while what is ‘concrete and complete within itself’,² which is what they are, is overlooked. The modus has already shown

¹ Hegel, TW2, 10.

² Hegel, Encyc. § 143 Obs.

itself to be such a 'concrete', a complete relation; in this case too it exhibited doubling like the Kantian modality but then the outside of this relation is 'externality of the absolute', while its inside or essence is 'reflection in itself' of the absolute and both were the same as 'the absolute's *own manifestation*' (541, 380). The Hegelian modus is for that reason not only, like a Kantian modalised object, "diaphanous" for the understanding in general, it *is* as a *whole* the self-setting total relation of clarity that has all the differences of passive determination and active determining, of a "something" that is shown and of the "other" to which it is shown, *within itself* and nowhere else. The peculiar difficulty in grasping Hegel's category of the absolute and its determining moments, as we have seen, lies in the fact that here we are talking about what could be called the "back side" of the concept, of its in-itself that is to be grasped purely in terms of the logic of negation, the δύναμις and power of all language as "being-in-and-for-itself", of which the I is the concept. One can confidently say that only Hegel's philosophy undertook to think through the negative underground of speaking or meaningful speech, that which in all positivising and objectivising expression remains obstinately evasive. Actuality for example is a moment of this revelatory self-removing, and is in particular the incommensurability of the true matter itself; as such it is for all external reflection *unknowable* as only and always other than "one might have thought". In Hegel it is not only not closed off to cognition, it is also known as its own power of discovery (manifestation). Actuality appears first in the logic of essence. Looked at more closely however where actuality emerges essence is on the point of becoming the concept and is in self-showing already expressly '*absolute form*' (ibid.), i.e. individual and metabolic unity of the immediacy of being and essence, if also still without expressed content as such, thus without absolute *determination* as a set moment of form.

In terms of its Hegelian concept actuality is not only not an indeterminate other of the process of understanding, it already has everything *other* in it. This is why it is taken from both the 'sphere of *variation*' in the logic of being and from the '*shining ... in another*' (542, 381) of essence, and even if it does persist in the negative in-itself, it is the first concept of the *self* in Hegel's *Logic* that is 'just the motion of distinguishing itself from itself and determining itself' (ibid.). The *something* and *other*, just like the *one* and the *many* of being, as well as the *same* and the *different* of essence, disappear in the form which is what *shows* its *self* (the self). The pathway from actuality to concept is the emergence of the content set by absolute form itself as of *absolute determination* from the negative concept of self-showing. Another way of putting it is that on this pathway it can be seen and understood that nothing determinate at all can be "given", "about which" language speaks but that all the content of

speech is determinate language issuing purely from itself into determination. Only for external reflection could the semblance arise that content-laden, successfully uttered language is something (simply) *other* than language and speaking, in relation to which "other" that "about which" style of thematising could happen in terms of external relating. Meanwhile Hegel's preferred perspective makes it clear that *no language happens at all* if speaker, language, "means" and "object" stand in the difference of finitude to each other and are not instead *absolutely related*, so that all three as *moments* of the concept (λόγος) are simultaneously infinitely identical and different. The chapter on the absolute relation has above all the task of fundamentally dismantling all finitely represented passivity within the relation and letting the pure activity of the concept (its *speaking*) emerge from that. It is the emergence of this activity which, by the way, constitutes its decisive difference from a Kantian "spontaneity", on which Kant has to rely so immediately and unmediatedly *because* what it is supposed to mediate (subject and predicate in the proposition or subject and object in the cognition) are simple and finitely opposed terms. This dismantling of passivity in the absolute relation, from which the freedom of the concept emerges, also dismantles the semblance as if language were essentially a "means" of speaking about something other, something "outside" (as the unphilosophical understanding takes the otherness, logically the only kind, in its spatial imagination), something being-for-itself (as if that "itself" in "being-for-itself" were not the *same* self as that of the speech). According to Hegel it is no longer seriously possible to be of the opinion that we begin to *speak* occasioned by "perceptions" or merely something "given", imagining this given as if it were precisely the end of all language. The movement of "affection" to speech, if it is not already speech, is not to be imagined as affection *to* speaking. But the affirmative setting of activity and passivity is only to be reached from pure self-showing, in opposition to which there is no longer any external determinate language, from the incommensurable manifestation. Both lie undifferentiated within each other in actuality, just as showing is not yet the set, developed difference of the concept and its three moments. The *reflection* of the modus of the absolute through the three levels of actuality is essentially not to be grasped as *external* reflection but as reflection of the pure, immediate and *negative* totality *within itself*. Up to the pure point of completely gathered absolute necessity, that reflection becomes the (dynamic) concentrated power as the being-in-itself of language. Moreover this power is not only an absolute *necessitating to* speech but united with that also the power which completely eliminates what is merely passive and finitely opposed to that force of necessitating, which is also what makes it necessity *qua* freedom.

On the pathway that the self-showing and clarity-within-itself of actuality takes up to the concept presented as concept, topics arise that relate to matters in the logic of language like those of universality or determination, which are preparations for the theory of the set or posited concept. Focussing on such topics in the leadup to the developed concept, and with that prior to language, cannot mean in methodological terms fleeing apparently more weighty “ontological” issues, as which e.g. actuality or substantiality might appear, into the “easier” element of language and so produce an adaptation of Hegel’s philosophy for what are on the whole indeed more light-weight times. Now the representation of “heavy” being and “light” language persisting in essence, and especially in the external reflection that belongs to essence, is not to be regarded simply as a fundamental or vulgar materialist misuse of the λόγος but as a standpoint which, even before all logical enlightenment on its activity, any true self-consciousness must already have left behind because it is ready to discard *being* for the sake of the *I-say*. The I is nowhere else to be found than in language; for that reason it is “heavier” than what is non-linguistically represented. Thus the *philosophical* problem is never to be approached like a fleeting and “contingent” I, cunningly escaping it, e.g. by technically mediated means or even by consciously accepting self-deception e.g. “dionysiacally”, under being imagined as terminally oppressive. The issue on the contrary is how the being known already at the beginning of the philosophical tradition would be capable of cognising the nothing which is the weight of the I, how infinite meaning and quite simply the language aspect can be communicated to it. Philosophy rejects a conscious *making* as belonging to external reflection, like scepticism which regards the linguistic sense as simply given and inserted into the “world” as an unlinguistic container. This is rejected already in Kant’s proportionality of experience but the more so by the fully rational concept of language, in which consciousness and its other are completely relationally known in the one negativity. In absolute form it is far more *actu* in cognition, in the successful uttering of the known; known as always already completed communication of reason that does not have another “past”. This is how Hegel understands the task of philosophy as the systematic self-disclosure of reason, as self-assertion of language against *every* semblance of absence of language. In actuality’s self-showing, to which no otherness is any longer abstractly opposed because it contains the absolute principle of change within it, in the actuality then that is reason as being-in-itself without limitations, destroying by itself the groundless “utopias” of reason that have to be made, the semblance of the absence of language has in every respect already been absorbed and has sunk into the past of mere essence. It must be philosophically cognised that because it comes from the root of speech itself, every word spoken simply

but seriously and from actuality has an infinitely greater value than whole systems of language regulation supposedly oriented towards "possible" or "better" worlds.

The forms of reason of Hegel's *Logic*, its categories and concepts, because they are all considered in their own right, are by nature dialectically oriented to the actuality of reason, looked at also logically, such that each of them is fundamentally capable of taking up the idea or the τέλος of the *Logic* and presenting it as a whole. The categories are separated by respective limits of immediacy and the dialectical motion in each is that of those limits pushing it into its successor. These limits of immediacy are known in terms of the whole idea as the category's own limits, and their ideal differing (the action of the idea itself) can similarly be assigned to each individual category. As category each is not a finite form that would have to find its definitive end in another finite form; each is a moment of infinity and indeed is infinite in its own right. The concepts of Hegel's *Logic* are in this sense also never mere *names*, more or less effectively to be placed beside each other in the service of external purposes. They are *concepts* and that means above all: self-purposes or goals of the self, *of the* concept κατ' ἐξοχήν. As names they would be at best means and would lie outside of cognition. If they have as concepts differences with respect to each other and these differences are ideally appropriated to them, then one must grasp these concepts distinguished from the nameables of nominalism as shapes, internally differentiated connections and relations, as themselves individual spheres and horizons, which one could say, display to each other an internally dynamic *relief* or *contour* in which they fill out their respective logical space. The space metaphor suggests itself because the logical concepts, as internally complex relations (λόγοι), possess moments that are self-external and present a sphere of otherness, which is simultaneously comprehended as internally united in the concept. That distinct views on the logical concept reliefs are possible without it thereby becoming possible to question the category itself, belongs to the *reality* of actual concepts which are not, like the nominalistic lable, to be fixed as supposedly "unambiguous", nor indeed can they be so fixed. The philosophical concept's real strength lies in its immanent plurality, which endows it with relations. The concept *is* in the relating of the many but it "is" actively and only as such actual being—not merely "meant" and inexpressible being like that of the name. The difference between being and the form moments in which it is supposed to be known has disappeared in the concept. From the standpoint of the concept of actuality the result is that they have vanished in the δηλούν of the concept, which itself constitutes the absolute beginning of the concept in general.

For Hegel in the actuality, in the uttering of the concept in its pure immediacy known as in-itself of motion manifesting itself absolutely, 'the moments (cf. of this motion) are only as overcome or formal, not yet realised' (542, 381). The determinate difference of these moments is external to self-showing, it 'belongs as such initially to external reflection and is not determined as content' (ibid.). The external reflection emerging here is determined by its relation to absolute self-showing, just as already for absolute external reflection it had to be comprehended as a *relation moment* of the whole negative totality, in which the absolute moment was also found. If external reflection here fixed the 'externality' in which the actual is according to its concept '*it itself*' (ibid.), then it consequently demands the *setting* of the in-itself in general,³ more precisely it demands the absolute mediation from the inside of self-showing into the sphere of settings and hence actual actuality or necessity. External reflection in this way represents the claim of the idea on actuality, to go beyond its immediacy and no longer only to say *everything* without distinction but to determine itself to determination. External reflection is hence the other of that which is already there but it is an alterity that has not yet been appropriated by that which is there and for that reason still possesses the semblance of a positive independence. Every immediacy within the *Logic* means also an unmediatedness. The latter emerges from the idea against the immediacy of the respective logical result as an *ought*, an ought not of another but of its own mediation. Only in the face of the absolute idea is it possible that such an ought cannot once again happen; what happens in the idea is instead the total negation of this ought (nature). Nature is nothing other than the *inability* of the idea to be its own ought. On the highest logical level the idea refuses strictly, and for its own sake, to recognise any other than itself as its mediation. This recognition is eternally denied to the ungraspable possibility of the idea or its *rejected* other, nature as nature, the finite which *as such* already claims a right to be, which against the idea it can only arrogate to itself. It is this negation that is left standing at the end of the *Logic*, not some kind of 'creation'.⁴

3 On the fundamental methodological meaning of the difference between being-in-itself and setting cf. H. Röttges, *Der Begriff der Methode in der Philosophie Hegels*, Meisenheim am Glan 1978, esp. 233 ff.

4 Cf. on this interpretation, only briefly discussed here, F. Ungler, *Individuelles und Individuationsprinzip in Hegels 'Wissenschaft der Logik'*, habil., Vienna 1983, 625 ff. Ungler distinguishes between 'nature' qua 'totality' of 'form' of the idea (compare: SoL 843, GW XII, 253) as 'divine nature' (626) itself from the possibility of falling into the 'hardest unfreedom' of the 'ἄπειρον' as a mere 'possibility, which it (sc. the idea) itself cannot grasp', as it namely cannot 'decide against the "eternal truth", the method, which is its nature' (627). But if the possibility is 'grasped, then it is indeed the freedom of the idea to lead this decision back into the

The ought it firmly holds against immediate actuality is what makes external reflection *possibility*. Not indeed in the sense of the in-itself that actuality itself is in relation to the concept and its uttering but rather in the sense of the formal or reflexive possibility which as we shall see, the terms of reflection will also follow initially at least. The completion and overcoming of the ought would be:

'the *connecting* of the two to each other ..., the actual determined equally as being reflected in itself and then this also as immediately existing', i.e. '*necessity*' (542, 381).

According to the beginning of the consideration of the actual in external reflection, as yet then *no* necessity takes place; consequently the beginning happens with *contingency*. The first '*setting*' required by external reflection will emerge in contingency and hence in the positive sphere of determination in general; possible and actual acquire a 'term' (ibid.) in which the essentially negative indeterminacy of self-showing is initially left behind in the direction towards finitude or relative (real) necessity. Its return into itself as into the finitely invisible point of origin of self-showing as the power of determining however will emerge as absolute necessity—as absolutely negative and free origin of the conceptually successfully spoken world.⁵

syllogism of absolute mediation. The decision for externality is thus only the persisting of the finite spirit in itself—its being-for-itself, not the creation' (627 f.). Such an interpretation is also required to resist Schelling's misunderstanding that in Hegel the 'absolute spirit' at the end of the *Logic* (!) gives itself 'up to a process from which it can no longer free itself, against which it possesses no freedom, in which it is caught up and is as it were unsavable' (cf. *Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Münchener Vorlesungen*, sw v, 229). Schelling's misunderstanding rests in part on an incorrect application of the statement in SoL 71, GW XXI, 57 on absolute spirit to the absolute idea (cf. sw v, 226 f.). More fundamentally however it also rests on the concept of logic as only 'negative philosophy' (cf. sw v, 227 and *passim*) in distinction to the 'actuality' (!) e.g. of nature.

- 5 The obviously prominent significance of the logic of actuality, possibility and necessity in the *Science of Logic*, and especially its significance for the emergence of the concept within it, has led to the production of a substantial number of special studies devoted specifically to them, apart that is from the commentaries. In addition to the studies quoted above in notes 211–213,, by Kusch and Manninen, Longuenesse, and di Giovanni, we mention here only the following:—G. Schmidt, *Das Spiel der Modalitäten und die Macht der Notwendigkeit. Zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik* in I. Fetscher (ed.), *Hegel in der Sicht der neueren Forschung*, Darmstadt 1973, 188–206. Schmidt investigates the section of interest to us in terms of, among other issues, the forms of contingency and the cosmological proof, which can be brought into relation to the terms of contingency and of absolute necessity. Important also is the inclusion of the form-content issue in this context (cf. 194 f.). The extension of this study's line of interpretation into the absolute relation (as well as beyond that to a total position on Hegel's

2 Contingency and Its Formal Interpretation

Of that which *shows itself* the “minimal” statement is always possible that it *is*. In such a statement, implying that actuality is ‘nothing but a being or existence in general’ (542, 381), clearly the ‘itself’ of that showing is not taken seriously and instead the self announcing itself in an infinite proposition is confused with immediacy of being or essence. This confusion is possible because absolute negativity, as itself all power of alternation, *can bear* it, and will drive meaning out of it. In the view of actuality as mere immediacy, the ‘totality of form’ (ibid.) is forgotten, i.e. its concept does not become its whole relief or contours and hence is not taken as relation but is only taken according to its “that” of being. Actuality is spoken of this “that” initially only in terms of assurances; it does not yet prove itself in the speaking relation to it. This happens instead in its first approach, when speaking about the actual knows that it can speak of it immediately as something possible too. This recalls actuality as a ‘form unity of being-in-itself or interiority and externality’; in being known that actuality as such ‘immediately’ contains ‘the *being-in-itself* or the *possibility*’ (ibid.). It is simultaneously known that no longer are we talking about being or existence, of which this cannot be valid but of an immediate totum that already includes reflection-in-itself, which has to be given a name. The apparently trivial statement, ‘*What is actual is possible*’ (ibid.) is the first opening of a retreat of determinate external speaking “about” what is self-showing within this itself. What is not trivial in this statement is the matter that is more than “formal”, that actuality has its possibility within *itself* and not in something external to it. Once this is recognised external speaking too will know its determination or its content in the *self* and will discard the externality of speaking “about” actuality in actual, knowing speaking.

philosophy) is given in Schmidt’s study quoted above 123 note 66. D. Henrich, *Hegels Theorie über den Zufall* in I. Fetscher (ed.), op. cit. 161–187, discusses the misunderstanding that in Hegel there is a ‘deduction system’ that lays claim to ‘derive’ every and any finite term. Henrich shows that Hegel’s philosophy is in fact capable of setting the finite-contingent free and in that, also in practical terms, can have its “*amor fati*”. It has to be said however that he does not *logically* develop the contingent, instead treating it as a given. This last named deficiency was also felt by J.W. Burbidge, *The Necessity of Contingency: An Analysis of Hegel’s Chapter on ‘Actuality’ in the Science of Logic* in W.E. Steinkraus and K.I. Schmitz (eds.), *Art and Logic in Hegel’s Philosophy*, New Jersey, Sussex 1980, 201–217, where he unfortunately attempts to remove it without taking the systematic context of absolute and concept into account. Nevertheless Burbidge’s solution of regarding contingency as the simultaneity of being overcome and being set, with their mediating unity in absolute necessity *qua* self-grounding, is correct (cf. 213).

In contrast to being or existence, there is thus at first in actuality its mediation *within itself* to be determined, to which in various ways natural language usage already leads us. Following this line, one cannot express e.g. the opposed concept to actuality, the 'non-actual' simply with negations of being (nothing or also semblance) or existence (that which "is not given"). Even on the level of natural speech the non-actual has the peculiarity of an aspect of absolute negativity to it, as it were of being in a *powerful* ("possible", capable) way of being nothing, so that for what is merely existing in the non-actual, distinct from what is merely non-existing, there may lie a threat. The verbal roots of actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] and possibility [*Möglichkeit*], "*wirken*—effect" and "*mögen*—want" (this latter in the sense of a "powerful" capability), refer to activity and absolute motion in the *inside* of these concepts, which motion as set by the endings "*-keit*" and its pendant "*-heit*", both equivalent to the English word ending "*-ness*", similarly refer natural language to the status of essence in the sense of an immanent *reflection* into unity.⁶ Then a statement like: 'possibility' is 'actuality reflected into itself' (542, 382), for which in formal modal logic there can be no adequate expression,⁷ is implicitly grasped completely correctly in terms of the rationality of language—disposing as it does over the concept of motion, in contrast to logical formalism—i.e. by grasping any true effecting as simultaneously the self-identifying return into its own power. The formal expression of this return remains immediately at the first term of reflection, that of identity, when it seeks to present the being-in-itself of actuality. On the issue of how cognition is to proceed with that, the essence problematic is answered here in that a form is conceived of *within* which it is immediacy as being that itself puts forth the first immediacy of essence in reflexive mediation and sets it. What is actual has the understanding within it because—something which is here not yet known—it is the whole of reason and its form itself. Hegel says that 'the term here is *totality of form*', and for that reason the thought of possibility is 'being-in-itself' but it can be given linguistic expression 'determinate as *one overcome* or as essentially only in relation to

6 "Natural" language, which can be set up as standard or gauge in the most diverse senses, is as this reference should reinforce, at least not an instance on which the nominalistic concept of the concept and its formal logic should support its claims. Caution is also in order when it comes to an abstract differentiation of 'natural logic of language' and the 'non-linguistic' being mediated by a 'logic of the self-unfolding concept' as we encounter it in H.G. Gadamer, *Die Idee der Hegelschen Logik* in his *Gesammelte Werke* vol. 3, Tübingen 1987, 65–86, and that especially for the sake of the language, which in this way threatens to sink back into a simple positivity.

7 The semantic foundation of formal modal calculus also does not allow thinking of the understandable theorem $p \rightarrow Mp$ as the self-identification of p but stops at its *being identified*.

actuality' (543, 382). "Possibility" distinguishes itself logically as a whole from "conditions" imagined by the externally reflecting understanding as an *external* but "necessary" something for an existence. Conditions listed in terms of the understanding are not immediately known as reflections of the self of the matter they are supposed to condition; while the possibility, namely as argument of the form totality against simple immediacy, is precisely what drives the essential production of selfness. Something actual thus has no longer "external conditions" and in general no "other" ground but only *its* possibility, which it is immediately itself.

Prior to its setting and being-for-itself in the absolute form of the concept or of the individual as a whole, on our interpretation actuality is the in-itself of the concept grasped essentially, its other side brought negatively into view. Possibility initially brings out the 'in-itself' in this in-itself of the concept; possibility is 'the negative' of actuality in the sense of a first negation and 'set as a negative' (ibid.). Possibility *breaks* up into two sides: against the immediacy of self-showing in general it brings first the claim of the state of 'being set' to the fore, i.e. it differentiates what is shown from the act of showing and with that forces actuality to present itself as 'reflectedness in itself' (ibid.), formally: not only as A but as $A = A$. But then secondly, it starts from this reflection which is not mediated with immediacy as being, so it does not arrive at the whole 'absolute form', in which 'reflection-in-itself' can 'no longer' be valid 'as essence' (ibid.). Possibility is in the second view mere possibility, 'something lacking' which 'refers to another, actuality, completing itself in this' (ibid.). For the production of content from absolute form this doubling of possibility will be of decisive importance. From its doubling will emerge that of absolute determination. The two antinomically stressed extremes of positive and negative possibility present in their whole relation the doubled opposition in the actual. Positive possibility *first* in the sense of that which 'does not contradict itself' (ibid.) is as such already doubled into the two sides of the identity relation $A = A$. This relation expresses in the most formal manner the determination of *reflection*, which if it only remains by itself can weave a web, a veritable whole:

'domain of possibility' as 'limitless multiplicity' (ibid.), for then according to Hegel 'the perspicuity of the empty understanding' 'indulges itself pleasurably' 'at best in the meaningless figuring out of possibilities and many, many possibilities'.⁸

⁸ Hegel, *Encyc.* § 143 note.

Like all determination the setting of all possible terms is negation as *being-in-itself* of self-showing. *This is why* the understanding can be of the opinion that it negates actuality with its possibilities and can in this way even help in the work of “changing” it. But actuality has already left all otherness behind, whether within it or isolated from it. Once that is comprehended the reflected possible determination shows itself to be precisely only negation as being-in-itself and *secondly* is set as negative, i.e. it is now *only* possible and the positive determination opposition repels itself negatively into the other of $-A = -A$. What is possible precisely for that reason is *also* not possible, for a merely possible A *itself* expresses the possibility of $-A$.

As a moment of absolute form the possibility reflection no longer leaves this form; it remains an immanent complement of the totality of form. It is in this sense not only *determination* of form, by which reflection penetrates into it but is itself determined by the form and even completely inverted. The possible is for Hegel in its own right the *impossible* and this is in a sense analogous to one of the doublings of possibility. According to the positively thought out possibilities of the understanding, reference is made in general to determinations, each of which ‘*is determined within itself and against others*’ and has ‘negation to it’ (ibid.), for the possible A is what it is in that it is not B and similarly the possible B, in that it is not A. Thus everything determinate, *to the extent that* it is supposed to be possible, contradicts this—it is not only that A is set opposed to B but the possibility that is supposed to make both possible according to the principle of contradiction does this only at the price of setting itself against itself in the other determination, i.e. it contradicts itself. ‘Hence *everything* ... is something contradictory’—for it is possible in that possibility contradicts itself—‘and hence *impossible*’ (ibid.)—positive possibility fails as such on its own criterion. The negative or mere possibility is moreover impossible because the negation it sets, the simple essence as being-in-itself, which it seeks to bring to stand against the form totality, is in fact only its ‘moment and not up to the absolute form’ (544, 382). What is set that it brings out negatively, as not actual but only possible, is immediately known also as not the in-itself as which it should set it; thus it is repelled from actuality as not its possibility, not its moment; it is contradiction and impossibility (cf. 543 f., 382 f.). If one understands the self-showing of actuality in view of the concept already as the power of (individual) speaking, then the attempt to give a merely possible essence of this power and to *set it* would simultaneously be the attempt to have a concept of the individual dubbed positive, if with affected modesty also called “tentative”, “hypothetical” etc., which indeed has to be called contradictory and impossible. Absolute form is only known by absolute form or else not at all.

Now at least the first formality has been left behind, in which all that was of interest was A , $A = A$ and their negations. The possibility that as moment of absolute form was simultaneously inverted into impossibility knows that it has meaning as '*overcome set form term*' within absolute form and only to that extent as its own—the reflection of the quality of being set—is it made a moment by absolute form and 'has a *content* in it at all' (544, 383). Set as overcome possibility, it is related within the whole relation of absolute form; immediately this means that its negativity, which it brought to expression positively as determination and negatively as set negation, is once again negated but this time from the form whole as being-in-itself. Now negation *happens* to it, so possibility experiences not only that it has to deal with actuality but also that it is not only form because it is related to a content that only affirms itself in that negation. Thus the negation of the simple possibility reflection of $A = A$ already has generated $-A = -A$, more precisely: only in the fact that both of these statements are supposed to be more than simple assertions of identity, namely possibility reflections, only in this do they have anything to do with each other and stand in a relation of identity.

Possibility is the comparing relation of the two; in its determination as a reflection of totality it includes also that the opposite is possible (ibid.).

With this the moment of *μεταβολή* emerges in possibility, by which it is marked as belonging to absolute form. Formally it unifies the contradiction of A and $-A$ and is as such 'the linking ground' of the two; not only the ground in relation to which both would be possible 'free of contradiction' but the ground of the contradiction itself 'that because $A = A$, $-A = -A$ holds also' (ibid.). In metabolic alterity however possibility has precisely the content that is the in-itself overcome or 'is an otherness' (ibid.). The reflection of possibility that has become other to itself is on the one hand no longer only reflection but its overcoming into the content, of the doubled opposition of the possibility form into the contradiction, which is also its demise; while on the other hand possibility is, as supercession of formal possibility, also the restitution of that actuality from which the whole process started. It is its own alterity that drives formal possibility down into no longer formal immediacy.

The actuality arrived at is in fact not simply the one we started with, which remains devoid of reflection but instead actuality '*set as unity* of itself and possibility' (544, 383). According to its determination possibility in fact has brought the setting, in contrast to the purely immediate self-showing, to validity at the cost of itself, as it loses its immediate independence in that, which corresponds to the immediacy of the first actual. The first actuality (A), reflected

in the doubled possibility opposition of $A = A$ and $-A = -A$ and hence having passed through the contradiction, returns as 'genus' of itself and reflection, as indivisible unity of this disjunction and mutual determination, thus as in general a content relation (A'). The absolute form of self-showing displays its immanent difference as in general content-laden form, its self-disjuncting in possibility and actuality. This disjunction however which here has as yet no determinate determination, grasped as immediate unity, is *contingency*.

Contingency is the expression of the fact that absolute self-showing (A') has determined itself to relate to an arbitrary *immediate something* (A or also $-A$) in showing. Speaking and the clarity of language do manifest in general in each arbitrary positive and determinate element or word of the language. "Material" differences of natural languages are thus on the one hand completely left free, while on the other it is known that the content of absolute form does not yet consist in that material, because the content can only be set by the form itself.⁹ As contingent content of speaking a word—to stay with the example—is a "case" that is only possible for the clarity within it. It is 'not yet *all* actuality' (544, 383) but only the formal kind (A); this it has in any case. This is how the Megarian sounding statement is understood: 'Everything possible thus has in general a *being* or an *existence*' (ibid.). It is indeed self-evident because the reflection of the absolute form, which is what is addressed here in terms of possibility, is not only fundamentally indifferent to all terms weaker than it but already on the formal level appears here in contingency as an other of the first immediacy. Hence it is not reflection if there is not also a simple immediacy. This latter can however—and this is decisive—no longer have the rank of "genuine" actuality, which is in fact absolute self-showing, for it only shows itself within that simple immediacy in general as a contingent moment. The positive is only being [*Sein*] that is merely allowed by the activity of actuality ('*Seyn*'), which itself is initially still devoid of mediation, i.e. contingent. The immediate actuality *qua* being or existence that is allowed is a passive setting; 'actuality here is for this reason mere being or existence but set in its truth of having the value of a setting or of possibility' (545, 384). At the same time however possibility that makes immediate actuality into a setting in the sense of the contingent is itself only something contingent, for it is nothing more than a moment of the relation of allowing, it is *only* mediation or '*being-in-itself*' set as setting' (ibid.), i.e. it is only immediate actuality known *as not* actuality in

9 Content is in general material *with* a form and the unity of the two, the latter of which however is also form of the ground relation (here: of possibility); cf. Hegel, SoL 455, GW XI, 301 f. Absolute form generates content by generating the simple (relative) form in which it is determinate.

the emphatic sense. The contingent now has the two meanings. It is first a setting of self-showing admitted as an immediate actuality and with that in itself negation of the same. Second as a possibility of the first, it is set negation and thus definitely not self-showing itself. In terms of that admission the contingent as such has *no* ground but is simply immediate position in the space of absolute form. In terms of the negation or of the negative setting set together with the contingent however it is not only an arbitrary positive in diversity but something determinate by virtue of something else or it is mediated; it 'has its true reflection-in-itself in another, *or it has a ground*' (ibid.). In the language example the names of something with respect to its positivity are arbitrary and contingent—they have to be that at least for the formal consideration of actuality, for they are only the names and not the in-itself of the concept or of the something itself. For them there is no ground because they are contingent. But then it is also true that they are *not* the something, they are just its linguistic setting, i.e. they stand under general negation or mediation of the matter and are grounded in this because they are contingent. Names are not the matter but are contingent to it, so there is no ground for saying 'equus' or 'Pferd'; then again they are not it but its other and this is the general ground for speaking in that way.

The contingent has no ground because it is contingent; and equally it has a ground because it is contingent (545, 384).¹⁰

Allowed as determination now the contingent sets its disjunction, the particular content. From the standpoint of formal actuality the content relates to it as the predicate in the disjunctive proposition does to the subject; for with the immediate disjunctive proposition it is precisely stated that it is indifferent whether the subject is A or – A, i.e. it is fundamentally both. This is why there is no ground for predicating A; A is contingent and there is no ground to do that because in the form of contingency A is related to the whole relation of the subject to its determination. Actuality is meanwhile not an external third, as is the subject in the proposition represented in terms of the understanding to both of its predicates, instead as the proposition itself expresses, it is the either-or of the two predicates themselves. As such actuality is not to be thought of as that which is for itself while also allowing something else but instead it is only this allowing and otherwise nothing. Contingent actuality is

¹⁰ SoL 481, GW XI, 324: 'what exists has a ground and is conditioned' and 'it has no ground and is unconditioned' (emphasised in original). Hegel thinks of the two 'types' of contingency in Kant (cf. above 257 note 152) in one term.

simply that which can be other than it is, i.e. it has its determination in alterity and this in the double sense: it is *itself* otherwise determinate than it is determinate, or it has its self in the mediation via alterity (it has a ground); it is *itself* otherwise determined than it is determined, or it has its self in that it lies under no term (it has no ground). The contingent is otherwise determined. It is determination as destruction of the same and it is determination as destruction of itself. That which is actual in the sense of the contingent is in its own terms not possible but impossible. Its possibility is only the other of itself. As actuality of the impossible, something which must be repeatedly stressed, the contingent is on the one hand without all ground that would be its possibility and on the other hand has always already suffered its demise, i.e. it has arrived at the connection to its immediate impossibility as at its possibility.

In the concept of the contingent, the form-totality that has actuality as in-itself of self-showing essential to it is set as immediate absence of connection between the form moments. It is set as negated. Already in its beginning, formal actuality was 'not totality of form' (542, 381), which in reference to the developed concept means: not an individual but in *external* setting or positivity. However it is the case that in contingency mere setting sharpens to the point where it can no longer say what exactly it is doing with that; it arrives at self-destructive determination; indeed it does this in the same moment in which it would cease being mere form and instead is content. In the contingent lies the destruction of formal actuality and of pure setting as an independent claim against the negative in-itself. For Hegel the contingent gains its right from the concept, although it must also be the case that 'philosophy makes the viewpoint of mere contingency vanish and in it recognises, as in the semblance, its essence, necessity'.¹¹ Clearly contingency is semblance and this already because its two immediacies, actuality as being and possibility as reflected, are in their immediate unity neither being nor abstract essence but both; they *are* semblance. We saw how semblance as semblance in the modus lets the in-itself of the truth emerge and this is how the overcoming of the contingent as contingent, its *cognition*, already gives us the in-itself of the concept or of absolute form. The contingent is the finite that proves itself to be in itself finite or that

11 The quotation is found at *Philosophy of Right* § 324 note, where the statement continues 'That which has the nature of the contingent meets the fate of the contingent'—it arrives thus at its concept—'and this fate is precisely with that necessity' (Hegel, TW 7, 492). Cf. further TW 12, 52 f.: in the case of the 'empirically individual', 'the contingent' has 'the peculiarity' of receiving 'the power to exercise its compelling right from the concept'. The contingent is merely immediacy of the concept. That which belongs only to this but not to the concept, against that the contingent directs itself, which empirically proves to it its finitude.

demonstrates its infinity as its mediation.¹² It does this immediately in its own right, for it 'is the *set*, unmediated *inversion* of the inner and the outer or of being-reflected-in-itself and being into each other—*set* by the fact that possibility and actuality, each in its own right, has this term because they are moments of absolute form' (545, 384). The two moments of the contingent, the actual and the possible, become *de facto* moments of one unity, when the immediate dispersion of contingency, which is devoid of totality, comprehends itself as its lack of connecting in the sense of self-destructive (finite) determination, precisely the dispersion or inversion as self-determination of the moments in *their* other and with that itself the totality of the self, i.e. necessity. For the concept of the set self in immediacy, total dispersion is inevitable because, as emerged above for the concepts of death and the infinite proposition, only from completed finitude can it summarise infinity and produce it. So once again here the '*absolute disturbance* of becoming' in which contingency is dissipated is precisely as *absolute* disturbance also pure rest or the unity of the connection of what is differentiated in it; but then as such 'identity' it is 'necessity' (ibid.).

The contingent is thus necessary because the actual is determined as something possible, ... as also, because this has simply overcome its *possibility*, the *ground relation* and is set as being (546, 385).

In the immediate disjunctive proposition, the example for contingent determination, this is precisely the possibility of the actual, namely to be A or – A, and hence also the *ground* of its being, not yet set as being but only possible being. In the case of the necessity of the contingent, as the double "as" in our example already indicates, now the actual is *as* possible and possibility *as* being—the immanent horizon of the matter or its self-showing is set as being in which now the previously dispersed moments complete each other to compose the whole. In coming out of the complete dispersion of the contingent, self-showing achieves the identity of absolute form. The disjuncts of determination are for each other in a horizon of self-showing in which against them for the first time the individuality of the matter or of the concept emerges with great clarity, one could almost say shining brightly. If it may be allowed to bring in examples for the matter arrived at here such as the synonym or translation problem, one could say that the names contingent in formal linguistic consideration "Pferd",

¹² Cf. TW17, 420: 'the category of the relation of *contingency* and of *necessity* of being is the one in which all relations of finitude and infinity of being are summarised; the most concrete term of finitude of being is contingency and similarly the infinity of being in its most concrete term is necessity'.

"horse" or "equus" show their contingency in *becoming* and hence resolve themselves spatially or chronologically without it being possible immediately to indicate why this is so. At the same time however each inversion of one such immediate actuality into another is its own pathway to its reflection-in-itself or lies in its being possible, i.e. in the either-or of the disjunction that first gives rise to it. The inversion of "equus" to "Pferd" in this way refers the former to its whole possibility or to itself, so that one can say that 'equus' is understood as "Pferd". "Equus" as "Pferd" however is already the expressed necessity, the attained form-totality of the universal concept that produces itself from the immediate determinations. The "translatability" of contingent names is immediately their formal necessity and the concept, with respect to which they are necessary is not to be imagined as the third of comparison but as the relation of translatability itself. More precisely the concept is only the formal concept, not itself a "reality" and the necessity of the contingent expressed in it is still a contingent necessity. Nevertheless within it self-showing asserts itself against what is only immediately set. It begins to turn that being which is only allowed by the in-itself into being, i.e. to set it in its clarity. Formal necessity is at once in-itself and setting; both are the same and are not the same, just as they are also no longer simply identical to *themselves*, rather the setting is instead being-in-itself and 'this being-in-itself is itself only setting' (ibid.). But then precisely in the fact that each of them is not identical with and for itself, the whole actuality that began in immediacy and then became immediate identity with its other (contingency), has become identity mediated from out of itself. Language will speak in the concept because it represents the power of absolute negativity of identifying itself with itself; with this we have attained the insight that it is at least no longer possible to distinguish simple immediacies from language in such a way that language would not be able to master them.

3 Relative Necessity or Actuality of Content

The premisses of formal necessity are simple, mutually distinct, immediate being. Necessity itself is the essence of these premisses, namely their mediation again distinct from them into identity, which however is simultaneously their given relation of the "as". While the premisses taken for themselves 'do not have the form of independence', becoming identical in necessity is their 'totality' (ibid.), which starting from the absolute is a feature of all subsequent categories on their respective logical level. In terms of totality's independence from what is merely setting or the mere formality of actuality as A and of possibility as $A = A$ or $-A = -A$, thus as independence that not only sets the formality

of actuality and possibility but sets it overcome, as it were as the interpretation of actuality and possibility by each other, totality is *content*. Possibility had already referred to content in general (cf. 543 f., 382 f.) by superimposing the form of determination onto actuality. This then made the immediate unity of actual and possible in contingency into content in the sense of determination in general; although it was just a *possible* content, only becoming actual content in the totality relation of necessity. To remain for illustration with the chosen example, any given name is only simple form or possible content for as long as it is known as determinate and rendered necessary by a relation of substitution (e.g. of translation). From the disjunction of determination determined as necessary then the content function emerges as a positive unity of the disjuncts (of plurality).

In fact the plurality appropriate to the independence of actual content, namely itself devoid of totality, is the ἄπειρον of the contingent manifold so that the form of the content, its one encompassed within it, is 'merely *distinct* terms' (546, 385). In this way the content function is affected by variety itself; it is determination of the various which in their own right are devoid of totality, hence are never 'all' various and with that varied determination. The content is 'manifold content in general' (ibid.); it is in each case determined or real. Out of formal necessity real actuality has overcome the content it had stored up against the immediate becoming of contingency; from this latter however it takes over the determination or variety of its persistence. Self-showing that enters into the persistent variety of reality has become, once again in the language example, determinate meaning which *per definitionem* is something and not everything but the something simultaneously as a many, i.e. many and various but in that as reflected into itself, as showing the same. The determinate meaning 'sustains itself in the manifold of mere existence; its externality is internal relating only *to it*' (546, 385), i.e. it is essentially a self. Hegel calls 'real actuality *as such* ... initially the thing of many properties, the existing world' (ibid.). Just as the terms of formal actuality were taken from the section on *Reflection* of the *Logic of Essence*, so those of real actuality are taken from the section in it on *Appearance*. Now as a term of actuality the thing is no longer what is immediately objective devoid of context that is dissolved into its own properties, which taken together as its composition are set against its character or its imagined inside. With respect to the other then as a presentation of the negativity of self-showing the content as thing is instead 'the manifestation of *itself*' and in that something that can '*be effective*' (546, 386). Self-sustaining thinghood in the sense of real actuality is effectiveness against variety or the production of reality in variety. But then the real determination of production turns out here too to be various production, i.e. it is determined

against another. Other real actuality is set together with real actuality in general and what is really actual—e.g. the determinate meaning that actively means something—is ‘only in relation to another’ (547, 386), contextually determined. This makes it clear why Hegel could call the ‘thing’ itself *qua* actuality ‘the existing world’ (546, 385).

‘Its reflection in itself, its determinate essentiality’—e.g. the ‘what’ of a determinate process of meaning—has the actual as such in general ‘in an other independent’ (547, 386).

The two selves of real sufficiency are immediately others with respect to each other, which is why they respectively still presuppose the contingent. But they need immediate alterity in order to be *determinately negated*, in order to be set as content immediately against the pure in-itself and *its* determinate negation. Each determinately meaningful word is negation of the pure language quality as being-in-itself and *with that* its setting and the gain in the sphere of settings by its own power. Nevertheless it must still be shown that through self-sufficient determining the self of what is sufficient is absolute negativity, which as given concept is the *infinite* independence of the individual against real meanings and their finite independence too. The concept has to result as *not a meaning*.

In determinate negation which presents real actuality, it has ‘the *possibility* immediately *in its own right*’ and is from that simultaneously ‘different’ (547, 386). One could say real actuality is the immediate presentation of its contextuality and of the relation to other reality; as such it is simultaneously *not* this contextuality (its in-itself) or reflection but only its being. The *real possibility* arising from that is no longer the contradiction-free kind of formal reflection but a reflection with *content*. Possibility expresses no longer only the *form* of determination but determination as formal necessity or as content function. The representing of real possibility happens no longer in formal logic but in *material* reflection such as in a discipline like history. Now it is about ‘terms, circumstances, conditions of a matter’ (547, 386), which, while the matter appears to be what is immediate, stand open to the understanding *because* they are reflections. In the reflection of real possibility the formal possibility concept is still only a *means* of presentation and of making understandable. The *purpose* is the knowledge of what is existing to the extent that this has become real actuality from out of formal possibility. It is still noticeable that the understanding that reflects real actualities imagines them as *past*—representation illustrates in the natural form of time the self-sufficiency of what is formally necessary, which has moved out of the μεταβολή of the

contingent. Understanding now imagines what it only formally conceives—the ‘hollow possibilities’ of what is free of contradiction—as not-past but as *always* in *time* and at least *not* at a *place* (‘utopian’), as pure variation and with that already itself as nothing. As a result the historical understanding, to continue the example given above, in contrast to the empty utopian understanding, reveals that it has already acknowledged the *contradiction* of formal actuality, as whose relating ground formal necessity has emerged. Similarly in its imagining it also allows itself to acknowledge the contradiction of the two natural intuitions space and time, namely motion, and thus to imagine a historical “development”, something of which the formal understanding is not capable.

Real possibility is taken as itself something existing. Indeed it has to be so because otherwise it could not be the *immediate* possibility of the actual. Immediate existences as real possibilities are now numbered, and these are supposed to be simultaneously the reflection of the matter. This is where the characteristic refraction of possibility reveals itself, which it always has in itself as the set form of determination (cf. 547 f., 386 f.). Possibility begins with a content that it seeks to reflect into itself (in fact both the content into itself and vice versa) or render it understandable. The ‘framework’ of understandability is ‘the set *whole* of form’ (547, 386), contextuality, i.e. the relation to other immediacy that is supposed to be outside its immediacy, e.g. as conditions, reflections of content. These immediacies are actual but they are not real actuality into which it is supposed to be reflected but only ‘formal’ or ‘immediate’ ‘actuality’ (cf. 547, 386), which was always assumed as the starting point. Its actuality is in this way, as Hegel can say, not the *actuality of the matter*, which it instead only *ought* to be. From this ought there is no longer any escape. Formal it may be but it is still an actuality necessarily devoid of totality and hence in general just another actuality. In this way possibility presents in what it enumerates as possibility ‘the being-in-itself of another actual’ (547, 386) or an actuality that is alien to itself. For examples one can here too stay with the historical understanding, which seeks to ‘explain’ something more developed and, in terms of its actuality status, in higher standing through what is a lesser and ultimately only formal, actuality, e.g. explaining a work of art from positivist iconographic traditions or a human action from material interests. But it is essential in this that with respect to what is really actual, external reflection *can* fundamentally still in this manner find its validity, even if its result as the ‘actuality that is not reflected into itself but dispersed’ (ibid.) amounts to nothing more than the deserts of the objectivity of awareness and are thus of no philosophical interest whatsoever. Logically it has to be said that just as formal possibility was already a determinate external reflection and was capable

of being that, just so does real possibility contain an external reflection, now indeed in its own right in broken unity with an immediacy. Real possibility is a being and an ought in one; however it is that only antinomically. In 'dispersed actuality' only waiting for resumption through the matter, external reflection has in a certain sense once again achieved victory over the matter—which is due to the fact that real actuality is not yet the developed self of absolute form and hence also is not yet *individual*, thus only just conscious, i.e. arbitrarily divisible.

Dispersion of real possibility as externality that has not returned into itself ensures also on the real level that the contradiction is avoided. But then for different real matters that ought to constitute a whole of possibilities, it is in fact 'easy', as Hegel says, to find a 'contradiction' (cf. 548, 387). It turns out that the terms enumerated in the possibility reflection *must* contradict each other, insofar as the *contradiction* presents their *relation* to each other, i.e. the realisation of their contextuality and the transition into the actual. By suffering its demise the existence shows its 'term of being *only a possible*' (ibid.). Once again possibility shows its doubling, i.e. as both positive and negative possibility, thus on the one hand the positivity of the dispersion of "conditions" and on the other these conditions as *only* possible, i.e. not actual, which is indeed the contradiction into which they vanish. In what is self-contradictory of possibility, i.e. precisely in the completion of the disjunction of those terms, lies the totality which once again shows itself to be, as only it can, genetically defined, and the disjuncts result that gather themselves together out of dispersion constituting the actuality (of the contradiction!). 'When all the conditions of a matter are completely present'—in which completion is a negative form function—'then it enters into actuality' (ibid.). Hegel clearly limits the concept of conditions as *possibility* reflection of the matter or of the content itself off from the matter's concept, which they have as simple *ground*, by regarding the latter as 'determined by a presupposing reflection', i.e. so that they have 'the reflection as being for itself, ..., that relates them to moments of the matter', '*outside themselves*' (548, 387). Conditions as immediacies that are supposed to be the only ground for an *other* existence are reflection *products*, while the conditions here, comprehended as immediate reflection-in-itself of actuality, do belong to their concept and thus have not suffered their demise in them, presenting instead the form moments of their contradiction as being. While the conditions that become an existence by external means have the meaning of facilitating a selfless consideration (an external reflection) of the existing matter, the conditions in the sense of reflections of absolute form bring out the self of the matter in that they ultimately present it as conditioned by itself: 'it is set that it is itself the possibility' (ibid.). Truly real

possibility correspondingly overcomes *itself*. It gives itself over into its other and is whole in that.¹³

The logical formation of the identification of possibility and actuality shows clearly that we already find ourselves on the ground of absolute form that has closed itself off against the possibility of an external reflection. The 'negation' of possibility in its actualisation is 'not a *transition* but rather a *coalescing with itself*' (ibid.). This *self-like* motion however requires once again—something we are already acquainted with for the proposition, especially the infinite proposition—a presentation in four different moments as extremes of a doubled opposition. Hegel says that it is 'doubled' and 'will be overcome ... in self-overcoming real possibility' (ibid.). On the one side: (1) the disjuncts of possibility as immediate or formal actuality become in their self-relation (2) 'reflected being, a moment of another', so that they have a 'being-it-itself' (ibid.) or in general have mediation in their own right. On the other: the disjuncts were already in their dispersion (3) possibility or being-in-itself and indeed they were that *because* they were dispersed possibility, possibility of another; this being-in-itself however will become (4) its other when possibility actualises itself, i.e. when it becomes actuality. Presented according to the logically decisive moments, this means: (1) the immediate setting becomes (2) mediated or setting as being-in-itself while (3) immediate being-in-itself becomes (4) mediated or set being-in-itself. In this motion the following must be kept in mind, that the two negations between (1) and (2) and between (3) and (4) are negative mediations, while the difference between the two pairs or also that between (2) and (3) is an immediate *alterity*. Looked at more closely this alterity is the broken middle of possibility, just as (2) and (3) then are also both in their own terms possibility, first as mediation of immediacy (their identity reflection), then in contrast as immediacy of another mediation (their alterity). In the middle of their whole mediation, possibility is other to itself. It *is* this merely, i.e. it is the μεταβολή only, as being in which by the way the fact is expressed that what is presupposed of real actuality, which is mediated in the

13 The self-developing formation of the self of the terms possibility and actuality, which are simultaneously complementary extremes of the reflection of the absolute in-itself, allows one to speak with certainty of a 'double sursumption réciproque' in the 'procès d'effectuation', as do the commentators in J. Biard et al., *Introduction à la lecture de la Science de la logique de Hegel*, Paris 1983, vol. II, 332 f. Against that it is strictly external and for the conception itself not very helpful to emphasise a 'symmetry' of actuality and possibility, thereby suppressing the necessary 'asymmetry' of the immediate relation of the two self-overcoming terms (as H. Fink-Eitel does in his study *Dialektik und Sozialethik*, Meisenheim am Glan, 1978, 152).

motion of real possibility (from (1) to (4)), is *contingency*. The contingent is not a set immediacy within the real world, constituting instead its 'dumb' *middle term*. This determination can be explained from distinct points of view. In actuality the simple alterity is expressed that it stands opposed to itself in two distinct extremes—(1) and (4)—as mediated alterity. By virtue of the fact that in the middle of real actualisation stands the contingent, it can appear as if there were a 'becoming to the self' or 'selves' from out of alterity, so that it is not about a becoming *of the* self, which is itself already the other. It is the immediately presupposed contingency in the middle of the mediation that distinguishes real actuality from the absolute kind. In relation to the *positivity* of the contingent, the two complementary negative mediations, (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), simply differentiated from each other in terms of the direction from actuality to possibility or conversely, are only *relative* negations. All negativity mediated by positivity is necessarily only relative not yet absolute negativity, which itself has to be the setting of the positive. It is on this restriction that e.g. the Kantian idea in its ur-division breaks down. Moreover as will emerge in greater detail below, the necessity of real actuality is as a consequence only relative necessity, nor is it the completion of the reflection of the absolute. In it too as yet the contingent is only presupposed (cf. 549, 388). If we remember finally that the contingent could also be called impossible actuality on the condition that the possibility of the contingent actual was its immediate alterity,¹⁴ then real actuality shows itself here determined via the concept of impossibility. This happens not only when what is not immediately impossible is really possible and actual but also from the other point of view that what is in itself contingent, and for that reason indirectly also itself impossible, is really possible. What is self-sufficient in the real world stands in the middle on the shaky ground of the absence of self-sufficiency, which latter will only vanish together with what is merely real determination.

Alterity is now included in internally broken possibility with its form of doubled mediation, so that possibility does not externalise itself as formal possibility. Here then in $A = A$ already $-A = -A$ lies as similarly possible, i.e. there lies an A and a $-A$ within it so that as it was possible to differentiate the other was coordinated with the possible, while from this point on in the case of possibility that is 'the *being-in-itself* of an other' (549, 387) a subordination happens, which would be written completely formally and externally as A of the $-A$. And since possibility within actualisation is simultaneously also its alterity or solely being-in-itself against actuality, this subordinates as $-A$ also the possibility as

14 Cf. above 273-274.

A under it, i.e. it is '– A of A', and both are others only as *moments*. Alterity is itself rendered a moment and for that reason, as we have said, is in the middle.

The synoptic expression for the mediating alterity or of the aspect of being-other-to-itself of the middle term is 'the counterthrust' (549, 388). This contains 'the *negation* of real possibility ... *its identity* with itself' (ibid.). It is easy to see that not only possibility in its real actualisation is identical with itself but that this also holds for the actualisation, i.e. for the negation itself, which above emerged as a result, as complementarity of the two negations. The negating identical to itself however is in the real world 'real necessity' (ibid.). In this is encompassed the self-relating of real possibility and real actuality as a negative totality. The *alterity* of the moments, both in the sense of their contingency insofar as they are *not* moments as well as in the sense of their alterity *as* moments, understood as necessity, no longer comes to immediate expression: 'What is necessary *cannot* be *other*' (ibid.). The necessary can be 'not other', because it is another 'not', it is negating of a first alterity of what is within itself negation (counterthrust). Necessity has shown itself to be the immanence of or the becoming self-immanent of possibility in its four moments of actualisation. It is for that reason the inner sameness of these four moments that are externally held apart from each other, or it is the same self of possibility. 'Real possibility and necessity are for this reason only *apparently* different' (ibid.); the semblance is generated by the fact that inside and outside are in general held apart, which on the level of absolute form no longer corresponds to the true logical level. Instead it must be understood that they are four moments as the externality of their inner identity itself. In the real world for that reason what is really possible is also real necessity and 'can no longer be other' (ibid.); it is not possible that the analogy of this for formal possibility and necessity could be valid. Necessity abolishes the semblance of a becoming to the same self so that the '*identity* that does not first become' instead lies in what is 'already *presupposed* and indeed at its foundation' (ibid.). According to this identity however necessity is what is already determinate; it is the content function that was the distinguishing mark for real actuality and for that reason 'content-filled connection' (ibid.). Relating the reality of necessity again to our example of linguistic meaning, we can say that just as real actuality could be presented as an immediate meaning maintaining itself against what is contingent or meaningless, it was real possibility whose in-itself or contextuality brought their determination to linguistic expression, without which it would be quite simply not meaning (δύναμις). This is moreover precisely how real necessity in this field is the connection between contextuality and its immanent alterity of meaning on the one hand and set meaning on the other. The 'necessary meaning' would be in this way syntactically defined and itself

determinate connection, for which one might well think of Descartes' *coniunctiones necessariae*.¹⁵

This example also illuminates the transition, which is in any case logically already prepared, to the relativity of the real necessity that means something determinate, for the necessary connections presupposed the sphere of the unconnected, the immediate, which is what first elevates them into mediation. Thus according to Hegel real necessity in general has a 'presupposition from which it begins, it has in the *contingent* its *starting point*' (ibid.). Contingency formulated more precisely, which has already presented itself to us, is the point of view in which actuality and possibility (thus e.g. meaning and its contextuality) are *external* to each other or appear to be so; in fact they are as such 'the totality of form' but as '*totality* that is still external' (ibid.). For the explanation of this externality we return to the difference between positive and negative possibility, already encountered in the formal consideration of possibility (cf. 543, 382); it is developed here on the real level. Once again the refraction of possibility as the middle term and reflexive determination form of the whole absolute-formal relation of actuality emerges here. On the positive side, real possibility is 'manifold existence' that is *identical* to itself because possibility is also actuality; on the negative side or as mere possibility and non-actuality, the identity with actuality is only an 'immediate inversion', as occurring identity, which as an occurrence is itself other than possibility, the actually impossible or '*contingency*' (549, 388). Against this other, possibility has a side of passivity—it has in it a beginning that is not itself or which it only is to the extent that it presupposes it. In fact however 'this *presupposing* and the *motion of retuning* into itself are still separate' (550, 388). Possibility has for this reason as one could also say two beginnings. One according to which it is a beginning by itself and as such is absolute reflection and another, the selfless beginning by another that lets it appear as only relative reflection or only presupposing reflection. In the first perspective it *is* absolute meaning or its generation, in the other it only *has* meaning. In the concept of determinate meaning both sides are grasped together as actuality; in the determinate meaning determining itself they are presented as a unity of the necessity of a real content. To refer once more to the chosen example, a necessary connection in the sense of Descartes is a self-determining meaning (the concept of colour for instance *generates* that of extension) but it is also a determinate meaning distinct from others since it has the beginning of its own generation in something given which in relation to meaning is something completely contingent.

15 Cf. above 77.

In order to connect the thought of necessity with that of content-laden determination or restriction as soon as the issue is not only formal, although not absolute, necessity, Hegel refers back to the distinction between content and form. Fundamentally speaking in his presentation of real necessity Kant did nothing other when he sought to have necessity restricted to hypothetical and 'understandable' form, for this imposes itself precisely as external form on arbitrarily given and finite content. For Hegel it 'appears' indeed to be the case:

that the really necessary *in terms of form* is certainly something necessary but in terms of content something restricted whence its contingency derives (550, 389).

This would mean that the reflection of form that is already absolute, like Kant's regulative idea, is already infinitely beyond what contingently possesses content—this however only *as* reflection and without being strictly accommodating itself to that reflection. It would thus be possible, with reference to the empirically real world for instance, to think out a complete determinism but at the same time for reasons of the logical nature of the reality of the world it would never be possible to implement it in the content. Such determinisms rely for their popularity on the fact that they are themselves finite *form*, which is shown in that in them it is not at all the form itself that determines itself—which e.g. would be the case with an act performed in freedom—instead the form determines something other than itself, namely an arbitrary content (e.g. an action that is not of the spirit but is instead grasped as a natural event). For this reason Hegel can say that 'even in the form of real necessity ... contingency is contained' (ibid.). The schema under which real necessities are usually imagined, the one of (finite) 'developments' and 'processes' shows this, for it clearly involves a certain 'return into itself' from out of the 'unruly mutual alterity of actuality and possibility but not out of itself to itself' (ibid.).

The unity founded by relative necessity as reflexive setting of the absolute or of self-showing which it also completes is in all this similarly eccentric; it does not remain in the self of showing, as of course the moment of the contingent in it is only something shown and essentially not self-showing. It was in this sense also that the hypothetical form of Kant, especially its most important representative, experience, was eccentric and attached to presupposed perception. Relative necessity in contrast is '*in itself*' also already the 'unity of necessity and contingency' (ibid.), even if this unity it has to be said is not set by the semblance of the positivity of the difference between the two. From the *in-itself* Kant was able to assume the right to demand that experience, at least in terms of the ought, be absolutely rendered necessary and idealised. But then

this demand had to include the consciousness of the impossibility of meeting it, indeed that it formulates what is fundamentally not actuality. For Hegel in contrast the in-itself of a unity of the determinate contingent and the determining necessity is already an anticipation not of a lesser but of a higher actuality; for 'this unity is to be called *absolute actuality*' (ibid.). It is in fact what is in Kant and in general for consciousness not actual but at the same time what is in Hegel and for self-consciousness absolute actuality: the individual.

4 Absolute Necessity

The category of absolute necessity is without doubt one of the stumbling blocks for the finite imagination in Hegel's *Logic* but it had to be that for the sake of absolute form. It is still possible to associate various representations in formal logic, in the special sciences, and in the weltanschauungs to name a few examples with formal possibility or contingency, with real actuality and its necessity, and since the imagination finds itself confirmed within such an alliance, it is easy to gain the impression that this is precisely the instance needed to confirm logic itself. In stark contrast however it all looks completely different when we turn to absolute necessity; indeed this situation already obtains with its derivation out of real necessity. As Liebrucks puts it, the 'transition from real necessity to absolute necessity ... [is] a transition into the *void*,'¹⁶ which it has to be said is logically correct in terms of its status as absolute—for the absolute is immediately nothing other than the void in total aspect. This is why it reminds the finite understanding of its relativity, of the fact that it should come under scrutiny here, that here it is to be logically *judged*, so that it must now abandon its role as the judge of logic, as external 'observer'. In the commentaries the understanding often appears in the role of judge whenever absolute necessity is spoken of.¹⁷ No doubt it has to be handled with care, since for Hegel even 'the concept of necessity' itself is 'very difficult', 'and that is because it is the concept itself'.¹⁸ It is the developed in-itself of the concept, its *comprehending*, to the extent that it as *essence* still can be thematised before the concept present in-and-for-itself. It is this comprehending especially as *absolute* necessity, for according to its moment of absoluteness it is a *function of*

16 Cf. B. Liebrucks, *Sprache und Bewußtsein* v. 6/2, Frankfurt a. M. and Bern 1974, 368.

17 Examples include: G. Noël, *La logique de Hegel*, Paris 1897 and J.M.E. McTaggart, *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, Cambridge 1910, who considers 'the nature of this category and the transition to it' 'extremely obscure' (167) after he had already stated on the absolute that it is 'erroneous, and should be removed' (156).

18 Hegel, *Encyc.* § 147 Obs.

self-showing, the void but as active concluding that completely evacuates finite content. The removal of merely positive representations is vital on account of the concept; for in its concept, in the individual comprehending *actu* no more finite representations appear, neither as comprehending's presupposition present for itself, which would make it only a relatively necessary act, nor as representation of the concept, so that it would have to be rendered finite in that representation. Comprehending is in its roots always absolute, i.e. it comprehends *only* in its own clarity, *only* from out of *itself* or from *the self*, whose logical formulation is absolute negativity. The difference between representation and concept can be illuminated by reference to the emergence of selfness, unavoidable in thinking of *execution*, and in that of the absolute relationality or of totally turning all passivity and mere presupposition into moments. There is not simply one *representation of representing* that always has to present a something as determination on which it holds itself and against which it measures its abstract identity. But there is a *concept of comprehending*, for the concept is the comprehending itself; it does not present any kind of something but *negates* all somethings by not referring to something without its other, i.e. doing so only by means of *contradiction* not abstract identity. For the representation *determination* remains in this way also something other than its representing, i.e. it remains *contingently* broken into being and reflection, while, as in particular absolute necessity has to mediate it, determination in the sense of the concept is *absolute* determination, necessary and individual unity of being and essence, which alterity does not have as immediate presupposition but as premiss in its own syllogism. The relation of absolute necessity is itself a *concluding* from distinct premisses which suffer their downfall in this as well as in its respective opposite such that simultaneous with its downfall it is set.

Both in terms of its content determination as well as in its form which does not return back into itself, real necessity was finite, as something it was determinable necessity. In this sense it had 'its negation, contingency, within it' (389, 550); for a necessity that is determinable at all (namely via a passive presupposition) and which in that is something *determinate* (e.g. for an observing understanding), is *in this respect* at least not necessity. Its form can be used as a *means* of explanation and as purpose (the explaining itself), although not in the same respect in which it is a means. It is basically the power (possibility) of relating itself to the content or the contingent such that it appears as set in its form and as having entered into its relation. Thus on the one hand it overcomes the finitude, not overcoming one set by it but only a presupposed finitude, in which presupposing on the other hand it has *its* finitude or reality. Necessity conceived of in this way appears as if it were a *disposition* of relating freely to contingencies *according* to their position without itself being already *absolute*

setting, positing in free relating, i.e. known in the overcoming of the setting. The alterity of the contingent or of determination is still immediately limit and makes freedom with respect to this other itself into a mere something, into externally determined freedom, which indeed overcomes its concept. So already at this point it turns out that *for the sake of freedom* it is required to think *absolute necessity*. More precisely this freedom will no longer be the freedom determined via the immediate limit with the other, i.e. via simple negation but will be individual or self-determined through absolute limit and alterity. With that it is also not only formal freedom but absolute content-laden (knowing) freedom that has the *conceptual* power to reject all relating to others that is not self-relating but a passive "being related" as unfreedom.

The progress from real necessity happens now in such a way that Hegel calls its determination or content 'in *its first simplicity*' (as present determination) 'actuality' (550, 389). It appears as if in this simply the term 'real necessity' had been replaced by the other, now indeed called '*actual necessity*' (ibid.). The actuality of necessity meanwhile comes 'out' of this; it is not an *external* term or a simple attribute of necessity but this itself to the extent that it immediately *shows itself*. Actuality is not only for Kant but also for Hegel not an 'objective' predicate. In Hegel it is at any rate an *absolute* predicate and always designates a truly infinite mediation or a capacity for mediation. The step from real to *actual* necessity thus points back to the accomplished mediation, that necessity was not only real for reflection but had presented itself as the form of *being* identical to its determination, which *being of identity* can bear the predicate of actuality while "reality" would leave it underdetermined. Since however a being which *is simultaneously* identity can only be sufficiently expressed by the category "absolute"—such a being in fact no longer loses itself in relativities, like its reflection, because it *is*; it no longer repels itself into immediate others—this is how the *actuality* of necessity is '*absolute actuality*' (ibid.). This is revealed also by the fact that it 'contains necessity as its *being-in-itself*'—no longer possibility, which is why absolute actuality 'no longer can be other' (ibid.).

In the expression "actuality of necessity", in our context synonymous with the other expression "absolute actuality", absoluteness is expressed as a *relation* of actuality and necessity. This relation is absolute precisely to the extent that it is no longer a relation directed "outward" or to another. It is a relation that shows itself from out of itself. The simple absolute was pure in-itself but now in the relation "absolute actuality" the actuality of the inherent absolute has become *for itself* or it is also set in-itself. The in-itself of the absolute relation is to be thought of on the level of absolute necessity. In itself immanently relational, absolute necessity is the double negativity of the *in-itself* as such and reflects that; combining that double negativity with the *inherent* relation,

as which it is in general and which it also reflects, absolute necessity becomes the absolute *positing* of the absolute relation, initially as substantiality. At this point it must be recalled that even the category of the absolute did not immediately thematise this relation but instead focussed on the absolute as a moment in the, itself completely external, *relation* to external reflection. In the modus of the absolute the externality of the relation comprehended itself as itself the relation and to that extent as the absolutely absolute. In the reflection of the actuality of the modus however, which emphasises its absoluteness as *set* determination and seeks to reach it as such, now the relation returns as absolutely inner, which means for the concept of determination that it can no longer understand itself as external setting, arriving instead at itself from out of self-showing. If, as in the concept of actual necessity, the in-itself has determined itself to be set and the setting and can no longer be another than it is, then as a result every *ought* of determination that goes beyond being is overcome, the external reflection is superseded and determination itself has been rendered absolute. Absolute actuality thus immediately means self-determination.

When it was said that the absolutely actual or self-determining can “no longer be other”, then it means that it lacks the possibility to be anything other or to become anything other than self-determination. At the same time however this *lacking* possibility is the absolute possibility of *absolute* actuality. Hegel develops this out of the concept of the *void*, which was already the distinguishing mark of the immediate absolute (cf. 530, 370). As self-determination, absolute actuality is immediately undetermined, indeed from outside it is indeterminable what the possibility is that it lacks. But as self-determination it can *always be something other* than it is—so it ‘can be determined as a possible’ (551, 389). Its ‘possibility to be determined as possibility just as much as as actuality’ (551, 389 f.) makes it absolute to the extent that it is with that released from this difference and hence is capable of being *indifferent* to it. The void is thus that of the difference between the in-itself and the setting of self-showing or of the absolute in-itself, no longer simply that of the latter itself; it is already mediated void from out of the first absolute void—absolute possibility *to the void* and ‘*contingent* determination’ (551, 390). Contingency is complete in the inside of absolute possibility that it itself expresses in its concept and to which it is as such also indifferent whether and ‘as what’ (in terms of the content) it impels to it. Speculative consideration has in this way acquired a concept of the contingent that is not only an accepted logical other but which has emerged by means of the concept of absolute possibility and essentially belongs to this. Real necessity, which turned into actual necessity, still carries this development and as a result beside its ‘*immediate determinacy*’, in the sense of the presupposed contingent, it has set a concept of the contingent according

to which it is '*its own becoming*' and also '*the presupposition that it has [is] its own setting*' (ibid.). It is not seriously possible for these two contingency concepts to persist side by side. The first is after all what we can call selfless contingency, while the other contrasts with that as self-like contingency, so the latter is the form that has already superseded the former. This context is initially once again shown from the standpoint of real necessity only now in respect to its negativity as such. Real necessity was '*simple positive unity*' of the alternately self-overcoming of real possibility and real actuality, in which it has negatively set moments that in the counterthrust had their overcoming simultaneously mediated with themselves (cf. 551, 390). Now it should be clear that in the self-relating comprehended in this concentration of real necessity the form of the philosophical process emerges clearly into view. We have discussed this already. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it knows of no external third of mediation; it is '*the mediation with itself that contains the moment of mediation with another such that the other is set as one negated or ideal*'.¹⁹ The negative moments coalesce with *themselves*—i.e. each of them with itself and in that *eo ipso* with the other—by entering into simple self-like positive unity, which however '*is only as this simple coalescing of form with itself*', as '*the actuality*' and this as '*itself the presupposing or setting of itself as overcome*' (ibid.). Selfless contingency is superseded when actuality as a whole form in this manner is simultaneously its negative moment (its own "kind") and its difference or other. The contingency of the reversal of actuality is formed by the form and for that reason is no longer an external point of beginning. Instead what happens is that the form recalls or internalises itself to be itself this beginning and is for that reason also '*immediacy*' (ibid.).

In this train of thought Hegel shows that already the conception of real necessity in reference to the kernel constituting the thinking in this thought, which is merely presupposed in the usual use of this thought without itself being linguistically expressed, is the speculative fundamental figure of pure self-mediating unity and with that the true infinity that ultimately makes claim to the idea. In the *Logic* such proofs constitute the task of philosophy as such; they mediate the absolute form by rendering terms still encumbered with a finitude transparent for the freedom of the idea. What philosophy demands against finite speech is nothing other than this, that the speaking "kernel", which finite speech always does no more than lay claim to and which it uses as a means for external purposes, instead should itself be brought to linguistic expression—or what is the same thing that the language be fundamentally

19 Hegel, TW 17, 460.

liberated from the semblance that it is merely a means and be restored to its own speaking. External reflection fears the speaking power of language because it fears its counter-claim, its *contra-diction* against external and finite purposes. Thus it was still possible to do “something” with the concept of real necessity, e.g. in terms of a *weltanschauung*—while absolute necessity left nothing any more “to be done” and not because this starts up all by itself. In terms of the form that has emerged indeed this thought is itself the contradiction. But the untruth of external reflection is this, to be sure to avoid the contradiction and still want to speak from out of it: it not would be a statement if it were not already a contradiction.

For Hegel the rational fundamental constitution of actuality is its contradictory nature. It emerged as the immediacy that has its own overcoming as its prerequisite. Clearly the contradiction of actuality is no longer one of reflection but a contradiction of the complex unity of given and reflected immediacy; only in this way can the level of absoluteness articulating and presenting itself in the reflection of actuality be also factually sustained. Actuality that emerges ‘from *the negation of itself*’ and is as such mediated, and which for that reason has itself, namely as negated, for its possibility, is in this way to be recognised ‘as negative’ (ibid.). Even the previous term of actuality as (in terms of content) ‘simple *positive unity*’ (ibid.) had nothing more to do with the Kantian conception of the actual or of present being as (absolute) position, because as autopoietic positivity it is not thought of as immediate “givenness” in a simple relation to the understanding. The Kantian positive of perception is immediately for another, which is why even the notion of a causal determination of subjectivity by the given could arise. In contrast actuality *qua* positive unity coalesces ‘within the other only *with itself*’ (ibid.), i.e. that it is there for itself is only so for others. If however actuality is not given as a “there is”, not in the sense of the construct of the understanding of “givenness” but understood as an original self-giving and self-giving-in-another-as-in-itself, then also the positive unity (the “giving”) is in fact already activity and hence negating or understood as negative (as “*self-giving*”). As the negatively set moments of real actuality and possibility coalescing with each other, being-in-itself or the possibility of negative actuality is on the one hand the negation of its self as of the setting, while on the other hand it is as negation of actuality this itself, for it is only the negating such that the difference in general falls into the negation. The being-in-itself of actuality is ‘immediately nothing as *this mediating*’ (ibid.). In mediating once again the differentiated elements of the mediation are being-in-itself as such and the mediated as immediacy such that the mediating is the making of the difference and its overcoming in both respects, that of the making as well as that of the overcoming of the difference. The in-itself

is a setting and for that reason identical with the setting. This requires thinking that now there can be neither a non-setting nor a setting whose relation to absolute actuality would be something other than its own *overcoming* while simultaneously acknowledging that this overcoming itself is *setting*. Such an actual overcoming, which itself is a setting such that the alterity not only “breaks in” unmediated but is itself mediated from another, must be called necessity. Alterity is the determination of its self-relating; as long as it was only immediacy or presupposition it was formerly contingency and it is now still contingency, only now as that which is itself completely determined from necessity and is its *own* alterity. From the concept of necessity arrived at above there is nothing *more* contained in the thought of contingency than in that itself. The *incommensurability* that emerges prominently as contingency is nothing *other* than the necessity of the matter, namely itself the form of its complete *being-appropriate-to-itself*.²⁰

The ‘*form*’ that starting from the determination of the absolute as absolute totality is to be thought of as absolute form has by virtue of this *inner* attaining of all possible external determination, to which, being its absolute appropriateness, it no longer has to make itself appropriate, has ‘in its realisation permeated all its differences and made itself transparent’ (ibid.). It is no longer only the power *to* determination but all power of determination itself that outside this relation to form strictly speaking has *no meaning* and is instead pure indeterminacy—an indeterminacy even less than that of being since it is already expressly defined *against* the form that contains all being such that out of it also nothing more can *become*. The form itself is ‘absolute necessity’ and ‘this simple *identity of being in its negation* or in the *essence with itself*’ (ibid.). This formulation refers to the solution of the problem of essence, as one could say from out of reflection, as the truth “about” being. This solution is that in absolutely necessary form the truth is already uttered, only that it is not truth “about” something but the common relatedness of the moments of being and of essence in the form’s own articulation of itself. Starting from the form, which is speaking itself and pure meaning *actu*, both passive (given) and active (reflected) immediacy are equally moments of the language mediation and *themselves language*. Truth is attained when the contradiction of the two language moments is no longer pushed into a remaining and necessary *non-linguistic* *χωρισμός* and in that imagined as avoided but allowed within language itself and maintained within it. As what is in itself a *true* word, the

20 In the twelfth lecture on the *Proofs of God's Existence* absolute necessity is determined as the ‘appropriateness itself’ of ‘concept’ and its ‘external existence’ (Hegel, TW 17, 455).

concept will have to contain this form and the concept will be an individual because it is the linguistic presentation of truth not as abstract, universal content, nor as (“abstractive”) form that would be only a means to something else but is in the contradiction’s own relating. In the concept then it is known that one cannot utter the truth at all by speaking “about something” but one only effectively speaks truth and speaks truly when the individual as totality of what is related in contradictory terms within it utters itself. For Hegel the semblance has to be dismantled that precisely what is not individualised could make the claim in the emphatic sense to be “true”; since it belongs to external reflection it is instead not capable of truth at all, which is also the reason why it does not even begin to bear the contradiction and hence self-like speaking of the language neither.

Untenable now after the internalisation of determination into the form totality is the difference of form and content, the difference which in real necessity was still an immediate positivity. The positivity of this logical difference was synonymous with the assumption of an external starting point for necessity, the contingent, and hence with the finitude both of the content, that was only a determinate one, as well as of the form, that could not be self-determination. Only if this positivity is fixed is there a restricted content, is there correspondingly also the semblance of “reality” as *not* capable of linguistic mediation. In terms of absolute necessity however such a finite positivity is what is untrue. It separates in the matter moments which in terms of form are known to be identical, with the separation only producing the semblance of a content independent of its mediation. The real knowledge of the positive sciences for instance thus consists of *separations* of absolute form, through which the semblance of a difference between a finite form of linguistic mediation and a selfless, non-linguistic determinate matter emerges. Against this knowledge in real-philosophy is the striving for the reproduction of absolute form from out of the separated parts from which the known acquires its infinite, linguistic, I-like meaning and should become concept. Content and form are then no longer in separation and in difference, rather the difference is, grasped in its absolute necessity, ‘this difference permeating itself within it’ (552, 391). Absolute necessity resolves merely persisting differences into the activity of differentiating and in this way also returns behind “real stocks” of forms and contents.

The *being* that in absolute necessity is supposed to be opened up to speech in itself can only do this because it is absolute being and for that reason just as much also reflection. Reflection does not so much penetrate into absolute being as it is already there *because* this being is absolute, i.e. self-showing. Precisely for this reason reflection can in general not seek to find essence outside

of the being of absolute necessity; it has 'no condition or ground' but 'is only because it *is*' (ibid.). The reflection of being of the absolute form can only repeat this being and as soon as it seeks to be more and other turns out to be impotent. This can provide an example of the question on the origin of language as the Enlightenment formulated and attempted to answer it. But precisely because it forces its repetition the absolutely necessary is also '*because it is*' (ibid.): it is not immediate being like e.g. that of sense certainty, which behaves only negatively with respect to its mediation; instead it itself is *all* mediation of itself such that in it the absolute self-showing shines through as ground. Thus the answer to that question on the origin of language consists in the insight that our entire origin can only be clear and "explained" linguistically. Both being and essence are in absolute necessity only *by the mediation* of the respective other respectively themselves—thus not without its negation, nor indeed without the opposing direction of complementarity of the two negations; but then the self they attain in them and together is absolute negativity.

In these terms according to Hegel 'absolute necessity' presents 'the *reflection or form of the absolute*' (ibid.). As such it is simple 'unity of being and essence' and expressly 'absolute negativity' (ibid.). The power of the latter makes the moments of absolute necessity wholly the self *and* the same as their other. The absolute independence of alterity means that the moments of absolute necessity are '*as being manifold*' (ibid.) and have nothing to do with each other; their relation *is* simply not and what ever is, is independent and without relations. But this independence is only because the in-itself of what is devoid of relation is 'absolute identity', which is the reflection of this free being as the same (ibid.). The reversal of what is independent into its in-itself or its ground is for this reason immediately the reversal into the other independent; for the absolute identity is as reflection of absolute negativity not an understandable, abstract equality of something and another but 'the *absolute reversal* of their actuality into their possibility and their possibility into their actuality' (ibid.). It is infinite *μεταβολή* without external parameters. That the relation of the different parts is 'not to be seen' means simultaneously their complete independence just as their being overcome completely by their other without 'prior announcement' and without 'reminder'. Absolute negativity gives and takes only the whole and is as it were free of all sentimentality for halves that in any case only belong to finitude. Since their relating of the one and the other is 'not to be seen', without being a 'connecting element' and giving and taking are concealed in the absolute counterthrust 'absolute necessity ... [is] *blind*' (ibid.). This does not mean that it would be activity devoid of the concept in the sense e.g. of mere nature; it is the end of finite imagining in the inherent concept, the concept that is only set by itself and

as such can be known.²¹ Absolute self-showing has become in the reflection of absolute necessity set not-showing which because of the absoluteness of showing must belong to its concept; for if nothingness is only an external to showing then it would also be its immediate limit and with that its finitude or relativity would be uttered. Each of the moments of absolute necessity is only truly 'grounded within itself' through its very own nothingness of indicating others; only as '*free actualities*, of which *none shines in the other* nor seeks to show on itself a trace of its relation to the other' (ibid.) are they *for themselves* concept. What comes to stand outside them stands at least not in the self and is '*only possibility, contingency*' (ibid.). There can be for this nothingness of the concept also only one name, an 'empty lawfulness' (553, 391); for there where the power of language is not, is only its 'vacuum'.

The power of necessity *being* locked up in *being* gives the void the sense of nothingness of being or of essence against it. The beings 'manifest' 'only *themselves*' (551, 392) and not their essence. They *are* however this self-determination that repels essential determination because their being is already not the indeterminate immediacy of the beginning but is 'absolute negativity' (ibid.) that no longer allows the thought of the essence *against* a being. Absolute negativity is 'the *freedom* of its immediacy devoid of semblance' (ibid.). Now the independent structures have as a consequence their essence within themselves, i.e. absolute negativity itself. Having this for their essence means however as mere being that they are 'the contradiction with itself' (ibid.) and hence already stand in the absolute motion—not the motion of being, namely becoming, nor in that of essence, reflection but the conceptual, absolutely clarifying *development*. It is to be understood in the sense of absolute self-showing when from out of independent being absolute negativity as essence breaks through in order to 'reveal' being as well as essence (ibid.). The void 'outside' of self-determined being is:

the *negation* of those actualities *absolutely distinct* from their being as their nothingness, as an *otherness* that is just as *free* as their being is (ibid.).

Thus the beginning of the *Logic* is repeated here now under the assumption of the absolute form, the first self-determining now located within self-showing. Determination that gives the absolutely necessary being by the

21 'Blind' means once again here—as above in Kant—not the lack of sight but the negation of visibility (cf. above 250 note 139).

absolute reversal into essence is neither the determination of present being nor of reflection but absolute determination, hence also simultaneously the 'manifestation of that which *determination* is in truth', namely 'negative relation to itself' (ibid.). Absolute determination will have to present itself as the self-mediation of the absolute relation, performed on the basis of the thoroughness of determination in view of the individuality of the concept. Here it results from the relation of absolute necessity to the content determination or restriction of which precisely independent being is capable. In absolute necessity the difference between form and content fell away; but then precisely for that reason it related to the content of which the absolutely actual as such is capable, as to the 'mark' of finitude on what is consequently determinate, 'the witnesses to its right' to 'whom it has reached out, who now have their downfall' (553, 392). For that reason it is not claimed that absolute necessity would still have a content or a finitude in it, instead it is shown how it operates with that; for it is the self-showing that has become the absolute procedure. What could appear as a restraint on the clarifying procedure, the finitely contingent or determination as something that would be solely external, is only a moment and point of passing through of the procedure, which also as such has no finite existence but is:

the being that is within itself strictly unequal and self contradictory, which only in the absolutely necessary is restored to this equality with itself.²²

—i.e. with the absolute contradiction. The contingency of the contingent is forced in the direction of actually no longer being able to mean "something" and enters with that into the pure meaning *actu* of the negative relation to itself—'contingency is absolute necessity' (553, 392), i.e. it is nothing for itself that would not also be completely for its other and it is only through the mediation of its other or as presupposed by this that it can be what it is.

In his *Lectures on the Proofs of God's Existence* Hegel gave an example from ethics that can illustrate the logical situation of the absolute identity of contingency and necessity. For Hegel the subjective spirit is not satisfied with real necessity and nor with the contingent presupposed by that for the reason ultimately as we can say that as spirit it carries an infinite claim within it, a claim that can only be damaged by the contingent that means only "something", i.e. thus simultaneously also means nothing. As long as the spirit is affected at all

²² Hegel, TW 17, 467.

by the contingent or the really necessary, it is as finite as these terms. Only with the thought of absolute necessity does it find '*satisfaction ... because this is peace with itself*'.²³ It is that too for the spirit for its 'result is: It is so—strictly necessary; thus has all longing, striving, demanding for another passed'.²⁴ It has passed because in the category of absolute necessity 'such relating to other' 'turns around' 'into a relating to itself' and 'with that precisely' produces 'the inner agreement with itself'.²⁵ For the contingent this means that it is always already a past other, strictly meaningless and in that really for the first time the *absolute contingent*. The contradiction of the contingent, of being merely contingent and still of striving to have or to affect a meaning, is resolved such that the contingent itself is contradicted and against it is set absolute meaning as a result of which it is now absolutely contingent and still only *is*. The 'fatalism' of absolute necessity is for Hegel freedom, if at first only an abstract kind.²⁶ The freedom of the *concept*, of linguistic self-determination and of self-expression, is thus something other than this, for here the individual is set and obviously not only an inherent interiority against an external destiny that is merely universal. Add to this that it has to be known that all setting cannot be simply passive being—i.e. the semblance of the independence of passivity and activity with respect to each other in the absolute relation must be dismantled. Emerging from this the concept will no longer find its satisfaction through the mere repelling of what is meaningless but only by linguistically communicating meaning. In this the power of necessity is preserved as an in-itself, negating the claims of merely finite meanings and positive images and instead inverting them absolutely into their truth.

Summarising the most important moments in the development of the actuality concept, from this point on its dialectic can be presented in the following steps:

1. Referred to its setting, self-showing or actuality is initially only immediacy in general.
2. As the immediacy of absolute form however it is not only being but implicitly the immediacy of its own reflection: possibility.
3. Possibility is the doubling of actuality in reflection and itself doubled: positive and negative possibility (the same thing common to actuality as $A = A$ and mere possibility).

23 Ibid. 457.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 TW 17, 459 f. 'This freedom of abstraction is not without pain but this is degraded to a natural pain' (459), i.e. it does not want to change anything.

4. The double opposition of possibility is identity only in the contradiction, which immediately renewed is actuality but as self-contradictory actuality it is contingency.
5. In the contradictory actuality of contingency immediate actuality and possibility go together; the one is *as* the other and their relation is formal necessity.
6. The "as" of necessity is as immediacy actuality but this is now as the unity of many determinate in its content: real actuality (self-showing in set determination).
7. In its immediate determination real actuality is only a *different* determinate content function or meaning; real possibility is the explicit difference of real actuality as dispersed immediate existence.
8. Possibility, again doubled, must move on from this difference to the contradiction totalising it in order to be the possibility of actuality.
9. Possibility is mediation of actuality by being in its middle, the counter-thrust, and returning back into itself in its overcoming, while mediation out of the return into itself is real necessity.
10. Real necessity is finite to the extent that it has a merely presupposed, contingent beginning.
11. In its mediation of the presupposed contingent real necessity is in itself unity with this; this unity is actual necessity (self-showing as determining).
12. The unity of actual necessity is absolute actuality.
13. The absolutely actual cannot be anything other than it is; it is indifferent to determination: absolute possibility of this and the contingency arrived at from of the concept.
14. Absolute actuality is positive unity of the coalescing with itself in absolute possibility; simultaneously it becomes this from its negation and is itself negative.
15. It is process grasped in formally speculative terms and as this absolute necessity it is adequate interpretation of the absolute and the inherent middle term of absolute form (self-determination).
16. In absolute necessity actuality and possibility are being in absolute identity on the one hand, while on the other they have their essence in the absolute reversal into each other.
17. The difference of absolute necessity is itself absolute and for that reason the nothingness of indicating; the different sides are thus absolutely contingent, they show nothing and are meaningless; in this however absolute necessity is what is absolutely differentiated, i.e. identification in pure meaning as absolute relation (self-showing as self-determining, inherent totality of the setting).

18. Absolute necessity is thus the absolute power of setting and hence the in-itself of the concept (inherent speaking as complete language aspect of determination).

By taking the contingent back into absolute contingency, i.e. into absolute necessity, the sphere of setting, which in that had the semblance of a positivity independent of the in-itself, has lost its immediacy and has become instead a moment of the 'absolute's *own interpretation*' and of the 'motion of itself within itself' (ibid.) expressed by absolute necessity. That the setting *as totality* is but a moment can only be conceived of as such on the assumption of absolute form. For this is total relationality and the absorption of all that is merely positive. If the abstraction that still lies in the difference between meaning and meaninglessness is superseded from the standpoint of the absolute relation as the last difference that is still essential then this will have become the concept.

5 Absolute Relation

a) *Substantiality*

Absolute necessity is for Hegel 'the *interpreter* of the absolute' (554, 393); it is the pure procedure of *communication* of the absolute in-itself, of self-showing. It is hence the means by which original clarity reaches the other and to that extent the activity of clarification itself; but the other it reaches and by which it then is, is no longer an external other but another that completely lies in the middle of mediation, its absolute counterthrust, such that in its own communication self-showing just remains by itself. The merely finite or external contingency is overcome by means of the concept of absolute contingency belonging completely to the mediation of absolute necessity; it is only the immediacy of its differentiation, of the clarifying procedure; this is of great importance for the progress to the concept. For if the external contingent remains persistent in immediate positivity against mediation and the form of necessity then the (dogmatic) semblance that there is "something" outside would *ipso facto* also have to remain persistent and the mediation would only be relative—an objection against the absoluteness of mediation and form that would be bound to emerge and which would make it ultimately "actuality" *against* the mediation, its "beyond", which it could not arrive at because of its finitude. All dogmatic representations of the unknowable beyond but "genuinely" actual ultimately go back to the finite concept of contingency in relation to which cognition too determines itself as contingent, finite etc. and assures that its language does not extend into what it in fact should reach. Now this may be valid for *its* language

but it cannot be said of language as such determined as absolute form against the beyond and all immediate limitation.

Just as the really *necessary* based on finite contingency–*relative* mediation–is always only *determinate* necessity and with that also just something determinate or simply something, conversely absolute necessity, itself setting the absolute contingent, is no longer anything determinate, *not* ‘the *necessary*, much less a necessary but *necessity*–being strictly as reflection’ (554, 393). With this it is only its own relation or the stretching of the relation over its internal “turn” within itself, the immediacy which, doubled, drives itself apart and precisely in that is the communication of itself to its own alterity. As pure relationality absolute necessity is strictly *rational*, for the rational ‘is itself nothing other than relation’.²⁷ The concept rationally addresses everything from absolute necessity which gives it the power to set up initially pure but then expressly linguistic relations; for Hegel it determines ‘present being initially as terms of relation to continuities of itself in the differentiated manifold of existence’²⁸ with which it asserts the claim of the finite with respect to the idea, relates it to a true, non-contingent end and hence makes it capable of truth and laden with meaning–briefly put: brings it to language. The concept was already in the early logic of Hegel a ‘system of relations’ in which the single moment was a vanishing magnitude, thus e.g. the positive, finite representation only as absolutely related also has absolute actuality.²⁹ The execution of absolute relationality as set up by absolute necessity cannot be dispensed with if the cognition of the individual is to be understood not as a purely contingent, positive occurrence beside other contingent occurrences or accidents in the existing world but is instead comprehended as linguistic, infinite actuality. Indeed as absolute actuality that has no beyond and is true from itself and can be presented as such it is the general horizon of the self-determination of absolute form. While absolute necessity is for itself self-determination and for that reason only a ‘procedure’ and no longer anything ‘graspable’, as interpretation of the absolute in-itself it is in fact only now inherent self-determination, i.e. the whole relation to the setting but not yet the relation to itself which it arrives at only in alternation and as which relation it is set as the concept and expresses itself as such.

Immediate self-realising relation in which simultaneously the absolute interprets itself, absolute necessity is now ‘its self-setting and ... *is* only this

27 TW 2, 245; precisely in this sense is ‘the rational eternal and in every way equal to itself’ (ibid.), namely itself setting itself absolutely equal to itself.

28 Hegel, SoL 644, GW XII, 71. ‘Sciences whose principle is not a concept of relation’ can only ‘report one after the other’ what they at best ‘set in empirical qualities’ (Hegel, TW 2, 438).

29 Cf. Hegel, GW VII, 55.

self-setting' (ibid.). It is thus the effective performance issuing from itself of the one self-showing in the sphere of setting–clarification, as we have said, and this starting from itself. This relation grasped as such is immediately substantiality. Hegel's concept of substance is from the start one of the '*relation to itself*' (ibid.) and means thus not in any way like the common *image* of substance 'the unreflected immediate'—e.g. the 'substance' that fills a bucket—'nor also an abstract *persistence* standing behind existence and appearance'—like the purely noumenal substance of dogmatic metaphysical imaginings (555, 394). The fundamental thought for Hegel's concept of substance is that of absolutely necessary self-determination and of self-relation; as such it may perhaps recall Spinoza's concept of the '*causa su*'. In this comparison however it must be kept in mind that Spinoza's substance cannot be any kind of *absolute* self-mediation because it neither knows the concept of the *absolute* contingent nor does it mediate from out of itself at all.³⁰ Since in the case of Spinoza, in the framework of what is ultimately a concept of substance that is proposed in essence, being is not arrived at from it. For Hegel in contrast substance is introduced as what is absolutely mediated and is the self-mediating of being and essence such that no such analogous problem arises. Starting from this introduction there emerge quite naturally from it the moments of their difference, i.e. the extremes that separate themselves out in its immediate mediation. Their *essence* is namely on the one hand absolutely *being*; as the immediate unity of being and essence it is *semblance*, similarly what is here absolutely mediated is the *semblance as semblance*, inherent truth as in modality and this '*shining relating itself to itself*' of the in-itself is 'substance as such' (ibid.). On the other side however its *being* is simultaneously absolutely *reflected*; it is '*setting identical to itself*, this is how it is *shining totality, accidentality*' (555, 394). It is thus as substance shining concentrated within itself, insistence within itself, and it is reflected as the existence of shining thrown apart and with that, accident. The latter is as it were the absolute horizon of the absolute relation, the former its immanent motion, or also: the former is the term, while the latter is the self of self-determination. In anticipation of the linguistic-self-conscious relation of the concept, one can add that accidentality is *awareness*, while substance on the other hand prepares being (in the active sense) and sets both as the one and the same λόγος (in the universality of the I).

In terms of its aspect of immanent identity substance is 'identity as of form' (ibid.) which may be illustrated by the formal substance in the sense of

30 The contingent 'modus' is not known by Spinoza from substance but only 'per aliud' (cf. Eth. I, def. 5).

Leibniz's monadicity. It is as such a formal unity 'the unity of possibility and actuality' (ibid.), thus of the two reflection moments of absolute form in terms of the logic of totality in relation to their setting. This unity is immediately contingency; substance is hence related to 'the sphere of coming to be and passing away' (ibid.) and is in that as being the μεταβολή as '*immediate reversal*' (ibid.). Its metabolic being however is not itself a being; it is reflection or shining as the shining into which the reversing sides respectively pass into their reflected identity. Each of these sides is always determined both in the logic of being (as quality) as well as in that of essence (as a term of reflection and indeed immediately as that of '*variety*' (ibid.)). In the transition quality is actuality and the term of reflection is possibility, i.e. from out of variety to the contradiction of actuality and with that progressing into the ground. What substance in its shining being thus proves and produces in the accidents is 'the *necessary actual*' (ibid.) in which the turn of the μεταβολή shows itself to be a moment of absolute form and this as immediacy. To bring in once again a linguistic example even for this matter without stretching it too much, we might think of the relation of species or universal to its particulars. For the latter could be regarded as the contingent given accidents—in the determination of qualitative being and simultaneously as terms of reflection—of that universal, itself not 'abstracted' from the particulars but instead saying and showing something of its own that they cannot say and that with 'substantial' necessity, as necessarily actual. Similarly the concept of man which does not itself have a given immediacy, e.g. without gender characteristics but which with respect to the "cases" of man and woman is only a shining being, still cannot simply be interpreted in quantificational terms as an abstraction of "characteristics" of these cases to the benefit of a greater extension, for it speaks in relation to these cases precisely of their "absolute relation" and to that extent about infinitely more than them taken for themselves.

The accidents are thus in relation to the formal unity of substance as such in motion, which simultaneously presents 'the *actuality* of substance as a *tranquil emergence of itself*' (556, 394).³¹ The process of accidentality is simultaneously the tranquillity or state of rest of their unity, if then speculative absolute motion is always 'rotational'³² rest-within-itself. Since the accidents in terms of their contingency are *absolutely* contingent and for that reason identical to the substantial motion and necessity resting within itself, substance does not orient itself to it as '*against* something but only against itself as a simple

31 For the word field of 'actuality' cf. the discussion in G. Schmidt, *Kausalität oder Substantialität?*, loc. cit. (p. 132, note 66), 163.

32 Cf. on this above 93-94 as well as 94 note 137.

element devoid of resistance' (ibid.). The shining of substance as a speculative process cannot be a simple (merely first) negating of something assumed in its relative mediation that would be 'the vanishing semblance'. It is instead in the '*overcoming act*' immediacy becoming itself, in that namely the immediate, itself negative against the negativity of action in its negation, is the affirmation of shining. The statement: 'the beginning of itself is only the setting of this self, of which the beginning is given' (ibid.) summarises what has been developed up to this point. It is a statement of great significance for the entire *Logic*, for it also summarises the two beginnings of being and of essence together which is indeed what the concept requires: for it is clear from the concept the extent to which the first being was already the *self*. Moreover it becomes clear methodologically for the *Logic* the extent to which its self, absolute form, could be thought of as substantial shining in the development of its "accidental" terms.

Substance grasped in this way already contains 'the totality of the whole', namely the whole 'accidentality' and this *as* 'the whole substance itself' (ibid.). In terms of its extent the accidental adds nothing to it. Only the 'formless substance of representing' (ibid.), e.g. Spinoza's, appears as something simply other than accidentality and is for that reason also not an absolute relation. Accidentality however as a moment of the absolute relation, as shining totality of the self-divided existence and as relation of externality of substance, presents this 'as the *absolute power*' (ibid.). This power is absolute because it is disjunct within itself while being both '*productive*' and '*destructive power*' (ibid.) simultaneously, which apart from its self-externalising activity only has the absolute contingent as immediacy of this its action. Thus as what is externalised of substance, as the outside of its self-externalising, the accidents are immediately self-external, i.e. they are in terms of being in general: many, as a term of reflection: various, and in relation to the absolute form, as it presents itself in substance: impotence; i.e. they 'have *no power* over each other' (ibid.). Here then in what could be called a domination-free communication community of substanceless ephemerides, it is indeed the case that it is not them but only substance that has something to communicate. It accommodates that claim by setting 'an unequal value' for the accidents that makes the one vanish and the other emerge so 'comprehending both within it' (557, 396) and recalling constantly itself as the self of these terms. For this reason the single accident is also not that which it immediately is, instead just existence from out of the 'subsisting' of 'totality of form and content itself' (ibid.), in which it simultaneously inheres and hence has fundamentally already vanished. In substantiality then the absolute relation is immediate to its differentiated parts; its relation to them has not yet achieved any *determination* of its own or there 'is not yet any *real* difference available' (ibid.). The absolute difference of self-differentiating,

the absolute relation, is hence as substance only formal, i.e. it does not maintain itself as such, for which it would have to relate to itself negatively. 'Substantiality is thus only the relation as immediately vanishing' (557, 396); the absolute difference affirms itself as we have seen as shining, which as it were is the power of power and has as this affirmed difference already vanished in the mediation (the active power). It negates itself on the other side as externality of accidentality, as simple semblance, which is only 'in *itself* certainly substance' but is 'not *set* as such' (ibid.), so that the power in it is only in the "inside"; it cannot be seen and is not *determinate*. Meanwhile accidentality also has two negative terms to it, namely on the one hand the simple difference of the accidents in which they become and are held, in which they are the simple semblance, and on the other the totality form itself through which accidentality in general is reflection and in which the accidents do not really become but are reflected into each other. The differences of accidentality are the identical reflected becoming of self-externalising *positive* unity, content (which is not to be confused with the materiality of the accidents as absolutely contingent self-externality) and *determination* in general, while in their negativity or power they are themselves the absolute difference or substance, for only in the difference can becoming be simultaneously understood as the identity reflection. In this way substance relates to itself within accidentality, comprehends itself as determination in which its differing is, and the content is its own "case". Substantiality that doubles in such a way that absolute differing as beginning of itself is a beginning in content determination or in the finite difference, which hence also turns out to be capable of immediate self-externality, no longer simply disappears 'between' the existences of accidentality as semblances that have been thrown apart but affirms itself in them as cause and effect. Substantiality has become causality.³³

b) *Causality*

In substantiality absolute relation was merely immediate to simple determinates, their absolute and sole truth as well as the merely '*formal power*' (ibid.), nothing determinate and always already vanished—just so did substance

33 With this interpretation of the dialectical movement from substantiality to causality we want above all to avoid the semblance as if content determination arises out of the *accidents*, which then could only be real and contingent, *immediately* into the absolute relation. Like absolute necessity, to which it belongs, the absolutely contingent is for itself definitely *not* content that no longer admits the difference of form and content. The commentators in J. Biard et al (loc. cit. note 12), 350, clearly tend to the view that it is the positivity of the accidents itself that imparts determination or reality to causality.

ontology lay all truth in substance and still was unable to allow on the “level of the phenomena” any kind of experience or even a phenomenal present of substance there. In causality in contrast the absolute relation itself is one immediately determinate; the absolute relation, and within it the absolutely necessary differentiating relation, the beginning by itself, *are* in the determination. Since in causality it is not expressed that self-determination has determined *itself* also as determination, the truth of absolute form appears in causality as *finite truth* without the *contradictio in adiecto* in this term being already known.³⁴ In causality it appears to be the case that one could speak of beginning, “spontaneity”, relation and self-relating but only mean something and something restricted—which semblance of restricted rationality is what earns this term its popularity with the understanding and the logic of reasonings.

Initially however causality is not given in a set finitude; all we have is the substantial self-differentiating into cause and effect in the horizon of accidentality in general; as such a ‘formal causality’, it is still ‘the infinite relation of absolute power whose content is pure manifestation or necessity’ (560, 399). It is the ‘*truth* as manifestation’, the self mediating of the absolute clarifying others in absolute differing, and as such it is the original matter and its objectivity itself, cause, and as the interpretation of setting, its immanent clarifying and progress into truth, its setting as a setting: effect; between both extremes there is thus ‘*one* actus’ (558, 397) which is the same original determining in both. The interpreted true, the effect, is no longer simply setting like the former substanceless accidentence but now manifest substance, this itself as division, existence, that does not only inhere in showing but is the *existence of inherence* itself. The formal term of this status is that it is setting *as* setting and hence is necessary; the effect is what has been made true from out of inherent truth, the spoken as itself the language. In contrast to that even the cause, the in-itself or showing of language, is similarly ‘*set* as this being-in-itself’ (559, 397). Thus the absolute relation relates itself as doubled on both sides to itself, which doubling is precisely what constitutes the truth which in its turn is the horizon of *determination*. Determination is ‘from now on set *as determination*’ (ibid.). Determination which in its own terms is a broken middle is then *true* when its separated extremes have to be simultaneously understood as mediation, i.e. when they repeat themselves as determination in its own terms. In the perspective of absolute form all its determination is pure repetition of its

34 ‘Finite truth’ is the opinion that positive representations could be simultaneously absolutely true. ‘Absolute truth’ is in contrast the ‘relativising of all positive representations’ ‘to the individual, itself not positively determinable consciousness’ oriented to absolute form; thus J. Simon, *Wahrheit als Freiheit*, Berlin and New York 1978, 260.

self and in this sense absolutely or “eternally” true. From this relation formal causality already has a concept. The terms cause and effect are in fact abbreviations of the complexes of the relation in terms of the logic of absolute form in which determination for the first time can be thought of as absolutely true—which however only the *Logic* knows, while the understanding is by this immediately rendered untrue, for it takes the abbreviations themselves for what is true and pushes this so far as to end up in all seriousness claiming to be of the opinion that there “are” causes and effects into which it analyses its finite contents. Logically speaking self-repetition of true determination and hence the showing that has gone into the truth, and shows this, expresses itself in that ‘*the effect*’ contains ‘*nothing at all*’ ‘*that the cause does not contain*’ and ‘conversely *the cause* is *nothing that is not in its effect*’ (559, 399). For the concept it is of the greatest significance that in its in-itself it is not only the *power* of speaking and absolute relating in this (substance) but just as much the form of *truth*, i.e. the consciousness of speaking truly.

The *identity* of cause and effect is now in its *immediacy* also the overcoming of its difference in which they were the extremes of being-in-itself and setting. Self-differentiation itself has vanished in this immediacy or has been alienated in it; for it is only an externally self-differentiating ‘indifferent actuality’ (560, 398), as what the effect has become. In this respect *only something* comes out of the truth, or it is a *content* in its determination which as such is determined as true. But the true determination appears to be only this in-itself of this content, its (alienated) form and mediation that is only *different* from that, e.g. in the sense of what can be thought of in *substrates*—their ‘hypothetical’; not absolute, necessity which for Kant is all we have insight into—but was in this way *only* thought (appearing) and for the matter is ‘a *contingent* causality’ (ibid.). Causality here is the *real* or *determinate* kind; it gives the contingent back a value that it no longer had as absolutely contingent. If in real causality form and content decay in this way and are *different* then the dialectic of variety kicks in, i.e. the content ‘is something various in its own terms’ (560, 399); it is self-various and the variety into which it coincidentally breaks itself down is the cause and effect of determinate causality. Against its form relation once again the content is itself what is contingent-actual, while as ‘the *finite substance*’ (ibid.) that generates the representation of the substrate it is different. The merely different ‘assigned’ content is ‘*given* content’ and indeed as identity *against* what is self-differentiating now it is ‘an external difference in this identical’ (ibid.) and no longer the substantial power. The externality of the difference means that it is simultaneously only one internal to the content which in the real causal relation does not go beyond itself. That is ‘this causality is an *analytical* sentence’ (ibid.). This observation, which contains a polemical claim against the most important

category in terms of usage in the Kantian table, is sharpened into the claim that in such thinking in real causalities, it is only about a 'tautological consideration of a *subjective* understanding' (ibid.), of an understanding thus overwhelmed by the variety of the content, which hence understands itself as "subjective", "finite" etc., because it must believe that it is *different* from the matter under its consideration, the "substrate". It is this also in fact in relation to finite and contingent content, which precisely for that reason it essentially can also regard however it wants to but in each case it will be seen as what they *are*. However this relation is not yet the knowledge of truth. Finite causality in what is decisive is *not* capable of truth; at the latest the understanding becomes aware of this when it is supposed to understand *itself* as merely an effect of a cause outside itself, which concerns not only the problem of affection but by extension also the question of freedom obviously requiring *absolute* necessity in order to be actually thinkable. According to Kant e.g. the proposition of experience that the sun warms a stone should be objectively true and this truth is synthetic because it has emerged from the making of experience—for Hegel it is as we said tautological. The tautology consists in the fact that the identical concept of warmth is *observationally* divided between two places—the sun and the stone—and two times—before and after—and in this way all that is said of what is in its own terms a differentiated identity of determination is that it is different, which indeed is then also true.³⁵ It might appear to be an objection, that namely the sun is something other than the stone, so that each of the differentiated ones thus have yet other terms but for the simple causal determination this is completely without significance, for devoid of relation these other terms are different further terms arising in the course of the dialectic of variety which have already been repelled and the one has as aggregate of its terms *nothing* to do with the other aggregate in the causal perspective. It is 'a contingent accompaniment' (561, 400). What is not in its own terms already different but synthetic unity or concept is further also never 'cause' or 'effect' of another synthetic unity—'one does not say Homer is the cause of the *Iliad* or this is an *effect* of Homer'³⁶—for in this case the *infinite* relation emerges, the *freedom* of absolute form, which is never a tautology but is *contradiction* and arising from this e.g. *creation*.

35 One would certainly have to state more precisely that the Kantian categories as *functions* of the synthesis of the unity of experience initially have to be considered in terms of the *dynamic* of experience in which they are necessarily synthetic; this holds moreover also for the relation of opposed perception propositions in a proposition of experience in which e.g. the *concept* of warmth is synthesised with that of cold in the predicate 'to warm' (cf. above 15-16).

36 Hegel, TW 11, 412.

As real causality this category of causality for Hegel departs from its finitude neither in the search for the '*distant cause* of an effect', i.e. through 'increase in the number of causes' (ibid.), because being itself many the cause is as it were even more finite than the analytical cause was. In fact in those terms it has nothing whatsoever to do with the matter, unless as a *moment* of the possibility reflection (cf. ibid.), as which it is again only a reflection of the matter. And still the 'joke ... to let *great effects* proceed *from little causes*' (562, 401) catches something in this relation, for as a joke it works precisely because the middle term, on which the production of the relation that is understandable by itself and true, i.e. self-determined, depends, is not uttered. Between Caesar's kitchen and the conquest of Gaul there exists a relation only for the will to be funny, since the *mediation* of these extremes that starts by itself, Caesar, is not the issue, at least not so that from this medium term, as one of spirit or individuality, it would be known that it is at most 'the inversion' (563, 401) of an external cause into itself but cannot be externally caused. The finitude of the causal relation can instead only be superseded by considering the variety in which it consists from all sides such that in the end the opposition emerges and from out of this the contradiction within it. Thus the content can be seen as distinct from the causal form, for in this the same determination that is supposed to be identical is given in two terms—cause and effect—here externally expressed. The identical content is for that reason itself an external with respect to these different parts for their relation—it does *not* enter ... itself *into the effecting* and *into the relation*' (ibid.). This content is distinct without remainder and as such 'devoid of relation' (ibid.), while the absolute relation has immediately vanished. What remains is merely '*some thing or other*', the '*substrate*' (ibid.) of the relation which has in it its 'essential persistence' (ibid.). But in this external third that is still only substrate '*the causality ... is itself external*' (564, 402) to itself. It is *conditioned* causality and has a representation of that in the thing whose finite interpretation it is. The opposition thus lying in that is that it is 'the *originality*', relating that shows and simultaneously ought to be 'in its own terms *setting* or *effect*' (ibid.). It is a beginning and understandable from out of itself *because* it is the beginning of *another*. For instance the substrate is a condition of the cause such that the finite schema of causality iterates in the cause so that one can ask, what is its cause? The given relation generates both the relation that ought to be and *itself* as this; its self (the beginning) is external to itself in the '*infinite regress* of causes to causes' (564, 402 f.). But even in the bad infinity of this regress there lies also the anticipation of totality within it, which in the simple and finite understandability of a given causal relation was already presupposed. Exactly as in Kant that '*originality*' it expresses is only 'an *immediacy*' (564, 403)—for it is in this way that the I knows of the judged idea

only the immediate 'that' which it is and does not get out of the mere ought of mediation. What is important in a narrower context is that the regress or for the effects the progress overcomes the representation of the finite determination and with that ultimately the substrate. The cause is no longer "extinguished" in the effect but this is *inverted* and turned into its opposite, i.e. itself becoming a cause. This inversion, which is or should be also the unity of mediation, happens from out of the mediation itself that is already there, not for instance by the power of the substrate that was only the representation and distortion of pure originality. 'Causality sets ... itself as *presupposition* or *conditions itself*' (566, 404) which in fact it does in double fashion by actually repeating itself, i.e. to know that it is what always comes before each cause and behind every effect while also having a '*substantial identity*' outside it '*against*' which causality has 'determined' itself 'as its negative' (ibid.). This latter perspective brings the substrate to expression which now however maintains itself in its identity against self-repeating causality, and *because* causality permanently presupposes it, it is the determinate power against this and is substance. The first perspective shows causality in its own originality completely devoid of substrate and instead itself as power or substance. What thus emerges is a passive and an active substance that stand in the relation of effect to each other.

Out of causality there results here an immediate doubling of substance which in its own relation was not able to relate to itself but which from now on has itself for its other. The pressure to double itself resulted from the question as to the determination and its truth. For the concept this tells us that it will only be able to speak in determinate terms if it speaks 'about' itself, that in general language it can only show its *true* power if its 'topic' and object is *its* power and hence itself language. The absolute meaning of the refraction of determination is this: to bring language itself into the metabolic counterthrust from out of which it is the absolutely clarifying procedure and the production of the individuality of self-showing, of actuality. The individual or the concept can no longer fall out of their absolute beginning by themselves. In the relation between active and passive substance it can appear as if the one side suffers 'violence' (567, 405) from the other. As if e.g. language forces its objects into its "perspective" or conversely this latter forces language into a determinate speech that is external to this perspective. This semblance depends upon the status of the doubled opposition that in the relation between effect and counter-effect still is *abstractly* given, i.e. has not yet been rendered infinite to the contradiction. The opposition is doubled because both the passive and the effective substance are doubled. The former is independent and yet only presupposed for the sake of the continuation of determination; the latter is the 'overcoming of its *determinacy*', while in contrast it is the presupposition

of the determining other (567, 405). As long as these moments are mutually external and immediately other each is fundamentally alien to itself and what happens to it as an alien action or 'violence' by an 'alien substantiality' 'must also be done to it' (567, 406) because it is the manifestation of itself as of the other. Only the arbitrary suffers the arbitrary. No violence at all can be done to the concept.

What is alien to itself, to which what is alien happens, comes to itself in this and is inverted into its origin. Thus passive substance that has become 'originality in becoming determination' (568, 406) is 'turned back into a cause' (ibid.). It overcomes the effect against it becoming instead the counter-effect; this no longer against another in general as in the infinite progress but against *its* other, the other of itself. To this other constituting the origin of its selfness it has from now on a *truly* infinite relation. For the first effect the corresponding circumstance holds; 'both', which are thus not abstractly two, find themselves in 'an infinite *reciprocity* that returns back into itself'; as such they are the self of the absolute relation that has its absolutely broken middle of self-differing in its unity.

c) *Reciprocity*

The term reciprocity is the form in which the essence thinks its question as answered and in which its shining is as it were the immediate ἀπαυγάζμα (radiance) of the concept. Since the absolute, the problem of essence, is answered from self-showing, while in the concept, the completely developed absolute form, it will no longer be a *question at all* because its *actual* speaking is known *eo ipso* to be true. If one can summarise that question in the problem as to how one could utter the truth about something (not something in general as in being), then in fact with the conception of self-mediation arrived at by self-determination, this question is now formally answered by 'the absolute contradiction' (570, 409) presented by total being, total reflection and their absolute relation. Under the term reciprocity it was especially Fichte who *schematised* the self-mediation of the I.³⁷ In Hegel the concept logically *emerges* from out of reciprocity in that this as 'the absolute substance' (571, 409)³⁸ shows itself to

37 For Fichte e.g. 'the last ground of all consciousness' is 'a reciprocity of the I with itself by means of a non-I regarded from various sides'; and 'that reciprocity between the I and non-I is simultaneously a reciprocity of the I with itself' (*Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, WW I, 282. 280 f.).

38 Correspondingly at the end of the mediation of reciprocity in Hegel's *Jena Logic of 1804/5* there is talk of a 'state of the separate substances of having been overcome' such that 'only one' remains 'but it is absolutely filled substance, the rendering indifferent of all determinations', thinking (Hegel, GW VII, 75).

be also the concept of substance that discards all the concealment of manifestation in the in-itself exposing itself to complete clarity with respect to itself and is as such the hardest, most concrete substance or *subject*. The question that arises here is not how could the concept and with that also thinking and reason emerge from a relation of reciprocity or in general from actuality, under both of which one *imagines* the most diverse manifold of things somehow graspable, *natural*, finite? All that has to be shown is that in the conception of the absolute relation, which as reciprocity reaches its greatest complexity, in rational terms there is already thought of here that which is equally to be thought of in the concept of the concept.

Reciprocity begins with two substances which however in their determination no longer display any difference since both are active as well as passive substance; the difference is thus 'a completely transparent semblance' (569, 407), and its immediacy, which also constituted its opacity, is reflected into the mediation and is no longer its simple other. What is thought is that the activity which initially seemed to pass into an external passivity now does not pass to an external, but to *its* other, which it arrived at by means of the counter-effect. *Its* other is its passivity which '*is mediated by it itself*' and hence is 'the *passivity set by its activity itself*' (570, 408). The broken middle that was made manifest in 'two' substances shows itself thus as absolute mediation of the unity with itself and as return out of two negations—the first alterity of passivity which then becomes alterity of activity and as this again the other of the first activity or its passivity and thus itself—to absolute negativity. Hegel can say that this result 'is only causality itself' (ibid.) which indeed does apply at least to the extent that one can understand the two moments of the self of the connection once again as cause and effect. In this of course one must understand both as *the same*, as causality inverted into itself, which for that reason also is no longer an external relation to something but as absolute relation has become for itself. Causality as it has been understood up to now has vanished: causality that is only an 'internal' necessity of the substances that was supposed to manifest only following them externally and reflecting them. It is now known that this manifesting of the inside does not show something other and essentially hidden but only self-setting self-showing, the pure motion of clarity and clarifying that is without a displaced beyond. Thus the 'semblance of substantial alterity ... has overcome' itself (ibid.). It is no longer the other of a simple substance and only necessary for itself. Instead now the relation to it is 'the *absolute substantiality* of the *differentiated parts*' (ibid.). Now what is for itself in this relation is on the one hand, as absolute contingency, *immediate* meaninglessness and on the other in the truth of its infinite being-for-itself as absolutely necessary *mediation*, absolute meaning. But this does not mean that there would be even

two respects that themselves could be only arbitrarily or only necessarily 'chosen'; for what appears in this way as 'respect' is from now on a moment of the unity of the two in the self-seeing of *freedom*. This is the absolute relation that degrades all external or merely inner determination to absolute contingency *because* it itself is its power and identity, which just as much however is the absolutely necessary that reveals itself because this is its own self-setting determination. Freedom is in the difference (the set determination) just as in the identity (inherent determining) only it itself—the self-determination that presents its difference as identity and this as the difference. This motion through the completely mediated moments that contain the absolute opposition is its *being* which is just as much absolute reflection. The being of freedom is self-showing in pure clarifying of the differentiated parts because it itself is the absolute power of the difference. This freedom is the speech that remains by itself as language—now no longer speaking 'about' something but such that all 'somethings' are already its origin so that its determination lies *only* in the beginning-by-itself of clarifying speaking itself. The actuality of this free speech or free knowing and as such all actuality is the λόγος itself.

The simple linguistic expression of absolutely actual language capacity or logicity is the category I. This displays the immediately completed present being of absolute form. In the interest of the absolute form it is then a question of taking the I not in the sense of a merely essential reflexivity but of emphasising its being, the language or clarifying speaking as itself already containing all reflexivity and 'mere' thinking. That Hegel speaks of the I under the title of 'the concept' is for this reason of infinite importance, just as conversely it is easy to show that the view that I is only a name for a reflexive self-relation is always associated with an at least latent nominalism in the conception of language. This nominalism which has not found the λόγος is followed, in reference to the other of reflection, immediately by the mere ought in which the other is already lost—not to mention that the paradigm of clarity will be mere awareness and corresponding to the clarification its means will be external reflection. Into all these deficient forms is torn apart what in the concept essentially belongs together constituting in its identity its linguistic body. For no mere reflection brings together the concept moments of universality, particularity and singularity in 'a *completely transparent difference*' of 'determinate simplicity' or 'simple determination' (571, 409). In reciprocity unity has already emerged: the previously other or passive substance summarises itself from out of the determination through the first into itself becoming through this reflection-in-itself the universal of both or unity. The first or effective substance knows from the relation of determination that its negativity does not run out into an indeterminate external but only returns to itself and is with that reflection-in-itself as

into the whole of the relation *qua* singularity. The broken middle of the two however is reflected-into-itself, the absolute determination itself, the identical whole as its difference: particularity. But:

these three totalities are ... *one* and the same reflection distinguishing itself as *negative relation* to itself in both of those (the universal and the singular) (ibid.).

Similarly language distinguishes itself from itself in determinate speaking as its general horizon and as the individual power of speaking and is simultaneously unity of the concept. It is in this way the 'absolute form' 'distinguishing itself from itself' (ibid.)—absolute self-particularising of true speaking out of which alone unconditioned and free determination arises.

6 Science of Absolute Form

Hegel called his *Logic* the 'science of absolute form'. In it he attempted to show with complete consistency the extent to which the free determination that the individual form gives itself, in which it maintains itself, is simultaneously scientific form and that which is presented with *absolute* necessity or is self-presenting form. In this science he was able to actualise what in a letter to Sinclair he declared to be his purpose: 'to produce that scientific form or to work on its formation' through which 'philosophy, as much as geometry' should 'become a regular edifice' 'that would be just as teachable as geometry'³⁹ and he would not need to worry that what philosophy teaches would be something that would overcome individual freedom. For even as teachable philosophy is not simply a 'doctrine' that teaches 'something' instead it remains absolute form and therefore the spoken, and in this an absolutely actual, individual: the concept. Philosophy does not teach 'something'. What it teaches is a negative approach to everything that is and can only be 'something' or finite determination making it original critique of everything that can only be a doctrine. Philosophy is not a science as a theory of positivities; instead it is one of negative form differences, of self-mediating differences, which are to be cognised in the emphatic sense as moments of the idea and as actuality.

39 *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. J. Hoffmeister, vol. 1, Hamburg 1969³, 332.

It has justly been said of Hegelian speculation that it is not a new theory but a new *language*.⁴⁰ Note however that as far as the newness of the language is concerned strictly speaking it is not about a mere novelty in the restless development of language; something absolutely new has happened here. Philosophical form finds its way to this pure beginning by itself only through a critical return from out of what is in each case new. This is how it finds the *middle term*, the idea of individuality whose linguistic self-understanding it is itself and which it constantly opens up anew. In general it reduces the positive stock to the beginning newness in which everything is in its own terms *open*. In the sense of this beginning as returning, which is simultaneously a forward movement from the logical end, the science of absolute form in general can indeed be called a 'logic of finding language'.⁴¹ The conclusion of the scientific 'edifice' of philosophy is the speaking idea as absolutely open linguistically active invention: coming-to-itself as coming-to-another that is neither willed nor made but can only be known absolutely.

Taken in isolation the conclusion of philosophy has its determination in the absolute form itself to the extent that this absolutely cannot be taught. It is pure individuality and absolute actuality both of which cannot be shown and presented because they are self-showing. But then the conclusion is not something strictly for itself, isolated and unapproachable; rather it is constant linguistic self-interpretation and is necessarily present in all language. Absolute form makes the claim to understand this present being scientifically and to utter it methodically. It makes this claim because it knows itself already to lie in the conclusion, its own self and its beginning, knowing itself to be self-interpreting and as such individualising: λόγος.

40 G. Lebrun, *La patience du concept*, Paris 1972, 92: speculation is not 'une doctrine nouvelle, supérieure aux doctrines archaïques et les supplantant, mais un *langage nouveau*'.

41 J. Simon, *Philosophie und ihre Zeit* in B. Scheer and G. Wohlfart (eds.), *Dimensionen der Sprache in der Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus*, Würzburg 1982, 11–39, loc. cit. 18.

Bibliography

Editions of the primary sources used as well as books and articles quoted in the text are given here. In general only well-known and easily recognisable abbreviations are used for the primary sources in the text. Bibliographical information on secondary literature will be found in the footnotes as well as here. Collections from which only one text is quoted are not given separately, only in the information on the articles used.

I Primary Sources

Kant's Works are cited in the edition of the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (AA), vols. I–XXVIII, Berlin 1910 ff. Quotations from the *Critique of pure Reason* (CpR) are cited as usual from the first two editions, the second first (B/A); those from the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (CpJ) to the second (B) edition of W. Weischedel, Darmstadt 1983. CpR in English is based on the translation of P. Guyer and A.W. Wood, Cambridge 1998.

Hegel, *Science of Logic* (SoL), translated by A.V. Miller, London and New York 1969. *Wissenschaft der Logik* (WdL I, II, and III) in the edition of the *Gesammelte Werke* (GW), vols. XI, XII and XXI eds. F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke, Hamburg 1978.

Phenomenology of Spirit (PoS), translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford 1977.

Phänomenologie des Geistes, GW edition vol. IX eds. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede, Hamburg 1980.

Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 1830, eds. F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg 1969 (Additions in Suhrkamp edition vols.8–10 eds. Moldenhauer and Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1969).

Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 1817 (Heidelberger Enzyklopädie) in the centennial edition of H. Glockner, vol. VI, Stuttgart 1927.

Jenaer Systementwürfe I–III in the following editions: I: eds. K. Düsing and H. Kimmerle, Hamburg 1986 but with the pagination of the GW edition vol. VI; II: ed. R. P. Horstmann, Hamburg 1982, GW vol. VII; and III: ed. R. P. Horstmann, Hamburg 1987, GW VII.

Dissertatio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum, ed. W. Neuser, Weinheim 1986.

Naturphilosophie vol. I, *Die Vorlesung von 1819/20*, ed. M. Gies, Naples 1982.

Hauptideen von Hegels Vorlesung über Logik und Metaphysik (1801/02),

nachgeschrieben von I. P. V. Troxler, ed. K. Düsing, in his: *Schellings und Hegels erste absolute Metaphysik (1801–1802). Zusammenfassende Vorlesungsnachschriften von I. P. V. Troxler*, Cologne 1988, 63–77.

All other writings and lectures in the Theorie Werk (TW) edition of E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, vols. 1–20, Frankfurt a. M. 1969 ff.

Briefe von und an Hegel, eds. J. Hoffmeister and F. Nicolin, vols. 1–4, Hamburg 1969 ff.³. Fichte's Works are cited in the edition of the philosopher's son I. H. Fichte (WW), vols. I and II, reprint Berlin 1971. Schelling's Works are cited in the edition of M. Schröter (SW), vols. I–VI, München 1977 ff.³.

II Other Cited Texts and Secondary Literature

Adorno, Theodor W.: *Negative Dialektik*, Frankfurt a. M. 1988⁵.

Aristotle:

Aristoteles, *Erste Analytik*, German translation by E. Rolfes, Hamburg 1975 (reprint of the ed. of 1921).

Aristoteles: *De interpretatione*, Greek and Engl. in: The Categories. On Interpretation. Prior Analytics, eds. H. P. Cooke and H. Tredennick, London and Cambridge Mass. 1955.

Aristoteles: *Metaphysik*, translated by F. F. Schwarz, Stuttgart 1970; Greek in the ed. of W. D. Ross, 2 vols., Oxford 1958².

Aristoteles: *Nikomachische Ethik*, translated by F. Dirlmeier, Berlin 1983.

Aristoteles: *Poetik*, Greek and German translated and edited by M. Fuhrmann, Stuttgart 1982.

Aristoteles: *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, ed. J. H. Freese (Greek and Engl.), London and Cambridge Mass. 1947.

Baeumler, Alfred: *Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Darmstadt 1981 (reprint of 2nd ed. 1967).

Baptist, Gabriella: *Ways and Loci of Modality*. The Chapter "Actuality" in the *Science of Logic* between its Absence in Jena and its Disappearance in Berlin, Lecture at the Tenth Biennial Meeting of Hegel Society of America, 7th to 9th October 1988 in Chicago (Ms.).

Baum, Manfred: Zur Methode der Logik und Metaphysik beim Jenaer Hegel, in D. Henrich and K. Düsing eds., *Hegel in Jena*. Die Entwicklung des Systems und die Zusammenarbeit mit Schelling, Hegel-Studien suppl 20, Bonn 1980, 119–138.

Baummanns, Peter: Kants Begriff des inneren und äußeren Sinnes, in Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses Mainz 1981, Bonn 1981, 91–102.

Baummanns, Peter: Kants vierte Antinomie und das Ideal der reinen Vernunft, in Kant-Studien 79 (1988), 183–200.

Baumgardt, David: Das Möglichkeitsproblem der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, der modernen Phänomenologie und der Gegenstandstheorie. Kant-Studien suppl. 51, Berlin 1920.

- Biard, J., Buvat, D., Kervegan, J.-F., Kling, J.-F., Lacroix, A., Lecrivain, A. and Slubicki, M.: *Introduction à la lecture de la Science de la logique de Hegel*, vols. 1–3, Paris 1983.
- Bocheński, I. M.: *Formale Logik*, Freiburg 1956.
- Böhme, Gernot: *Zeit und Zahl*. Studien zur Zeittheorie bei Platon, Aristoteles, Leibniz und Kant, Frankfurt a. M. 1974.
- Bonsiepen, Wolfgang: *Der Begriff der Negativität in den Jenaer Schriften Hegels*, Hegel-Studien suppl 16, Bonn 1977.
- Bonsiepen, Wolfgang: Salomon Maimons Kant-Rezeption—Ausgangspunkt für Hegels Kant-Kritik?, in *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 7.3 (1982), 37–44.
- Boolos, George S.: *The Unprovability of Consistency*. An Essay in Modal Logic, London and New York 1979.
- Bourgeois, Bernard: Dialectique et structure dans la philosophie de Hegel, in *Revue internationale de philosophie* 36 (No. 139–140, 1982), 163–182.
- Brauer, Oscar Daniel: *Dialektik der Zeit*. Untersuchungen zu Hegels Metaphysik der Weltgeschichte, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt 1982.
- Bubner, Rüdiger: Hegels Logik des Begriffs in his *Zur Sache der Dialektik*, Stuttgart 1980, 70–123.
- Burbidge, John W.: The Necessity of Contingency: An Analysis of Hegel's Chapter on "Actuality" in the Science of Logic, in Steinkraus, W. E. and Schmitz, K. I., *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, New Jersey and Sussex 1980, 201–217.
- Büchel, Gregor: *Philosophie und Geometrie*, Kant-Studien suppl. 121, Berlin and New York 1987.
- Cassirer, Ernst: *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, vol. 2, Darmstadt 1974 (reprint of the 3rd ed. 1922).
- Cassirer, Ernst: *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik, Darmstadt 1980⁵ (reprint of the 1st ed. 1910).
- Chiereghin, Franco: *Dialettica dell' assoluto e ontologia della soggettività in Hegel*. Dall'ideale giovanile alla Fenomenologia dello spirito, Trient 1980.
- Chiereghin, Franco: ed. *Hegel, Logica e metafisica di Jena (1804–05)*. Traduzione, introduzione e commento di F. Biasutti, L. Bignami, F. Chiereghin, A. Gaiarsa, M. Giacin, F. Longato, F. Menegoni, A. Moretto, and G. Perin Rossi, Trient 1982.
- Chiereghin, Franco: *L'influenza dello spinozismo nella fondazione della filosofia hegeliana*, Padua 1961.
- Cramer, Wolfgang: *Das Absolute und das Kontingente*. Untersuchungen zum Substanzbegriff, Frankfurt a. M. 1959.
- Crusius, Christian August: *Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis*, Leipzig 1747 (reprint Hildesheim 1965).
- Democritus: Demokrit, Fragmente, in Diels, H. and Kranz, W., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* vol. II, Zürich and Hildesheim 1972¹⁶, 81–230.

- Dilthey, Wilhelm: *Briefwechsel zwischen W. Dilthey und dem Grafen P. Yorck von Wartenburg 1877–1897*, Halle a. d. S. 1923.
- Dilthey, Wilhelm: *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. VII, ed. B. Groethuysen, Stuttgart and Göttingen 1959⁵.
- Düsing, Klaus: Ästhetische Einbildungskraft und intuitiver Verstand, in *Hegel-Studien* 21 (1986), 87–128.
- Düsing, Klaus: *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik*. Systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Prinzip des Idealismus und zur Dialektik, *Hegel-Studien* suppl 15, Bonn 1984².
- Eley, Lothar ed.: *Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes in der "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse"*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1990.
- Eley, Lothar: Was ist der systematische Ort des Kampfes des Anerkennens und der Unterwerfung unter einen Herrn in Hegels Theorie des Geistes der "Enzyklopädie"?, in his edition of *Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes in der "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse"*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1990, 339–366.
- Fetscher, Iring ed.: *Hegel in der Sicht der neueren Forschung*, Darmstadt 1973.
- Fink-Eitel, Hinrich: *Dialektik und Sozialethik*. Kommentierende Untersuchungen zu Hegels "Logik", Meisenheim a. Gl. 1978.
- Fischer, Kuno: *Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre*, 2 vols., Heidelberg 1901.
- Fleischmann, Eugène: Die Wirklichkeit in Hegels Logik. Ideengeschichtliche Beziehungen zu Spinoza, in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 18 (1964), 3–29.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg: *Die Dialektik des Selbstbewußtseins*, in his *Gesammelte Werke* vol. 3, Tübingen 1987, 47–64.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg: *Die Idee der Hegelschen Logik*, in his *Gesammelte Werke* vol. 3, Tübingen 1987, 6–586.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg: *Gesammelte Werke* vol. 3. Neuere Philosophie 1: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Tübingen 1987.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg: *Die verkehrte Welt*, in his *Gesammelte Werke* vol. 3, Tübingen 1987, 29–46.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg: *Wahrheit und Methode*. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Tübingen 1975⁴.
- di Giovanni, George: The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic, in Steinkraus, W. E. and Schmitz, K. I., *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, New Jersey and Sussex 1980, 179–200.
- Grünewald, Bernward: *Modalität und empirisches Denken*. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der Kantischen Modaltheorie, Hamburg 1986.
- Hartmann, Nicolai: *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*, Berlin 1966³.
- Heidegger, Martin: *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, Frankfurt a. M. 1984.
- Heidegger, Martin: Kants These über das Sein, in his *Wegmarken*, Frankfurt a. M. 1978², 439–473.

- Heidegger, Martin: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Frankfurt a. M. 1973⁴.
- Heidegger, Martin: *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen 1972¹².
- Heidegger, Martin: *Wegmarken*, Frankfurt a. M. 1978².
- Heidemann, Ingeborg: Über die methodische Funktion der Kategorientafel. Zum Problem der "eigentümlichen Methode einer Transzendentalphilosophie", in Kopper, J. and Marx, W. eds., *200 Jahre Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hildesheim 1981, 43–78.
- Heimsoeth, Heinz: *Transzendente Dialektik*. Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 4 Teilbände, Berlin 1966 ff.
- Heintel, Erich: Das Problem der Konkretisierung der Transzendentalität. Ein Beitrag zur Aporetik der "daseienden Vermittlung", in his *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* vol. 2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1988, 7–30.
- Heintel, Erich: Der Begriff des Menschen und der "spekulative Satz", in his *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* vol. 1, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1988, 284–310.
- Heintel, Erich: *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* vols. 1 and 2. Zur Fundamentalphilosophie, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1988.
- Heintel, Erich: *Grundriß der Dialektik*. vol. 1: *Zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie*, vol. 11: *Zum Logos der Dialektik und zu seiner Logik*, Darmstadt 1984.
- Henrich, Dieter: *Absoluter Geist und Logik des Endlichen*, in D. Henrich and Düsing, K. eds. *Hegel in Jena*, Hegel-Studien suppl 20, 1980, 103–118.
- Henrich, Dieter: Andersheit und Absolutheit des Geistes. Sieben Schritte auf dem Wege von Schelling zu Hegel in his *Selbstverhältnisse*, Stuttgart 1982, 142–172.
- Henrich, Dieter: Die Beweisstruktur von Kants transzendentaler Deduktion, in Prauss, G. ed. *Kant. Zur Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen und Handeln*, Cologne 1973, 90–104.
- Henrich, Dieter: Die Formationsbedingungen der Dialektik. Über die Untrennbarkeit der Methode Hegels von Hegels System, in *Revue internationale de philosophie* 36 (No. 139/140, 1982), 139–162.
- Henrich, Dieter: Formen der Negation in Hegels Logik, in Horstmann, R. P. ed. *Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Frankfurt a. M. 1978, 213–229.
- Henrich, Dieter: *Hegel im Kontext*, Frankfurt a. M. 1981³.
- Henrich, Dieter: with Düsing, K. eds. *Hegel in Jena*. Die Entwicklung des Systems und die Zusammenarbeit mit Schelling, Hegel-Studien suppl 20, Bonn 1980.
- Henrich, Dieter: Hegels Grundoperation, in *Der Idealismus und seine Gegenwart* (FS W. Marx), Hamburg 1976, 208–230.
- Henrich, Dieter: Hegels Logik der Reflexion in his *Hegel im Kontext*, Frankfurt a. M. 1981³, 95–156.
- Henrich, Dieter: Hegels Logik der Reflexion. Neue Fassung, in *Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion*, Hegel-Studien suppl 18, Bonn 1978, 203–324.
- Henrich, Dieter: Hegels Theorie über den Zufall in his *Hegel im Kontext*, Frankfurt a. M. 1981³, 157–186 also in Fetscher, I. ed. *Hegel in der Sicht der neueren Forschung*, Darmstadt 1973, 161–187.

- Henrich, Dieter: Die Identität des Subjekts in der transzendentalen Deduktion, in Oberer, H. and Seel, G. eds. *Kant. Analysen—Probleme—Kritik*, Würzburg 1988, 39–70.
- Henrich, Dieter: *Identität und Objektivität*. Eine Untersuchung über Kants transzendente Deduktion, Heidelberg 1976.
- Henrich, Dieter: Kant und Hegel. Versuch zur Vereinigung ihrer Grundgedanken in his *Selbstverhältnisse*, Stuttgart 1982, 173–208.
- Henrich, Dieter: *Selbstverhältnisse*. Gedanken und Auslegungen zu den Grundlagen der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, Stuttgart 1982.
- Hölderlin, Friedrich: *Werke und Briefe*, ed. F. Beißner and J. Schmidt, 2 vols., Frankfurt a. M. 1969.
- Holzhey, Helmut: Das philosophische Realitätsproblem. Zu Kants Unterscheidung von Realität und Wirklichkeit, in Kopper, J. and Marx, W. eds. *200 Jahre Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hildesheim 1981, 79–111.
- Hossenfelder, Malte: *Kants Konstitutionstheorie und die transzendente Deduktion*, Berlin and New York 1978.
- Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M. J.: *Einführung in die Modallogik*, Berlin and New York 1978.
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von: Ueber Göthes Hermann und Dorothea in his *Werke in fünf Bänden*, ed. A. Flitner and K. Giel, vol. 2, Darmstadt 1986⁴, 125–356.
- Hume, David: *Treatise on Human Nature*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 2 vols., London 1898.
- Jaeschke, Walter: *Äußerliche Reflexion und immanente Reflexion*. Eine Skizze der systematischen Geschichte des Reflexionsbegriffs in Hegels Logik-Entwürfen, in Hegel-Studien 13 (1978), 85–117.
- Kaulbach, Friedrich: *Der philosophische Begriff der Bewegung*. Studien zu Aristoteles, Leibniz und Kant, Cologne and Graz 1965.
- Kohlenberger, H. K. and Oeing-Hanhoff, L.: Artikel „Attribut“, in J. Ritter ed. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol.1, Darmstadt 1971, cols. 612–614.
- Kojève, Alexandre: *Hegel*. Eine Vergegenwärtigung seines Denkens, Stuttgart 1958.
- Kopper, Joachim and Marx, Wolfgang eds. *200 Jahre Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hildesheim 1981.
- Kroner, Richard: *Von Kant bis Hegel*, 2 vols., Tübingen 1977³.
- Kulenkampff, Arend: *Antinomie und Dialektik*. Zur Funktion des Widerspruchs in der Philosophie, Stuttgart 1970.
- Kusch, Martin and Manninen, Juha: Hegel on Modalities and Monadology, in Knuutti-la, S. ed. *Modern Modalities*. Studies of the History of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism, Dordrecht, Boston and London 1988, 109–177.
- Lambert, Johann Heinrich: *Neues Organon* (oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung von Irrtum und Schein), 2 vols., Leipzig 1764 (reprint Hildesheim 1965).

- Lausberg, Heinrich: *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik*, München 1984⁸.
- Lebrun, Gérard: *La patience du concept*. Essai sur le discours hégélien, Paris 1972.
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: *Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand*, translated, introduced and explained by E. Cassirer, Hamburg 1971.
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, vol. IV, Berlin 1881.
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: *Philosophische Schriften* 1. Kleine Schriften zur Metaphysik, ed. H. H. Holz, Frankfurt a. M. 1986².
- Liebrucks, Bruno: *Sprache und Bewußtsein*. vol. 4: *Die erste Revolution der Denkungsart*. KANT: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Frankfurt a. M. 1986; vol. 5: *Die zweite Revolution der Denkungsart*. HEGEL: Phänomenologie des Geistes, Frankfurt a. M. 1970; vols. 6/1–3: *Der menschliche Begriff*. Sprachliche Genesis der Logik, logische Genesis der Sprache, Frankfurt a. M. and Bern 1974.
- Longato, Fulvio: Il conoscere come sistema di principi, in Chiereghin, F. ed. *Hegel, Logica e metafisica di Jena (1804–05)*, Trient 1982, 444–481.
- Longuenesse, Béatrice: L'effectivité de la *Logique* de Hegel, in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 87 (1982), 495–503.
- Lucas, Hans-Christian: *Wirklichkeit und Methode in der Philosophie Hegels*. Untersuchungen zur Logik. Der Einfluß Spinozas, Dissertation Cologne 1974.
- Lütterfelds, Wilhelm: *Kants Dialektik der Erfahrung*. Zur antinomischen Struktur der endlichen Erkenntnis, Meisenheim a. Gl. 1977.
- Lugarini, Leo: La “confutazione” della filosofia critica, in his *Prospettive hegeliane*, Roma 1986, 77–119.
- Lugarini, Leo: Logica e movimento riflessivo, in his *Prospettive hegeliane*, Roma 1986, 121–144.
- Lugarini, Leo: *Prospettive hegeliane*, Roma 1986.
- Lugarini, Leo: Spinoza nella formazione della dialettica hegeliana, in his *Prospettive hegeliane*, Roma 1986, 55–76.
- Maier, Anneliese: Kants Qualitätskategorien, Kant-Studien suppl. 65, Berlin 1930.
- Maimon, Salomon: *Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie*. Mit einem Anhang über die symbolische Erkenntnis und Anmerkungen, Berlin 1790 (reprint Darmstadt 1963).
- Maluschke, Günther: *Kritik und absolute Methode in Hegels Dialektik*, Hegel-Studien suppl 13, Bonn 1974.
- Marcuse, Herbert: *Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*, Frankfurt a. M. 1932.
- Marx, Werner: *Das Selbstbewußtsein in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Frankfurt a. M. 1986.
- Mathieu, Vittorio: Filosofia della natura e dialettica, in *Hegel interprete di Kant*, ed. V. Verra, Naples 1981, 91–122.

- Mathieu, Vittorio: *Kants Opus postumum*, herausgegeben von G. Held, Frankfurt a. M. 1989.
- Meier, Georg Friedrich: *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, Halle 1752 (in AA XVI).
- Menne, Albert: Artikel „Modalität (des Urteils)“, in J. Ritter ed. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol. 6, cols. 12–16.
- van der Meulen, Jan: *Hegel. Die gebrochene Mitte*, Hamburg 1958.
- Moretto, Antonio: *Hegel e la "matematica dell' infinito"*, Trient 1984.
- Noël, Georges: *La logique de Hegel*, Paris 1897.
- Pape, Ingetrud: *Tradition und Transformation der Modalität*, vol. 1 (only one published to date): *Möglichkeit—Unmöglichkeit*, Hamburg 1966.
- Paton, Herbert James: *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, 2 vols., London and New York 1965⁴.
- Penolidis, Theodoros: *Bestimmtheit und Reflexion*. Bemerkungen zur Unmittelbarkeit des Denkens, Manuskript 1989.
- Peperzak, Adriaan: Selbstbewußtsein—Vernunft—Freiheit—Geist, in Eley, L. ed. *Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes in der "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse"*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1990, 280–312.
- Peperzak, Adriaan: *Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten*. Grundlinien der Hegelschen Philosophie des Geistes, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1987.
- Pinder, Tillman: *Kants Gedanke vom Grund aller Möglichkeit*. Untersuchungen zur Vorgeschichte der "transzendentalen Theologie", Dissertation Berlin 1969.
- Plaaß, Peter: *Kants Theorie der Naturwissenschaft*. Eine Untersuchung zur Vorrede von Kants "Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft", Göttingen 1965.
- Plato, *Werke in acht Bänden*. Greek and German, Darmstadt 1970 ff.
- Pöggeler, Otto: *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Freiburg and Munich 1973.
- Poser, Hans: Mögliche Erkenntnis und Erkenntnis der Möglichkeit. Die Transformation der Modalkategorien der Wolffschen Schule in Kants kritischer Philosophie, in *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 20 (1983), 129–147.
- Poser, Hans: Die Stufen der Modalität. Kants System der Modalbegriffe, in *Logik, Ethik, Sprache* (FS R. Freundlich), Vienna and Munich 1981.
- Poser, Hans: *Zur Theorie der Modalbegriffe bei G. W. Leibniz* (Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa vol. VI), Wiesbaden 1969.
- Prior, Arthur N.: *Time and Modality*, Oxford 1957.
- Puntel, Lorenz Bruno: *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur*. Untersuchungen zur Einheit der systematischen Philosophie G. W. F. Hegels, Hegel-Studien suppl 10, Bonn 1981².
- Quine, Willard van Orman: *Reference and Modality* (1953), German.: Bezeichnung und Modalität, in W. Stegmüller ed. *Das Universalien-Problem*, Darmstadt 1978.
- Reich, Klaus: *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, Berlin 1948².
- Reinhold, Karl Leonhard: *Über das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens*. Über die Möglichkeit der Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, ed. W. H. Schrader, Hamburg 1978.

- Reininger, Robert: *Kants Lehre vom inneren Sinn und seine Theorie der Erfahrung*, Vienna and Leipzig 1900.
- Reininger, Robert: *Metaphysik der Wirklichkeit*, Vienna and Leipzig 1931.
- Rescher, Nicholas: Artikel „Modallogik (I)“, in J. Ritter ed. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol. 6, Darmstadt 1984, cols. 16–23.
- Richli, Urs: Dialektik im Sinn der Betrachtung der Denkbestimmungen an und für sich. Zu Michael Wolffs Rekonstruktion der Kategorie „Widerspruch“ in Hegels „Wissenschaft der Logik“, in *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 14.2 (1989), 37–44.
- Richli, Urs: *Form und Inhalt in G. W. F. Hegels „Wissenschaft der Logik“*, Vienna and Munich 1982.
- Richli, Urs: Michael Theunissens Destruktion der Einheit von Darstellung und Kritik in Hegels „Wissenschaft der Logik“, in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 63 (1981), 61–79.
- Römpf, Georg: Ein Selbstbewußtsein für ein Selbstbewußtsein. Bemerkungen zum Kapitel „Die Wahrheit der Gewißheit seiner selbst“ in Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, in *Hegel-Studien* 23 (1988), 71–94.
- Röttgers, Kurt: Art. „Prozeß (I)“, in J. Ritter ed. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol. 7, Darmstadt 1989, cols. 1543–1558.
- Röttges, Heinz: *Der Begriff der Methode in der Philosophie Hegels*, Meisenheim a. Gl. 1976.
- Röttges, Heinz: *Dialektik als Grund der Kritik*. Grundlegung einer Neuinterpretation der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* durch den Nachweis der Dialektik von Bedeutung und Gebrauch als Voraussetzung der Analytik, Königstein Ts. 1981.
- Rosenkranz, Karl: *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben*, Darmstadt 1977 (reprint).
- Rotenstreich, Nathan: *Legislation and Exposition*. Critical Analysis of Differences between the Philosophy of Kant and Hegel, *Hegel-Studien* suppl 24, Bonn 1984.
- Schadewaldt, Wolfgang: *Die Anfänge der Philosophie bei den Griechen*. Die Vorsokratiker und ihre Voraussetzungen, Frankfurt a. M. 1978.
- Schindler, Walter: *Die reflexive Struktur objektiver Erkenntnis*. Eine Untersuchung zum Zeitbegriff der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“, Munich 1979.
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst: *Dialektik*, ed. R. Odebrecht, Leipzig 1942 (reprint Darmstadt 1976).
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst: *Hermeneutik und Kritik*, ed. M. Frank, Frankfurt a. M. 1977.
- Schmidt, Gerhart: Kausalität oder Substantialität? Zu Hegels Ontologie der Geschichte, in Lucas, H.-Chr. and Planty-Bonjour, G. eds. *Logik und Geschichte in Hegels System*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1989, 147–171.
- Schmidt, Gerhart: Das Spiel der Modalitäten und die Macht der Notwendigkeit. Zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, in Fetscher, I. ed. *Hegel in der Sicht der neueren Forschung*, Darmstadt 1973, 188–206.

- Schmitz, Hermann: *Hegel als Denker der Individualität*, Meisenheim a. Gl. 1957.
- Schneeberger, Guido: *Kants Konzeption der Modalbegriffe*, Basel 1952.
- Siep, Ludwig: *Anerkennung als Prinzip praktischer Philosophie*. Untersuchungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes, Freiburg and Munich 1979.
- Simon, Josef: "Anschauung überhaupt" und "unsere Anschauung". Zum Beweisgang in Kants Deduktion der Naturkategorien, in *Perspektiven transzendentaler Reflexion* (FS G. Funke), Bonn 1989, 135–156.
- Simon, Josef: Die Bewegung des Begriffs in Hegels Logik, in *Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion*, Hegel-Studien suppl 18, Bonn 1978, 63–73.
- Simon, Josef: Einbildungskraft und wirkliche Zeit, in Busche, H., Heffernan, G. and Lohmar, D. eds. *Bewußtsein und Zeitlichkeit*. Ein Problemschnitt durch die Philosophie der Neuzeit, Würzburg 1990, 147–150.
- Simon, Josef: Einleitung zu J. G. Hamann, *Schriften zur Sprache*, Frankfurt a. M. 1967, 7–80.
- Simon, Josef: Hegels Gottesbegriff, in *Theologische Quartalschrift* 162 (1982), 82–104.
- Simon, Josef: Intersubjektivität bei Kant und Hegel?, in Eley, L. ed. *Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes in der "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse"*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1990, 313–338.
- Simon, Josef: Kants pragmatische Ethikbegründung, in *Archivio di filosofia* 55 (1987), 183–204.
- Simon, Josef: Kategorien der Freiheit und der Natur, in Koch, D. and Bort, K. eds. *Kategorie und Kategorialität* (FS K. Hartmann), Würzburg 1990, 107–130.
- Simon, Josef: Modalität und Kommunikabilität (unveröffentlichtes Manuskript).
- Simon, Josef: *Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel*, Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne and Mainz 1966.
- Simon, Josef: Philosophie und ihre Zeit. Bemerkungen zur Sprache, zur Zeitlichkeit und zu Hegels Begriff der absoluten Idee, in Scheer, B. and Wohlfart, G. eds. *Dimensionen der Sprache in der Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus*, Würzburg 1982, 11–39.
- Simon, Josef: *Sprache und Raum*. Philosophische Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis zwischen Wahrheit und Bestimmtheit von Sätzen, Berlin 1969.
- Simon, Josef: *Wahrheit als Freiheit*. Zur Entwicklung der Wahrheitsfrage in der neueren Philosophie, Berlin and New York 1978.
- Specht, Rainer: Artikel „Modalität“, in J. Ritter ed. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol. 6, Darmstadt 1984, cols. 9–12.
- Spinoza, Benedictus de: *Opera/Werke*, Latin and German, 2 vols., Darmstadt 1989²/1980³.
- Stallmach, Josef: *Dynamis und Energeia*. Untersuchungen am Werk des Aristoteles zur Problemgeschichte von Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, Meisenheim a. Gl. 1959.
- Stegmüller, Wolfgang: Gedanken über eine mögliche rationale Rekonstruktion von Kants Metaphysik in his *Aufsätze zu Kant und Wittgenstein*, Darmstadt 1974, 1–61.

- Steinkraus, Warren E. and Schmitz, Kenneth I. eds. *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, New Jersey and Sussex 1980.
- Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Rainer: Neue Monographien zur Argumentationsstruktur von Kants *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 15.1 (1990), 39–49.
- McTaggart, J. M. E.: *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, Cambridge 1910.
- Theunissen, Michael: *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat*, Berlin 1970.
- Theunissen, Michael: *Sein und Schein*. Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik, Frankfurt a. M. 1980.
- Thöle, Bernhard: Die Beweisstruktur der transzendentalen Deduktion in der 2. Ausgabe der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" in Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses 1981, ed. G. Funke, Bonn 1981, 302–312.
- Ungler, Franz: *Individuelles und Individuationsprinzip in Hegels "Wissenschaft der Logik"*, Habilitationsschrift Vienna 1983.
- Ungler, Franz: Das Wesen in der Jenaer Zeit Hegels in Henrich, D. and Düsing, K. eds. *Hegel in Jena*, Hegel-Studien suppl 20, Bonn 1980, 157–180.
- Veca, Salvatore: *Fondazione e modalità in Kant*, Milan 1969.
- Verra, Valerio ed.: *Hegel interprete di Kant*, Naples 1981.
- Verra, Valerio: Immaginazione trascendentale e intelletto intuitivo in his ed. *Hegel interprete di Kant*, Naples 1981, 67–89.
- Vuillemin, Jules: La théorie kantienne des modalités in Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses 1981, ed. G. Funke, Bonn 1981, 149–167.
- Wagner, Hans: Kants affirmative Metaphysik von Dingen an sich in Micheli, G. and Santinello, G. eds. *Kant a due secoli dalla „Critica“*, Brescia 1984, 181–191.
- Weidemann, H.: Artikel „Modallogik (II)“ in J. Ritter ed. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* vol. 6, Darmstadt 1984, cols. 23–41.
- Wohlfart, Günter: Zum Problem der transzendentalen Affinität in der Philosophie Kants in Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses 1981, ed. G. Funke, Bonn 1981, 313–322.
- Wolff, Christian: *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia*, 1730 (reprint Hildesheim 1962).
- Wolff, Christian: *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica*, 1728 and 1740 (reprint Hildesheim 1983).
- Wolff, Michael: *Der Begriff des Widerspruchs*. Eine Studie zur Dialektik Kants und Hegels, Königstein Ts. 1981.
- Zeidler, Kurt Walter: Die transzendente Geschichte des Ichs. Deduktion und Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe in *Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie* 18 (1986), 95–125.

Name Index

- Adickes, E. 201n9
 Adorno, Th.W. 121n58
 Aristotle viii, ix, xv, 17n40, 53, 56n32, 60n37, 77n78, 101, 116, 150n131, 158, 168n198, 171n213, 198–199, 202, 204, 207n23, 211, 228
 Augustine 3, 138

 Baeumler, A. 3n3
 Baptist, G. 168n198, 169n202, 171nn212–213
 Baum, M. 73n66
 Baumanns, P. 151n136, 155n149, 158n162
 Baumgardt, D. 214n43
 Becker, W. 165n90
 Biard, J. 171n213, 282n13, 305n33
 Bocheński, I.M. 202n12, 207n23
 Böhme, G. 131n78
 Bonsiepen, W. 70n60, 72n63, 117n55, 136n96
 Boolos, G. 204nn16–17
 Bourgeois, B. 101n3
 Brauer, O.D. 11n28
 Bubner, R. 13n31
 Burbidge, J.W. 268n5

 Carnap, R. 204
 Cassirer, E. 48n19, 212n40
 Chiereghin, F. 71n63, 88n115, 92n130, 132n79, 132n84, 181n231
 Cramer, W. 196n260
 Cresswell, M.J. 203nn13–14, 206n19
 Crusius, Chr.A. 13–14, 201n11
 Nicholas of Cusa ix

 Dedekind, R. 48n19
 Democritus 39n92
 Descartes, R. viii, 77–79, 171n213, 186, 208, 285
 Dilthey, W. 53n24, 54n26
 Düsing, K. 24n53, 55n29, 57n32, 72n65–73n66, 87n109, 113n35, 132n79
 Duhem, P. 24n51
 Duns Scotus, J. 199, 207n23
 Ps.-Scotus 202n12

 Eley, L. 102n7–103n8
 Euclid 133

 Feys, R. 204
 Fichte, J. G. 7, 33n67, 34–38, 43n8, 56, 66, 74, 78n82, 85n94, 101, 171n213, 181n231, 311
 Findlay, J. N. 171n212
 Fink-Eitel, H. 282n13
 Fischer, K. 124n66
 Fleischmann, E. 170
 Frege, G. xiv
 Fränkel, H. 116n53

 Gadamer, H.G. 52nn24–26, 89n120, 98n150, 269n6
 Galilei, G. 208
 di Giovanni, G. 169n202, 171n213, 267n5
 Gödel, K. 157n157, 204
 Goethe, J.W. 64n45, 177n224, 196
 Gottschlich, M. xiiin4
 Grünewald, B. 214n43, 215n49, 233n106, 234–237, 241

 Hamann, J.G. 81
 Hartmann, N. 196
 Hegel, C. 169n202
 Heidegger, M. xiv, 62n40, 105–106, 153n142, 228–229, 232
 Heidemann, I. 223n82
 Heimsoeth, H. 155n146, 160n172, 244n130
 Heintel, E. 15n37, 71n61, 110n26, 121n58, 158n161
 Henrich, D. 32n65, 40, 49n20, 56n32, 61n37, 78n81, 92n131, 113, 118n56, 268n5
 Heracleitus 170
 Hölderlin, F. 7n11, 38n86, 85n94
 Holzhey, H. 138n103, 244n129
 Hossenfelder, M. 18n43
 Hughes, G.E. 203nn13–14, 206n19
 Humboldt, W.v. 64n45
 Hume, D. 14, 16–17, 32, 42, 76, 80n83, 144, 173

 Jacobi, F.H. 71n63, 178n225
 Jäsche, G.B. 46nn15–17, 110nn23–24, 186n238, 200, 203n15, 217n56, 217n59, 217n62, 220n68, 220n70, 221nn74–75, 227n91, 249n137
 Jaeschke, W. 23n50

- Kaulbach, F. 208n27
 Kierkegaard, S. 121n58
 Kohlenberger, H.K. 187n239
 Kojève, A. 92n132
 Kripke, S. 204
 Kroner, R. 48n19, 101n4
 Kulenkampff, A. 15n38, 24n52, 218n64
 Kusch, M. 171n211, 267n5

 Lambert, J.H. 202n11
 Langford, C.H. 204
 Laplace, P.S. 25
 Lausberg, H. 116n52
 Lebrun, G. 2n1, 10n23, 315n40
 Leibniz, G.W.F. viii, 48n19, 149–150, 155,
 170–171, 196n260, 199, 202n11, 204–205,
 207–213, 216n52, 217, 228, 230, 253, 303
 Lessing, G.E. 23, 71n63
 Lewis, C.I. 120n58, 204
 Liebrucks, B. xiiin4, 23n50, 91n127, 96n142,
 151n140, 172, 248, 256n150, 287
 Locke, J. 80n83
 Longato, F. 181n231
 Longuenesse, B. 171n212, 267n5
 Lucas, H.-Chr. 124n66, 170n207
 Lütterfelds, W. 232n105
 Lugarini, L. 101n9, 33n67, 71n63
 Luhmann, N. xiv
 Luther, M. 122n59

 Maier, A. 244n129
 Maimon, S. 29nn60–61, 48n19, 70n60,
 72n65, 115n51
 Malebranche, N. 3, 170
 Maluschke, G. 96n143
 Manninen, J. 171n211, 267n5
 Marcuse, H. 12n28, 171n213
 Marx, W. 61n37, 95n142, 98n150, 138n103,
 223n82, 244n129
 Mathieu, V. 15n37, 27n55
 McTaggart, J.M.E. 287n17
 Meier, G. F. 200–201, 213
 van der Meulen, J. 21n47, 105n12
 Moretto, A. 73n66
 Mure, G.R.G. 171n213

 Neumann, H. ixn1
 Newton, I. 151, 241n122

 Nietzsche, F. xiv
 Noë, G. 287n17

 Ockham, W.v. 202
 Oeing-Hanhoff, L. 187n239

 Pape, I. 207n22, 213n41, 237n118,
 255n149
 Parmenides viii, 91n129, 170, 182
 Paton, H.J. 223n82, 236, 237n16, 249,
 250n141
 Penolidis, Th. 21n47
 Peperzak, A. 102n7, 167n196
 Pinder, T. 156n150
 Plaaß, P. 201n10
 Planty-Bonjour, G. 124n66
 Plato viii, ix, xii, 1, 3, 39n92, 91n129, 94n137,
 111n28, 171n213
 Plotinus ix
 Pöggeler, O. 117n55
 Poser, H. 202n13, 207, 207nn23–26, 210n31,
 210n33, 213n41
 Prior, A. 203n13
 Protagoras 14
 Puntel, L.B. 27n54, 170n207

 Quine, W.v.O. 205

 Reich, K. 109n21, 147n125, 215n48
 Reinhold, K.L. 34, 35, 56n32, 215n48
 Reininger, R. 139n104, 151n136
 Rescher, N. 204n17
 Richli, U. 24n52, 63n42, 127n70,
 165n190
 Römpf, G. 98n150
 Röttgers, K. 124n66
 Röttgers, K. 49n20, 67n53, 96n143, 266n3
 Rosenkranz, K. 6n10, 21n47, 71n63
 Rotenstreich, N. 40
 Russell, B. 207n24

 Schadewaldt, W. 116n53
 Schelling, F.W.J. 3, 5n7, 6, 7n11, 24n53, 56n32,
 72n63, 87n109, 159n167, 171, 175n222,
 224, 248, 267n4
 Schindler, W. 222n81, 230
 Schleiermacher, F.D.E. 5n7, 53n26
 Schmidt, G. 124n66, 267n5, 303n31

- Schmitz, H. 22n48, 109n18, 117n55,
118n57, 120n58
- Schmitz, K.I. 171n213, 268n5
- Schneeberger, G. 216n52, 245n132
- Sheffer, H.M. 113
- Siep, L. 102n7
- Sigwart, Chr. 214n43
- Simon, J. xiiin4, 38n85, 45n11, 47n18, 58n34,
62n39, 77n77, 81nn85-86, 84n91,
87n109, 90n126, 103n8, 108n17, 122n63,
151n140, 174n220, 219n65, 223n82,
306n34, 315n41
- Specht, R. 202n11
- Spinoza, B. de xii, 59n36, 71-73, 164n187,
170-172, 182n234, 184, 186, 190nn241-242,
302, 304
- Stegmüller, W. 205n19, 241n22
- Stuhlmann-Laeisz, R. 49n20
- Tarski, A. 218
- Theunissen, M. 63n42, 112n32, 120n58,
129n75, 163n176
- Thöle, B. 59n20
- Trendelenburg, A. 110, 119
- Troxler, I.P.V. 24n53
- Ungler, F. xv, 18n42, 122n63, 206n21, 266n4
- Veca, S. 211n34, 237n117, 241n121
- Vergil 98n149
- Verra, V. 27n55, 54n29
- Vuillemin, J. 223n82
- Wagner, H. 30n61
- Weidemann, H. 204n16
- Whitehead, A.N. 124
- Wilmans, K.A. 34n71
- Wittgenstein, L. xiv
- Wohlfart, G. 6n8, 115n41
- Wolff, Chr. 154n143, 207, 210, 212-213, 254,
255n149
- Wolff, M. 17n41, 127n70, 159n166
- Zeidler, K.W. 48n20
- Zeno v. Elea 90, 209, 256n150

Subject Index

absolute 3–6, 21n48, 25, 26–27, 93, 99,
256–260, 266, 287–314
absolutely 193, 261, 290
relative 188–189, 247n134
of representation 163–164
action 227–228
Tathandlung 35n76
activity 11, 57n32, 163, 177, 180, 199, 263, 295
actuality (see also self-showing) xi, 16, 39,
100, 106, 148, 193, 242–247, 261–315
absolute 287–300
formal 217–220, 268–277
real 277–287
actuality 303, 306
aesthetics 62–65, 79
affection 43, 46n18, 137, 263
aggregate 41, 143, 159
alterity (see also other, otherness) 8–9,
17n40, 37, 57, 90–93, 192
ambiguity 21–23, 50n21, 68, 92–93, 130–131,
139, 227–228, 231
ἀνάγκη 182n234
analytic, transcendental 133
ἀνάμνησις ix
and 9n19, 93, 118n56, 140, 139–140, 144
antinomy 17, 24n53, 28, 36, 49, 55, 105n13,
117n55, 119, 152–156, 175n222, 228,
270, 281
of appearance 30n60
fourth (Kant) 68, 155–158, 174, 178n226
subcontrary 59
third (Kant) 80, 157
of Zeno 90
ἀπειρον 266n4, 278
appearance 26–39, 43, 54, 88, 144, 152–153,
159, 173, 177, 234, 249, 278
as objective “as” 50n23, 150
apperception, transcendental 5n7, 31, 40,
55, 74, 138, 143–144, 211, 220, 248, 253
apposition (see also systematicity)
41n3, 66
a priori 46–48, 58, 75
arbor prophyrina 112
as 49, 75, 146–148, 224, 276, 299
as-if 44, 65, 95n141

aspect 86, 89n120, 166
attribute 181, 184–188
automotion xii, 12, 33, 132, 173, 228
autopoiesis viii–xiii, 1, 46, 53, 193, 230, 292
becoming 21, 45, 91, 114, 127, 276–277,
291, 305
beginning 11, 118n56, 130, 176, 184, 296, 304,
313, 315
being 10, 31, 84, 100, 126, 198, 268, 297
absolute 160, 193, 294
qua activity (*Seyn*) 11, 95n141, 180, 273
highest 163, 181n230
being-for-itself (see also being-within-
itself) 61n37, 86n103, 97, 122n63,
164–167, 176, 181, 191, 193–194, 263, 270, 313
being-within-itself 127n73, 164, 254
body 26, 38, 63, 121, 314
calculus
logical 113
infinitesimal 48n19, 208n27
intuitionist 120n58
modal 205, 269n7
category x, xii, 8n13, 33, 46n18, 48n20, 54,
56n32, 65–66, 73n66, 96n134, 132, 144–153,
161–174, 202n13, 222, 262–265
table of xn2, 29n59, 145–146, 171n212, 201,
223n82, 308
metac. 73n66, 164–166
causality 49, 50n21, 147, 221, 232n105,
305–311
certainty 12–20, 49n20, 77, 194, 211, 216,
217n61, 222, 233
sense c. 84, 88n12
cognition 43, 63, 79, 93–94, 115n51, 117n55,
123–136, 145, 149, 164, 168n199, 172, 181,
208, 220n70, 223n82, 235, 249–250, 256,
262, 269, 275, 300
complementarity 133, 135, 202n13, 282n13,
284, 295
completeness (see also consistency, maximal;
totality) 41, 157, 217n61, 222
composition 21–22, 80, 92, 199
compossibility 13, 205, 208n24

- concept 11, 23, 26, 40, 60n37, 66, 92n131, 99,
103, 130, 138, 145, 180, 201, 217, 265, 271,
274, 313
- concept of the c. xiv, 18n42, 23, 90n120,
117n55, 145n120, 198, 269n6, 312
- absolute 56, 179n229
- mere 162
- empirical 16, 66–68, 237, 245
- conclusio (see also syllogism) 22n48, 47, 117,
122, 123n65, 221, 242
- conclusion 13, 161, 175, 230
- conditioned, condition, condition relation
(see also form, hypothetical) 46–48,
70n60, 75–77, 200, 223
- external 20, 270, 281
- conscience 122, 256
- consciousness 26–38, 45, 46n18, 56n32, 71,
76, 83–98, 102, 107, 137–139, 141, 184
- absolute 38
- philosophy of 10, 36, 107
- consistency 13, 81, 157
- maximal 204
- construction 7n11, 24–25, 27n54, 47n18,
61n37, 72n54, 132–133, 197n260, 239
- content 1, 32, 66, 101, 132–134, 140–141,
156n150, 177, 213–214, 271, 277–287, 284,
288, 305–306
- absolute 166
- context, contextuality 13, 66, 103, 148, 197,
203n13, 204, 207, 230, 237, 241, 252
- contingency 53n24, 168n198, 192–194, 218,
267–278, 283, 293, 268–277
- absolute 300, 300
- continuity, continuum, continuation 25, 45,
47n19, 126, 251–253, 311
- contradiction 12n28, 22n48, 61, 61n37, 85,
108, 127–130, 173, 192, 217, 281, 293
- principle of 157, 207–208, 217, 220,
253, 271
- copula (see also judgement,
proposition) 55, 58–60, 69, 75,
109–111, 145–146, 156, 159, 198–199,
202n11, 242, 261
- counterthrust 21n48, 119, 195, 284, 291, 299–300
- absolute 32n65, 117, 295
- metabolic 310
- critique, critical philosophy 43–45, 50,
52n24, 315
- Dasein* (Heidegger) 105–107
- death 97, 102–108, 126
- deduction 134–135, 189
- transcendental 43–45, 48–49, 136, 144
- definition 4n5, 16, 20, 34, 54n28, 57, 131–132,
146, 176–177, 212
- genetic 41–42, 49n20, 51, 62, 75, 114, 144,
160, 166, 180, 228, 281
- deixis 25, 178
- derivation 46–47, 96, 99, 147, 199, 254
- desire 90–93
- determination (see also term) 9, 20–21,
31n65, 67, 91, 100–101, 134, 152, 159, 165,
183, 186, 220, 244, 261, 274–276, 293–294,
299, 312–314
- absolute 100, 123, 174, 297, 313
- determinatio omnimodo* 154, 159
- διήλωσις 26, 178
- dialectic vii–viii, ix, xiv, 5n7, 6, 21n47, 24n52,
28n57, 72n65, 73, 91n129, 92n131, 112,
132–134, 157, 160, 164, 179n227, 180–181,
198, 216, 226, 230, 247n134, 261, 265, 298,
305n33, 306–308
- transcendental 5, 133, 210, 252
- διαίρεσις 192
- δίκη 182n234
- difference (see also particularisation) 1, 23,
29–30, 42, 58, 65, 69–70, 75, 102, 154,
163, 185, 187n240, 215, 314
- discretion 128–129
- disjunction 17, 21n48, 24n53, 33, 46n16, 47,
68, 78n82, 93–94, 195, 273
- divination 54n26
- division (see also difference,
disjunction) 46, 133, 154, 222n81
- dogmatic 16, 29, 42, 79, 123
- δόξα 179, 182
- δύναμις 112, 158n161, 177, 198, 234, 262, 284
- empiricism 16, 79
- ἐνέργεια 53, 198
- Enlightenment 193–195, 264, 295
- ens necessarium* 156, 156n150
- ἐντελέχεια 198
- essence 8n17, 28–29, 117n55, 172, 262, 293
- example 80n84, 161
- experience
- analogies of 234, 243–244

- context of xi, 4, 6n8, 15n38, 50n21, 66,
 145–154, 174, 197, 230, 241, 243–245, 248
 judgment/proposition of 12, 14–16, 55,
 66–68, 88, 151, 198, 221, 242, 308
 making of 15n37, 16, 48, 67, 140, 152, 211,
 227, 230, 246, 308
 the one e. 3, 12, 76, 121n58, 230n99,
 232, 253
 explanation 87n109, 90
 extension 26–27, 67, 77, 100, 146, 175, 203n13,
 241, 253, 255, 285, 303
 external, externality 17–18, 37, 40, 69–70,
 101n3, 146–148, 205, 255, 265–266, 283,
 309–310
 evolution theory 124n66

 facts, facticity 10, 218
 faculty psychology 28, 68, 141, 214
 faith 80nn84–85, 193–195, 219, 224, 246
 feeling 5n7, 64, 105n11, 151n136
 finitude 5, 9n17, 10, 12n28, 24n53, 30n60, 101,
 136n98, 153, 183, 193, 226, 267, 296
 force 87–89
 freedom 33, 38, 77, 104n9, 121n58, 127,
 136n98, 164, 167, 206, 226, 263, 286, 289,
 291, 298, 308, 313
 from contradiction 203n13, 236

 genus 17, 35, 48n19, 93–94, 123, 273
 God ix, 5n7, 23, 75n70, 77, 81n85, 122n63, 159,
 163–164, 166–167, 187, 191n242, 196n260,
 207, 209–210, 218, 230, 250
 existence proof ix, 155, 293n20, 297
 ground 31, 59, 74, 102, 132, 157, 180–181, 183,
 197–198, 204, 210, 217, 246
 of syllogisms 14

 harmony, pre-established 150n133, 196n260
 hermeneutics xiii–xiv, 52–53, 74, 82n86, 242
 historicism 52–54
 history 11n28, 129, 170
 holism 24n51
 horizon xiii, 4, 5n6, 13, 15, 30, 79, 89, 123,
 186–188, 196, 219, 229, 230n99, 265, 276,
 302, 306, 314

 I 10n22, 36, 39–41, 77–79, 96n142, 141, 145,
 155n149, 181, 225, 231, 262, 264, 302–303

 idea viii, 1–6, 45–46, 54–55, 58, 58n34, 62–
 64, 70, 76, 80n84, 95n141, 109, 122–123,
 125, 127–128, 130, 153–154, 167n196,
 171n213, 178n226, 200–201, 208n25, 231,
 247–248, 252–253, 265–267, 286, 291,
 301, 315
 i. *in individuo* xi, 55, 81n85, 154, 161, 174,
 226, 257–258
 judged (divided) 4, 5n7, 68, 79, 109,
 122n63, 178n226, 226, 247, 283
 absolute xii, 12, 27, 122, 167n196, 266–267
 ideal, transcendental x, 5n7, 55, 69n59, 79,
 89, 133, 154–161, 216, 258
 idealism 11, 232n105
 refutation of (Kant) 246, 256
 identity 85, 114–115, 164–166, 184, 188–189,
 195, 211, 233, 235, 269–271, 272, 284
 unmediated 22n48, 115, 175, 179n227
 illness 104
 image 88, 183
 imagination (see also representation) 7,
 9n17, 18–19, 45, 62, 92, 128, 163, 172, 180,
 228, 263, 287
 immediacy levels 30–31, 118n56, 172–173, 181,
 184, 212, 228, 298
 impossibility 207n23, 230, 235n112, 239,
 271–272, 275, 283
 incommensurability 29n60, 34, 39, 48, 58,
 64, 72n65, 94n138, 97–98, 101–102, 119,
 131, 164, 193–195
 independence 195, 272
 indifference 9, 20, 102, 116, 123, 131–133,
 159n167, 169
 individuation, principle of 88, 161, 167, 180,
 195, 196n260, 259
 induction 16, 42
 infinite, infinity 47, 55, 70n60, 82, 86, 162,
 168n199, 173, 179, 242, 291
 infinitesimals 47n19
 inherence 208n25
 in-itself 87, 97, 162, 164–166, 176–189, 234,
 266–167, 275, 287–289, 300–302, 306
 inorganic (see also nature) 94
 inner, inside, interiority 62, 66, 78, 97–98,
 138–144, 179, 191, 246, 284
 intending, intention 19, 21, 35, 42, 44, 46, 63,
 83–90, 125–126, 172
 intellection 149, 208n25

- intersubjectivity 103n8
- intuition 8, 18n43, 29n60, 36, 45–46, 54–57, 62–65, 93, 120, 137, 145, 179n228, 199, 211, 241n121, 252, 280
- inversion (see also μεταβολή) 35n66, 79, 82, 94, 97, 100–108, 115, 120n58, 136, 157, 174–176, 180, 194–195, 254, 271–272, 285, 309–311
- irreversibility 50, 70n60
- judgment, proposition x, 3–5, 12–14, 16, 55–71, 84–86, 92, 116, 145, 201–203, 228
- aesthetic 63
- analytical 56n32, 67, 220
- apodictic 220
- assertorical 219
- categorical 114
- disjunctive 19n42, 66n50, 117n55, 132, 154, 215
- hypothetical 19n42, 66n50, 132n81, 154, 215
- identical 114, 118
- infinite 21n48, 27n55, 32n65, 108–123, 152n141, 183, 236, 268, 276, 282
- modal 203
- negative 111, 113n36, 119
- particular 92n130, 142
- positive 110, 119
- singular 21n48, 122n60
- synthetic 14–15, 43, 55, 256
- universal 88, 142
- of concept 117n55
- of necessity 117n55
- of perception 142
- of possession 10n22
- of present being 114, 120
- of reflection 113
- knowledge 1–8, 222–224
- absolute knowing 34, 37, 51, 71, 136n98, 173n216, 177
- language (see also concept, word) 10–11, 16, 24n52, 39, 63, 79–99, 262–269, 300, 314
- natural l. of logic 269
- law 31, 42–43, 88–89, 99, 220
- particular (Kant) 31, 44, 88, 158
- realm of 10n22
- life, living things 12, 53, 73, 91–103, 123n65, 167, 179n228, 197
- light xii–xiii, 32n65, 125, 185–186, 211
- limit xi, 9n19, 27, 40, 62n39, 104, 105n11, 107n16, 110, 114, 121n58, 131n77, 136n98, 147, 152n141, 157–158, 165, 175, 180, 222, 236–237, 251, 265, 289, 301
- linearity 42, 46, 50, 53n24, 96, 119, 120n58, 125–126, 129n75, 189, 198, 202n13, 233, 247
- logic 26–28, 33, 46, 47n19, 54, 70, 113, 136, 161, 176, 185, 265–267, 291, 314–316
- formal xi, xiv–xvi, 46, 109–110, 120n58, 198–200, 202n12, 314–316
- intensional 65n48, 113, 120n58
- modal xi, 120n58, 168, 198, 201–227
- speculative viii, xv, 82, 113n35, 179
- transcendental viii, xi–xii, 48n20, 109, 199, 225, 234, 248
- λόγος ix–x, 1, 10, 116n53, 120, 158n161, 176, 177, 180, 237n116, 263–264, 302, 313–315
- lordship and bondage 97
- μάθημα, μέγιστον 3
- man 64n45, 70–71, 105
- many (see also plurality) 41, 97, 146, 196n260
- mathematics 45n14, 47n19, 99, 136n97, 172, 220n70, 227, 235n111, 239–252
- matter (*Materie*) 7n11, 8–9, 138, 201n10, 208, 250, 257, 281, 308
- matter (*Sache*) vii, x, 1–2, 8, 10, 19, 23–25, 40, 51, 89, 99, 123, 127–128, 158n161, 161–162, 172–173, 174–176, 194, 200, 208, 235, 281
- maxim 80
- meaning 139, 141, 144, 152, 185, 285
- measure 196
- medium/middle term 6, 7n11, 11, 21, 26, 32n65, 39, 43, 52–53, 58, 64, 88, 94–96, 101, 104–105, 117n55, 123, 125–126, 130–131, 134, 138, 145, 150, 157, 167, 180, 184–186, 211, 229, 241, 251, 283–284, 299, 309, 315
- broken 21n47, 32n65, 117n55, 183, 193, 209
- Megarians 198, 254, 273
- μεταβολή 14, 33n66, 94, 108, 128, 135, 152, 167, 175, 180, 193, 259, 272, 279, 282, 295, 303
- metabolic
- coincidence 127

- form 108, 140, 226, 228, 259, 262, 272,
 303, 310
 μέταφορα 33n66
 metaphor 115–122
 metaphysics
 dogmatic 29, 85–86, 107n16, 210
 as rational science 117n55, 133–135, 164, 181
 μέθεξις 60n37, 171n213
 method 42, 96n143, 100, 128, 170n207,
 180, 185
 monad 149–150, 196n260, 303
 motion 17–18, 27, 32n65, 42, 45, 50–51,
 60n37, 77, 82, 87–88, 90, 94, 102–103,
 114, 127, 133–135, 142, 144–145, 151n136,
 164, 175n220, 178, 181–183, 190, 195,
 208–209, 211, 226–228, 242, 250, 262,
 266, 280–282, 300, 312–313
mundus intelligibilis 30, 45n14

 natural law *a priori* (Kant) 249
 nature 26, 31, 63n42, 91n128, 94–95, 104–108,
 126, 137, 145, 235n111, 251n143, 266
 necessity 147, 168, 182, 206–208, 267
 absolute 220, 225, 257–258, 287–300, 314
 blind 250–251
 formal 75, 215, 235n112
 hypostasised 124
 hypothetical 232, 249, 256, 307
 logical 220–222
 real 286, 299
 of terms of thought 33n67
 negation (see also other, privation) 50,
 50n37, 77n77, 91, 93, 112, 119, 147, 158,
 162, 184, 187–191, 201, 208n24, 274
 alternative 113–115
 autonomous (see also absolute
 negativity) 113–115, 121n58
 determinate 127, 158, 208n23
 double 120n58, 289
 common 113n37
 transcendental 158, 159n169
 negativity 61n37, 71, 72n63, 77, 104, 117n55,
 121, 123, 128, 162, 192–193, 195, 196n260,
 264, 272, 278, 304–305
 absolute 78n82, 103, 107, 120–121, 160,
 169, 173, 180n229, 189, 197, 259, 268–269,
 277, 283, 288, 293–295, 312–313
 νόησις νοήσεως ix

 nominalism xiv–xv, 24–25, 48n19, 89n120,
 206n21, 265, 269n6, 313
 nothing, nothingness 31n65, 52, 60, 72, 106,
 182n234, 296, 299–300
 table of (Kant) 217, 252n146
 of indicating 296, 299

 object 41, 146, 199, 205, 233, 242, 261
 objectivity (see also judgement/proposition
 of experience, transcendental
 reality) vii, xi, 11–16, 48, 149, 233,
 241–242, 255, 280, 306
 observation 29, 36, 51, 53, 67–68, 133,
 136n97, 308
 ontology ix, xv, 11n28, 56n32, 64, 105n12, 127n70,
 167, 168n198, 172, 198–214, 228, 264, 306
 opinion 85, 216, 233
 opposition 17, 35, 65, 83, 86, 110, 119, 126
 double 21n48, 36, 37–38, 111n28, 117n55,
 127, 173, 270, 272, 282, 299, 310
 organic, organism 54n29, 95n141, 104, 105n11
 other, otherness (see also alterity,
 negation) 3, 9, 28, 30–31, 38–40, 62,
 87, 91, 135, 195, 264, 266, 273
 ought 30, 84, 217, 267, 290

 pain 105, 298n26
 paralogism (Kant) 28, 27, 246n133
 particular, particularity (see also difference,
 division) 40, 78, 94, 134, 314
 particularisation, self-p. 1, 19–20, 41, 44,
 95n141, 98–99, 117n55, 123, 127, 132, 149,
 152, 180, 185, 200
 perception 67, 86–87, 136–145, 161, 244, 249
 person, personality 98n149, 104, 122, 128,
 151n140, 195
 picture 45, 52, 80n84, 130, 151, 183
 plurality 29, 40–41, 73, 77, 86, 138–139, 146–147,
 181n233, 215, 219, 222, 224, 242, 265, 278
 ποίησις 11
 point 102n8, 108, 121, 127, 130–132, 152, 164,
 248–249, 263, 280, 284–285
 position, absolute 79, 148, 155, 160, 292
 positive, positivity (see also external,
 many) 20, 45, 97, 103, 111, 172, 254,
 262–263, 274, 315
 autopoietic 292
 of the absolute 187

- positivism 121n58, 137, 259, 262
possibilia, possibile 208–210
possibile logicum 199, 207n23
 possibility 3, 69, 105n12, 148, 155, 159, 160,
 176, 204, 207–209, 233–242
 absolute 257
 formal (Hegel) 299
 logical 213–217
 mere 270–272, 299
 real 198, 279
 complete (Kant) 245
 postulates of empirical thinking (see also
 principals, Kant) 75, 81n85, 227–255
 power 1, 11, 39, 50, 62–63, 71n63, 72n65,
 80n84, 87, 94, 101, 105, 108, 141, 158,
 176–177, 179n228, 180, 185, 188, 196–197,
 249, 300, 304, 306, 310, 313–314
 of imagination 48n20, 54, 62–75,
 140–142, 228
 praxis 11, 129n75
 predication 84, 119, 144, 178, 186, 201, 226–227,
 232, 245, 252n146, 261, 274
 present being (*Dasein* Hegel) xi, 4, 8, 21, 28,
 35, 58, 76, 84n91, 96n142, 113–115, 163,
 198, 243–245, 297, 313–314
 of negation 112
 principle
 of consciousness (Reinhold) 34
 of determinability
 Kant 256
 Maimon 70n60, 72n65
 highest analytical 212
 highest synthetical 14n35, 38, 74, 256
 in Fichte 101, 181n231
 in Hegel, system of 181
 in Kant (see also analogies of experience;
 postulates) 29, 44n9, 148, 210
 regulative 68, 173
 privation 158
 process 34, 77, 94, 100, 123–136, 179, 195,
 228–229, 254, 299, 303–304
 formal 124–126
 notion of 125–127
 progress 2, 25, 30–31, 67, 100, 197, 306, 311
 infinite 171n213, 218, 310
 proportion 34, 64, 92n132, 116n53, 168n199,
 232–233, 236–238, 241–242, 244n130,
 246–248, 255, 264
 quality 9n19, 70n60, 103, 109, 146–147,
 151n140, 181–184, 190, 224, 279, 303
 quantification of modal
 expressions 205–207
 quantity 146–147, 181n233, 224
 realisation 8, 38, 46–49, 67, 73, 79–81,
 96n142, 117n55, 132, 145, 148, 162, 254, 281
 reality 5–8, 136–145, 158–161, 243,
 277–279, 306n33
 in judgment, transcendental 66–67,
 199, 203
 real philosophy 26–32, 82, 98n149, 294
 reason (see also λόγος) 24n53, 80–82, 152,
 225–228, 256–259, 306
 receptivity 57, 150, 216
 reciprocity 181n230, 282n13, 311–314
 recognition 92n132, 98n150, 102–103,
 121n58
 reflection 31–33, 52–54, 60–61, 69–72,
 132, 150
 external 20–26, 84, 136, 182–184,
 196n260, 266–270
 in-another/in-itself 17, 22, 28, 74–76,
 116–118, 247
 transcendental 31
 relation 7–12, 34–37, 93, 146–148, 190–193,
 227–228, 289–290
 absolute 73, 165, 185, 228, 263, 267n5,
 288, 300–313
 essential 165, 175, 190
 representation (see also imagination) 21,
 34–35, 56n32, 106–108, 124–126, 139–140,
 161–167, 178–180, 287–288
 religion 80n84
 restriction thesis (Kant) 71, 109, 153, 200n4,
 237, 241
 scepticism 16, 18n43, 42–45, 50, 76, 79, 81,
 108, 175n222, 212, 261, 264
 schematism 44–48, 80n84, 149–151, 203n13,
 234, 311
 science 2, 11, 23n50, 26–28, 41, 91, 137, 234
 natural 137, 137n104, 212, 261
 seeing in 66n51
 self 11, 31, 35–36, 89n129, 123–128, 166–167,
 173, 262, 268–273, 290–291, 296–298
 consciousness 36n80, 90–99, 101, 115,
 136, 173, 194, 264

- determination vii, 33, 127, 166, 176, 180,
185, 188, 193, 195–196, 220, 232n105, 247,
276, 285, 289–290, 297–302, 313
relation 33, 40, 72n65, 84, 223, 302
setting 262, 302, 313
showing xi–xii, 141, 195–197, 206n21, 255,
264–268, 273–278, 295–300
semblance 28, 32n65, 160, 180–194, 216n52,
302–306
sense, outer/inner 98, 179
sensibility (see also sensation) 17, 45, 57,
150, 243–244
sensation (see also sensibility) 137–139, 142
sentence 59
setting 6, 21, 50, 55, 78–79, 110, 117n55, 159,
187–188, 228, 238, 242, 253–255, 266–268,
272–279, 290–292, 300–313
shape 36n76, 140
showing, manifestation (see also self-
showing, δῆλωσις) xi–xii, 25, 178–184,
189, 270–278
single, singular, singularity 87, 95n141, 97, 113,
129, 147, 152, 175, 192, 197, 216, 223, 301
something 1–12, 44, 52, 56n32, 101, 107–108,
126, 136n98, 139–141, 152, 172, 273–280,
288, 304
soul ix, 38n86, 114
space 58n34, 126, 139, 145n120, 158, 239,
250n141, 265, 274
speculation xiii–xiv, 22n50, 28, 38, 52n24,
59n36, 63n42, 109, 113n35, 125n69, 169,
178, 197–198, 238, 247n134, 258, 290–291,
299, 303–304, 315
speculative
concept xvi, 34, 92n131, 106n15, 133n86
form 121n58
logic viii–xv, 82, 113n35, 179
sentence 59n36, 71n61
speech 19–21, 39, 51–52, 63–64, 85, 101, 108,
115–116, 261–268, 294, 311
sphere, logical 21n48, 96n142, 109–112, 114,
158, 186–187, 212, 250n141, 300
spirit 26–28, 36, 40, 99, 102–108, 123, 194,
297–298, 309
absolute 129n75, 162–163, 267n4
philosophy of 10, 38
spontaneity 45, 54–55, 58, 140, 145, 239,
263, 306
intuitive 54
state (*Staat*) 102n7
state (*Zustand*) 106, 119, 127, 206n19,
208, 214, 224, 233, 246, 250–251, 253,
256, 309
struggle 93n32, 97, 102–103
subject 41, 50–52, 88, 132, 261, 274
subjectivity 12–15, 37, 50, 70–72, 80, 95n141,
143, 235n111, 261, 292
substance, substantiality 60n37, 66,
70–74, 88, 92, 104n9, 186, 191n243, 249,
300–305
substrate 17n41, 90, 156–158, 165, 307–310
sum 46n18, 49n20, 89n118, 145, 147–148,
150n135, 153–159, 198–199, 220, 223
syllogism (see also *conclusio*) 3, 12–20, 37,
39, 44, 49, 88, 118, 122, 167, 189, 224–226,
229, 241–242, 254, 268
synthesis (see also unity) 18n43, 55–58, 88,
137, 141–142, 147, 154–157, 198–199,
201–205, 308–209
synthesis speciosa 44n9
system 26–28, 37, 40–51, 131, 166–168, 170–171,
179n229, 180–181, 223, 301
systema reflexionis 117n55, 133
teleology 18, 44, 50, 63–65, 101n3, 129–131,
168n198, 182
τέλος 129–131, 265
term 67, 267
τέχνη 39n92
thing 84–85, 233, 235n112, 278
in itself x, xv, 29, 159–160
thinking, thought 172, 174, 182, 185, 196n260,
212–218, 221–228
and being (see also immediacy
levels) viii, 4–5, 8n13, 13–14, 37, 69,
203, 187n240, 203, 228, 258, 261
third, excluded 181, 192, 220–221, 224
time 11n28, 62–63, 131, 137, 145n120, 201n11,
244n129 n. 129–244n130
sum total of (Kant) 153, 202n11, 203n13
τὸδε τι 95n141
totality (see also system, completeness) 13,
16, 29n60, 35, 84, 123, 174, 178, 180–181,
186–187, 193, 197–199, 217, 230, 268–272,
275–278
transcendentals 216n52, 219–220, 224
trichotomy 46–47, 204
triplicity 201n11, 228

- truth 11–14, 21–24, 34, 49–52, 105, 149, 173,
179, 188, 217–220, 306–308
correspondence theory of 218, 245
as modality 202, 217–221
semantic conception of 24n52, 218, 246
transcendental 14n33, 173, 233
- unambiguousness (see also univalence) 23,
68, 90, 130, 152, 174, 230, 254, 265
- unconditioned 3, 157, 165, 174–175, 181n232,
257–258, 314
- understanding 16, 19–20, 24, 87–88, 128–130,
186, 201, 270, 279–280, 287, 306–309
intuitive 18n43, 62n39
law of the (Kant) 220
- unity 40–51, 65n32, 74, 83, 92–98, 150, 153,
173, 181n233, 214–215, 311–314
distributive/collective 160
- univalence (see also unambiguousness)
21–22, 24
- universal, universality 21n48, 40–42, 44, 50,
87–88, 95n141, 114–115, 122–124, 235–236,
193, 193, 303
functional 48n19
subsumption 40, 142, 145n120, 159
- utopia 264, 280
- validity, private 143
- voice 108n17, 229
- void 153n176, 287, 290, 296
- Weltgeist* 124
- word vii, 11, 52, 176, 294
- world xiv–xv, 25, 123–125, 161, 181n230,
204–205, 230, 286, 301
first supersensible 89–91
inverted/second supersensible 89, 194
- χωρισμός 8, 173, 293